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ABSTRACT 
This dissertation examines in detail, the planning, conduct, and context of 
Allied Operational Command during the period from the Normandy Invasion to the 
end of Operation MARKET GARDEN, the airborne invasion of Holland. These 
campaigns were influenced by several factors: the nature of the Allied Coalition, the 
differing views and approach to battle of the separate services and the different 
nationalities within the coalition, and the actual conduct of battle within the context of 
a larger effort, the military campaign. 
The 1944 campaign was unique in that it represented the two year evolution of 
a political-military coalition, whose campaign conduct in the field was overseen by a 
fully integrated headquarters and whose staff was composed of members of both the 
individual services and separate nationalities. While this headquarters presented a 
united front behind its admired commander, General Dwight D. Eisenhower. its 
competence to plan and control operations in anything but the broadest sense was 
challenged at every turn by the air and ground commanders tasked to fight the actual 
campaign. 
This dissertation concludes that the "oversight" provided by the Supreme 
Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force, SHAEF, and its Supreme Commander. 
was not in tune with both operational realities and practices. and was not capable of 
seizing opportunity and conducting a campaign of maneuver. During the actual 
execution of MARKET GARDEN, the Allied Command system functioned poorly 
causing the operation to fail by the narrowest margins. While MARKET GARDEN 
has often been portrayed as a failure of one man, of intelligence, or of poor planning, 
the coalition system and the men who ran it were not capable of fighting a 
complicated battle efficiently because of their inability to function as a team, rather 
than as a band of brothers, the creation of which was the responsibility of the Supreme 
Commander. 
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Introduction 
This dissertation is the product of a lifetime of study and practice of the 
military profession and has its roots in answering a professional soldier's question, 
"Can an air-ground campaign be waged effectively? " I was the inquirer, then the 
newest and youngest instructor at the US Army's Command and General Staff 
College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. The American Army was then in a time of 
doctrinal ferment; the Vietnam-era Army that I had joined had turned itself full-bore 
to the previously unthinkable concept of winning huge, armored battles in either 
Europe or, as some said, in the Middle East. I selected OPERATION MARKET 
GARDEN as a one-hour presentation to challenge my students with the question, 
"How do you make an Air-Land Battle work? " OPERATION MARKET GARDEN 
was the combined Airborne and Land invasion of Holland in September 1944, 
designed to give the Allies a bridgehead over the Rhine as a prelude to the final 
offensive to capture the Ruhr and to move on to Berlin. Conceived, planned, and 
launched in a period of eight days, it was one of the most complex-and because of its 
mixed results, controversial-operations conducted by the Allies in World War 11. 
I had visited the MARKET GARDEN battlefields, and had done some 
rudimentary study of the operation. The Staff College's library had an ample supply of 
documentation, and for to the Fortieth Anniversary of World War II, the College 
began honoring some of its famous graduates. Through this program, I met, and was 
granted private interviews with, several of the senior participants in MARKET 
GARDEN. I carried on this research during a six-year assignment in Europe, three 
years of which was as a War Plans officer in NATO's Central Army Group, and one 
year of which was as the Special Assistant to the Commander in Chief. United States 
Army, Europe. Here, I learned the mechanics and difficulties of coalition planning. the 
problems of interservice rivalries, and the issues involved with senior leadership in a 
coalition. This study rests heavily on that background, as well as on a decade of 
further research and thinking. 
This study intends to shed light on several key aspects of one of World War 
11's most famous and controversial operations, OPERATION MARKET GARDEN, to 
provide a military vista from which to study how a military campaign is planned and 
executed, how the professional attitudes and thinking of its commanders shape action, 
and how-after the fmal arbitration of combat itself-individual battles fit within the 
context of the greater effort, a military campaign. 
Allied Operational Command during this period will be examined by 
exploring and assessing several of its key components. The basis for the Allied 
OPERATIONAL COMMAND, the coalition itself, will be explained in light of the 
conflicts inherent in combining air and ground forces within a multinational 
environment. These conflicts include the basic doctrines or "approaches to battle" of 
each service and each country based upon the experience and organizational design of 
each component force. Combined with the ever-present strains of strong personalities, 
the ability to find workable solutions by men convinced that their own service 
doctrine and experience is preeminent, lent itself to unhappy compromises, bitterly 
resented and aggressively contested. These resentments led to criticism far beyond 
that called for, as plans went awry and the conditions of battle negated firmly-held 
notions of what constituted military success. 
2 
The campaign planning process will be examined. not in its methodological 
sense, but in its intellectual aspects, to demonstrate how decisions were made based 
upon the confluence of the information available, the assets provided, and the 
perceived requirements of the operation under preparation. From this mental planning 
there rose not simply a campaign plan that was a conceptual outline for future actions, 
but also expectations that did not always conform to the reality of the battlefield and 
the enemy's reactions. This conflict between the battles envisioned and the battles 
fought is a key catalyst in changing a plan of campaign. How the Allies actually met 
this challenge will be demonstrated by examining the detail and logic of the original 
campaign plan, and by describing the operational results of the early battles that 
sparked controversy at the highest level. From this controversy rose perceptions based 
less on logic than on the preconceptions of plans held by resentful personalities, and 
advocated by men often not responsible for the actual military conduct of the 
operations unfolding. 
During the period examined, the campaign did not go as planned, but some 
aspects of it exceeded the original assumptions of the planners without actually 
accomplishing the capture of key objectives needed to support the next phase of 
operations. The decision to continue the campaign as planned, and the challenge 
posed by the key commanders in attempting to reshape the basic conceptual 
fi-amework that had been theorized by the planners at Supreme Headquarters and 
accepted by the Allied Supreme Commander as unalterable, posed both military and 
political challenges to the unity of the coalition exceeding that which might have 
3 
occurred within a single nation's forces. How this debate originated and the results of 
it will constitute the kernel of my discussion of the Allied campaign plan. 
The mounting and execution of OPERATION MARKET GARDEN, an 
operation conceived to accomplish a rapid thrust across the Rhine. will be examined 
in the light of the detail needed to launch the operation and as a special case within the 
coalition where all the military factors of battle were complicated by service politics, 
interpersonal strife, coalition dissent, and the misconceptions of the would-be victors. 
These combined to produce a partial victory whose recriminations reverberate today. 
MARKET GARDEN itself, while only one of many decision points reached in World 
War H, exemplified the complicated nature of modem war fought by coalitions. 
Examined in detail will be the logic of the air and ground commanders, the 
commander's intent and the assumptions that caused that intent to be formed, and the 
plans drawn by the subordinate commanders tasked with fighting the battle. 
Moreover, the most controversial aspects of the battle, whether there actually was "an 
intelligence failure, " and whether the ground forces conducted themselves with the 
vigor and aggressiveness needed to win through to the objective, will also be 
examined. As part of this study, a detailed examination of the specially created "First 
Allied Airborne Army" will be presented-to include its background in planning 
operations prior to the mounting of OPERATION MARKET GARDEN-to illustrate 
the problems and complexity of interservice planning. 
To understand the key commanders and their ideas, an in-depth discussion of 
each man's point of view, derived from diaries, from the official headquarters records 
and journals, and from living participants who witnessed the decisions made and the 
4 
plans being drawn, will be part of the analysis offered. Furthermore. excerpts from the 
confidential assessments of the MARKET GARDEN battle and campaign made by 
key participants as background to the American and British Official Historians will 
also be offered as part of the author's summary. 
I have chosen to use, as often as possible, the actual words of the participants 
as an essential part of the narration, to enable the reader to participate in their thoughts 
and to judge their intentions and plans. Having done so, my intention is to show how 
operational decisions are made, to examine the factors behind decisions as the 
planners and commanders would have analyzed them, and to demonstrate how the 
evolution of a campaign is based not simply on a perfectly cast "Master Plan" but on 
the continuing analysis, debate, and controversy that surrounds the events of battle and 
the higher direction of combat operations. Having read this study, I would hope that 
my readers would agree with the words of one of my first mentors, repeated here by 
his unabashed admirer: 
Great battles, like epic tragedies, are not always staged or the product 
of human calculation, and disaster is less likely to derive from one 
gross blunder than from reasoned calculations which slip just a little. 
S. L. A. Marshall 
Brigadier General, USAR, Ret. 
Night Drop: TheAmerican Airborne Invasion ofNorman4j, 
5 
CHAPTER ONE 
No Band Of Brothers 
For the Americans, there had been only one strategic object worth pursuing as 
part of the "Europe First" Strategy adopted by the Allies in 1941. That object, the 
Cross-Channel Attack on the coast of France that would permit America to employ 
the full weight of its mobilized army, had been a source of contention between the 
American Joint Chiefs of Staff and the British Chiefs of Staff Committee since the 
beginning of their deliberations. Too soon to split the coalition at the war's onset, the 
argument increased distrust in the partnership--a partnership cemented far more by 
politicians than soldiers, and embraced far more by the British who relied upon it for 
survival, than the Americans, for whom the German war had been thrust upon them 
by the Axis agreement, not the emotional scourge of a Pearl Harbor. From their first 
disagreements, the American commanders, despite the obvious advantages and 
frequent benefits of the coalition, never abandoned their contempt for, or downplaying 
of, contributions made by their Allies. Collectively, the senior soldiers, sailors, and 
airmen that oversaw the military, air, and naval campaigns of the war were no band of 
brothers, despite the forced cooperation of their governments. ' 
The "Grand Alliance" was a marriage of convenience, a marriage healthier in 
times of crisis than in good times. By 1944, with the Cross-Channel attack looming, 
1 The most complete and balanced presentations of the national approaches to strategy are contained in 
the official histories of the participating countries. For the Americans, the most complete view is 
contained in the US Army in World War II Series Sub-series, The War Department, under the general 
editorship of Kent Roberts Greenfield, dealing with strategy, logistics, and overall organization. The 
British Grand Strateo, Series edited by John Ehrman (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office) 
proýides the Commonwealth view with a British emphasis. C. P. Stacey, Arms. Men, and Governments: 
The War Policies of Canada 1939-1945 (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1970) offers an often ignored, 
focused view of the Canadians' problems. 
the last of the selfless, dedicated days were running out. The strains and disagreements 
of Grand Strategic planning, and the conduct of actual operations in the 
Mediterranean, set the stage for the upcoming campaign. Though victorious in the 
end, the operation in Northwest Europe would prove to be a contentious campaign 
whose disagreements would outlast the blast of war. At the root of the problem were 
the nature of coalitions, the command structure, and the personalities of the players 
themselves. 2 
The shadow of the Great War hung over the system. Along with the experience 
of administering and coordinating large endeavors came the memory of slights, real 
and imagined. American military leaders scorned any-but their own ideas on the 
conduct of war in general and this war in particular; their political masters were more 
realiStiC. 3 With Grand Strategy firmly in the hands of the Big Three-Prime Minister 
Winston S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt, and Premier Joseph Stalin-the 
conduct of operations in the field fell to "Theater Commanders" supervised by the 
Combined Chiefs of Staff (CCS) of the American and British armed forces. 
Following frequent conferences between Churchill and Roosevelt, the CCS worked 
2 Forrest C. Pogue, The Supreme Command (Washington: Center of Military History. 1953.1989. ) The 
creation of the command system and its actual employment are addressed officially in this volume of 
the US Army Series by the Office of the Chief of Military History (now called the Center of Military 
History). 
3 Alfred D. Chandler, Jr.. cd., and Stephen E. Ambrose, assoc. ed., The Papers ofDwight D. 
Eisenhower: The War rears, I (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1970), 405.406; Harry Butcher. Atv 
Three Years with Eisenhower., The Personal Diaq, of Captain Harry Butcher. USNR, Naval Aide to 
General Eisenhower 1942-1945 (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1946) [hereafter referred to as 
Butcher, Ati, Three Years with Eisenhower], 29,30. For example, Eisenhower calls the cancellation of a 
cross-channel attack in 1942 the "Blackest Day" in history. For a sample of American vitriol, see 
General Albert C. Wedemeyer, Wedemeyer Reports! (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1958), 
chapters 6-12 passim. Wedemeycr was a principal war planner in the War Department and the author 
of the original "Victory Plan. " He later became the American Theater Commander in China, Mark A. 
Stoler, Allies and Adversaries: The Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Grand Alliance, and US Stratqy in World 
War 11 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000), passim. This examines prewar 
American ideas well salted with Anglophobia, and discusses war planning and the Joint Chiefs. 
S 
out the details of strategy, allocated national resources, and provided a directive to the 
theater commander concerned. The National Service Chief for the specific Allied 
Theater Commander wrote and communicated the CCS views and orders. For 
Northwest Europe, the United States Army Chief of Staff, General George C. 
Marshall, was the executive agent. 4 VAiile certain theaters such as the Pacific (US), 
Southeast Asia (British), and the Mediterranean (British) were considered to grant a 
special oversight authority to the most interested nation, Northwest Europe was 
considered to be the purview of both countries. Moreover, with the British Prime 
Minister using, and in the American view, abusing his dual role as Defense Minister 
to inject himself into the conduct of operations, the Americans were firm in their 
attempts to end British control of the major campaigns of the war. 
If 1942 had been the year of resolve, 1943 was the year of dispute. America 
followed Britain into an unwanted Mediterranean Campaign through the North 
African invasion, TORCH. TORCH had been seen as a political necessity, not only to 
offer some aspect of a "Second Front" to the beleaguered Soviets but also to get the 
American Army involved in the German war as a prelude to the congressional 
elections in the fall. 
Every aspect of 1943's campaign irritated the Americans. Marshall viewed the 
Mediterranean as a "suction pump, " taking resources away from the invasion of 
" Pogue, The Supreme Command, Chapter 2, Dominick Graham and Shelford Bidwell. Coalitions. 
Politicians and Generals: Some Aspects of Command in Two Wars (London: Brassey's UK, 1993), 
Chapters 9 and 10, critiques the mechanics of this arrangement. Stephen E. Ambrose. The Supreme 
Commander: The War Years ofDwight D. Eisenhower (New York: Doubleday, 1970), Forrest C. 
Pogue, George C. Marshalt Organizer of Victo? y 1943-1945 (New York: The Viking Press, 1973) 
Volumes 2 and 3, should also be consulted concerning the relations of the CCS and the Allied Supreme 
Commander. 
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Western Europe. 5 The Navy viewed it as a diversion from their war of vengeance in 
the Pacific, and the United States Army Air Forces, whose independence from the 
ground Army had all but been made legal by Marshall, viewed the Mediterranean 
campaign as delaying the massive bomber offensive it felt could win the war. 
Roosevelt had ovenuled his service chiefs on TORCH. The resulting 
campaigns, not only in Sicily but in the Mediten-anean-which landed the Allies on 
the European mainland through the Italian peninsula-had marked the high-water 
mark of British influence. During the Casablanca Conference in January 1943, the 
Allies had ageed to appoint an individual to analyze the invasion plan that the 
Americans demanded. (The officer appointed Lt. Gen. Sir Frederick Morgan was 
British. He had an American deputy, Maj. Gen. Raymond Barker. ) The position was 
called "Chief of Staff to the Allied Commander, Designate, " or "COSSAC"; the 
individual and the plan soon shared the same name. 
In August 1943, the COSSAC forwarded his feasibility study, most often 
called the COSSAC Plan but in reality named OUTLINE OVERLORD. OUTLINE 
OVERLORD, once approved, changed the conduct of World War 11. No longer 
content to fend off Mr. Churchill's seemingly bimonthly mid-course corrections for 
Grand Strategy; the Americans pressed for a decision on the Cross-Channel attack. 
OVERLORD's approval in August 1943, followed by the appointment of a Supreme 
Allied Commander and his principal commanders, put Marshall and the American 
Chiefs in charge of the war in its largest aspects. Every campaign, every major 
5 Larry 1. Bland. cd., George C Marshall: Interviews and Reminiscencesfor Forrest C Pogue 
[hereafter referred to as Bland, Reminiscencesfor Pogue] (Lexington: George C. Marshall Foundation, 
10 
decision now was scrutinized through the prism of the Allied main effort. 
OVERLORD. VAiile OVERLORD did not end inter-Allied bickering or even 
Churchill's attempt to shape Allied strategy, it did end British dominance over the 
military conduct of the war. 
The Supreme Commander's job was the vision of the American Chief of Staff, 
General George C. Marshall. Almost mythical in the respect he evoked from 
Roosevelt, Churchill, and the American Congress, Marshall was the architect of the 
American Army and was the most formidable advocate of the Cross-Channel Attack 
and the "Unity of Command" principle that had necessitated appointing a Supreme 
Allied Commander. A staff officer and prot6g6 of General of the Armies John J. 
Pershing, the American Expeditionary Force's Commander in Chief in the Great War, 
Marshall was cold, distant, severe and eminently practical. He "made" every general 
in the American Army and was the coldest of judges. Though he developed a good 
working relationship with his British opposite numbers, he was never known to have 
praised Britain or the British to any historian and quietly accepted the bigoted 
xenophobia that predominated in many of his senior officers. 
6 
Following the simple principle that the largest force contributor would provide 
the Supreme Commander for the European invasion, Marshall was expected by all to 
1986), passim. Marshall left no memoirs; these are the only known interviews of the general done as 
background for the authorized biography. 
' Stoler, Allies andAdversaries, is replete with discussions concerning the American view of their 
allies; John S. D. Eisenhower, Allies: Pearl Harbor to D-Day (Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday and 
Company, 1982) covers the formation of the coalition in less strident terms. For any serious student, 
the personal diaries of General Joseph W. Stilwell (Stanford), General George S. Patton (Library of 
Congress), and General Mark W. Clark (The Citadel) have repeated xenophobic remarks. Of particular 
note concerning the British should be the Wedemeyer Papers (Stanford) and his memoirs, Wedemeyer 
Reports!, ibid. On the naval side, Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King was a practicing Anglophobe of 
legendary proportions. Marshall kept his counsel. His only candid remarks on the war are bereft of 
positive remarks for specific allies; see Bland, Reminiscencesfor Pogue, ibid. 
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include himself. to be named the Supreme Commander. Allied Expeditionary Force 
(SCAEF). Roosevelt, buffeted by admirers of Marshall (to include the ancient 
Pershing) who claimed that Marshall could not be spared from Washington, relented. 
Marshall stayed on the Combined Chiefs to remain Roosevelt's champion at the 
conference table. 7 
General Sir Alan Brooke (later Field Marshal Lord Alanbrooke), the Chief of 
the Imperial General Staff and Marshall's opposite number, had been considered a 
contender for the Supreme Commander position. Churchill had offered the position to 
an American in 1943 as recognition of the greater American role (in numbers) in the 
war effort. Able, analytical, and blunt, Alanbrooke matched Marshall in reputation 
and was regarded as the necessary foil to Churchill's enthusiasms. 
8 Alanbrooke's 
generals, unfortunately, matched American xenophobia with their own brand of 
arrogance and condescension, never tiring of calling their American counterparts 
"inexperienced. " 9 
While the American Chief of Naval Operations/Commander-in-Chief. United 
States Fleet, Admiral Ernest J. King, and his British counterpart, Admiral Sir Andrew 
B. Cunningham, were key members of the Combined Chiefs, their influence over the 
ground and air aspects of the Northwest Europe campaign diminished after the D-Day 
7 Pogue, The Supreme Command, 22-34. Note Pogue discusses the American attempt to make Marshall 
the Supreme Commander for both the European and Mediterranean Theaters, and also to keep him as a 
sitting member of the Combined Chiefs. As such, he would have commanded the entire Allied effort 
against the Germans. 
8 Alex Danchev and Daniel Todman, eds., War Diaries 1939-1945: Field Uarshal Lord Alanbrooke 
[hereafter referred to as Danchev and Todman, Alanbrooke War Diaries] (London: Weidenfeld and 
Nicholson, 2001); Sir Arthur Bryant, Triumph in the West. 1943-1946 (London: Collins, 1959); David 
Fraser, Alanbrooke (New York: Atheneum, 1982). passim. 
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decisions for Normandy and Southern France. King's effect on the European and 
Mediterranean campaigns was negative. He controlled the crucial construction and 
allotment of landing craft and LSTs (Landing Ships, Tank). His refusal to limit his 
own Pacific campaigns, and Roosevelt's disingenuous practice of "supporting 
Europe" while refusing to curb King, caused major strategic problems. In decisions 
not involving shipping, King deferred to General Marshall on all issues concerning the 
war against Germany. 
10 
The airmen on the Combined Chiefs seemingly waged their own campaigns. 
Represented by Air Chief Marshal Sir Charles "Peter" Portal of the Royal Air Force 
(RAF), and General Henry H. "Hap" Arnold of the United States Army Air Forces, 
the airmen secured their own campaign directive for Europe called POINTBLANK. 
11 
Crafted at Combined Chiefs level with Portal as executive agent, it subordinated RAF 
Bomber Command and the United States Strategic Air Forces, Europe (USSTAF), 
directly to the CCS for operations. POINTBLANK was considered by the CCS as a 
necessary preliminary for OVERLORD, and was seen by the airmen as a guarantee 
that their operations could not be subordinated to those of ground forces. While the 
POINTBLANK directive provided a "priority" list of targets by type, the airmen were 
free to conduct operations within very general controls. 12 
9 Brian Holden Reid, "Tensions in the Supreme Command: Anti-Americanism in the British Army, 
1939-1945, " in Brian Holden Reid and John White, eds., American Studies: Essays in Honour of 
Marcus Cunliffe (London: Macmillan, 1991), 270-296. 
"' Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King and Walter Muir Whitehill, Admiral King: A Naval Record (New York: 
W. W. Norton and Company, Inc., 1952); Thomas B. Buel, Master ofSeapower. A Biograpky of 
Admiral Ernest J. King (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1980). 
" General of the Air Force Henry H. Arnold, Global Mission (Blue Ridge Summit, Penn.: Tab Books, 
1989); Denis Richards, Portal of Hungerford (London: Heineman, 1977). 
'2 CMH, MS, Historical Section, Headquarters, USFET, Outline Chronologv of Notes on the History of 
Continental Operations, E. T. O., Volume 11 (Historical Section, Headquarters, USFET, n. d. ), 223-227; 
13 
Bomber Command's Commander-in-Chief, Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur 
"Bomber" Harris, and the American air commander, Lt. Gen. Carl A. "Tooey" Spaatz, 
were both outspoken and independent believers in the superiority of airpower. Spaatz 
believed that the OVERLORD operation was unnecessary. While Bomber 
Command's aircraft were generally confined to night operations launched from 
England, Spaatz held operational control over both the Eighth Air Force in England 
and the Fifteenth Air Force in Italy. Spaatz had been commander of the Northwest 
African Air Force during TORCH and the Mediterranean campaign and 
administratively commanded all US Army Air Forces in Europe, bestowing some 
influence over the American elements of the Mediterranean Allied Air Forces as 
Arnold's trusted agent in the German war. ' 3 
Harris and Spaatz also shared a unique advantage. Spaatz reported not only to 
the American theater commander but directly to Arnold as Commanding General, 
United States Army Air Forces (AAF), a separate component of the United States 
Army. Harris, at Bomber Command, reported directly to the Air Ministry, Portal being 
the professional head of the Air Force and his superior. The implication was clear. 
Regardless of "'theater" command structures, the airmen had direct access not only to 
their service superiors but to the Combined Chiefs. POINTBLANK covered a 
multitude of sins, the greatest of which was the "negotiation" the theater commander 
needed to do with airmen for support. 
Sir Charles Webster and Noble Frankland, The Strategic Air Offensive Against Germany 1939-1945. 
Volume I 11, Part V (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 196 1), Chapter X1 1, passim. 
13 Richard G. Davis, Carl A. Spaarz and the Air War in Europe (Washington: Center for Air Force 
History, 1993), Part Four, passim. The numbered air forces, therefore, under Spaatzs influence were 
the 8' and 15 th as part of USSTAF, and the 9' and 12' (Tactical) Air Forces. 
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On December 7,1943, General Dwight D. Eisenhower was named Supreme 
Commander for OVERLORD. Eisenhower was the choice of Franklin Roosevelt and 
was embraced enthusiastically by Churchill as the best possible candidate for the job. 
Eisenhower's own reputation with the people of America and Britain, and with the 
Allied press, was flawless. Since his appointment as the Allied Supreme Commander 
for TORCH, Eisenhower had been seen as the international symbol for the coalition. 
Victory had followed his flag in French North Affica, in Sicily, and onto the European 
continent during the Invasion of Italy. Untainted by the stalemate yet to develop in 
front of the Gustav Line and Anzio in Italy, Eisenhower left the Mediterranean theater 
as the symbol of Allied success. 14 
Eisenhower was not the only commander picked by the CCS. (See figure I and 
2. ) The Allies, wanting an airman as Deputy Supreme Commander. selected Air Chief 
Marshal Sir Arthur W. Tedder, who had been Allied Air Commander in the 
Mediterranean. Tedder relished the "Deputy" title, but he also wanted operational 
command of all air assets for the invasion. This job, had in fact, been filled before 
Eisenhower was appointed. In August 1943, Air Chief Marshal Sir Trafford Leigh 
Mallory, then serving as the Commander of Fighter Command, and a commander who 
had been deeply involved in invasion and Combined Operations planning since 1942, 
was appointed as the Commander of the Allied Expeditionary Air Forces (AEAF). 15 
The Americans made it clear that they would not accept "a ground 
commander. " This job had fallen to General Sir Harold L. Alexander in the 
14 Pogue, The Supreme Command, 33-35. 
Ibid., 48. 
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Mediterranean. first as Eisenhower's Deputyý and then as the 15'h Army Group 
Commander in Sicily and Italy. No senior American ground commander existed with 
the commensurate combat experience to fill an "Army Group" command, so by 
default, the British 21 Army Group was accepted as the de facto ground headquarters 
until sufficient American ground troops required a promotion or new assignment for 
an American commander. 16 
The ground commander appointed to 21 Army Group was General Sir Bernard 
L. Montgomery, former commander of the Eighth Army. 
17 Montgomery was a 
talisman for the British soldier, and a remarkably popular commander with the British 
people. "Monty" meant victory to the British public, and to the average Tommy. 
Monty was a commander who brought victory without excessive casualties. His 
victories had assured Churchill's continuance in government during the dark days of 
1942. Eisenhower had wanted the pleasant and pliant Harold Alexander for this 
com mand but stated that Montgomery was "acceptable. "' 8 
The Allied Naval Commander, Allied Naval Expeditionary Force (ANXF), 
was Admiral Sir Bertram Ramsay, a professional seaman who had saved the British 
Army at Dunkirk, and whose professionalism and affability made him popular with 
every Allied seaman. During postinvasion operations, he would be the key naval 
16 Ibid., 43-45, Eisenhower Papers, 111,1609,16 10. 
17 As such, Montgomery replaced General Sir Bernard Paget, who had also been the senior British 
Army planner for the (British) Combined Commanders, had succeeded Alanbrooke in command of the 
Home Forces, and became 21 Army Group commander in 1943. With the exception of the abortive 
Norway expedition in 1940, he lacked experience of operational command in combat. 
18 General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe (Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday and 
Company, 1949), 211. 
16 
advisor concerning ports and shipping for the theater as well as the coordinator of 
Allied naval operations in support of ground forces. 
19 
Eisenhower brought his own Chief of Staff, Lt. Gen. Walter Bedell "Beetle- 
Smith; his G-2, Major General Kenneth Strong; and a host of minor appointments 
from his Mediterranean headquarters. Marshall had chosen the G-3, Major General 
Harold R. Bull, the man who was expected to be Marshall's G-3. Marshall also 
selected Lt. Gen. Omar N. Bradley to lead the American First Army. Tentatively. 
Bradley was dual-hatted to create a "First Army Group" Headquarters, though its 
permanent commander was not named. Bradley expected to move up to that 
command. His success as an army commander would determine that; his promotion 
was by no means a foregone conclusion. 
Other appointments in the theater included British Second Army Commander, 
Lt. Gen. Sir Miles C. Dempsey, a former corps commander under Montgomery. Lt. 
Gen. Harry H. G. Crerar was named to command Canadian First Army; he had been 
the Chief of Staff in Ottawa and had commanded the I Canadian Corps for a short 
period in Italy. His deputy, Major-General Guy Simonds at 2 Canadian Corps. was the 
most battle experienced of the Canadian commanders. Lt. Gen. George S. Patton 
commanded the American Third Army. Having been relieved of command of Seventh 
Army after the Sicilian Campaign for slapping two soldiers, Patton by seniority and 
experience might have had the American Army Group command. His tempestuous 
temper and rampant xenophobia had ruled out the appointment, but Eisenhower had 
19 Robert W. Love, Jr. and John Major, eds., The Year qfD-Da ' r. 
The 1944 Diarv ofAdmiral Sir 
Bertram RamsaY [hereafter referred to as Love and Major, Ramsay Diaq] (Hulf* University of Hull 
17 
retained him. Bradley, his superior at "First Army Group, " had not wanted Patton in 
the theater. Eisenhower had not consulted Bradley concerning this. Patton also 
functioned as the "commandee' of a mythical Army Group under the FORTITUDE 
deception plan, aimed at deceiving the Germans into believing the main Allied 
landings would be in the Pas de Calais area. 20 
The American Ninth Air Force in England had moved from the Mediterranean 
with Lt. Gen. Lewis H. Brereton as its commander. Eisenhower also brought Lt. Gen. 
James H. "Jimmy" Doolittle to command the Eighth Air Force. Other Mediterranean 
commanders that migrated to England for OVERLORD included desert airmen Air 
Marshals Arthur "Maori" Coningham and Harry Broadhurst, who commanded the 2 
Tactical Air Force and 83 Group respectively. 21 
As assigned, Eisenhower's commanders were the most experienced, proven 
combat commanders of any Allied theater. None were strangers to combined 
operations, to high-level command, or to the press of battle. While a host of lesser, 
unproven commanders rounded out the subordinate commands, the key leaders all had 
the confidence of their services and countries but not, necesssarily, of one another. 
Press, 1994); Rear-Admiral W. S. Chalmers, Full Cycle: The Biographýv ofSir Bertram Rome Ramsav 
(London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1959). 
20 MHI, Papers of Chester B. Hansen: Bradley Commentaries. These are unnumbered notecards 
containing questions, comments, and answers prepared by General Bradley in response to his "ghost" 
author, Lt. Col. Chester B. Hansen. Hansen, Bradley's aide and keeper of the Hansen Diary, drafted 
Bradley's memoir, A Soldier's Story (New York: Holt, 195 1). Bradley held Patton in contempt for his 
conduct in Sicily. Numerous comments concerning this and his distrust of Patton and his motives can 
be found in the commentarics. 
21 Vincent Orange, Coningham: A Biography ofAir Marshal Sir Arthur Coningham (Washington: 
Center for Air Force History, 1992), passim. The fulsome foreword to the American edition notes he 
"is the architect of modem airpower. " British Army officers universally thought Broadhurst to be more 
effective and cooperative, and that he was the actual airman running combat operations. 
18 
The Allied Command was, after all, a coalition. Publicly, the coalition faced 
challenges together, and sensitivities were respected. Controversy, while aired through 
national channels, was well known, but above all, attempts to make decisions 
adversarial at the Combined Chiefs level were avoided. For the Americans. in 
particular, having been chastened by their own Commander-in-Chief over TORCH, 
the Chiefs had learned to agree to disagree. Inwardly, they held grudges that never 
healed. Battles, then, were fought not simply in the meeting room but between field 
commanders whose own service chiefs saw them as "'champions" of their national and 
service points of view. 
The differing national views on command posed significant problems at the 
operational level. "Unity of Command" as defined by the Americans mandated that 
one Allied commander hold supreme command in each theater of operations. Unlike 
the Great War, national commanders were not given the right to appeal decisions 
directly to their governments, though this policy remained unofficially in force 
through national representatives on the Combined Chiefs. At no time during the war 
did any government overrule a Supreme Commander's decisions by CCS action 
prompted by a commander's disagreement, nor was any Supreme Commander 
relieved as unsuitable to the approval of America or Britain. While disagreements 
were common, and frequently feelings ran high, commanders obeyed orders regardless 
of what they felt would be the military consequences of decisions. 22 
Essential to maintaining the command, however, was that senior commanders 
remain free to act within the purview of their own authority within their own 
2' Pogue, The Supreme Command, 4 1. 
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commands. This was challenging in that the British demanded to work x6thin a 
system naming a separate senior commander responsible for air, ground. and naval 
operations, essentially subordinating all nations by service to one command. a tighter 
description of "Unity of Command. " While the Americans always held the Supreme 
Command position in the war against Germany, the separate commands had fallen to 
senior, experienced British officers. This was deeply resented by the Americans. who 
did not accept the "experience" argument-nor were their ideas on warfare congruent 
with those of Commonwealth officers. By 1944, with the preponderance of combat 
forces for the first time shifting to the Americans, this brought about near revolt by the 
American commanders whose views, through press leaks or divination. were 
frequen tly the subject of American press discontent with British influence in running 
the war. Roosevelt, Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson, and Marshall were adamant 
that 1944 would be an American year-that once the invasion was launched, Britain 
and her commanders would have no influence and little say in the strategy of the 
23 war. 
Despite its position as land base for the invasion and host to more than 200 
airfields for the American air force and its contribution as the dominant U-boat killer 
and escort force in the Atlantic war, custodian and primary producer of special signals 
intelligence (ULTRA), and deliverer of the tremendous weight of bombs dropped on 
Germany by Bomber Command, Britain's dwindling ground force was seen as making 
23 This is bome out by the American refusal to reconsider ANVIL, even at the peril or OVERLORD, 
Marshall's refusal to accept a British officer as Ground Commander, and Marshall's and Stimson's ire 
during the Normandy campaign over newspaper stories reflecting "British dominance" of the war. 
From OVERLORD onward, it also became Eisenhower's task to virtually refuse any direct pleas for 
decisions or actions in favor of a British view to be taken to the Combined Chiefs. For an example. see 
Pogue, The Supreme Command, 225-226. 
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Britain the decisively junior partner in the war in Northwest Europe. Britain's 
manpower issues. as well as those of Canada (which Ottawa kept to themselves), also 
became prime considerations for any operations launched. Britain could not afford 
major casualties if it was to fight to the end of the war, a fact the Anglophobic 
American press frequently used by claiming the British were "'not pulling their 
weight. " American generals habitually and disparagingly used the word "caution- 
regarding British attempts to avoid unproductive blood-lettings, as had been common 
in World War I. It was also used as a blanket insult to describe any American 
doctrinal or philosophical differences with the British approach to battle. 
The last point was a major philosophical difference. American generals had a 
virtual blank check on losing both men and equipment. No American generals were 
threatened or relieved due to heavy losses; only outright failure or national 
embarrassment brought on sackings. From 1943 onwards, British generals were 
warned that manpower shortages would require the "cannibalizing" of major 
formations to provide replacements. 24 Moreover, as the war lengthened, with 
bombardment by planes and soon missiles, rigid rationing, the mass mobilization of 
women, and the return to the colors of middle-aged Great War veterans, Britain's 
national psyche was particularly vulnerable. Its press trumpeted any success of British 
arms, real or, in the minds of the Americans, "stolen" fiom themselves. Its war 
leaders--Churchill, Slim, Mountbatten, and Montgomery--often spoke of "morale" 
as the magic formula to keep the nation functioning. 
24 F. W. Perry, The Commonwealth Armies: Manpower and Organisation in Two World Wars 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1988), Chapters 2 and 4; The War Office, Manpower 
Problems: The Second World War 1939-1945, Army (London: 1949); Stacey, Arms, Men and 
21 
Yet, how this morale was achieved. too, was a key irritant within the coalition. I- 
American generals read British newspapers and heard BBC broadcasts, and stupidly 
believed that such organs should have been dedicated to the glorification of the 
American war effort and the triumph of American arms. They resented any positive 
comments that either compared favorably British arms or downplayed or excluded 
American contributions. 25 American newspapers were likewise not as objective or all- 
encompassing in their coverage of the war, though these, of course, did not appear 
within the theater. They were, however, a frequent stimulus to Stimson and Marshall, 
who reported to Eisenhower the criticism of columnists during the first months of the 
invasion that the British were controlling the war. 26 
Most prominent among command issues at the operational level were those C 
inspired by personalities, and by the inherent prejudices held among the separate 
services. Compounded by nationalistic views, these issues-not those of strategic 
policy handed down by the heads of government and formulated as plans and military 
directives by the Combined Chiefs-posed the greatest problem to senior command 
functioning. In the realm of operations, the actual conduct of military actions designed 
to support the strategy handed down by accomplishing tasks, achieving objectives, and 
Governments, Chapter 7; Carlo D'Este, Decision in Norman4v (New York: Dutton, 1983); Chapter 15 
is of particular interest. 
21 
* During separate interviews in the early 1980s with two prominent US wartime commanders, Lt. Gen. 
James M. Gavin and Gen. J. Lawton Collins, the author was stunned by their voluntary and emphatic 
comments on the British press during the war. This, they both volunteered, had caused great problems 
over -who was winning the war. " 
26 G. E. Patrick Murray, Eisenhower Versus Montgomeq: The Continuing Debate (Westport. Conn.: 
Greenwood Press, 1996), 12,19,171. Murray assesses the postwar fight of the memoirs, as well as the 
problems encountered during the war, including those of public opinion; Larry 1. Bland, ed., and 
Sharon Ritcnour Stevens, assoc. cd., The Papers of George Catlett Marshall, IV, "Aggressive and 
Determined Leadership, " June 1,1943-December 31,1944 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 1996), 550-551. 
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establishing a jumping-off position in time or place for the next sequenced action C 
called for by the strategy-this was the most intense environment in the coalition. 
Operational commanders had to harmonize the actions of combined services in 
battles and multiphased operations. Moreover, while strategy had the benefit of 
modification over time, operations were immediate, their results stark. Operations 
succeeded, failed, or were jumping-off phases to new operations. With the immediacy 
of time and the gauge of success the ruling standard, pressures on commanders 
magnified differences among commanders. Given the disparate personalities, services. 
and nationalities involved, conflict was commonplace and was most intense among 
the senior commanders. 
General Dwight D. Eisenhower, as Supreme Commander, fell between two 
stools. As the executor of the Combined Chiefs of Staff's directives, he straddled 
strategic and operational commands. Since 1942, he had dealt in the ethereal realm of 
pleasing two political bosses, while retaining the confidence of his military superior, 0 
Marshall, as well as at least the nominal support of the CIGS. Alanbrooke. 
Eisenhower was uniquely qualified to participate in the "Higher Direction of 
War, " but was not accepted as a field commander by the British. Eisenhower had 
graduated in the famous West Point Class of 1915, the class the "stars fell on. " By 
dint of age and opportunity, this class supplied the Army with 58 generals, including 
the senior American ground commander for the invasion, Lt. Gen. Omar N. Bradley. 
Commanding the US Army's tank training camp in World War I, Eisenhower missed 
the Great War. Marked early as a man of ability, Eisenhower distinguished himself in 
23 
the next two decades in two realms, neither of them in connection with the leading of C 
troops in the field. 27 
Eisenhower became a star in the burgeoning Army school system, 
distinguishing himself at the Command and General Staff School, the War College, 4: 1 
and the Industrial College of the Armed Forces. Trained as a General Staff officer, he 
served both the Assistant Secretary of War, and later Army Chief of Staff Douglas 
MacArthur, both in Washington and later in Manila. Promoted to colonel in 1940. he 
briefly commanded a regiment and was the Chief of Staff for Third Army during the 
Louisiana Maneuvers, serving under Lt. Gen. Walter Krueger, arguably the Army's 
best tactician and trainer. 
Following Pearl Harbor, Eisenhower was selected to head the War Plans 
Division of the War Department Operations section, thus becoming the principal 
overseer of the Army's strategic plans. Chosen by Marshall to establish the 
groundwork for the Cross-Channel attack, he was named Commanding General, 
European Theater of Operations in June 1942. As such, he was the principal planner 
acting for Marshall with the War Office Staff in London. 
Eisenhower, once described by his son as "intense, " was ambitious, energetic, 
high strung, and an efficient administrator. Highly intelligent, he had spent most of his 
career serving the great. One of his contemporaries who commanded a battalion, while 
Ike acted as brigade executive officer, noted that Eisenhower told him that his motto 
27 Eisenhower did not attend his own branch school for infantry, which focused on the tactics of that 
arm from platoon to regimental level. The staff school centered on division and corps operations. The 
War College, in Eisenhower's time, dealt with "strategy" and the preparation of war plans. The 
Industrial College dealt with the industrial mobilization of the United States. Combined with his 
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was, "The Commanding Officer is never wrong with me. " -18 That trait never left him, 
and Eisenhower showed remarkable skill in adhering to the smallest ideas of his 
commander. Marshall, whom Eisenhower served, had carefully tested and selected 
someone who could act not simply on the boss's wishes, but who could perceive. 
predict, and perform exactly how his superior thought. Fortified with an endless 
number of messages from the War Department, Eisenhower acted as if he were still 
down the hall from his Chief While he realized the necessity to succeed, his mental 
test of every decision no doubt had to be, "What would Marshall say9" 
29 A perfect 
follower himself, he deeply resented the two Army Group Commanders unafraid to 
stand up to him, Montgomery and Devers. 
Eisenhower proved to be an ideal subordinate to Marshall's ideas during his 
time in London. Alanbrooke noted that his first meetings with Eisenhower had 
literally made no impression. 30 This rapidly changed as the Americans pressed not 
only for action in 1942 but for a landing in France called SLEDGEHAMMER. As 
Eisenhower's duties involved him with planning the second front, Churchill and 
others soon saw the American in conferences and as advocate for the War 
Department's and Marshall's views. SLEDGEHAMMER and ROUNDUP, the two 
service both with the civilian and military heads of the Army, Eisenhower was exceptionally well 
prepared in the theoretical and policy realms of warfare. 
28 Brig. Gen. Bradforth Chynowcth, Bellamýv Park (Hicksville, N. Y.: Exposition Press, 1975), 101. 
29 Graham and Bidwell, Coalitions, 177, notes that Marshall ensured "Eisenhower acted as if he were 
the great Chief of the Army Staff's deputy, and his loyal agent. " The thousands of pages of message 
traffic from the War Department to SHAEF and the personal and official correspondence of the two 
men bear this out. Joseph P. Hobbs, Dear GeneraL Eisenhower s Wartime Letters to Marshall 
(Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1971), offers a selection of letters from the published 
Eisenhower Papers, with commentary on the relationship of the two men. 
30 Danchev and Todman, Alanbrooke War Diaries, 276. 
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primary plans advocated by the Americans. were produced by Brigadier General 
Eisenhower's Plans Division before he moved to London. 31 
TORCH, seen by the Americans as the substitute for ROUNDUP. was placed 
under Eisenhower's command, and he was promoted to lieutenant general. TORCH 
demonstrated Eisenhower's obeisance to Marshall. He ably supported Marshall*s 
intentions while establishing a completely integrated coalition headquarters, setting a 0 
model that would be repeated throughout the Mediterranean and Northwest Europe 
32 
campaigns. 
Eisenhower also established his pattern of giving priority to political-military 
requirements rather than operational requirements. The North Africa experience 
showed that the Supreme Commander had little time to intensively supervise a ground 
campaign. Following the winter stalemate in front of Tunis, Alanbrooke ensured that a 
senior British commander, General the Hon. H. R. L. G. Alexander, became the senior 
ground commander, essentially taking Eisenhower out of the direct operational chain 
of command. 33 
Tunisia, however, was a watershed in Allied conunand relations. The 
American setback in the Kasserine Pass battles painted the American command 
31 J. M. A. Gwyer, GrandStratelD,, III, Part I (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1964), Chapters 
XXIV, XXVIII; Maurice Matloff and Edwin M. Snell, Strategic Planningfor Coalition IYarfare 1941- 
1942 (Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1953). 
32 Eisenhower Papers, 1,11, passim. Eisenhower reported his every move and decision to Marshall and 
continued to function almost as a member of Marshall's operations staff. While it was apparent that the 
British would have to approve Eisenhower's general conduct, the pattern of telling Marshall everything 
and his Allies only what was required was established during this time frame. Eisenhower's insistence 
on almost dual chairmanship of major staff functions is described both in Pogue, The Supreme 
Command, 49-55, Chapters III and IV; and in Frederick Morgan, Overture to Overlord (London: 
Hodder and Stoughton, 1950), Chapter IX. 
33 Danchev and Todman, Alanbrooke War Diaries. 365. Eisenhower was charmed by Alexander 
despite his job to keep Eisenhower isolated from operational influence. 
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structure in a bad light, as well as prompting American discontent with the British 
Army commander. The arrival of Patton brought a foil to what was seen as British 
condescension. Bradley's replacement of Patton, and his insistence on an American 
task in the final drive after Alexander had attempted to pinch out the American Corps. 
brought American feelings to a fever pitch. The drive on Bizerte had established 
American competence in their own eyes. To the British, they remained, in too many 
mouths, "our Italians. " 34 
The incipient hostility between air and ground commanders budded during 
Coningham's handling of American air units and his argument over air support with 
George Patton. 35 From Tunisia onwards, the AAF and RAF grew together in defining 
air-ground operations, in which the Americans would eventually surpass their 
teachers. The RAF and British Army were driven farther apart as the Mediterranean 
war went on, mainly due to Coningham's and Tedder's personal resentment of 
Montgomery. 36 
The subsequent American actions of Patton's Seventh Army in Sicily 
worsened feelings. Patton saw the campaign as a "horse race" designed to bring 
himself, and hence the Americans, glory. Bad feelings continued onto the Italian 
3i MHI, Bradley Commentaries depicts the deep American resentment of "British treatment" of the 
Americans. See also Hansen Diaty for the period March-May 1943. 
35 Orange, Coningham, 144-149, Daniel R. Mortensen, A PatternforJoint Operations: fflorld 9ar 11 
Close Air Support North Africa (Washington: Office of Air Force History/US Army Center for Military 
History, 1987), 84-88. Patton, who wanted direct control of air units, was wrong, and Coningham's 
insistence on centralizing air to support the main effort was correct. Patton falsely painted the incident 
as American-British squabble; in reality, it was a doctrinal argument wherein Patton followed US 
doctrine soon to be replaced by FM 100-20, Command and Employment ofAir Povver. 
36 D'Este, Decision in Normandy, 218-220, passim; Orange, Coningham, passim; author interview with 
Vincent Orange, 1997. concerning his forthcoming biography of Tedder; Nigel Hamilton, Master of 
the Battlefield: Monoy's ; Var Years 1942-1944 (New York: McGraw Hill Book Company, 1983), 
passim. 
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peninsula with the entry into operational command of Lt. Gen. Nlark '"'. Clark. 
another close Eisenhower ftiend, whose Anglophobia matched Patton's. 37 
Throughout, Eisenhower attempted to appear to be an honest broker. He 
earned the respect of the Allied staff and the loyalty of the three operational 
commanders in chief, all British officers. He impressed the CIGS as an overall Allied 
coordinator, but not as a commander. It is logical that American and British policies 
and commanders would clash-the armies, after all, were cut from far different cloths. 
One individual commander seemed to be a firestarter, a lightning rod for contempt, 
controversy, and counterargument. That individual was Alanbrooke's trusted prot6g&, 
General Sir Bernard Law Montgomery, commander of the then legendary Eighth 
Army. 
Montgomery had reached the summit of his career by dint of unyielding 
professionalism. Blunt, opinionated, and a quick study, Montgomery's ruthlessly 
analytical mind fed an outspoken manner, not designed to please superiors or Allies. 
In the Great War he had risen from decorated and wounded platoon leader to Division 
Chief of Staff. He had served under the war's great set-piece attack specialist, General 
Herbert Plumer, and had learned the value of organization, training, and planning. In 
the interwar, he had revised the Army's infantry manual, had twice been a staff 
college instructor of some repute, had participated in both gas trials and amphibious 
warfare tests, and had seen active service in Ireland and Palestine. No mossback, he 
had embraced airpower and motorization. and had experimented with the use of 
37 Martin Blumenson, Mark, Clark (New York: Congdon and Weed, 1984). Clark's diary is full of 
references to the "poor dumb British, " and he consistently accuses them of -lack of drive. " In June 
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airborne forces while in Corps Command in England. His performance in France in 
1940, and during the frenetic preparations to meet an expected German invasion. had 
cemented Alanbrooke's confidence in his operational abilities. 
38 
Montgomery's personality was both a blessing and a curse. Confident. earnest, 
and egocentric, he inspired great loyalty from subordinates and hatred from those who 
opposed or who tried to control him. His personal ruthlessness with the ungifted had 
merited a fear of him by many, but his attempts to bolster morale and to achieve 
victories, while avoiding the profitless waste of life that had characterized his view of 
the Great War, had earned him an almost messianic following among British soldiers 
and the British public. He seemed to evoke instant contempt from American generals 
while contralily being popular with US soldiers whose units he visited and later 
commanded. 39 
Central to the divide among the ground commanders by nationality is the 
figure of Lt. Gen. Omar N. Bradley, the commander of US First Army and later 12th 
Army Group. As such, he led the American forces in the Normandy campaign and 
would be the key ground force commander on the continent with the largest body of 
national troops. Unlike his contemporary commanders, Montgomery and Devers, 
1944, he deliberately disobeyed the orders of his superior, Harold Alexander, regarding operations to 
seize Rome. Nothing was done. 
3'Nigel Hamilton, Mom: The Making ofa General, 1887-1942 (New York: McGraw Hill Book 
Company, 198 1); The Výar Off ice, Infantq Training, Volume 11, ; Par (London: War Office, 193 1). 
3' Hamilton, Master ofthe Battlefield, 596, cites a letter from Bedell Smith regarding Montgomery's 
visits of US troops. Current memoirs, colored by the "Greatest Generation" craze in nostalgia. and 
influenced by the 1950s wave of telling their sons that -America won the war, " have a distinctly 
Anglophobic tinge to them, with Montgomery often named by men whose ranks and positions would 
have scarcely made them aware of the man other than through newspaper pictures. In interviews in 
1983 and 1984 with Lt. Gen. James M. Gavin and Gen. J. Lawton Collins, both told the author that 
they "liked" Monty, and that he was "good to work for, " though both were quick to point out that they 
didn't necessarily agree with his battle tactics. Gavin commented that he had seen Monty frequently at 
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Bradley commanded a pure national force generally free of "in house- national 
sensitivitieS. 40 Beginning with his experience in Tunisia, Bradley began to harbor 
distinctly anti-British feelings, and took umbrage at slights real and imagined from his 
Allies. Like most American generals, he held French colonial troops in contempt. 
Patton's self-styled competition with Montgomery soured Bradley on both men. 
Fanned by his own growing press as the "G. I. General, " Bradley saw himself as the 
protector of US prerogatives and prestige. Any decision that favored anyone but 12th 
,, 41 Army Group he typified as "anti-American. 
Bradley, a career infantryman, had seen little troop service. He had missed the 
Great War, and had spent most of the interwar period either attending or serving at the 
Army's schools. This included service under George C. Marshall at the Infantry 
School and extensive service at his alma mater, West Point. He was the first officer of 
the Class of 1915 to be promoted to brigadier general. Soft-spoken, and outwardly 
kind, he was a humorless taskmaster and was quick to relieve general officers. He had 
been an extraordinarily good corps commander in Tunisia and Sicily and was an able 
infantry tactician. Undemonstratively but ardently ambitious, like Eisenhower he was 
a mindless follower of the "boss is always right" philosophy, though it might be 
the front during the Ardennes, and that he had never seen his own American Army commander during 
the battle. 
4" The sole exception to this was the assignment of the French 2d Armored Division to Bradicy's army. 
Montgomery commanded American, British, Czech, Canadian and Polish forces within 21 Army 
Group. Devers; commanded both a US and a French army. 
41 MHI, Bradley Commentaries, passim; General of the Army Omar N. Bradley, A Soldier's Story 
(New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1951); Omar N. Bradley and Clay Blai * r, 
A General 's Life (New 
York: Simon and Schuster, 1983). The clearest statements of Bradley's feelings and prejudices are 
recorded in the question-and-answer interplay between Bradley and his aide and ghostwriter, Lt. Col. 
Chester B. Hansen. The more subdued but distinctly anti-Montgomcry version was published in 
Bradley's memoir, A Soldier's Story. A more shrill and undependable posthumously-written and co- 
authored set of -memoirs" was later published with Clay Blair. The day-to-day barometer, often 
distant, is the Hansen Diary. 
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argued he grew to see the real "boss" as Marshall, the American. rather than 
Eisenhower, the Allied general. 42 
Lt. Gen. Jacob L. Devers had outranked Eisenhower in the regular army and 
had followed Eisenhower as Commander of the European Theater of Operations in 
late 1943; he later was Deputy Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean. He was 
chosen to lead the Southern France campaign and would eventually be an Army 
Group Commander under SCAEF. Eisenhower possessed a distinct but unclarified 
prejudice against Devers. 
43 It is possible that Eisenhower resented his refusal to send 
American bombers to the Mediterranean while he was overseeing the American 
buildup in England. Whatever the reason, Eisenhower tended to avoid giving 
responsibility to those who were not "in his camp. " The upshot was a remarkable set 
of military decisions that defied logic-made solely to diminish Devers' role in the 
Northwest Europe campaign. 44 
Unable to ignore Montgomery because of his status as senior Commonwealth 
Commander, Eisenhower attempted to downplay Devers' influence and would 
abandon any reasoned attempt at creating Army Group sectors based on terrain, basing 
them instead on his personal attitude to commanders. 
42 Bradley kept a close car to Washington views, was careful to expound his pro-Amcrican message 
during Marshall's visits, and confirmed his "aggressiveness- in person to Marshall by expressing his 
strong desire to fight in the Pacific after the European campaign had finished. Bradley, though critical 
of Eisenhower after the war, went to great lengths to visit his boss and, of the three Army Group 
commanders, was the only one who acted as confidante for the Supreme Commandcr. 
43 EL, Interview with Devcrs. It is telling that Devers, when interviewed by the Eisenhower Library and 
asked about Eisenhower's leadership abilities, replied that he was unfamiliar with them. 
" Eisenhower Papers, IV, 2467-2469. Eisenhower's rating of Devers after his opposition to Ikc's plans 
to withdraw from the Colmar Pocket in the Alsace Campaign were stinging, and in large measure 
uncalled-for. In this February 1945 rating of officers' contributions to the war, he rated Devcrs 24th of 
his generals. 
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The airmen posed a special personality problem uithin the coalition. 
In 
addition to the expected normal strong personalities, a consistent tension existed 
between the airmen and the ground soldiers. The Royal Air Force had achieved status 
as a separate service from the British Army in 1918. Airmen, however, used the term 
"independent. " It was an article of faith that not only were the airmen "separate, " but 
they would not be subordinated to their sister services. The American Army Air Force, 
although reorganized as one of the Army's major components in 1942. was still an 
A4 
45 organic component of the My. Arnold owed his sitting status on the CCS to the 
need to provide an opposite number to Portal. Arnold acted independently, as if a 
service chief, though he deferred to Marshall-except on issues concerning air. 
whereupon he acted with equal status. It was widely believed that the AAF would 
become a separate service after the war. 46 
Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur W. Tedder was Eisenhower's Deputy Supreme 
Allied Commander. As such, he was the senior airman in the theater, though be served 
as a Deputy without portfolio. Tedder was an organizer and technocrat. His service 
during the Great War was distinguished but not exceptional. During the interwar he 
had specialized in the development and acquisition of aircraft. He had become Air 
Officer Commander-in-Chief, (AOC-in-C), Mediterranean, and had demonstrated a 
genius for organization, logistics, and strategy in the employment of air forces in the 
4% In March 1942, Marshall had streamlined the army by reorganizing it into the Army Ground Forces 
(AGF), Army Service Forces (ASF). and Army Air Forces (AAF). The ASF and AAF retained 
command authority over like units regardless of theater. The ground forces were assigned from the 
Zone of the Interior (ZI) to each respective theater commander. The dual reporting system, designed to 
bring efficiency to a service fighting worldwide, was a bone of contention between evcry theater 
commander and the War Department in Washington. 
4' Herman S. Wolk, Planning and Organizing the Postwar Air Force 1943-1947 (Washington: Office 
of Air Force History, 1984). 
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Mediterranean campaign. Appointed Eisenhower's Allied Air Commander in 1943, he 
formed a close partnership with the American and retained Eisenhower's fiiendship 
and support. 47 
Tedder's appointment as Deputy pleased Eisenhower but foretold problems 
within the command structure. Tedder, a firm disciple of Lord Trenchard. did not 
view the army favorably. In fact, he claimed that he was the actor who had placed the 
wedge between the American Army and its Air Forces, who by doctrine "supported" 
the ground arms . 
48 His ability to cooperate was very much seen through RAF-Azure 
eyes. While his service feelings may have intensified the feelings, Tedder despised 
Montgomery, and never missed an opportunity to criticize him to Eisenhower, Portal, 
his "old friend and protector" Trenchard, or the staff. Working to undermine him, he 
would also try to engineer Montgomery's relief Moreover, he sought to expand his 
own brief by attempting to control the USSTAF through Eisenhower, and also to 
unseat the CCS appointed tactical air commander, Leigh Mallory. 
49 
Air Chief Marshal Sir Trafford Leigh Mallory had been appointed on Portal's 
recommendation to the position of AOC-C-in-C, Allied Expeditionary Air Forces 
47 Author interview with Vincent Orange. the Pentagon, 1997. The author gained valuable insight from 
Orange into Tedder and his feelings toward Montgomery. 
4' Roderick Owen, Tedder (London: Collins, 1952), 196-207. Tedder viewed his role in the 
Mediterranean as educating Eisenhower on air power. The Americans viewed their change in doctrine 
as the result of their own ideas. Lt. Gen. E. R. Quesada mentioned to the author that the Americans 
owed much of their techniques and ideas to the British Desert Air Force. 
49 D'Este, Decision in Normandy, Chapter 4. D'Este has the most complete discussion of interservicc 
and interpersonal relations among senior commanders for Northwest Europe available in a credible, 
objective source. While the author has had the benefit of examing diaries and corresponding with or 
interviewing several of the war commanders still alive in the early 1980s, it must be noted that D'Este 
and Nigel Hamilton were the last two authors to interview those close to the war commanders before 
their ages took them. I am grateful to extensive discussions with both these historians over the past 
decade and admit their influence. Final judgments expressed, however, arc unabashedly my own. 
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(AEAF) in August 1943, receiving his directive in November. 50 Leigh Mallory had Cý 
been commander of Fighter Command and had held operational command positions 
since 1937. He had the experience of Combined Operations in supporting the ill-fated 
Dieppe landing, and had been planning the second front as part of the Combined 
Commanders. 51 
Leigh Mallory was considered stuffy and distant but was professional and 
thoroughly capable. He had been a premier developer of Army Cooperation within the 
RAF, and hadparticipated in the famous 1918 Amiens tank action as a supporting air 
squadron commander. He had been Commandant of the School of Army Air 
Cooperation. Leigh Mallory was despised by Tedder, who attempted to block his 
appointment, and then to unseat him. Tedder poisoned Eisenhower against Leigh 
Mallory, and combined with Spaatz to attempt to have him removed. Failing official 
action, he appointed his favored subordinate Air Marshal "Maori" Coningham as the 
"AOC, Advanced Headquarters, AEAF, " as a way to eliminate Montgomery's 
coordination with him. Tedder urged Spaatz to refuse to serve under Leigh Mallory, 
and managed to acquire the power to coordinate strategic bombers under his role as 
so NAC, RG 24, Volume 20420, File 969(D4), COSSAC (43) 81.16 November 1943, Directive to Air 
CommandcT-in-Chicf, Allied Expeditionary Air Force. The directive statcd that he was "to excrcisc 
operational command over the BRITISH and AMERICAN Tactical Air Forces. supporting the invasion 
of North-West EUROPE from the United Kingdom. " Pogue, The Supreme Command. 13,14.48. 
51 AWC, MS, RoyalAir Force Narrative: The Liheration ofNorth West Europe. 1944-1945 [hereafter 
referred to as RAFNarrativel, Volume I "The Planning and Preparation of the Allied Expeditionary Air 
Force for the Landings in Normandy" (London: Air Historical Branch. the Air Ministry, n. d. ). Chapters 
I and 2 cover the organization of AEAF and the formation of 2 Tactical Air Force (2 TAF); Bill 
Newton Dunn, Big Wing. - The Biography ofAir Chief Marshall Sir Trafford Leigh Mallory 
(Shrewsbury: Airlife Publishing, 1992). This book is largely based on the Leigh Mallory Diary, which 
is heavily excerpted in the book. The original diary includes only the period from 5 June 1944 to 15 
August 1944. 
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Deputy, SCAEF. Apparently, he had hoped to acquire Leigh Mallorýv*s portfolio, by 
eliminating AEAF. 0 
Coningham. proved an additional problem. Hating both the ArmY and 
Montgomery, he sabotaged any attempts to streamline or facilitate Army-Air 
cooperation. 53 While attempting to undermine Leigh Mallory, he would eventually 
attempt to cripple Army-Air relations by trying to relieve the AOCs of both 83 and 84 
Groups, both of whom "cooperated" with the Army. While he did engineer the relief 
of the 84 Group commander, he was unsuccessfid in dealing with Harry Broadhurst, 
the popular, cooperative, and dynamic commander of 83 Group, who was a personal 
favorite of Monty's and esteemed by the ground commanders he supported. 54 
Spaatz added further fuel to the air command fire by informing Leigh 
Mallory's deputy, an American, that his loyalty was to the Americans and not to his 
commander. Subsequently relieved on Leigh Mallory's demand, the new American 
deputy, Maj. Gen. Hoyt S. Vandenberg, proved willfully ineffective in aiding Leigh 
152 Davis, Spaatz and the Air War, 294,309-319; Air Vice-Marshal E. J. Kingston-McCloughry. The 
Direction of War. ý A Critique ofthe Political Direction and High Command in War (New York: 
Praeger, 1955), 116-135. 
'3 Quesada Interview, 1984. Lt. Gen. E. R. Quesada, Commander of IX Tactical Air Command in 
Northwest Europe, and a close associate of Coningham, told the author that Coningham's hatred of the 
British Army was vocal and constant, and that he was surprised that Coningharn was not relieved. 
Admitting that Coningham had taught him much, he said that Coningham's motto was not to support 
any action that the army told him to support, and to cooperate only if he had been part of the planning 
and conception. 
54 NAC, RG 24, Churchill Mann Papers, "Lecture on Air Support. " 
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Mallory. 55 Taken together. the airmen formed a virtual "Niediten-anean Nlafia. 
" with 
c 
Leigh Mallory the odd man out. 56 
While the principals came to the table unhappy, %ith one another. they were, at 
least during the OVERLORD planning stage, able to cooperate to plan and mount the 
invasion. In this effort, Eisenhower's role as coordinator and arbiter was essential. 
nk-, Cooperation, however, was ftirther impeded by something that Ta ' position, 
organization, or even nationality could not Solve, i-C- the differing -approach to battle- 
philosophies that each service and nationality held. While Eisenhower sought to 
separate nations and services along operational lines, the operational level often 
required a harmonization or synchronization of effort that was affected greatly by the 
tactics and equipment of each arm. Given the tendency to compare each other's efforts 
negatively, this was the foundation of much unwarranted criticism at command levels 
within the Allied camp. 
During the planning stage, this first manifested itself within the air command 
structure. Tedder correctly convinced Eisenhower that as theater commander, he 
should hold the operational direction of the strategic bombers, a command authority 
that Eisenhower had great trouble obtaining from the CCS. Given the authority to 
have strategic bombers operate "under the direction" of SCAEF, Eisenhower's first 
challenge was to settle the dispute over their employment. Tedder improved on Leigh 
"' Davis, Spaatz and the Air War, 354-355; Philip S. Mcilingcr, Vandenberg. The Life ofa General 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1989), 4445. 
16 The principal "Mediterranean-experienced" senior air commanders were Tedder. Spaatz, Doolittle, 
Brereton, Coningham, Vandenberg, and Broadhurst. Only Harris, who was entrenched at Bomber 
Command, shared Leigh Mallory's lack of Mediterranean experience. 
36 
Mallory's interdiction programme, creating a new design called the Transportation 
Plan. 57 
This plan was contested by Arnold's airman, Carl Spaatz. He believed that 
USSTAF could not only drive the Luftwaffe from the skies by direct assault against 
Germany's economic targets, but also drive Germany from the war. The key target to 
bring defeat, Spaatz held, was Germany's oil and petroleum production, not simply in 
oil fields but in the plants for synthetic oil. 
58 
Eisenhower's fight to obtain control of the air did not produce a tangible 
decision to attack transportation until 25 March 1944. The first bombing attacks by 
the Americans did not proceed until May, though RAF bombing had begun in March. 
Despite ongoing British participation, Churchill muddied the waters with repeated 
concerns over civilian casualties, delaying the American participation. 59 
The Transportation argument lay at the root of Air Force doctrine and practice. 
Both USSTAF and Bomber Command viewed themselves as "Strategic Forces" 
operating under POINTBLANK. The "Bomber Barons" viewed their campaign as 
complementary to, but separate from, OVERLORD. While Spaatz and Harris no 
doubt believed that their contribution was significant in its own realm, they also held 
firmly to not permitting the enemy industry and economy healing time while the heavy 
bombers supported OVERLORD. Moreover, the specter of heavy bombers directly 
5' Pogue, The Supreme Command, 123-133; John L. Sullivan, Overlord s Eagles: Operations ofthe 
United States Army Air Forces in the Invasion ofNorman4v in World War 11 (Jefferson, N. C.: 
McFarland and Company, 1997), Chapters Six and Seven; Solly Zuckerman, From Apes to Warriors 
(New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1978), passim. 
58 AWC, RAF Narrative, 1, Chapters 7 and 8; W. W. Rostow, Pre-Invasion Bombing Strategv. - General 
Eisenhower's Decision ofMarch 25,1944 (Austin: University of Texas Press, 198 1); Davis, Spaatz 
and the A ir War, 3 54-3 5 7. 
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supporting ground operations, as had happened at Salemo and Monte Cassino. was rý 
viewed as a misuse of aircraft and antithetical to air doctrine. 
While combining the strategic bombing force with the tactical forces. 2 
Tactical Air Force (2 TAF) and the US Ninth Air Force, Tedder was straddling belief 
systems as well as mixing specialized forces. His own belief was that airpower was 
best used for OVERLORD in "isolating the battlefield, "' an operational mission, rather 
than for providing close support, a tactical mission requiring close controls. Tedder's 
fence-sitting pleased Eisenhower. it gave him on-call use of the bombers, but it also 
gave Tedder, as executive agentý the role of defacto -Supreme" Allied Air 
Commander-a position Arnold opposed for any British airman. 60 
Both the RAF and the AAF held that not only the air forces were to be 
"independent" forces but also "equal" to the ground forces within a campaign. 
Surprisingly, considering their feelings toward the man, General Montgomery was a 
champion of this belief and widely quoted as such in AAF circles. His publication of a 
pamphlet, "Some Notes On High Command in War, " for his army was seen as 
supportive, if not one of the catalysts for the Army Air Forces' own publication of a 
doctrine stating its independence and equality, Field Manual (FM) 100-20, Command 
and Employment ofAir Power. 61 
5' Davis, Spaatz and the Air War, 400408. 
60 Churchill wanted Tedder to control all air, a way of inserting British control over air operations. 
Arnold had wanted Spaatz to be Supreme Allied Air Commander. 
61 US War Department, Field Manual (FM) 100-20: Command andEmployment ofAir Power 
[hereafter referred to as FM 100-20] (Washington: 21 July 1943); NARA, RG 18, entry 294, Central 
Decimal File, Memorandum for General Arnold, Subject: New Air Power Doctrine, G-3, Army Air 
Forces, June 8,1943, cites Montgomery's effect: Vincent Orange, David R. Mets, Daniel R. 
Mortensen, and David Spires, Air Power and GroundArmies: Essays on the Evolution ofAnglo- 
American Air Doctrine 1940-1943 (Maxwell A. F. B., Ala., Air University Press, 1998), passim. 
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While Tedder assured the airmen he would prevent their "misuse" by the 
army. Tedder's prot6g& Coningham. attempted to bureaucratize the air support process 
as a way to eliminate army control. As he would prove later in the command, as 
smooth techniques were worked out Coningharn would attempt to relieve the air 
commanders whom he felt had grown too close to the army. 62 
Tedder's own success at controlling the "bomber barons" caused problems 
with Doolittle, who resented his influence. Nor were the tactical air forces under the 
close control of AEAF. It was rumored that Brereton, of Ninth Air Force, tended to go 
his own way from Coningham's "Forward Headquarters" that he was subordinated to. 
Brereton, who also was waging part of the pre-invasion counterair campaign, earned 
Bradley's dislike when he failed to make Ninth Air Force assets available for training 
in lieu of the combat operations his commanders were then managing. 63 It must be 
stressed that while the operational air commanders-Tedder, Spaatz, Coningham, 
Brereton, and Doolittle-were not considered sympathetic to army problems, their 
subordinates who commanded the fighting elements (Broadhurst. Brown, Quesada. 
and Weyland) were considered genuine heroes by the soldiers and their commanders. 
Toward the end of his command, Leigh Mallory, too, would be seen by Montgomery 
as helpful for the Army's problems. 
QNAC, RG 24, Volume 10671, File 215CI. 093(D3), Air Support, Air Support in Second British 
Army and First Canadian Army, Brussels, 31.5.45. This document discusses the specifics of the 
organization and techniques developed for air support within 21 Army Group, Churchill Mann Papers, 
Air Support, ibid.; Ian Gooderson, Air Power at the Battlefront: Allied Close Air Support in Europe 
1943-1945 (London: Frank Cass, 1998), 2240,43. 
63 David W. Hogan, A Command Post at 9ar., First Arm 'v 
Headquarters in Europe. 1943-1945 
(Washington: Center of Military History, 2000), 45,65; Sullivan, Overlord's Eagles, 5-18. 
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The resulting air campaign in preparation for OVERLORD. however- must 
be 
considered a success, and Eisenhower's fight to make strategic bombers a theater 
asset, at least for the invasion, was correct. The value of the strategic bombers targeted 
against rail centers in lieu of fighter-bombers conducting rail cutting was controversial 
and the results disputed. 64 Beyond the military results, the arguments of the bomber 
fi 
commanders tcndcd to drive the airmen farther away from the soldiers, and intensi icd 
Tedder's demand that the army capture airfields to ease the air situation. Later, when 
Leigh Mallory drew directly on the strategic bombers for support, personal relations 
between these men would reach an all-time low. 
The approach to battle by the ground commanders was more divisive than 
for 
the airmen. In the air, the RAF and AAF shared common ideas, though their tactics 
and techniques were different. For the operational ground forces, the basic 
philosophies were more subtly different, and the difference in their own equipment 
and organizational design distorted the perceptions of one another, s effectiveness. 
Compounded by differing experience, nationalism, and a more personal interchange 
required for coordinating side-by-side ground operations. it was understandable that 
participants often perceived a chasm of difference rather than a common operational 
view. Worse still, unlike the airmen, there was a cancer of perception that had 
developed from their first battles together in Tunisia. Hard feelings begun in the 
Mediterranean had followed the commanders to England. 
'4 Rostow, Pre-Invasion Bombing Strategv, 72-87; Sullivan, Overlord s'Eagles, 153-180. Sullivan's 
analysis is the most detailed nonofficial analysis and critique of the Transportation Plan. It is 
particularly critical of Tedder and his strategist, Zuckerman. and their claims of success. 
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The operational differences reflect the Allies' Great War experience. The 
British Commonwealth had fought from August 1914 to the Armistice; the Americans 
entered the war in April 1917, but did not enter combat in substantial numbers until 
the summer of 1918 and not with a full field army until September. First US Army 
had seen but 110 days of action. Their scars less deep, the Americans examined their 
short experience differently. Moreover, the interwar posed fewer common 
experiences. The British Army resumed its Empire duties, America withdrew from the 
world stage. 
Montgomery's view of combat reflected the collective experience of the 
British Army. At the tactical level he stressed preparation for battle; at the operational 
level he clearly saw campaigns as sequenced and timed battles, designed first to 
destroy enemy forces in situ, and then to grind up the inevitable counterattacks and 
reinforcements that would arrive. This reflected a deep understanding not only of the 
reality of fighting a numerically larger army, but also experience in fighting the 
German army, an army possessed of the tactics and talent to fight an attrition battle in 
depth. 65 
Montgomery's views and talent matured from the desert to Europe, though his 
campaigns were stereotypical due to the realities of equipment, organization, and the 
6" General B. L. Montgomery, Some BriefNotesfor Senior 0jfIcers on tile Conduct ofBattle, Some 
Notes on High Command in War (Eighth Army, 1943); Field Marshal B. L. Montgomery, High 
Command in War (21 Army Group, 1945). 21 Army Group, Some Notes on the Use ofAir Power in 
Support ofLand Operations and Direct Air Support (21 Army Group, 1944); 21 Army Group, Some 
Notes on the Conduct of War and the Infantry Division in Battle (21 Army Group, 1944); 21 Army 
Group, The Armoured Division in Battle (21 Army Group, 1944); Stephen Brooks, ed., Montgomeiy 
and the Eighth Arm 
, vý* 
A Selectionfrom the Diaries. Correspondence and Other Papers of Field 
Marshal the Viscount Montgomeq ofAlamein, August 1942 to December 1943 (The Bodley Head: 
Army Records Society, 1991). Montgomery's pamphlets and correspondence encapsulate both his 
operational views and the "approach to battle" he used in his commands. 
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terrain. In the desert, he was forced to fight a war of mobility with an infantry-heavy 
army, lacking in the skills and tactics of armored warfare and only freshly supplied 
with the gun-power to defend its immobile troops from armored attack. At Alamein, 
he failed to control his inept armored corps commander, and spent precious fuel and 
transport on leap-frogging forward airfields for the Desert Air Force in the pursuit 
from Alamein. Yet Coningham whose airfields were moved forward, failed to make 
Rommel's one-road retreat a "highway of death" while simultaneously damning the 
army for not moving faster. His Sicily and Italy campaigns were mountain battles. a 
mismatch of organization and capabilities of his heavily wheeled forces too late 
configured for the deseM and now thrust on different fields. While his symphony 
approach to battle was refined, he lacked the forces and space to conduct true 
operations, nor was he given the weight of air effort to support simultaneous 
interdiction and close support operations, both necessary for keeping a battle fluid. 66 
As events would show, Montgomery's views had adjusted to a wider but 
different European battlefield, to include the new value of gun-power that had made 
the armored blitzkrieg impossible except under conditions created by an absence of 
the enemy or the destruction of his forces in depth, to include his reserves. 
Montgomery's plans and actions proved he understood the difference between 
operations and tactics, and how to use tactics to create an operational decision. 
Eisenhower, however, had not weighed the battlefield but was simply repelled 
by the man. In 1943, Ike had written: 
66 Hamilton. Master Ofthe Battlefield, 3-52. 
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Montgomery is of a different caliber from some of the outstanding 
British leaders you have met. He is unquestionably able, but very 
conceited. For your most secret and confidential infonnation, I will 
give you my opinion which is that he is so proud of his successes to 
date that he will never willingly make a move until he is absolutely 
certain of success-in other words. until he has concentrated enouch 
resources so that anybody could practically guarantee the outcome. 
This may be unfair to him, but it is the definite impression I received. 67 
Eisenhower would spread this gospel beyond Marshall to his American subordinates 
and senior staff, giving license to the anti-Monty flavor that permeated SHAEF. 
But it was military principle, not personality, that was the real issue. The issue 
of concentration was key. Concentration, particularly of the self-mobile panzer corps, 
was critical in the 1940 campaign and was used to gain an operational-level decision. 
Abandoning this concentration and the idea of sequenced operational objectives to 
support a strategic objective, the Russian campaign had stalled, irrevocably. 
Montgomery's own observation on these campaigns, and his view that the British had 
failed in Africa due to piecemeal commitment of forces, influenced his thinking. He 
balanced tactical and operational concentration. 68 
Despite his reputation for outnumbering his enemies, that reputation is less 
than accurate considering that the greatest numbers advantage, even at Alamein, was 
in overall forces, not necessarily at the point of attack on the German front line. He 
sought to have superiority of fires, enough forces to hold open a penetration, and 
reserves to meet a fluid situation. Montgomery understood the German principle of 
6' EL, Butcher Papers and Eisenhower Papers, 11,1070-107 1. In the printed version, this section has 
been purged; Hamilton, Master ofthe Battlefield, 210-211. 
" Brooks, Montgoineq and the Eighth Arm , y, passim. 
This volume demonstrates Montgomery's 
thinking and shows his progression of thought concerning operations; Stephen Ashley Hart, 
Montgomety and "Colossal Cracks ". The 21st ArmY Group in Northwest Europe, 1944-1945 
(Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 2000), Chapters 4 and 5. 
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the Schwerpunkt, concerning concentratin for main efforts or at a critical point. 
6" 
4: 1 9 
The issue for all of his operations was not "the break--in battle, " it was dealing with 
enemy reserves as he "broke out. " 
He also stressed "grouping, " called task organizing by the Americans. 
Montgomery "grouped" at corps level. The American tendency was to task organize at 
lowest levels using a standard corps mix of two infantry and one armored division, 
with the ke attachments being artillery, additional ammunition for artillery. and y CIP 
apportioned air sorties. The American tendency to use armored divisions as a corps 
standard in nonarmored terrain, to include holding ground, and the British tendency to 
shift armor to reserve, or to use it only for specific attacks, was viewed by the 
Americans as "cautious. " 
The Eisenhower view of concentration at the operational level had brought 
stalemate or disaster repeatedly to Allied arms in the Mediterraean. His support of a 
"far" landing in Casablanca to please Marshall, rather than a closer landing to weight 
his attack for Tunis, the strategic object; his far-fetched SATIN plan to dash laterally 
across Tunisia without roads, transport, or logistics that brought on the Kasserine 
fiasco; his wasteful landing of Eighth Army in the toe of Italy, rather than pushing for 
a second army-sized landing north of Salerno; and his farcical plan to outlflank the 
Winter Line in Italy with a single division which hatched the too-small and 
subsequently disastrous Anzio landings-all of these were the result of staff college 
maxims concerning boldness and maneuver that played well in crayon on maps, but 
which the Germans often turned into bloody horror-shows when attempted with real 
Hart, Montgomeq and "Colossal Cracks, " ibid. 
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troops. Failure. of course, was accorded in military tradition to subordinates. Ike 
learned nothing. 
Concentration would be a hallmark of Bradley's Normandy operations until 
August, after which dispersion and maneuver would beg for a new campaign plan and 
Bradley would return to the Eisenhower model. While American practice stressed 
time and rapidity over complete planning or concentration, a key distinction from 
British practice, the result when resistance was met was stalemate, and a pause to 
concentrate and attack in strength on a narTow front. 70 
The key issue for the ground commanders was the level of command at which 
battles were fought. Army4evel was really the lowest level from which air, artillery 
groups, armored brigades or separate battalions, engineers, signals, and a host of 
supporting arms as well as transport and logistic support could be apportioned. and 
constituted, at the time, the pure operational level of war. Corps, the largest tactical 
elements, fought battles grouping resources and divisions provided by the Armies. 
The Army Groups created an operational design for the use of the annies to support 
the theater campaign plan. The army commanders were the key catalysts in carrying 
out operations, and the Army Groups the key catalysts for campaigns. Army Groups 
and Armies had corresponding air headquarters that co-located to ensure a seamless 
battle, a system that had been developed by Montgomery and Coningham in North 
70 Michael D. Doubler, Closing With the Enemv. How GIs Fought the War in Europe. 1944-1945 (Lawrence: The University Press of Kansas, 1ý94), passim. This is the most detailed study of US tactics and procedures used in Northwest Europe. US generals tended to view -operations" merely as a bigger scale of tactics; the relation of tactics to operations has not been covered by historians. 
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Africa. 71 Coningham, however, never co-located with Montgomery in Northwest 
Europe, Montgomery sticking to his dictum that he needed to be close to the front, and 
Coningham feeling the army commander should move rearward to be with him. 
Regardless of country, successful commanders both planned and tasked two 
levels downward. 72 To do less invited disaster. Montgomery's tendency to see battle 
this way appalled the Americans, though the frequency of American division 
commanders being threatened by Army commanders or relieved by Army 
commanders indicates that the Americans practiced the same procedure, but without 
written orders. Army Groups and Armies normally wrote letters of instruction or 
operational memoranda as opposed to publishing formal orders or plans after the 
campaign plan had been devised. 
The American and Commonwealth forces often misunderstood each other 
across their formation boundaries, a factor that became critical when operations had to 
be harmonized, or timed as complementary to each other. Montgomery saw the 
battlefield as interelated sectors; Bradley, as it will be seen, did not. Eisenhower's 
view, however, would be most important. As Supreme Commander and Ground 
" Hamilton, Monýv: The Making ofa General, 638. This was apparently Montgomery's idea. 
Coningharn had retreated to more rearward airfields during the battles preceding First Alamein. The 
ground commander, Gen. Sir Claude Auchinleck, remained forward to command and inspire a 
faltering army. In order to collocate with Coningham, Monty moved the Army Headquarters rearward, 
severely hampering his own battle control during Second Alamein, during both the battle and the 
pursuit. As with all World War 11 actions, command and control was hampered by an overreliance on 
wire communications and undependable AM and FM radios. 
72 The author is indebted to Oberst-Dr. Heinz Golla, German Army, who as Chief of Exercise Branch, Central Army Group NATO, pointed out that the true translation of "mission tactics" as seen by the 
German army provided for this and recommended that Richard E. Simpkin's Race to the Swift: 
Thoughts on 21st Centu?: v Warfare is the best source in English concerning this topic. A discussion of 
taskings "two down" is essential to understand this. See, Richard E. Simpkin, Race to the Swift. ' Thoughts on 21" Century Warfare (London: Brassey's Defence Publishers, 1985), 232-234. Bruce 
Condell and David T. Zabecki, eds. and trans., On the German Art of War: Thippenfuhning (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Reinncr, 2001), is a translation of the German doctrinal manual used during World War 
11. 
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Forces Commander-in-Chief, his views and his command style would shape the 
upcoming campaign. 
In 1943, writing to his fiiend Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten, Eisenhower 
outlined 1-ýs views on Allied Command: 
The true basis [for Allied unity of command] lies in the earnest 
cooperation of the senior officers assigned to the Allied theater. 
Referring to the position of General Alexander, who was commanding the 
15th Army Group and had been designated by the CCS as Deputy Commander-in- 
Chief: 
He is the Commander-in-Chief only of ground forces committed to an 
operation ... he is coordinate with the commanders of Sea and Air. These two commanders are ordinarily with me. 
The result is that I am the over-all ground Commander-in-Chief. and I 
rather feel that it would be waste and duplication to assign another 
individual to that particular position. Likewise, it would be a waste to 
keep a man indefinitely as "Deputy Commander-in-Chief' with no 
other duties than to be just a stand-by in case of disaster to the 
Commander. 
Concerning the actual role of the Supreme Commander: 
He is in a very definite sense the Chairman of a Board, a Chairman that 
has very definite responsibilities. 73 
Eisenhower was describing the problems that would arise with his "Deputy, " 
Tedder, and also those that would surface over Montgomery's commaýd of an Anglo- 
American 21 Army Group. Further extolling his ideas in a secret diary memorandum 
in May 1944, he noted that of his three commanders-in-chief for OVERLORD, two 
were "ýtualistic" and needed more innoculation on unification. Clarifying the 
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comment for his probing Boswell. Butcher. he noted that these commanders were 
Ramsay and Leigh Mallory, not Montgomery. 
74 
Concerning the exercise of ground command, Eisenhower "always intended" 
to establish three separate "Commanders-in-Chief, " and that 
the land force in each natural channel of march should have its own 
commander, each reporting directly to my headquarters. 
75 
How he would command, he explained after the war. 
Examination will show that there were three great areas in which we 
had to develop our operations against Germany proper and each of 
these areas demanded a ground commander-in-chief.... 
In each of these great zones a battle line commander was'necessary and 
each of them worked with his own tactical Air Force commander. 
Above them, there was one control only, strategy, and the allocation of 
the mass of the Air Forces and logistics. That was my function and any 
thought of inserting a ground commander between those three 
commanders and myself was not based on logic. 76 
The conduct of operations, therefore, was his subordinates' role; his "stratee' 
would overlay their operations, but no discussion or perhaps understanding of the 
interrelationship of the three ground commanders-in-chief was described, even after 
the fact. OVERLORD's first challenge, the planning and execution of NEPTUNE, the 
actual landings themselves, would ruthlessly test Eisenhower's "Chairmanship of a 
Board, " and would mark Eisenhower's great character and skill in military diplomacy. 
7'Eisenhower Papers, 111,1420-1422. 
74 Ibid., 1880-1882. It is interesting that he does not mention Tedder, whose entire influence was based 
on "ritualistic" practices and who created the least smooth or cooperative of any of the command 
relations for the invasion. 
" Eiscnhowcr, Chisade in Europe, 223. 
16 Eisenhower Papers, VIII, 1574-1575. 
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SHAEF's assumption of control of ground operations was far off, and 
dependent not on the planning staff's theories or philosophy but on the vagaries of 
battle itself 
49 
CHAPTER TWO 
The Seeds Of Dissension 
The COSSAC, Lt. Gen. Frederick Morgan, made a tremendous contribution to 
OVERLORD. The proposed OUTLINE OVERLORD that he forwarded at the end of 
July 1943 opened the door for serious consideration of OVERLORD as a "sound 
operation of war. " He confirmed the location of the invasion, gave the operation a 
tentative structure, initiated key Allied planning and, most important, had obtained the 
approval of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, the Prime Minister, and the President. " 
The great strategic debate that had plagued the Allies, namely the time and place of 
the Cross-Channel attack, was given a solution. Henceforth, the operational 
requirements of the plan took over. 
Churchill, upon seeing OUTLINE OVERLORD, said that it needed to be -25 
percent larger. " But decisive debate over the size of OVERLORD was squelched at 
the Combined Chiefs level. The Americans, perhaps fearing a British ploy to cancel 
the operation, pushed for its immediate acceptance. The British, perhaps fearing the 
operation would fail, wanted additional discussion of the concept. No changes were 
made until January 1944, after the appointment of commanders for the operation. 78 
By that month, the Supreme Commander designate, his chief of staff and his 
newly named ground commander all had similarly pronounced the landing force to be 
too small. The invasion of Sicily (OPERATION HUSKY) had already proceeded with 
77 MHI, MS, "History of COSSAC"; Morgan, Overture to Overlord, which is an expansion of the 
COSSAC manuscript, descfibes the planning and problems in dctail. 
79 D'Este, Decision in Normandy, is the most analytical work on the Normandy Invasion plans, and the 
beginning source for any historical discussion of their development. 
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a seven-division landing,. Surely a direct assault on Fortress Europe would require a 
greater effort! This obvious debate, however, had not been addressed by the Combined 
Chiefs in their early discussions of COSSAC's plan, and world-wide allocation of 
naval forces and landing craft had been made without reference to expanded needs for 
Europe. The landing craft issue was further complicated by the proposal for a 
simultaneous landing OPERATION ANVEL in the south of France, as a "diversion, " a 
concept quickly seized upon by Stalin, who saw such a landing as a part of a massive 
compression envelopment designed to trap the German army in the west. The wish, 
not the reality, would haunt OVERLORD's development and eventual conduct. 
79 
Nor had General Marshall, the presumed future commander, addressed the 
issue when Morgan travelled to Washington to brief him on developments and to 
begin establishing a personal relationship with the man whom he believed to be his 
future boss. Marshall's failure to prompt a strategic review of assigned assets proved a 
major blunder, eventually delaying the actual landings by a month and revising the 
proposed "diversion" landing in the Mediterranean. 80 
The lack of naval lift had restricted the COSSAC planners into crafting a 
three-division assault, a deficiency that General Eisenhower immediately sought to 
79 Gordon A. Harrison, Cross-Channel Attack (Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, 
1951), 123. 
" Chester Wilmotý The Strugglefor Europe (London: Collins, 1952), 135-138; Morgan, Overture to 
Overlord, Chapter VIII, does not discuss this issue regarding his meetings with Marshall. Apparently 
Morgan was content to accept the 1943 strictures on size, and did not make issue of them with 
Marshall or anyone else. 
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eliminate. Montgomery. the 21 Army Group Commander. was tasked by the Supreme 
Commander to revise the plan, based on a five-division lift for the first wave. 
91 
Five divisions offered more than a broader, stronger attack. They permitted an 
entirely new operational concept. Despite the operation's joint nature, the possibilities 
offered by the enhanced ground plan controlled the revision for NEPTUNE, the name 
assigned for the OVERLORD landing. As long as resources permitted, air and naval 
forces would conform to the ground commander's concept within the limits of their 
own operational capabilities. 
Montgomery was quick to seize the opportunity to shape NEPTUNE. Unhappy 
with the size and concentration offered in the COSSAC plan. and charged by 
Eisenhower to strengthen the assault, Montgomery arrived in London intent on 
widening and deepening the assault. By his arrival he had studied COSSAC's plan, 
but was not convinced the plan had considered the requirement for ports within the 
lodgement area as the prerequisite to the operation's success. Not mesmerized by the 
assault alone, Montgomery's calculations considered the Allied buildup versus the 
arrival of German reserves, and the subsequent attrition battles that would develop as 
the correlation of forces swung towards favoring the defenders. Not just more forces, 
81 Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, 219; Field Marshal Bernard L. Montgomery, Norman4v to the 
Baltic (Germany: British Army of the Rhine, 1946), 9-14; Field Marshal Bernard L. Montgomery, The 
Memoirs offield-Marshal the Viscount Montgomeq ofAlamein [hereafter referred to as Montgomery, 
Alemoirs] (New York: The World Publishing Company, 1958), 189-19 1. Pogue, The Supreme 
Command, 108-109; General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower, Report ky the Supreme Commander 
to the Combined Chiefs ofStaffon the Operations in Europe ofthe Allied Expeditionaq Force 6 June 
1944 to 8 Mav 1945 (Washington: Center of M ilitary H istory, 1994) (reprint), 3; MH1, Papers ofDr. 
Forrest C. Pýgue [hereafter referred to as Pogue Papers], Interview with General Eisenhower by Col. 
S. L. A. Marshall, 3 June 1946. 
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but more deployment space and the necessary port facilities or sheltered beaches 
became prime requirements to be solved by the plan of attack. 
82 
Montgomery's first objection, therefore, should have been predictable. Why 
were no landings planned within the key Brittany peninsula, the key to the entire 
American buildup plan? Major General Charles West, the senior Army planner. ticked 
off the parameters, including beaches, air support airfield possibilities-all in the 
minus column rather than the plus. It was not, however, the end of Montgomery*s 
drunifire questioning of the COSSAC plan and was the beginning of a three-day 
dissection of the plan, its logic, and the possibilities for expansion. 
83 
Montgomery did accept the logic of landing in the Bay de la Seine. but he 
immediately veered from Morgan's underlying belief in a single key to the operation. 
Morgan's planners had, in fact, stated that Caen's possession was necessary "to avoid 
defeat early in the operation. " While this would be added to the Air Force's trump, 
64 airfields" as symbolizing near failure during the actual operation. the nuances of both 
the COSSAC plan and the Eisenhower-approved Montgomery revision, plus the 
plan's subsequent execution in Normandy, must be examined in tandem to see the 
foundation of the rift between Eisenhower and SHAEF, and Montgomery, that would 
prevent the execution of a harmonized campaign plan for the rest of the war in 1944.84 
82 CMH, Historical Section, USFET, "Outline of Notes on History of Planning, " 1, provides the most 
detailed summary of planning initiatives and details. A careful assessment of both the COSSAC plan 
and the Initial Joint Plan is essential to understand the NEPTUNE revision. COSSAC was also referred 
to as "OVERLORD ONE" after its acceptance and during its refinement in the fall of 1943. 
83 Hamilton, Master ofthe Battlefield, 491-495, summarizes the planner's postwar interviews, MHI, 
Pogue Papers, Interview with Major General Kenneth R. McClean, 11-13 March 1947; Interview with 
Major General Ray W. Barker, 16 October 1946; D'Este, Decision in Normandy, 62-67. 
84 MHI, MS, War Cabinet, Chiefs of Staff Committee, "OPERATION OVERLORD" Report and 
Appreciation, 30 July, [hereafter referred to as COSSAC Plan], 21 (Para. 96). 
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COSSAC's outline plan froze an operational concept for all to see. Never 
intended to be "a plan, " the outline theorized a concept of operation within a rigidly 
defined construct of both fTiendly and enemy orders of battle. While identifying key 
terrain features and the necessary ports for development, and setting a 90-day schedule 
for accomplishing the development of the lodgement at the Seine River, COSSAC's 
outline did not plan actual operations, provide concrete intermediate objectives, 
specify a line of operations, or propose an operational policy. Rather, it sketched 
hypothetical phase lines and, in theoretical annexes, proposed possible axes of 
advance. 
85 
Critical to the outline, was the limit placed on the probable enemy strengths. 
beyond which the outline was not considered a "sound operation of war. " This 
correlation of forces, to include the critical buildup of enemy panzer or otherwise first- 
class divisions, gave the planners a fair, even if hypothetical, manner in which to 
estimate if the operations, both at the time of landing and during the three months 
estimated to create the full lodgement, would be a success, a failure, or a stalemate. As 
such, these were the most important, yet virtually invisible, portions of the Morgan 
plan. How the correlation was made, updated, and assessed, argues the essence of 
Allied intelligence, planning and, moreover, the process of "forecasting" seemingly 
unavoidable at the SHAEF-CCS level. 86 
While COSSAC and its staff argued against the Montgomery revision, 
COSSAC never admitted that the enemy reaction to the original outline was predicted 
85 COSSAC Plan, passim. 
F. H. Hinsley et al., British Intelligence in the Second Worldftr, Volume 3, Part 2 (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1988), Chapters 43,44. 
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to be larger than originally foreseen in the August 1943 concept as Montgomery was 
revising the plan. Moreover, this updated threat analysis called in question the basic 
lines of operation listed as possible in the outline annexes. The enemy threat would 
continue to grow right up until the actual landings. 87 
COSSAC listed the ports of Cherbourg and the Brittany peninsula as 
OVERLORD's prime objectives, but saw Caen as the key D-Day objective. Caen 
became the campaiogn's red herring. At ten miles from the shore line, it was too far to 
be considered a logical assault objective on the landing day, COSSAC's planners 
solved their problem by assigning a coup-de-main capture by the airborne as the 
logical solution. This would be accomplished by the assigned two-thirds of a division 
lift, permitted by the CCS directive. 88 
Caen controlled the key roads entering the OVERLORD area from the prime 
German concentration areas near the Pas de Calais, as well as possessing a geographic 
location at the mouth of the best avenue of approach from the OVERLORD area 
toward Paris. From the point of the attacker, Caen would be a magnet for enemy 
mobile divisions counterattacking the invasion area. 89 
Caen's attraction, however, became an air force mantra, and its possession a 
repetitive incantation that distorted its value to the ongoing attrition battle in the 
OVERLORD area. At the time of the COSSAC plan's conception, air superiority was 
a major preoccupation for the planners. With the daylight bombing of Germany in an 
87 COSSAC Plan, 8-9 (Para. 36), Hinsley, British Intelligence, 3, Part 2,41-87, NARA, RG 33 1, Entry 
1, Box 59, File 350.09/3, "Buildup of Enemy Forces, " SHQ AEF, (44) 17,12th February 1944. 
88 COSSAC Plan, 27 (Para. 21), 8.7-90 (Appendix "0"). The plan envisioned three lifts with an elapsed 
time of 16 hours. 
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incipient stage, the actual defeat of the Luftwaffe as a prerequisite for landing was not 
seen as an immediately viable object. The requirement to weaken, and thereafter "hold 
off, " the German daylight fighter force fi-om the landing areas, was as key an enabling 
task for a successful invasion as protecting the fleet and providing for a logistical 
buildup in the invasion area. Caen was seen as the key to maintaining air superiority in 
the invasion area. 90 
Montgomery's Irinal outline provided for a "main effort" in each army zone. 
the object being to ensure that OVERLORD's prime requirements of a lodgement area 
could not be eliminated by a single enemy concentration. The original COSSAC 
planners baulked at what they felt would be a dispersion of effort and lack of focus on 
Caen. Morgan, had in fact, countered that a strengthened OVERLORD should have an 
additional division in the landing, all pointed at Caen. Additional airborne lift could 
go to the Caen coup-de-main. 91 
The NEPTUNE Initial Joint Plan promulgated by the Combined Commanders 
on I February 1944 was, in fact, the only written campaign plan accepted by the 21 
Army Group Commander, and the initiating planning document for ground battle 
plans. Its stipulations cancelled COSSAC's outline plan, a fact resisted by Morgan, 
misunderstood by Eisenhower, and ignored by Tedder and Monty's enemies at 
SHAEF. It provided the very broadest of "master plans" upon which subordinate 
planners could base their estimates and upon which commanders could begin their 
own tactical planning. Monty intended, and indeed continued throughout the 
s' COSSAC Plan, 22 (Para. 104), 98 (Appendix V, Para. 1). 
90 COSSAC Plan, 4 (Paras, 8- 1, Map "M B"), 8 (Paras. 34-35). 
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preparation and execution phase, to sharpen, modify, and reassess his orders in the 
light of newly developed intelligence and later an unfolding enemy reaction. But the 
initial Initial Joint Plan was the real "Master Plan. " 
The Initial Joint Plan listed its intention: 
The intention of the Joint Commanders-in-Chief is to assault 
simultaneously immediately North of the Carentan Estuary, and 
between the Carentan estuary and the River Orne, with the object of 
securing as a base for ftirther operations a lodgement area which will 
include airfield sites and the port of Cherbourg. 
92 
These intentions overturned Morgan's assessments, not only concerning Caen 
as the focal point but also regarding the existence of the marshy terrain that divided 
the lower Cotentin in the vicinity of the Carentan area. COSSAC believed the enemy 
could use both to separate a wide landing and provide a defensible position to prevent 
a cohesive lodgement from forming, and also to block a southern move from the 
Cotentin Peninsula. 93 One seaborne and two airborne divisions would essentially form 
"' D'Este, Decision in Nonnan4v, 66-68. 
92 MHI, MS, and First United States Army, Report of Operations [hereafter referred to as FUSA Report 
of Operations], 20 October 1943-1 August 1944, Annex 1, Intial Joint Plan, I February 1944, Para. 26; 
NARA RG 33 1, Decimal 322.01 PS to 327.22, Box 47. SHAEF Summary Directives, SHAEF (44) 22. 
10 March 1944, Subject: Operation Overlord, to the three -commanders-in-chief. " is an interesting 
paper deserving comment. It cancelled previous COSSAC planning directives and addresses the 
command function and notes that "Commander-in-Chief, 21 Army Group, is to command all ground 
forces engaged in the operation until such time as the Supreme Commander allocates an area of 
responsibility to the Commanding General, First (US) Army Group. " By implication, this will be at the 
end of Phase I of the operation, the establishment of the beachhead, and the capture of Cherbourg and 
the airfield sites. Phase 11, the capture of Brittany, is absent from the commandladministrative 
appendix. 
More intriguing is paragraph 2 1, that states, "You will adhere to the broad design of the operation 
as given in the Outline Plan [COSSAC] which has been approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. " 
Considering his directive to Montgomery to "direct and coordinate planning ... 
for the seizure of the 
lodgement area and for initiating operations subsequent to the. seizure of the lodgement area, " it can be 
assumed that Eisenhower did not find COSSAC binding on the conduct of the campaign, except for the 
idea of landing in Normandy and establishing a lodgement including the Brittany ports. This conflicts 
with Eisenhower's later views on the plan. 
93 COSSAC Plan, 5 (Para. 17), 6 (Para. 26). 
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their own lodgement, too far to immediately seize Cherbourg. to immediately block 
the Cotentin, or to quickly link with the main beaches to the east. 94 
Specific tasks allotted to each army, both on D-Day and during the subsequent 
expansion of the lodgement, were described: 
The tasks of First United States Army in order of priority will be: 
(a) to capture Cherbourg as quickly as possible; 
(b) to develop Viervflle-sur-Mer-Collevifle-sur-Mer beachhead Southwards 
toward St. Lo in conformity with the advance of Second British 
Army. 
The main task of Second British Army will be to develop the 
bridgehead South of the line Caen ... St. Lo and Southeast of Caen in 
order to secure airfield sites and protect the flank of First United States 
Army while the later is capturing Cherbourg. 95 
COSSAC had circumscribed the lodgement buildup by a series of phase-lines 
timed to meet the 90 days estimated to capture the sector defined by the Seine River 
and to include the Brittany ports. This time requirement was never challenged by 21 
Army Group, though the placement of the timings of the lines did change. The lines 
also were influenced by the armies themselves, who were required by the Initial Joint 
Plan to submit their own time estimates for incorporation into buildup planning. 96 
Phase-lines were common in military plans. British offensives in World War I 
94 L. F. Ellis, Victory in the ffest, Vol. 1, The Battle ofNormand), (London: Imperial War Museum, 
1962,1993), 138-139; Harrison, Cross-Channel Attack, 186. Týe airborne plan was changed on 27 
May to reflect new intelligence concerning the location of German reserves. Under the original 
concept, the US 82nd Airborne Division would have been tasked to try to block northward movement 
into the Cotentin by Gen-nan reserves and establish a blocking line north of the peninsula's neck. 
9' Initial Joint Plan, Paras. 64,65. 
96 COSSAC Plan, 28,29 (Paras 38-6);, 30-34 (Part III, Paras. 1-11), Maps "MC, " "MD, " "MF-" "MF, " 
MG, " "MH, " "MJ, " "MK"; Montgomery, Norman4i, to the Baltic, Map 2 Basic Conception Army 
Plan; FUSA Report of Operations Oct 43-Aug 44, Annex 20,25 February 1944, Forecast of 
Operations. The initial Joint Plan did not issue phase line maps, which were updated throughout the 
planning process using COSSAC's D+90 line as the base. Montgomery's published map was the last 
issued set of phase lines. 
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frequently used them, usually coded as named color lines (i. e. Blue Line. Red Line 
etc. ), and American operations also made provision for their use, generally as control 
measures en route to an objective. 97 These lines, then, were familiar controls not 
predicted to spark controversy. VAfile the phase-lines gave SHAEF a schedule to 
measure, they did not indicate thrust lines, major objectives, or a key to the Army 
Group's main efforts. Their formal title in the plan was "Forecast of Operations. " (See 
figure 3. ) 
These lines became a bone of contention prior to the final briefing and later 
were used by Montgomery's critics "to prove" that he and his plans had failed. 
Bradley, who in February had published phase-lines in his own plan, refused to have 
them displayed during Montgomery's briefing and rehearsal during EXERCISE 
98 THUNDERCLAP in April. 
Montgomery's Canadian aide had predicted that the phase-lines would become 
weapons for Monty's enemies; Montgomery apparently saw little concrete in their use, 
either during the planning phase or in explaining the progress of his campaign. He did, 
however, focus on one line, the D+17 line as measure of correlating forces with the 
predicted enemy buildup. After that date, a temporary equilibrium was predicted. 99 
" War Department, Technical Manual 20-205, Dictionar: v of United States ArmY Terms [hereafter 
referred to as Dictionary of US Arm , il 
Terms] (Washington, 18 January 1944), 200. This states, "Phase 
line: conspicuous terrain feature chosen as a place where troops may be halted for control, 
coordination, and further orders, etc. Each phase line is used as a temporary objective on the way to the 
final objective. " Montgomery used phase lines during El Alamein and most sct-piecc attacks. 
" General J. Lawton Collins, LightningJoe: An Autobiograpk), (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State 
University Press, 1979), 191,192; Hamilton, Master of the Battlefield, 560. 
" NAC, RG 24, Volume 10433,21 A Gp/oon4/G(Plans), 26 February 1944. The issuing document 
accompanying the phase line overlays stated: "[T]he attached maps forecast the possible development 
of operations subsequent to the assault. It is emphasised that this forecast has been prepared as a basis 
for administrative planning and that its fulfillment in practice will be dependent on enemy reactions 
which cannot at present be foreseen. " 
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This crossover forecast of the potential buildup of both the ffiendly and enemy forces 
was key in determining the success of the drive inland. It would haunt commanders on 
both sides and determine the tactics of the commanders in the field. 
The plans forecast demonstrated the broadest concept of operations begun by 
Morgan and accepted by Montgomery, i. e., the primacy of the landing region. the need 
for ports, and that operations might develop to the Seine in about 90 days. 
Significantly different, was that Brittany, and not the Caen avenue to Paris, was to be 
the point of main effort for the Allied advance, and there would be no westward wheel 
toward the Cotentin after the airfield areas beyond Caen and Falaise were taken. 
Though significant argument over the depth of the British penetration, its timing, and 
its failure to procure the airfield territory south of Caen would arise, all matters of 
tactics, the fact was that the overall belief always was that the Brittany ports were the 
key to establishing the lodgement-the true object of OVERLORD. ' 00 
Montgomery did modify the most basic assumption of the COSSAC plan, the 
total dependence upon Caen as the only key to the operation. Morgan's planners had 
identified the city as the key communications hub through which any substantial 
German commitment of reserves would come and the portal to the airfield country 
demanded by the air planners. The plan clearly stated, 
Caen, the bottleneck, remains the key. It is essential for us to seize early if we 
are able to avoid defeat in the early stages. It is also a valuable pivot for 
operations to develop the bridgehead. 101 
'00 COSSAC Plan, 2, "to secure a lodgement on the Continent from which further operations can 
develop. The lodgement must contain sufficient port facilities to maintain a force of some twenty-six to 
thirty divisions. " These were the Brittany ports. 
'O'COSSAC Plan, para. 96. 
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Montgomery returned to the most basic of the Principles of War. Maintenance 
of the Objective. NEPTUNE's basic object was a lodgement, made possible by the 
early development of Cherbourg and the Brittany ports. Monty would therefore strike 
out for both objectives simultaneously. Cherbourg, as well as Caen, would be an early 
objectives, "to avoid early defeat" as stated by COSSAC, not as a pivot to go to 
Brittany. 
Two facts of terrain dominated tactics in Normandy and predetermined the 
type of fighting to be expected on each flank of the Allied front. Caen, Morgan's 
focus point and the area of most interest to the airmen, offered open rolling terrain, 
with long-range fields of fire and good going for tanks and vehicles. Caen also offered 
other opportunities that would cause it to be the Schwerpunkt (critical point or focus 
of effort) of the enemy's defense. ' 02 
From the defender's perspective, Caen, its plain, and the high ground to its 
northeast constituted the major terrain localities needed to trap an invader landing in 
NEPTUNE's eastern zone. Taken together, they walled in the invaders and permitted 
major counterattacks, including rolling up the invasion from east to west. From the 
Caen plain, artillery could fire on concentration areas and on naval craft inshore. The 
terrain east of the Orne River along the coast, likewise, was a logical staging area to 
interdict an inland advance by long-range fires, including those from fixed shore 
. 103 battenes. 
102 COSSAC Plan, 19 (Paras, 86,87), 20 (Paras, 88-93), 98-103 (Annex V, Paras. 1-20, Annexurc I). 
Annex "V" is a detailed topographic and tactical study of the area. 
103 COSSAC Plan, 16 (Para. 55), 21 (Para. 98). Note though the planners identified these problems, the 
limited-sizc assault precluded their solution except by airborne forces or commandos not provided in 
the CCS-approved troop list. 
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Montgomery solved this problem by widening the beach assault and dropping 
an airborne division in this vital area. This reversed Morgan's favored route of a 
direct, narrow-based assault with an airborne division (minus) seizing Caen on D-Day. 
Paget's 21 Army Group intelligence supported Morgan's concept. Assessing 
the two locatable German panzer divisions within striking distance of OVERLORD at 
Lisieux and Laval, 21 Army Group believed that the Germans could counterattack 
with infantry against the British beaches (Caen) in about eight hours and the American 
beaches (Bayeux) in about ten. Panzer attacks could form in about ten and 14 hours in 
those zones, respectively. 
Accepting a near-clairvoyant enemy that could both read and assess the 
situation that these landings were not diversions, and that a 12-hour window during 
which no heavy support or armor could land until the next tide would require the 
Schwerpunkt to be the beaches themselves, Paget's intelligence predicted that the 
Germans would use both divisions to attack their respective beaches as soon as 
possible, with the vital town of Caen bypassed. ' 04 The implication was clear. The 
airborne would be free to take the town and to consolidate their hold while awaiting 
the battle of the beaches to be determined by the main force. Caen, as the "key" to 
victory or defeat, remained a viable D-Day objective for COSSAC. 
Montgomery lacked COSSAC's comforting estimates. By 1944, Rommel's 
new broom had stressed a stronger forward defense, to include the massive application 
of field fortifications, mines, and the closer siting of counterattack forces. It was, 
104 NAC, RG24, Volume 10540, File 215A21.014(D6), 21 Agp/INT/1101/4,26 August 43, 
Appreciation of the likely action by two reserve Panzer Divisions on 'D' day of OVERLORD ONE, I- 3. 
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doctrinally, the reinstitution of the defense tactics and structure of the 1917-1918 
defense of the west. VvUle Montgomery stressed both the break-in battle and the need 
to gain depth immediately, one additional factor lay outside of Montgomery's 
influence-the effective use of reserves by the defender. Two major operations were 
to affect these, one active and one passive. The active operation was the controversial 
Transportation Plan meant to interdict and, as much as possible, isolate the 
NEPTUNE area. The "passive" operation was FORTITUDE, the famed "Bodyguard 
of Lies" designed to fix German attention to the Pas De Calais area where it was 
believed Hitler and his generals most feared a landing. 
105 
FORMUDE gave one contradictory blessing. If successful, it would hold 
German divisions to the northeast flank of the invasion, the prime avenue of advance 
toward the final objective-the Ruhr and the critical supply path for the British 21 
Army Group, which intended to use the Channel ports as its lines of communication 
and supply with England. Likewise, it gave the Germans the opportunity to commit, 
piecemeal, mobile reinforcements towards the critical eastern flank of the invasion, 
while retaining static divisions in strength to cover the threatened Pas de Calais coast. 
These facts should have convinced Eisenhower that Caen was, as it was later 
termed, more a shield than a pivot for the advance, and that the Allied effort though 
lacking a designated main effort, would rely heavily on Bradley's forces to penetrate 
the dense bocage area while Dempsey's army crumbled away the German 
counterattack forces drawn both to the major avenue and siphoned off the Pas De 
'0ý NARA 33 1, Entry 1, Box 59, "Estimate of Enemy Build-up, " op. cit. SHAEF (44) 21,26 February 
1944, contains Eisenhower's directive for FORTITUDE; Roger Hesketh, FORTITUDE. The D-Day 
Deception Campaign (London: St. Ermin's Press, 1999), passim. 
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Calais reserve. Moreover, as intelligence predicted a much higher proportion of enemy 
mobile divisions within reach of the beachhead, the true substance of the -Master 
Plan" as delineated in the NEPTUNE Initial Joint Plan should have been apparent. 
An attack based on a mutually supporting advance, with the British fighting 
off the expected armor contingents, was the only possible course of action. The slow 
buildup of an amphibious landing, and the unfavorable terrain requiring a high 
proportion of walking infantry, tipped the scales against a rapid, deep advance, even if 
Montgomery's admonishments to his commanders called for one. He was correct to 
stress the need, but the wish was always finther from the event than believed. In April, 
Montgomery first mentioned, his intent to have "staked out claims inland" on D-Day. 
By May, the new intelligence that located 21 st Panzer Division "'in the woods south of 
Caen" would have eliminated reasonable hope for such a venture, unless ineptness 
accompanied temporary surprise on the part of the Germans. No such hope was 
advertised. The opposite, in fact, was true. 106 
2d Army's published plan phased the operations, with each phase's object to 
establish a firm base before the next was attempted. It was, in fact, the 1918-pattem 
limited-objective attack that expected a heavy counterpush, with the artillery and 
machineguns of the consolidated attack force expected to do the real damage to the 
'06 NAC, RG 24,24, Volume 10555, File 21502.013 (D7) Ops Brit. Army. Second Army, An Account 
ofthe Operations ofSecond Army in Europe 1944-1945 [hereafter referred to as Second ArmY History] 
(Headquarters. Second Army, 1945), 7; 30 Corps, A Short History of30 Corps in the European 
Campaign 1944-1945 (Hanover: 30 Corps, 1945), Map 2, The Second Army Plan; D'Este, Decision in 
Normandy, 80,8 1. This reproduces Montgomery's letter to his army commanders regarding gaining 
depth by use of armored forces; British commanders were informed about the possibility of 21 
Panzer's location during Dempsey's preinvasion talk on 23 May. 
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enemy. Dempsey's army hoped to make three phase-lines before it reached Falaise- 
the distant object mentioned in Monty's buoyant talk on 7 April. 
107 (See figure 3. ) 
The operations forecast was to meet the line Falaise by D+ 17. In the west. First 
Army's advance was predicated on two thrust lines, one to the northwest from UTAH 
beach toward Cherbourg, and the other in a southwesterly direction toward Coutances 
to cut the peninsula and then southerly toward the Brittany Peninsula. Though these 
axes through the bocage offered little rapid movement, they likewise relied upon a 
mutually reinforcing offensive with the eastern flank cleared by 2 Army. 
108 
Monty's EXERCISE THUNDERCLAP, on 7 April, did more than provide for 
the senior commanders a first airing of their plans. It was, in every aspect, the type of 
4-cloth model" exercise that the British excelled at, designed as "a joint commander 
service exercise ... to test certain aspects of the Joint Plan. " This wargaming exercise 
was designed for commanders down to division level along with key staff officers. 109 
The exercise posed II separate problems for study, nine by joint Army-Navy- 
Air syndicates for nine of the problems pertinent to the separate American or British 
sectors, and two for the entire group that affected all sectors. These contingencies 
included the failure of separate sector landings, the effect of airborne failures on either 
flank, to test the flexibility of the plans to permit exploitation of "a very favourable 
107 Hamilton, Master ofthe Battlefield, 559-568, D'Este, Decision in Nornian4l% 75-78. 
THUNDERCLAP was Montgomery's first public airing of his concept of operations, and the one most 
controversial concerning postwar claims about his plan. What is lost on most analysts is that 
THUNDERCLAP was a wargame, not simply a briefing, and the last time that major misconceptions. 
faulty plans, or problems could be identified; and that Montgomery's posed problems underscored the 
idea that commanders would have to adapt to the conditions of battle. The Master Plan was a rough 
outline for action, not an architect's blueprint. 
"' FUSA's phase lines are included in Annex 20 to the NEPTUNE plan. See FUSA Report of 
Operations, 20 October 1942 to I August 1944: Annex 2 (cont'd). 
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situation, " the effect on the total plan by enemy withdrawal by D+8, plus situations 
theorizing adverse weather effects, administrative failures, and problems that might 
develop for the air forces or along the inter-Army boundary. Taken by itself, Monty 
sought to give his commanders and his co-service commanders a feel for the 
possibilities that they might meet. 1 10 
In May, the senior ground commanders assessed their plans. The 21 Army 
Group appreciation published on 8 May outlined courses of action, and Montgomery 
wrote the Army commanders stressing the need to ensure all unit plans would take 
maximum advantage of offensive actions to add depth to the lodgement. The enemy's 
buildup was carefully assessed for each. Most telling of the appreciation's points 
were: 
e that the Germans would by about D+14 possess sufficient divisions (estimated 
at 28) to hold approximately a 100-mile line designated as the phase line, and 
during this period there was the risk of the enemy stabilizing the defense. 
o That: 
Once through the difficult bocage country, greater possibilities for 
manuever and for the use of armor begin to appear. Our aim during 
this period should be to contain the maximum forces facing the Eastern 
flank of the bridgehead, and to thrust towards RENNES. 
e That seizure of Quiberon bay offers the greatest potential for surprise and to 
facilitate logistical support requirements. III 
'09 NARA, RG 407, Entry 427, Box 1978,101-3.5 Exercise THUNDERCLAP, 7-8 April 44. 
110 Ibid. 
111 NAC, RG 24, Volume 10416,21 A. Gp/00/209/64/Ops, Appreciation on Possible Developments of 
operations to secure a lodgement area, 7 May 1944; NARA, RG 33 1, Entry 199, Box 101,12 AG 
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Little doubt among the senior commanders would have existed concernin- 
Monty's general intentions. These were, apparently, to maintain a consistent -side by 
side" offensive, accepting that the eastern flank would fight the bulk of the enemy's 
mobile reserves. Considering that either Quiberon Bay or the Brittany ports were the 
major follow-on objectives of the NEPTUNE landings after Cherbourg, virtually all 
operations would have to be conducted with the intent to support their capture. 
Concerning these critical operations, the British, but seemingly less the 
Americans, understood the potential brake on offensive operations that the bocage 
area of Normandy Uplands could become. Comprised of centuries-old hedged fields 
interconnected by nearly covered, sunken, narrow lanes, the bocage had been 
experienced by those like Alanbrooke in 1940 and were well described to the 
Americans. Not only intelligence reports defining the physical boundaries of the areas, 
but also detailed ground-level photographs were also provided. 112 
The 21 Army Group appreciation viewed the bocage as a dual-edged sword to 
both attacker and defender, noting that 
Military Objectives, 371.3, Vol. 1,21 AG Appreciation, 7 May. The appreciation noted itself as -a 
tactical study of the terrain correlated with the latest Intelligence estimates of enemy capabilities" 
(para. 2). It is important to note that the first portion of this estimate, consisting of a detailed terrain 
estimate and early enemy buildup estimates, arrived in Bradley's headquarters through the American 
senior planner at Monty's headquarters, who presented it as his own work. See G-3 Memo, 25 April 
1944, "draft of tactical terrain study, " in the same file, which does not contain full document as in 
NAC file. 
112 FUSA Report of Operations, Oct 43-Aug44. "First US Army Operations Plan NEPTUNE, " 25 
February 1944, Annex I a, Terrain Estimate, MH1, Papers ofBrigadier General A rthur S. Nevins, 
contains planning studies, including terrain intelligence; MHI, Pogue Papers, interview with Gen. 
Walter B. Smith, 11-12 February 1947; NARA RG 338, First Army, Decimal File 381, Box 180, 
Appendix VI to TIS/D. 14/TOP/9.2, Terrain Appreciation, Normandy. 
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it will not be easy for forces to advance through rapidly in the face of 
determined resistance, but it will likewise be most 
ýifficult for the 
enemy to prevent a slow and steady advance by infiltration. 113 
Optimistically, it stated that tanks "can penetrate most of the hedgerows and could no 
doubt operate in small groups with infantry to good advantage. " Considering control 
problems and possible tactical issues, the appreciation finther noted, "The tactics to be 
employed in fighting through the bocage country should be given considerable study 
by formations to be employed" Regardless, the appreciation further noted that the 
speed of unfolding operations would be hampered, problematic, and prone to 
interruption as both an attack and defense had advantages in the bocage. Noting the 
lack of American focus on the postassault bocage terrain, Bedell Smith said that it was 
neither a lack of intelligence or warning, but "we had to get into the country and be 
bruised by it before we could really take measure of it. " 114 
The planners focussed most on the "battle of the bridgehead, " the battles up to 
the D+14/17 line, the key crossover expected in the buildup of enemy forces. After it. 
stalemated action and attrition battles would be more likely. ' 15 
The airmen, however, posed their own set of requirements that they felt 
equaled the ground plan's objectives, and which they demanded ground action to 
accomplish. Caen and its open ground to the south mesmerized the airmen along with 
Morgan and the COSSAC planners. From the outset, the development of airfields was 
the prime consideration for the tactical airmen represented both by AEAF, and most 
113 NAC, 21 Army Group Appreciation, 2. 
114 21 Army Group Appreciation, 5; S. L. A. Marshall, Men Against Fire: The Problem ofBattle 
Command in Future War (Gloucester, Mass.: Peter Smith, 1978), 108. 
1 "; The D+ 14 and D+ 17 lines merged over time in various phase line representations published at 
individual army or army group level. 
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vocally, by Air Chief Marshal Tedder. COSSAC established an airfield development 
schedule, though the COSSAC planners' actual locating of airfields south of CAEN 0 
was undeveloped. The airfields mentioned in the COSSAC plan proper fall within the 
D-Day objective line. The bulk of the actual airfield sites desired for the total 
lodgement area were placed after the change from COSSAC to the NEPTUNE plan 
and after the initial Montgomery revisions. 116 
The airmen's view of the operation differed significantly. Totally mesmerized 
by achieving air dominance, the goal of destroying the German forces in Normandy 
and establishing a secure logdement area and port system held little water in air 
councils. Moreover, the mechanics of close support to enable the ground forces to 
achieve force dominance held less attention. While the airmen argued over "control, " 
they also bickered over air strategy concerning the overall interdiction plan and how 
airpower could best help achieve the conditions necessary to launch NEPTUNE. 
While this bickering progressed, the planners dealing with ground forces began to 
identify airfield sites that constituted one of Second Amy's major objectives. 117 
The airfields were not precisely located by the COSSAC staff. When they were 
finally added to the plan in mid-April, the AEAF planners had placed the bulk of them 
below the D+ 17 line. 118 
116 COSSAC Plan, Map"MB. " 
117 EL, Walter B. Smith Collection of World War 11 Documents, Box 29, AEAF, 15 April 1944; 
Operation "NEPTUNE" Allied Expeditionary Air Force Air Plan and map, Estimated Availability of 
Airfield Sites; Initial Joint Plan, Para. 82, states that "the practicability of this [airfield] programme will 
depend on the anticipated progress of operations. " 
Ila Second Armj, Histog, 36-37, cites airfield locations as part of Second Army Operations Plan. 
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The disconnect went far beyond a lack of coordination between the ground and 
air planners. The expectation of an early occupation of the airfield ground was not 
based on current evaluations of the enemy threat. The original German air threat had 
subsided, making the need to establish air parity less likely. Moreover, the southerly 
airfield sites would force the ground offensive farther south than Montgomery 
originally forecast for the D+17 line. Early occupation of the sites could only work if 
the COSSAC estimate of a gradual German withdrawal panned out. The airfield sites 
also required a greater advance than the D+17 line; they required an advance of at 
least 10 miles farther in order to prevent enemy artillery or counterattacks from 
threatening the maintenance of air operations. All of this would also demand an 
increase "off-loading" schedule for ships to provide additional units and ammunition, 
a total impossibility with the shipping and beach maintenance state that was forecast. 
The ground threat expected in May, and elaborated upon during the 15 May 
presentation of plans for the high command, should have given pause to anyone seeing 
the airfields as a quick-strike proposition. In fact, the stated objective of Caen should 
have been seen far differently by that time. Montgomery announced to the assembled 
commanders that intelligence had located a panzer division immediately south of 
Caen, and that two other panzer divisions could arrive in the NEPTUNE area by dusk 
on D-Day, and a ftirther two by dark on D+I. By D+2 the total enemy force that could 
be in action numbered five panzer divisions and a total of seven additional 
divisions. 119 
"9 Hamilton, Master of the Battlefield, 581-589, reproduces the notes of the entire Montgomery 
presentation; Second Arm ,v 
Histoq, 7, reproduces Dempsey's presentation to his commanders on 23 
May 1944, in which he reemphasized the hard fight ahead. Of note is the following excerpt: 
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The air plan stipulated two key objectives: air superiority in the NEPTUNE 
area, and the effective interdiction of the battlefield to slow the enemy rate of buildup. 
Both were subject to the divergent strategies of the airmen. Air superiority, however. 
was the gift of the American air forces, not the Royal Air Force, whose Air Marshals 
sought to dominate Eisenhower's air forces. 
This air superiority resulted fi7om Eighth Air Force's execution of its daylight 
bomber offensive. In following its POINTBLANK directives, the American airmen Cý 
had savaged the Luftwaffe at a horrendous cost to themselves. As Spaatz pursued the 
oil offensive following his "Big Week" strikes against aircraft production in February, 
the Luftwaffe's supply of pilots sank to crisis proportions. Moreover, while Doolittle's 
strategic Eighth Air Force struck targets deep within Germany, drawing the Luftwaffe 
to battle, Brereton's Ninth Air Force drove the Luftwaffe from its French airfields 
within the NEPTUNE area. 
Despite the more favorable air situation, the timing for the capture of airfields 
became an attack point for Tedder to use against Montgomery. Tedder saw the 
airfields, not the ground battle for the bridgehead, as key. The stress that Tedder 
placed on this reinforced Morgan's old concept and the stated airfield missions cited 
in the Initial Joint Plan, but became more divergent from the reality of the ground 
correlation of forces or what they planned to do. The NEPTUNE revision was driven 
by ports, and in Montgomery's mind it was clear that the main effort had to be the 
"The recent move of 21 Panzer Division to the woods South of Caen and the character of ROMMEL, 
the man at the head of affairs, make it reasonable to suppose that the reserves will start to fight 
immediately in the rear of the beaches, and that it is here that ROMMEL will try to defeat us. ": 
Hinslcy, British Intelligence. 3. Part 2,84, shows the difference in current intelligence estimates versus 
the smaller COSSAC predictions. 
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earl capture of these, with Dempsey's forces in nothing more than a supporting role y 4-1 
regardless of statements made at the time or in postbattle obiter dicta. 
Montgomery was committed, not only by the reality of geography but by the 
endless repetition of certain tenets of Morgan's plan, to the capture of Caen "on D- 
Day. " Demonstrating optimism during the 15 May presentation, while stressing the 
need to drive inland deeply, Montgomery set himself up for a political trap. No 
experienced commander, particularly with the specter of the Anzio operation still in 
the air, could fail to say anything other than Montgomery did during the run-up to 
battle. He had to appear positive; the operation was "on7 and no fimher forces were 
available. Eisenhower's personal lack of experience in ground battle, however, 
possibly led him to see the plan's architecture as sancrosanct. and anything less than 
achieving the paper-stated objectives "as a failure. " Monty would complicate matters 
by claiming the plan was "being followed. " By the end of May, however, it is curious 
that the senior commanders were not wondering if NEPTUNE, even with five 
divisions in assault and three airborne divisions, was simply too small to gain the 
quick victories its original planners had sketched on their maps. 
By invasion eve, the enemy laydown was particularly daunting. (See figure 4. ) 
Intelligence on 4 June portrayed a ring of divisions around the NEPTUNE landing 
beaches, with the 91st, 716th Infantry, 352d Infantry, 21st Panzer, and 71 Ith Infantry 
divisions forming an outline of the lodgement. While the same intelligence review 
denied exact knowledge of strengths and precise locations of the 352d and the 21st 
Panzer, their known general locations them put them within counterattack distance of 
the objective beachhead line, regardless of whether there was confirmation of the 
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claim that there were "tank tracks north of the Caen-Bayeux lateral. " 
Moreover. 
"layback" divisions such as the 243d in the west Cotentin and the 346th Division west 
of the Seine could provide immediate reinforcement. 
Most disturbing for thrusts south of Caen should have been the graphic 
portrayal of the 12th SS Panzer, the Panzer Lehr, and the 17th SS 
Panzer Grenadier 
divisions, all arrayed within a day's march of the Caen-Paris avenue astride which the 
RAF had designated its planned airfield sites. A total of 59 confirmed divisions, 
including 9 Panzer and I Panzergrenadier, were identified in France and the Low 
Countries. 120 
The latest strategic intelligence assessment, however, had argued for the 
adequacy of the Allied forces for the contemplated invasion. Presented on 23 May. it 
revisited the critical force assumptions presented by COSSAC in determining the 
viability of OVERLORD. Though it noted that the expected German reinforcement 
exceeded the maximun acceptable under COSSAC's estimate, it contrarily argued that 
the increased frontage, strength of the assault, and diminished enemy capacity to 
reinforce due to the Transportation Plan offset the numerical variances. It 
recommended that the assault go forward. Independently, the Joint Intelligence 
120 NAC, RG 24, Volume 10549,2lAgp/00/INT/1074, GSI 21 Army Group Weekly NEPTUNE 
Review NO. 17,4 JUNE 1944; Ibid., GSI 21 Army Group Weekly NEPTUNE Reviews. No. 1-16. 
commencing on 14 February, shows a kaleidoscope of German divisional changes. The 21 st Panzer 
was shown moving into the Caen sector on 14 May, the day before the final OVERLORD bricring. At 
this conference, Monty mentioned its presence, but showed the same confidence he did before 
Alamein. As at Alamein, the numbers were not dramatically on the side of the attackers, NARA, RG 
33 1, Entry 13, Box 45. SHAEF, Weekly Intelligence Summary No. II for the week ending 3 June 
1944. (All SHAEF Weekly Summaries are in this file. ) It is especially noteworthy that SHAEF's 
Weekly Intelligence Summary did not locate the 21st Panzer Division near Caen, or give the correct 
location of the 352d. Had these been noted correctly on 3 June, Eisenhower's expectations might have 
changed. SHAEF did not post a correct German location for the prcassault period until 10 June, in the 
following estimate; HinsIcy, British Intelligence, 3. Part 2, maps following 100; Montgomery, 
Norman, # to the Baltic, Map II reproduces this map. 
74 
Committee QIQ on 25 May offered slightly larger figures for reinforcement. but did 
not recommend cancellation or predict disaster. 
121 
SHAEF, meanwhile, began drafting a post-OVERLORD strategy in the 
absence of any discussions with 21 Army Group. In the final analysis this strategy. 
and the evaluation of the campaign as it unfolded, demonstrate the difference in 
values for the individual services and for each command-level headquarters. The 
genesis of what became "the Broad Fronf' surfaced silently in SHAEF's hallways in 
late April and was presented as an acceptable draft by May's end. 
1221 
The paper was not circulated outside of SHAEF, though publishing it might 
have met with little comment. Its promulgation, though the raison d'etre of 
OVERLORD, had no influence over NEPTUNE. The combat commanders were then 
actually "mounting" NEPTUNE as troops moved into preassault contonements and 
readied for loading onto ships and landing craft. Airfields were then under "seal, " and 
last-minute reconnaissance and interdiction missions were being flown. The reality of 
D-Day, not long-term operational and strategic plans, took hold. For the operational 
commanders, battle was at hand. 
By the night of D-Day, Eisenhower signaled the Combined Chiefs, viaý General 
Marshall, that "All preliminary reports are satisfactory. " 123 The full impact of the 
landings and its problems would not be sent to the Combined Chiefs for two more 
days. As the assault commanders assessed their gains, a mixed picture developed. 
12' Hinsley, British Intelligence, 3, Part 2,83-87, Appendices 9,10. 
122 NARA, RG 33 1, SHAEF, 381 OVERLORD, Box 77, PostOverlord 1, draft, May 30,1944. 
123 Eisenhower Papers, 111,1914,1915. 
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Few actual D-Day objectives had been accomplished. The D-Day objective 
line, following the norm for amphibious operations, 
' 24 ran along the "lateral" road 
emphasized by Montgomery in his THUNDERCLAP briefing. Achieving this 
line, 
Allied units would prevent observation, and therefore observed fire onto the D-Day 
beaches. Caen, due to its potential as a strong point and effective sally port toward the 
beaches, was included within the line. By nightfall, the forces had seized 
approximately 50 percent of their D-Day objective line, and worsening weather 
promised a slow-down in postassault buildup. 
125 
On 21 Army Group's right, the First Army had gained both lodgements, but at 
significant cost in the V Corps (OMAHA beach) sector. VN Corps" UTAH beach 
landings fortuitously beached south of the planned objective, a weak point unknown 
to the planners. VII Corps landed with few casualties, but the airborne forces were 
badly scattered in their night drops, and the bocage separated forces that normally 
would be expected to cohere into a mutually supporting force. By nightfall, the 
airborne had perhaps 50 percent of its troops under command, and the seaborne force 
had yet to link with the airborne perimeter astride the Merderet River. Most important 
was that the German forces moved into the Cotentin had caused the airborne force to 
be constricted into a mere bumper for the seabome landing, and prevented the 
124 This beachhead line, under current US amphibious doctrine, is known as the "Force Beachhead 
Line. " It is defined as a "phase line that indicates the general trace of the terrain objectives essential to 
the establishment of a beachhead. " This follows the planning principles used by the COSSAC planners. 
It must be noted that the "D-Day Line" assures the survival of the invasion, and that its actual capture 
on the day of landing is always reliant on the force ratio, weather, neutralization of prepared enemy 
defenses, and a quick breakthrough by the landing force. It is established as the immediate goal of the 
landing force, but is not necessarily possible to always be captured on the day of landing itself. 
12 *' FUSA Report of Operations Oct 43-Aug 44,34-48; the First Army Report offers no last-light 
assessment of its D-Day operations. It does, however, provide an extensive discussion of each corps' 
operations; SecondAr7n ,y 
History, 96,97. British D-Day operations and the German command 
reactions are succinctly assessed in the history. 
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airborne Erom sealing off the Cherbourg peninsula from the south to prevent 
reinforcement, as well as rapidly expanding the seaborne advance. Moreover, the 
marshy land, feared by COSSAC, had German reinforcements splitting the two US 
beaches as had been predicted. 
V Corps' OMAHA beach landings had been disastrous. With little depth to the 
landing and after suffering heavy infantry casualties upon landing, no armor had 
struck out to deepen the attack. US priorities, with Monty's approval, were to knit the 
landing beaches together before the Germans could effectively reinforce the gaps, and 
then attempt to defeat the landing in detail. 126 
21 Army Group's left flank also met with partial success. The COSSAC plan 
had selected the Caen beaches for their lack of defenses and, in order to assure the 
plan's acceptance, had stipulated that a favorable force ratio would be achieved. 
However, since the strengthening of the plan, beach defenses had been augmented, 
extensive obstacles and minefields had been laid, and a panzer division had moved 
within the objective area. The increased defensive strength, delay in landing the 
subsequent waves, and then the passing of these waves, including armor through 
cleared lanes, proved to be a slow process in the rough seas. Moreover, local tactical 
decisions made to reinforce the airborne east of the Orne River had slowed the 
advance in favor of securing the east flank. Also, stiff fighting at one of the 3d 
Division's intermediate objectives (the HILLMAN bunker complex) had halted the 
advance short of Caen. Confusion about the strength of this objective hampered the 
126 FUSA Report of Operations Oct 43-Aug 44,3448, IWM, Montgomeq Log, 7 June. Montgomery 
met Bradley aboard U. S. S. Augusta and ordered closing of the gaps at Carcntan and Isigny. Following 
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attacker's response, and the flanking Canadian division. that might have added forces 
to the attack, did not move. Available intelligence that might have helped the assault 
troops also appears not to have been passed downward. 
127 
The hoped-for 10-mile advance and capture of Caen had not been achieved. 
Rather, on the left flank, 21 Army Group found panzers threatening the British 
airborne, and German armor counterattacks imminent in the gap between the SWORD 
and JUNO beaches. Depth could not be achieved unless the beach lodgements 
themselves could be secured from defeat in detail. This entailed combining flank-ward. 
not forward attacks. The lodgements had to be widened and connected to prevent 
being split apart. 
0 Monty had tipped the assault in favor of an early capture of Cherbourg, 
both 
by the weight of airborne assault and his insistence that the port's early capture was 
necessary for the invasion to succeed, but Second Army's planners and those of I 
Corps had looked at their Caen objective realistically. The 10-mile distance from the 
beach was a significant obstacle, and the planners must have noted that two separate 
panzer divisions had been located in the vicinity at various times since February. 128 
While Dempsey still ordered Caen as a D-Day objective, I Corps' assault orders noted 
that the 3d British Division "should, before dark on D-Day have captured or 
effectively masked Caen and be disposed in 4epth with brigade localities" effectively 
tied in with the I st Airborne and 3d Canadian Division. Further, 
this, Bradley was to strike west, while methodically clearing the Cotentin to Cherbourg after the neck 
of the peninsula had been sealed; PRO WO 285/10, Dempsey Diary, 6-9 June. 
127 Ellis, Victor), in the West, 1, Chapters IX, X. 
128 21 Army Group GSI, NEPTUNE Reviews No. 1-16, passim. 
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Should the enemy forestall us at Caen and the defenses prove to be too 
strongly organized thus causing us to fail to capture it on D day. further 
direct assaults which may prove costly, will not be undertaken without 
reference to I Corps. 
129 
N 
The multiple failures of D-Day, however, posed more complicated problems 
than merely achieving the objective line, moving on Cherbourg, or securing Caen. The 
landing had gone forward during a weather "window, " a brief period of acceptable 
weather to permit the landings. The predicted bad weather that followed would 
hamper the needed buildup of forces while simultaneously limiting air operations to CP 
isolate the beachhead area to German buildup. Moreover, the presence of the three 
64extra" enemy divisions not foreseen by COSSAC added to the defense. Since the 
formulation of the plan, the 91 st Airlanding Division, the 352d Division, and the 21 st 
Panzer had all blocked key approaches and limited early successes. The assault forces 
had no recourse but to fight different actions than they had planned, and ones that did 
not promise quick establishment of the invasion or the rolling back of the defense the 
COSSAC planners had foreseen. With the enemy responding rapidly, the tactics of the 
invasion would have to change, though the objectives would maintain their relevance 
for overall success relative to the defeat of the enemy's forces. 
More than any single requirement, the invaders needed space to develop 
operations. Montgomery had two options. He could attack all out in every sector, 
hoping to keep the initiative but without using the military norms of a 3: 1 superiority 
in force to gain a military advantage. Or he could launch operational attacks to gain 
key objectives and then lever his advantages from these. The latter approach both 
suited the Montgomery style of warfare and used concentration to make up for 
"9 Second Arm. y Histoiy, 77,78. 
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deficiencies in small unit or armor firepower. Artillery, including naval gunfire, could 
become a hammer in such attacks. Second Army's role became bleeding the enemy 
through limited objective attacks as well maneuvering the enemy off vital ground, 
while First Army moved on to gaining what Montgomery termed the strategic objects 
of OVERLORD, Cherbourg, and eventually, the Brittany ports. 
' 30 
Montgomery tried to hustle both army commanders into rapidly securing their 
bridgeheads, and then to move deeply toward their respective major objectives before 
the Germans could mass units along key avenues. More than two weeks before D- 
Day, Montgomery's G-2 had assessed that the interdiction effort of the Transportation 
Plan would fail to isolate the battlefield. While the airmen had successfully dropped 
the major bridges along the Seine, the rail lines entering the NEPTUNE area were not 
destroyed. At best, the Transportation Plan slowed the enemy buildup with some 
degree of attrition, mostly among soft-skinned vehicles. ' 31 Moreover, bad weather had 
increased German ability to move forces along roads. RAF Bomber Command 
bombed rail centers during the night of D-Day, and US air forces attacked road 
movement. But the argument over air control kept the full weight of the bomber force 
from responding to every potential target, particularly within the lodgement area. 
Spaatz attempted to minimize the American heavy bomber effort, and Tedder 
complicated AEAFs attempts to centralize a response by dominating the Air 
Commanders' Conferences. 132 
Montgomery, Normandy to the Baltic, 63-70. 
"' Hinsley, British Intelligence, 3, Part 2,109. 
132 AWC, MS, Air Historical Branch. RAF Narrative, Liberation ofNorthwest Europe, III, "The 
Landings in Nomandy, " Chapters 11,13.14. 
80 
The ground commanders saw several threats immediately developing from 
enemy armor and a rapid buildup of forces. Two Panzer divisions were 
identified as 
rapidly moving toward the invasion area, and early estimates listed 500 enemy tanks 
within the Caen area. 
133 By 10 June, three Panzer divisions were committed along 
with seven infantry divisions. As the COSSAC planners had theorized, the buildup of 
both sides would become central to success or failure. 
134 
Though tank numbers were overestimated at this time, the result of the 
panzers' presence was not. Indeed, it is the panzers-and their complementary arm. 
antitank weapons-that posed the greatest single threat both to the existence of the 
Allied lodgement and to any attempts to break loose of the beachhead rapidly being 
"roped off' by the German defense. German superiority in quality of armor protection, 
tank guns, optics, and tank-killing systems ranging from the 88mm dual-purpose gun 
to the hand-held panzerfaust posed an operational problem for the Allies, particularly 
in the British Second Army sector. Put shortly, they combined to stop or cripple every 
attempt of armored based forces to advance or to defeat the panzers in open combat. 
Superior combined-arms tactics also favored the Germans. British reliance on 
concentration, fires, and carefully orchestrated "limited objective"or "set-piece" 
133 Hinsley, British Intelligence, 3, Part 2.45, NAC, RG 24, volume 10549 File 215A21.023.21 Army 
Group Daily Intelligence Summary No. 125,7 June 1944 (all 21 Army Group Intelligence Summaries 
are in this file). Intelligence noted that the Germans perceived their greatest threat in the Cacn area, 
hence their immediate comrnitment of 21 Panzer and 12 SS Panzcr to that sector-, Summary No. 126,8 
June, notes that I SS Panzer Corps is the overarching headquarters. 
"4 Hinsley, British Intelligence, 3, Part 2; Ellis, Victoq in the West, 1,2 1; NAC, RG 24, vol. 10549. 
File 215A21.023,21 Army Group Intelligence Summary No. 12 (9 June 1944), ibid.; 21 Army Group 
intelligence Summary, II June 1944. 
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attacks likewise set the operational pattern by the tempo of their execution. 
preparation, and advance. 
135 
From the German perspective, panzer divisions were considered an operational 
weapon. Capable of rapid self-movement, these combined-arms divisions were 
counted on to concentrate in a massive counteroffensive to drive the Allies into the 
sea or, failing a beachhead victory, to strike a killing blow to any Allied advance 
inland. Allied planners and intelligence keyed their estimates to panzer buildups from 
the time of COSSAC. Montgomery recognized that his own ability to gain and 
maintain momentum was contingent on his ability to eliminate the panzer threat. 
136 
German commanders hoped to mount a decisive counterblow centering on the 
Bayeux area, the critical Anny boundary for the British and Americans. Several 
factors swayed battle into this area. The vital Caen area acted as an armor magnet. The 
panzers attempted to roll up the key left flank via the airborne bridgehead, and also to 
split the Canadian/British boundaries west of Caen early in the invasion. As additional 
panzer divisions arrived, they were committed against the British on the more 
13' Ellis, Victoq in the West, 1, Appendix IV; NAC, RG 24, Volume 10560, File D4. Second Army 
Intelligence Summaries (all 2 Army Intelligence Summaries in this file). These summaries contain 
daily information on captured equipment with great effort aimed at tanks and antitank systems; Terry 
Copp, ed., Montgomeq's Scientists: Operational Research in Northwest Europe (Waterloo, Ont.: 
Wilfrid Laurier University, 2000), Chapter 10,11. Montgomety's Scientists reproduces key studies 
concerning armor in Normandy. Shortcomings in British tactics and training arc cxamincd in Second 
Army Intelligence Summary No. 5,8 June 1944, Appendix E. This summary is typical of tank 
problems discussed. It is significant that Second Army began circulating intelligence on the strengths 
and weaknesses of Panther tanks, noting that "Attack by 6 pdr., 75mm, 17 pdr. weapons [is] likely to 
be ineffective unless strikes are scored in the area between the horizontal line of the gun mantict and 
the top of the hull. " Essentially, unless this area, less than a man's head high, is hit, the tank is 
impenetrable from the front. 
136 D'Este, Decision in Normandy, 80,8 1, Montgomery, Norman4v to the Baltic, 82-85; Montgomery, 
Memoirs, 232; Brooks, Montgomery and the Eighth Army, 47-54. Brooks reproduces Montgomery's 
address to the Middle East Staff College, Haifa, 21 September 1942, outlining Montgomery's views on 
tanks, operational pivots, and the use of armor, plus the destruction of enemy armor. He followed these 
principles in Normandy. Montgomery, who was a believer in "teaching the generals, " lectured on these 
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favorable ground in the center of the Allied sector. Correctly reading his opponent's 
intent, Montgomery noted that the Germans consistently tried to pull back their armor 
in favor of an infantry defense to permit a strong panzer counterblow. Committing his 
own armor, Monteomery both drew the panzers to battle and prevented the formation 
of an operational reserve. Essentially, fighting on Second Army's front was an 
attrition battle regardless of intent or planning, and Montgomery recognized this early 
in the invasion. Following the logic of Second Army's defensive flank mission, by 10 
June Montgomery openly spoke of "attracting panzers" to the British front, an 
unfortunate word choice for the fixing mission of Second Army. Caen's terrain did the 
"attracting. " Second Army would have to hold the enemy there. 
137 
The battle found, however, did not match the battle imagined, especially at 
Supreme Headquarters and within the Allied Air Force command structure. Neither 
faction had appreciated Montgomery's actions during the reshaping of the plan or the 
implications of those changes, and both now reacted with alarm and disdain as events 
unfolded in the field. Tedder, Coningham, and Morgan hung crepe at every 
opportunity, declaring that the plan "had failed" and that the invasion had reached a 
crisis. Coningham. appears to have fired the first rounds during the 14 June Air 
Commanders' conference, and immediately attempted to involve Eisenhower. 
points frequently, but was seen as "didactic" by the Americans. He was a believer in killing Panzcrs 
with artillery and was a practitioner of the defensive-offense tactic. 
137 MHI, Foreign Military Studies, B466. Gen. Geyr von Schwcppcnburg, Panzer Group West. 
German attack plans are discussed and mapped in B466, passim. 21 Army Group Intelligence 
Summary No. 128,10 June 1944, and subsequent reports detail the enemy buildup. 
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Likewise. the two airmen also attempted to split Leigh Mallory from his ground 
counterpart, Montgomery. 138 
Montgomery sought to develop main efforts on both army fronts. His concern 
over the early car----e of Cherbourg never relented, and he also hoped that Bradley 
would strike westward and then south from the Cotentin simultaneously. This had not 
transpired. Caen and the left flank remained to be developed. Rommel. the German 
tactical commander, had matched Monty's main efforts with two of his own. He 
sought to pen the Cotentin landings and to delay the inevitable fall of Cherbourg, the 
destruction of which had already been authorized by Rundstedt. Infantry was sent into 
the bocage to block Bradley. Simultaneously, panzers were ticketed for the west and 
center of Dempsey's front while the in-place panzers continued to spar with the 
airborne in the east. 139 
Failing a direct thrust into Caen during the first two days, Montgomery ordered 
a double enveloping attack. He simultaneously ordered planning for an airborne 
division to be dropped to seal the double penetration prior to the juncture of these 
attacks behind the German front. Leigh Mallory rejected the plan several days before 
138 AWC, MS, Air Historical Branch, RAF Narrative, W, "The Breakout and Advance to the Lower 
Rhine, " 12 June to 30 September 1944,4, Chapter 1, passim; D'Este, Decision in Normandv. Chapter 
13; Orange, Coningham, Chapter 15; Marshal of the Royal Air Force Lord Arthur Tedder, 471h 
Prejudice: The War Memoirs ofMarshal of the Royal Air Force Lord Tedder, G. C. B. (Boston: Little, 
Brown, 1966), 552,553. 
139 Montgomery Log, 10 June 1944; Hinslcy, British Intelligence, 3, Part 2,17 1. The defenders had 
three parizer divisions and seven infantry divisions holding a continuous front on 9 June 1944. Montgomery's evolving battle concept can be traced in his log. It is noteworthy that Montgomery sees 
each US corps developing its own front, and with the US V Corps' operations to slice across the 
German front southwestward as a key component of his view for Dempsey's operations. 
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the widespread revolt of the airmen on the 14th. Daring but unrealistic, the initial 
operations failed, rendering the airborne plan moot. 
140 
The original Dempsey plan, that provided for masking Caen while forces built 
up, was followee Moreover, the advance listed as operational policy in the Second 
Army plan likewise seemed to blueprint the British actions. Focusing on the key 01 
terrain listed during the planning stage, Second Army saw the Caen problem as 
solvable by a turning movement in concert with a move for-ward by the First US 
Army. The actual attack was congruent with 30 Corps' phase II objective from the 
original assault plan, estimated for D+3AD+4.141 
These attacks went forward on 10 June, with Dempsey taking advantage of a 
gap developed at Caumont by the US I st Division. This gap had opened on 10 June, 
but the front had been eyed the day before by Second Army's commander, who asked 
Montgomery to prod US V Corps south in that sector. Second Army's right flank, had 
already been battering toward Tilly with scant success. (See figure 5. ) Dempsey 
ordered the 30 Corps commander, Lt. Gen. G. Bucknall, to advance with the 7th 
Armoured Division. Moving forward the next day as part of OPERATION PERCH, 
the 7th, after a ten-mile advance passed through Villers Bocage to occupy point 213. 
The subsequent defeat of the force by a handful of Tiger tanks destroyed the myth of 
140 Hamilton, Master ofthe Battlefield, 639-643. 
141 SecondArm 
,v 
History, 26,27,80,8 1. See key paragraphs 13-17 in the reproduced Second Army 
Operation Order No. 1,21 April 1944, and also the extracts from 30 Corps Operations Order No. I that 
describes Dempsey's intent concerning taking Villers Bocage as Phase 11 of the preinvasion plan; Ellis, 
Victo? y in the West, 257,264,265. Ellis notes that the buildup of forces ran two days behind and 
makes the case that the lack of forces at this key juncture severely damaged Dempsey's chances of 
success. 
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the Desert Rats. Their subsequent withdrawal, occasioned by the appearance of the 2d 
Panzer Division, brought on the "crisis"declared by the airmen. 
142 
PERCH also began a serious deficiency in Allied coordination and timing. 
Bradley could no* Ie prodded into using V Corps to support Dempsey's attack. nor 
later to guard his flank. This made the Montgomery technique of carefully timed, 
complementary attacks, designed to fix reserves away from the main attack, a total 
impossibility to conduct effectively. This was the beginning of Bradley's attempts to 
isolate American operations from British operations, an isolation due to the lack of 
mutual reinforcing operations, that would cause untold casualties in the future and 
would become a significant factor in future military failures. What Montgomery had 
assessed as the pre-Alamein problem of piecemeal attacks by Eighth Army in the 
desert, would become more and more the operational norm in Normandy due to 
Bradley's unwillingness to act in an Army Group battle. 143 
From the airmen's perspective, ground operations were failing. Caen had 
failed to be taken on D-Day, failed to be taken during the first days, and had now 
eluded the turning movement through Villers Bocage, an action that saw Bucknall's 
corps relinquishing ground. Nor was the intelligence picture brightening. 21 Army 
Group's intelligence cited movement of I SS and 2 SS Panzer divisions, along with 
the transfer of 11 SS Panzer Corps westward with its 9 SS and 10 SS Panzer divisions. 
"2 Dempsey Diary, 9 June, 13 June, 14 June; Harrison, Cross-Channel Attack, 376-377, describes 
Bradley's action in stopping the US V Corps; Second Army History, 101-104; Wilmot, Strugglefor 
Europe, 307-312. Wilmot's description of PERCH appears to be the first public criticism of British 
combat troops, particularly the Desert Divisions in the Normandy campaign. 
143 Ellis, P7ctoty in the West, 1.257. Ellis says that Bradley did not want to push V Corps "too hard, " 
and that his focus was on cutting the Cotentin. He does not explain why V Corps needed to wait for 
VI I Corps to perform this mission. 
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This meant that up to four more of the large panzer divisions could join the battle. 
most logically on the Second Army front. (See figure 6. ) Intelligence cited that a total 
of 18 divisions-six panzers, one parachute, and II infantry-now held the 
Normandy front. While this did fall short of the maximum of nine panzer divisions 
available, intelligence did indicate that ftu-ther reinforcements were being stripped 
from Bordeaux, Denmark, and Holland. Despite their best efforts, the airmen failed to 
isolate the battlefield. 144 
Bradley's beachheads finally linked on the 12th, and the west coast of the 
Cotentin was reached on the 18th, which signaled Bradley's main effort to capture the 
port. Still, Cherbourg eluded capture. The original phase-lines theorized capture by the 
fifteenth day, and Montgomery assessed his buildup in light of launching major 
operations by the introduction of fresh corps in both armies. Caen still loomed as 
Dempsey's major objective, along with fixing the bulk of the German panzers. With 
offloading and ship turn-around delayed, force buildup and the stockpiling of 
ammunition hampered large unit operations. The arrival of fresh enemy divisions 
would temporarily give the advantage to the defense if they could be concentrated in a 
counterattack. 145 
On 18 June, Montgomery issued his first written directive since the February 
Initial Joint Plan. M. 502 outlined his assessments and plans. He noted the exhaustion 
'44 Hinsley, British Intelligence, 3, Part 2,493. It should be noted that the arrival of SS Panzer divisions 
signaled a far larger combat capability than that of Wehrmacht divisions. It should also be noted that 
the arriving separate panzer -abteilung" units included heavy Tiger battalions, adding far greater 
capabilities. The division force equivalent was undoubtedly far greater than the maximum buildup 
predicted, which had not included brigades. army "Tiger" battalions, or dual-purpose flak corps that 
could act as antitank units. 
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of the German mobile reserves and their inability to concentrate for a counteroffensive 
due to lack of infantry, but noted that local counterattacks had delayed Allied plans. 
Monty banked heavily on "stretching" the enemy to a breaking point. He noted: 
Caen is th- key to Cherbourg; its capture will release forces which are 
now lockea up in ensuring that our left flank holds secure. 
146 
He ordered the following: Dempsey's Second Army would begin a pincer 
attack beginning on the 18th with 8 Corps passing lines on the right flank and 
completing the movement by the 22d. Bradley's First Army was ordered to capture 
Cherbourg while swinging its own left flank to keep touch with Second Army's 
offensive. Bringing up XV Corps, Bradley would then move on St. Lo. Calling for 
drive and energy by all commanders, Montgomery stressed the importance of 
Cherbourg as a solution for administrative problems beginning to plague the buildup 
and the expansion of the lodgement. He wanted both Caen and Cherbourg by 24 June. 
A Channel storm would change this plan. 147 
M. 503, issued the next day, modified the plan. Dempsey convinced 
Montgomery that 8 Corps lacked space on the Orne front, forcing a necessary 
westward shift of the corps that delayed operations until 22-23 June. As part of his 
revision, Montgomery stressed that Bradley must not wait for Cherbourg's capture 
145 SecondArm 
"y 
History; 106, Montgomery, Norman4v to the Baltic, 70,71,76,77. Montgomery 
counted on the arrival of Lt. Gen. R. N. O'Connor's 8 Corps. Badly delayed by the shipping problem, 8 
Corps' arrival was put further behind by the Channel storm. 
'46 M502,18-6-44,1-2. It is important to note that Monty saw Dempsey almost daily, he saw Bradley 
on the 7'. 10th, and 15th and was in constant phone contact with him, not only to gain his appreciation 
of the situation, but also to issue orders; Montgomery Log. 15 June, provides an example. Monty's 
directives were handwritten by himself, then typed and distributed. They are inconsistently listed as 
M. ---, or M----, or M-. I have retained their exact typing in notes, but have changed them to M. in the 
text for consistency. 
147 Ibid., 3,4, 
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before "extending its operations to the south-west. " He noted that when troops 
became available Bradley should develop operations to the southwest toward 
Granville, Avranches, and Vire. He ordered study for an airborne landing at St. Malo 
to speed Third Army's commitment. 
148 
The Montgomery-Eisenhower relationship, stiff on its best days, grew 
strained. Morgan, Tedder, and the SHAEF staff blamed Montgomery for the 
"stalemate" in Normandy. SHAEF and the airmen saw Caen, not Cherbourg, as key. 
Eisenhower, seeing a flankward attack from the Caen avenue as having been the 
original concept, felt that Monty had failed. 
149 He wrote to Montgomery, stressing his 
concern. Washington pressured Eisenhower, and the Supreme Commander, following 
his practice in Africa and the Mediterranean, sent letters to put the heat on his field 
commander. Rarely would he visit, and almost never would he conftont the man in the 
field. 
What Eisenhower, and Montgomery's critics, failed to understand is that large 
battles were being fought, with backs to the sea and with a limited amount of artillery 
or maneuver space. Every British advance sparked a counterattack, sometimes several. 
Monty's invasion plan had opted for space, but the lack of landing craft and the lack 
of airlift for airborne forces had limited the amount of force that could be brought to 
bear immediately. The Allies had lost the buildup race, due not to lack of effort or zeal 
but to numbers and superior firepower, as in the case of Germany's panzer divisions. 
"'MS04,19-6-44,1-2. 
149 Eisenhower Papers, V11,1069; COSSAC Plan, 23, Para 114 (c). This was not the plan published in 
February as the Initial Joint Plan. It is, besides a figment of Eisenhower's imagination, an attempt by 
Morgan and others at SHAEF to discredit Montgomery by convincing people that the August 1943 
feasibility study was the actual campaign plan. It was not. 
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While tactical opportunities may have been lost. the overall operational success 
needed to expand the lodgement to the depth and width theorized by Morgan was 
never possible with the limited forces that had been landed, particularly against a rapid 
buildup after an assault on beach defenses. Moreover, while Allied air was a scourge 
for German movement, it neither prevented it, nor did it seal the battlefield. Due to the 
strictures placed by Coningharn on close support, at this period Allied airpower almost 
never intervened directly in any German panzer counterattack. 
The Allies were in an attrition battle, and Montgomery attempted to fight it 
while controlling his own losses. Merely attacking all out everywhere, as Ike wanted, 
had failed on numerous occasions in the Great War. 21 Army Group sought to fight by 
the rules as it understood them. The tactics of small unit battle-not the operational 
design of large, wide-scale maneuver---obtained. 
The airmen who had contributed so much were helpless to do two things: First, 
they could hamper but not completely interdict ground forces' movement. German 
forces had been slowed, but the fact remained that five panzer divisions and 17 
infantry divisions had been moved into Normandy. Second, the airmen could not 
remove enemy units from the field. Bombing did not blast forces from their positions. 
Yet, under the condition that "air forces equaled ground forces, " the airmen demanded 
that their airfields be captured immediately, despite the fact that air superiority in 
Normandy was never an issue. Tedder continually pressed Eisenhower over the 
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airfields, who saw the failure to take them as indicative of Montgomery's caution. 
At 
the same time, Tedder overruled the use of heavy bombers to support major attacks. 
150 
Characteristically, Bradley's shortcomings, in forseeing the bocage problem, in 
"failing" to takc Cherbourg expeditiously or being able to attack simultaneously C) 
toward the north and south as desired by the Army Group, were never criticized. The 
Americans always received sympathy from Eisenhower. The British, and later the 
French, never drew any empathy from Eisenhower. 
For Montgomery, all-out consistent offensives would permanently cripple the 
British Army and eliminate 21 Army Group's shrinking troop list. Manpower 
shortages, already dominating offensive capabilities, were never mentioned 
by 
Churchill, who had shorted the Army of troops but who had demanded that his general 
carry Britain's sword to victory. 
151 Three weeks into the invasion, Montgomery had to 
demonstrate that Normandy would not be Anzio, with the Army as a beached 
whale. 152 
That demonstration would be EPSOM. EPSOM was designed to use the 
maximum weight of Second Army in an army-controlled battle. The air forces would 
play a major part. Terrain, however, did much to separate the available forces. 8 Corps 
'50 Eisenhower Papers, V111,157 1. In his comments to the official historian in 1947. Eisenhower did 
not stress "failure" at Caen, or that the plan had failed: Hamilton, Master of the Battlefield, 671-712, 
PRO Air 37n84, Dailv Reflections on the Course ofthe Battle by Air Chief Marshal Sir Trafford Leigh 
Mallory [hereafter referred to Leigh Mallory Diary], 14,16 June 1944, Hamilton excerpts key diary 
material from Butcher, Montgomery, and Dempsey tracing the evolution of SHAEF-21 Army Group 
relations; Tedder, With Prejudice, 553-556; RAF Narrative, IV, 4,5. 
"' 21 Army Group Intelligence Summary, No. 133,18 June 1944. Britain's manpower problems have 
always been considered the greatest shortcoming for the Army. 
152 Anzio, which had first been planned during Eisenhower's tenure as SACM ED, was a bone of 
contention between the Americans and the British. As at Normandy, the inability to provide landing 
craft sufficient for a decisive operational attack left critical force-to-space ratios short. The standard 
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would carry the major objective. with 30 Corps providing both supporting fires and a 
flank protection attack. I Corps at Caen would demonstrate. Leigh Mallory promised a 
maximum air effort, causing more trouble with Tedder, who preferred to believe that 
he could not commit air support without Tedder's approval. 
153 
Dempsey planned to make maximum use of armor in this attack. Originally 
intended to move to the east and south of Caen, lack of space forced 8 Corps to deploy 
in the cramped area west of the city. EPSOM aimed at breaking a hole in the panzer 
line, at gaining a bridgehead over the Odon River, and at gaining position to begin the 
decisive swing behind the Caen avenue. It replicated the PERCH turning movement 
writ larger and, if successful, would have broken the German defense into two 
separate sectors. Weather, however, dogged the execution as well as the buildup. 
Bradley, whose army was 10 days behind in unloading, begged off throwing in a 
major attack simultaneously. Again, the British would go it alone, drawing off enemy 
strength but receiving no reciprocal help. 154 
Storm damage from a huge Channel storm on the 17 th and the already slow 
off-loading had delayed preparations. When forces became available, rainy skies and cp 
repetitive weather halts kept airpower as a minor factor. The soldiers proceeded on 
their own. 
answer from the high command in such cases was "cautiousness- on the part of the field commanders. 
This was now the constant mantra at SHAEF. 
153 Second ArmY History, 110-115, Montgomery, Norman4v to the Baltic, 77-85; Tedder, With 
Prejudice, 552,553; Orange, Coningham, 198-199; Hamilton, Master ofthe Battlefield, 663-670; RAF 
Narrative, IV, 14-16,18. 
"4 Dempsey Diary, 17 June-19 June, 21 June. Montgomery Log, 15 June, 18 June, 20 June, 23 June, 
John Baynes, The Forgotten Victor. - General Sir Richard O'Connor, KT, GCB, DSO, MC (London: 
Brassey's UK. 1989), 187,188. Baynes credits O'Connor with proposing the alternative attack zone 
west of Caen. 
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Six panzer divisions blocked the British sector. two were immediately in fi-ont 
of 8 Corps and four blocked the 30 Corps approach. 155 (See figure 7. ) Besides a break- 
in battle, Montgomery and Dempsey meant to take on the main weight of German 
armor, a mission congruent with Montgomery's recently stated policy of holding 
German armor from the American front. 
Launched on 25 June, the attacks proceeded toward Point (Hill) I 12, with 
supplementary attacks being made toward the ridges that cut laterally into 8 Corps* 
axis of advance. More than 600 guns heralded the offensive, and the Germans 
responded with panzers to eat at any gains made. (See figure 8. ) After six days, 
De sey shut down the battle. He had driven a salient of about six miles into the 
enemy, but had neither broken through nor defeated the German armor. (See figures 9 
and 10. ) Ringed with panzer divisions, the troops in the salient fought the enemy to a 
standstill. Near battle's end, Second Army estimated that it had destroyed 191 enemy 
tanks. Intelligence also noted, that both the 9 SS and 10 SS Panzer divisions had 
arrived in sector, a factor no doubt weighing heavily in the decision to halt the 
attack. 156 
Montgomery proclaimed success, a reflection of his ideas on limited-objective 
attacks. Intelligence tracked enemy armor reserves and losses carefully, and 
continually appreciated the capability of the defense to concentmte for a 
counteroffensive, a task which the British attrition fight was designed to prevent. 
Earlier, Montgomery had stated in his diary, "as long as Rommel has to use his 
I" M505,30th June 1944, lists eight panzcr divisions: 21 Pz, 2 Pz, I SS, 2 SS, 9 SS. 10 SS, 12 SS. and Panzer Lehr. Ellis, Victory in the West, 1, map facing 286, shows six at the beginning of the battle. 
1.56 Hinsley, British Intelligence, 3, Part 2.194-199; Second Armv Hisloq, 110-115. 
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strategic reserves to plug holes, then we have done well. " Enemy armor was used 
to 
fill gaps in their infantry line. With the arrival of more German armor, Montgomery 
opted for the beating of enemy attacks and launching fixing attacks, while Bradley. 
again begging off an immediate assault on his front, regrouped to attack southwards. 
SHAEF pronounced the front as failing. Eisenhower quickly moved off to Normandy 
to see Bradley. Cherbourg had fallen three days before, on 27 June. The subject of 
Eisenhower's private discussions can only be the subject of conjecture. 
157 
Prior to Eisenhower's arrival, Montgomery on 30 June issued M. 505, the most 
far-reaching and important of his orders since the promulgation of the Initial Joint 
Plan in February. From it, the final design for the Normandy campaign would emerge, 
not a design based on COSSAC's flawed structure and the assumption of a weak 
enemy defense, but one based on the actual forces on the field and without the fear of 
a failed assault or lack of a port to develop. 
Montgomery's statement of policy enraged SHAEF and his critics: 
My policy once we had secured a firm lodgement area, has always been 
to draw the main enemy forces in to the battle of our eastern flank, and 
to fight them there, so that our affairs on the western flank could 
proceed the easier. 
157 Montgomety Log, 13 June, 29,30 June. Hansen Diary, 29 June 1944, claims Monty was interested 
in clearing the coast with Canadian, British, and First Army to take Pas de Calais and wanted to 
abandon idea of attacking the Brittany ports, which has no basis in fact, though it demonstrated 
Bradley's misrepresentation of Monty to Ike; Ambrose, The Supreme Commander, 432. Second Army 
Intelligence Summary, No. 26, cited 159 enemy tanks destroyed during EPSOM up to the end of 29 
June 1944. The following day's summary added 34 more tanks. Second Army estimated more than 360 
tanks destroyed during the June battles. Estimates also noted elements from eight separate panzcr 
divisions were present during EPSOM battles, with 10 SS arriving on the final day. 
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Citing Bradley's reorganization and restaging of forces to the south as critical. Cý C 
he emphasized that he would follow a policy of retaining the initiative, having no set- 
backs, and proceeding relentlessly with his plan. This plan he cited as. 
To hold the maximum number of enemy divisions on our eastern flank- 
between CAEN and VII-LERS BOCAGE, and to swing our western or 
right flank of the Army Group southwards and eastwards in a wide 
sweep so as to threaten the line of withdrawal of such enemy divisions 
to the south of Paris. 158 
Tasking Second Army to continue its fixing mission while preparing to receive 
a possible major enemy counteroffensive, Montgomery reiterated the need to seize 
Caen, "the sooner the better. " For First Army, he laid out a specific direction of attack 
to begin on 3 July: 
The Army [is) to pivot on its left in the CAUMONT area. and to swing 
southwards and eastwards on to the general line CAUMONT-VIRE- 
MORTAIN-FOUGERES. 
He further specified: 
On reaching the base of the peninsula at AVRANCHES, the right hand 
[US] Corps (VIII Corps) to be turned westwards into BRITTANY and 
directed on RENNES and ST MALO. 
As regards the remainder of the Army: 
Plans will be made to direct a strong right wing in a wide sweep, south 
of the bocage country, towards successive objectives as follows: 
(a) LAVAL-MAYENNE. 
(b) LE MANS-ALENCON 
Montgomery's last admonition left no doubt as to his aim: 
"' M505,30th June 1944,1,2. 
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it is highly important that when the above operations begin on 3 July 
they should be carried out with the greatest drive and energy. 
'5ý' 
Montgomery's "policy" had in fact percolated over a number of months, not 
simply since the D-Day failure to take Caen or the failure of PERCH to execute 
Dempsey's pre-Day plans. It was apparent from the Initial Joint Plan that the strategic 
objects of Cherbourg and Brittany were in the west, but that the airmen had forced a 
possession of the Caen area (actually south of Caen) as a key object. Monty's chief 
operations officer, Brigadier David Belchem, claimed that decisive operations in the 
west were considered as early as April. Had this been so, it would have been an 
unformed idea, not reasonable in Montgomery's mind until the campaign began to 
develop. Monty's discussions and memos prior to the landing indicated his flexibility. 
While he accepted the mask-and-encircle plan made by Second Army, he was also 
quick to see the logic of keeping a defense on the left as the panzers bore down on his 
forces. By mid- to late June his plans section produced an outline plan. LUCKY 
STRIKE, that reflected his tactical situation and his acceptance that he could not fight 
the strength of the German army with his British forces, whose strength would 
diminish over time. Accepting Second Army as the shield, he formalized First Army 
as the sword with his acceptance of LUCKY STRIKE. 160 
'*" Ibid., 3. 
160 NARA. RG 338, ML-200. OPLAN LUCKY STRIKE (Clearance of Normandy. circa I July 44); 
NARA, RG 33 1. Entry 34, Box 34,381-LUCKY STRIKE; RG 407, Entry 427, Box 1978, First Army, 
27 June 1944,101-3.5 Operation LUCKY STRIKE; Major-General David Belchem, Victoly in 
Norman4v (London: Chatto and Windus, 1981), 45-53; MH1, M S, Report of the General Board, 
European Theater, Study Number 1, "Strategy of the Campaign in Western Europe 1944-1945, " 29-30. 
The further development of LUCKY STRIKE. particularly LUCKY STRIKE B, can be seen as 
evolving from Montgomery's expressed views within the Afontgomeq Log, and also within his 
directives. His obsession with the western part of the front, as opposed to the easL is also apparent, 
particularly in view of his constant references to ports, all in the US zone. LUCKY STRIKE completed 
the "Master Plan" and was the crucial second half of Montgomery's concept of the Normandy 
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As with a rapid shift of effort and simultaneous attacks in the Cotentin. 
Bradley did not deliver on time. This was a consistent problem for Montgomery*s 
gencralship, that was based on timing attacks along the front to pose both threats and 
actual attacks in different sectors simultaneously, and it fiu-ther helped to establish a 
separate American and British battle for Normandy in nationalistic eyes, not the Army 
Group battle for which Montgomery was responsible. 
Characteristically, no talk of "American failure' pervaded SHAEF's kibitzing. 
Instead, Bradley continued to shovel forces forward piecemeal, chewing up divisions 
in the bocage by regiments, hoping to gain an adequate start line for a major attack. 
161 
No thought seems to have been given to following Montgomery's admonition to go 
for Coutances, a direct concentrated attack via the St. Lo area that would have cut the 
peninsula laterally, obviated much bad terrain, and bypassed seveml defending 
divisions. 162 
Monty attempted to keep up the tempo within the bounds of launching corps- 
sized attacks, not the "company exercises" that Tedder whined about. Montgomery's 
rationale was that only large forces could prevent the enemy from concentrating on 
Campaign, the first being the dual effort to take Caen and Cherbourg simultaneously, not in tandcm as 
in the COSSAC Plan. 
16'FUSA Report of0perations Oct 43-Aug 44,81-93; Martin Blumenson, Break-out and Pursuit 
(Washington: Center of Military History. 1961,1984). passim. It is interesting that the American 
official account strains to eliminate any cognizance of an -Army Group battle" or any favorable Wect 
gained by Second Army's attrition battles, Pogue, The Supreme Command, 196 (fn 7). 197 (fn 8). The 
offical historical account, The Supreme Command, by Forrest Pogue (no admirer of Monty) is more 
fair. Pogue attempts to restrict the importance of LUCKY STRIKE to footnotes, which is not the 
interpretation given by the US Army Theater Board, that credits LUCKY STRIKE B (variant) as bcing 
the breakout plan. Blumcnson obscures the fact that the plan existed. Nor have the American historians 
ever investigated the virtual congruence of LUCKY STRIKE B and Montgomery's directives. 
161 Montgomen, Log, 23 June 1944; Nigel Hamilton, Mono-. The Battles offield Alarshal Bernard 
Montgomeq (ýew York: Random House, 1994). 302. Hamilton quotes a Montgomery letter to 
Alanbrooke: "I tried very hard to get First US Army to develop its thrust southwards, towards 
COUTANCE, at the same as it was completing the capture of CHERBOURG. " 
97 
decisive counterblows, yet terrain and resources, especially artillery. restricted the 
width and depth of objectives for his own attacks. For Normandy, and indeed for most 
of the war, the corps was the unit of choice of limited objective attacks. Divisions 
rarely launched independent operations except within the context of a larger aim. 
' 13 
While Bradley's forces continued their fight, Dempsey moved to complete 
Caen's capture. Twice failing at an encirclement, Dempsey opted for a frontal assault 
using maximum air support. Leigh Mallory obliged, and with the Canadians 
intimately involved, both Generals Crerar and Simonds intended to use their fire 
coordination skills to the maximum in an advisory capacity. It would become a 
firepower battle using the air force for mass effect. (See figures II and 12. ) 
Apparently, unknown to SHAEF and virtually all of Monty's critics, the Caen 
operation was to be half a loaf at a time, with the first half being seizing Caen north of 
the river. The remainder would follow 2d Army's consolidation. The massed bomber 
strike supported this concept. 164 
Tedder and SHAEF, however, fumed. While Leigh Mallory coordinated, 
Tedder accused "the Army of being unwilling to fight its battles, " and alleged that the 
air force was being blamed for slow ground gains, Tedder hoped to engineer 
Montgomery's relief, a situation Alanbrooke would never have accepted. Moreover, 
Morgan and Smith, ignoring Bradley's lack of movement, blamed the stalemate on 
163 The Americans considered the corps the largest tactical unit, and for their operations throughout the 
war, the corps was the real fighting headquarters where detailed planning and control took place. 
Armies supplied, set tasks, and coordinated air assets; Tedder, With Prejudice, 559. Tedder's 
comments had far more to do with his hatred of Montgomery than with his actual or theoretical 
knowledge of ground combat or actual conditions at the front. His comment also showed incredible 
ignorance about the actual battle plans for Second Army and how they were carried out. 
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Montgomery. Eisenhower, who had just spent five days in Normandy without 
venturing toward the British front, decided to write a letter urging speed. 
Churchill 
accosted by Ike, blamed Monty and had a row with Alanbrooke. 
161 
Dempsey's Caen attack, called CHARNNVOOD, did little to alleviate 
SHAEF's ire. The airmen were unhappy with the plan, which was designed more to 
seal the battlefield than to propel the ground attack forward. The plan. in fact. was a 
victim of Britain's internal Commonwealth politics. With Simonds and Crcrar 
involved, Montgomery gave them leeway, a mistake for which he paid the popularity 
price. The resulting air plan called the question on the use of bombers. The slow 
ground advance following the bombardment brought on further ire from Tedder. who 
continued to hate the Army and Leigh Mallory equally. CHARNWOOD. in fact. was 
based on Leigh Mallory's ideas from mid-June, and also recognized that the city was 
cut by both a river and a canal. It was designed to gain the foothold to permit the town 
to be cleared, not to make a rapid move through it which was, in all probability. 
impossible. 166 
CHARNWOOD brought Dempsey's forces through the town, but Hitler 
refused to permit his I SS Panzer Corps to withdraw. The mouth of the avenue was 
now in friendly hands, but the crucial flanks and depth of the avenue remained to be 
'"SecondArm 
' vHiston-, 
118-121: )ZAF Narrative. 11'. 21-24; Ellis. Victon, in the West. 1.311-316; 
Colonel C. P. Stacey, fhe Victoq Campaign, Ill, The Operations in Northwest Europe 1944-1945 
[hereafter referred to as Stacey, The Victory Campaign, I 11) (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1966). 152-164. 
'63 Danchev and Todman, Alanbrooke WarDiaries, 566,567; Ambrose. The Supreme Commander, 
434435. 
'" Leigh Mallor), Diar),, 14 June 1944. Second Army Intelligence Summary, No. 34.7 July 1944. No. 
35,8 July 1944. Dempsey's intelligence noted that the strength of the guns and flak to the west of the 
town was increasing. Following the attack. they estimated that the value of the city had been eliminated 
and that its retention would be impossible; for battle description. see Second Arm. v Histoq, 118-12 1. 
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developed. German tanks and antitank, guns still dominated the precious airfield 
terrain that Morgan and the airmen had declared as the success standard for 
OVERLORD. 167 
Montgomery's resulting M. 5 10 directive on 10 July, repeated his policy as: 
draw(ing) the main enemy forces in to battle on our eastern flank, and 
to fight them there, so that our affairs on the western flank may 
proceed easier. 
Noting a reinforcement in front of Bradley, he intended to stage Second Army 
operations to draw additional force from the western flank. That intention grew into a 
double attack plan that further split 21 Army Group's commander from support at 
S 168 
While Montgomery's Army commanders planned two "colossal cracks, " 
COBRA (the final product of his M. 505 and LUCKY STRIKE B), and 
GOODWOOD, other operations proceeded. The British front, contrary to SHAEF's 
jaundiced view, was never quiescent. Because massive operations ("Colossal Cracks") 
weren't continuous, troublemakers such as Tedder, Morgan, and Butcher, Ike's 
propagandist, ignored the constant small-unit fighting that comprised limited objective 
attacks. Battles to absorb or fix reserves or to gain adequate "start lines" for major 
offensives were continuous in Second Army's sector. These included operations such 
as PERCH, DAUNTLESS, MARTLET, SPRING, ATLANTIC, and others, that saw 
"7 MHl Foreign Military Studies, MS, C-024, Generalmajor Fritz Kraemer, "I SS Panzcr Corps in the 
West, " passim. 
1" M510,10-744,1.2; Leigh Afallory Diary, 14 June; Montgomery Log, 12 July, notes that the two 
plans coming to fruition were the long-term result of discussions and orders. This was especially true 
for COBRA; Dempsey Diary, 10-12 July. The GOODWOOD variant, offering a double blow, was 
proposed by Dempsey on the 12th based on the post-Caen situation, and after discussing variants with 
his commanders. 
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units repulsing counterattacks, launching limited objective attacks. or conducting firc 
raids by artillery. 
Constant movement, or the threat of constant movement. was the only true 
"fixer" to keep enemy divisions in place, and the fact that this worked throughout the 
campaign indicates that Montgomery's plan, though not gaining significant ground. 
was working, regardless of when his concept emerged. In one sense. these operations 
mirrored many of the smaller battles that combined to generate the major "*battles" of 
World War I such as the Somme or Verdun. Unexperienced in such operations. 
Eisenhower accused the British of not fighting and was content to have his staff 
openly criticize British operations. Sensitive to American losses, Eisenhower never 
made such charges against Bradley, never noted the slowness of American divisions 
to adapt to the bocage, never commented that Bradley faced the lowest quality and 
fewest numbers of the enemy, and never mentioned that Bradley had becn warned 
about the difficulty of the bocage and that extensive intelligence had been provided by 
the British. Monty was the designated scapegoat for all failures. at evcry level. 
The differential in considerations betrayed Eisenhower's inability to estimate 
enemy potential, to assess terrain, or to credit any but Americans in fighting. Indeed, 
three days after Bradley had confessed at the Army commanders'confercnce that he 
had "failed" to deliver the breakthrough Monty had been asking for and ordering since 
27 June, Eisenhower wrote Bradley on 8 July, 
I well understand that you are having tough going, both from the 
ground and from the enemy. However, I am perfectly certain that you 
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are on the right track. We must keep up the pressure on the widest 
possible front on which we can continue to sustain the attack. 169 
The same day, Montgomery received a letter from Eisenhower questioning 
why "We have not yet attempted a major full-dress attack on the left flank supported 
by everything we could bring to bear. " Continuing, Ike noted that nothing could be 
done on the right flank to help except possibly an "airborne operation at St. Malo. " 
Montgomery, noting in his own log that Eisenhower's letter "is the first time he has 
ever expressed any views on the battle, " submitted his "reasons in writing, " in the 
traditional military manner, noting in his lengthy response both his actions throughout 
the campaign and his reasoning. Repeatedly, he stressed the value of Cherbourg and 
Brittany as key to his actions, and noted his concept: 
The great thing now is to get First and Third Army up to a good 
strength, and to get them cracking on the southward thrust on the 
western flank, and then to turn Patton westwards into the Brittany 
peninsula. 1 70 
Unfortunately, Montgomery failed to state the glaringly obvious. He hesitated 
to assault headlong into a qualitatively superior armored force heavily reinforced in 
depth by antitank weapons and backed by further armor reserves. Eisenhower himself 
had been appalled at Allied armor's failings, and had already moved to have the 
American ordnance corps look into it. 171 
169 Eisenhower Papers. 111,1986. 
"0 EL. Eisenhower Correspondence. Letter to Montgomery. dated 7 July 1944 (reproduced in EP 
111,1982-1983), ibid., Montgomery to Eisenhower, M-508; Montgomely Log, 8 July 1944. 
171 EL, Bedell Smith Papers, SHAEF Cable Log (in), 6 July 44, Eisenhower to Smith. 
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GOODWOOD exceeded Montgomery's 10 July design and was the Second 
Army Commander's response to what he felt was Bradley's failure to break out. 1721 
Dempsey believed that a full corps attack using all three armored divisions following 
an extensive air preparation would provide the final tip needed to topple the defenses 
south of Caen. A complementary "fixing" attack to clear the Verriercs; ridge area west 
of Caen would keep the Germans from shifting armor reserves. Two facts boded 
poorly for the plan. Firs4 the attack would use the narrow Cacn-airborne bridgchcad 
as the start line, an area already determined as too small and too congested to amass 
an additional full corps and its artillery. Secondly, the attack would be made head-on 
into the strength of the German defense in depth, the very thing that Dempsey and 
Montgomery had avoided since 8 June. The fact that GOODWOOD would require the 
same air assets needed for COBRA prevented their simultaneous launching. Dempsey 
would go fast and set the stage for a huge double assault. 173 
As always, air support using anything other than fightcr-bombcrs raised 
hackles among the airmen. As Leigh Mallory grew increasingly cooperative, Tedder 
and his henchman, Coningham, resisted "cooperation. " Tedder continually attempted 
to override or derail Leigh Mallory's cfforts. GOODWOOD, however, posed a 
problem to Tedder. Eisenhower was enthusiastic about a great double attack. For 
once, his idea of everybody attacking everywhere all the time seemed possible. He 
weighed in promising support. The "blue chip" of Ike's support was to prove another 
'? -'PRO, CAB 106/1061. Notes of Conversation between General Dempsey Commander British 
Second Army and Lt. Col. G. S. Jackson, Capt. B. H. Liddell Hart. Dempsey Diaq. 10- 12 July 1944. 
The "double blow" was proposed by Dempsey on 12 July based on the post-Cacn situation, and after discussing variants with his commanders. 
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stumbling block in SHAEF-Monty relations, though in reality. Tedder's helpfulness at 
Ike's prodding disguised Tedder's contempt for the Army and Montgomery. 174 
GOODWOOD was based on several assumptions, both written and unwritten. 
Primary among them was that the air bombardment would annihilate, or at least 
neutralize, the German antitank defense in depth built on the Caen avenue as well as 
cratering the flanks of the breakthrough area to prevent armored counterattacks. A full 
corps of three armored divisions would pass through the gap created. taking the 
airfield sites and "writing down" the German armor concentrated in front of the 
British. Moreover, COBRA, the American breakthrough attack on the St. Lo front, 
would follow immediately on 19 July, as GOODWOOD culminated. 175 
Dempsey's plan harked back to Monty's pre-EPSOM planning that had been 
scotched by O'Connor, who again sought to avoid cornmand in this sector, this time 
believing Crocker should be reinforced for the attack. Dempsey planned for a decisive 
operation, giving O'Connor three armored divisions, with Falaise as the objective. As 
the operation neared, Monty hedged his bet, limiting the armored advance to the high 
ground south of Caen. He also stressed the importance of the 2 Canadian Corps 
clearing their corridor and thus covering O'Connor's deep'flank-. Only then would 8 
'" John J. T. Sweet, Alounting the Threat. The Battle ofBourguebus Ridge, 18-23 Jult, 1944 (San 
Rafael: Presidio Press, 1977). Sweet's account is based on the former Camberley staff ride and his 
extensive talks with both O'Connor and other participants in the late 1960s. 
"'Teddcr, 117th Prejudice, 561.562. Tedder wanted to ensure that Monty understood that he was to go 
all out, regardless of air support, but Eisenhower balked at sending such a message. 
'I 7* Second Arpýr Histom 123-125; Montgomery, Norman4V to the Baltic, 97-102; EL, Correspondence 
File, M-50,13 July 194 
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Corps be able "to crack about" as the situation demanded. SHAEF, who saw Monty as 
spending the family fortune-airpower-cxpected a massive break-through. 
176 
Airpower played a huge part in the ground commanders" plans. virtually 
dominating both of the assaults planned. Neither GOODWOOD nor COBRA was 
seen at the time by SHAEF or the ground commanders as possibly gaining an 
operational decision beyond rupturing the current defense line, and it is because of this 
lack of faith that SHAEF's view of Montgomery's Sencralship hung on thin threads. 
From the beginning of the NEPTUNE planning period, Tedder and Coningham had 
been hostile to the Army in general and to Montgomery in particular. hlontyý dwelling 
in his own egocentric bubble, was slow to see this as crippling, though he did shy 
away from Coningham, tending to deal with Leigh Mallory, whom he saw as his 
opposite number. 
177 
Using airpower to support ground attacks was an unpopular idea with the 
airmen, but it had a firni root not simply in Montgomery's mind. but also in 
Eisenhower's mind and those of the SHAEF planners. The plans section, seizing any 
opportunity to put Eisenhower in direct control, noted in their contingency concerning 
breaking a "stabilization of the front" that concentrated airpowcr wielded by SHAEF 
"6 EL, Correspondence File, Letter to Montgomery dated 7 July 1944. reproduced in Eisenhovsrr 
Papers, 1//, 1982-1983; Correspondence File, M-508; Montgomery Log, 12-21 July 1944; NAC, RG 
24, Volume 10556, File 215132.016 (D4), Second Army Operation Instruction No. 2.13 July 1944; 
NAC, RG 24, Volume 10556, File 215B2.016(D3). 2 CDN Corps, notes from Chief of Staffs 
meetings, 2d Army, Operation GOODWOOD MEETING; NAC. RG 24. Volume 10791. Corps 
Comd's Notes on GOODWOOD MEETING; Baynesý The Forgotten Pctor. 197-205. 
177 Montgomery Log, 14,15 June. Montgomery's ideas concerning Leigh Mallory consistently 
improved. He believed Leigh Mallory to be a victim of dislike by Coningharn and Harris, but not by 
Tedder, who did dislike Leigh Mallory. Montgomery states clearly that Leigh Mallory is the author of 
the -bomber in support of ground troops" idea, and that -he is prepared to try anything to win the war. " 
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would be the best course of action. 
178 Heavy bombers had proven decisive in saving 
the Salerno beachhead in September 1943; they were therefore a clear option in 
Eisenhower's mind. 
Tedder, from the first, had opposed this type of tactic, as did Spaatz, Harris. 
and Doolittle. 179 Their opposition, however, did not take airpower off the discussion 
table. Montgomery used his trusted Brigadier, Plans, Charles Richardson, to ease air 
planning with Broadhurst, but Coningham remained intractable. Poor weather and the 
obviously porous interdiction effort offered little respite to the soldiers despite the 
targeting data provided by ULTRA decrypts. Unable to seal the battlefield, the airmen 
were hesitant to try to "blow the enemy off it, " the claim, originally made by Tedder 
for his Desert Squadrons, that was turned down by Montgomery at Alamein. 
180 
The ideas percolated with Leigh Mallory, who, betraying the airmen's dim 
view of "Army Cooperation, " began seeing airpower as the Army's best helpmate. 
Leigh Mallory, however, did share the airmen's view that the Army needed "to get on 
with it, " and was buoyed by the intelligence estimates that repeatedly noted that the 
German buildup was not meeting their expected capabilities. Moreover, like the other 
airmen, he did not see German defensive strength, particularly of their superior armor- 
anti-tank forces, as the critical problem in gaining depth and the desired airfields 
noted in AEAF's buildup plan. Leigh Mallory, however, did not use his reservations 
NARA, RG 33 1. Post-Overlord, 1, Memo from Plans Staff, 10 June 1944. 
Davis. Spaat-- and the Air War, 453482. 
'so James Ambrose Brown. Eagles Strike: The Campaigns ofthe South African Air Force in EgIpt, 
4ývrenaica, Lib. ya, Tunisia, Tripolitania and Madagascar 1941-1943 (Cape Town: Purnel, 1974), 26 1. 
Tedder proposed to hammer the El Alamein positions for 3-4 days to prevent a slugging match "on the 
best Quecnsbury Rules lines. " 
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to malign Montgomery or the Army, or to provoke the Army Group Commander's 
relief. Rather, he sought a solution by using airpower. 
181 
Leigh Mallory's conversion was steady, and Was recorded nightly by his 
amanuensis, Hillary St. George Saunders, for the AEAF Diary. Beginning with his 
ideas on bombing that led to CHARNWOOD, he noted: 
I have never waited to be told by the army what to do in the air. and my 
view is not bounded, as it seems to be in the case of the army, by the 
nearest hedge or stream. I said as much, though in different words, to 
Monty and tried to describe the wider aspects of this battle as I see 
them, particularly stressing the number of Divisions which he might be 
have had to fight had they not been prevented from appearing on the 
scene by air action. He was profoundly uninterested. Thý fact of the 
matter is, however, that we have reduced the enemy's opposition 
considerably and the efficiency of their troops and armour even more 
so. In spite of this, the army won't get on. 
182 
Leigh Mallory was clearly wrong about Montgomery's alleged disinterest and. 
in fact, had piqued his enthusiasm by offering to break the stalement with bomb 
power. Nor had Monty ignored that the "Air Forces have set the arena for the Army 
the army has [not] taken advantage of this situation or made use of it: ` as claimed by 
Leigh Mallory. 183 Montgomery's divisions received heavy armored counterattacks 
despite "air superiority, " a gift that was irrelevant on many days due to rain, mist, or 
cloud cover. Moreover, while the majority of the airmen operated from hardstands in 
England, the army was loosely tethered by across-the-beach administration hampered 
1" Leigh Afalloq Diaq, 14 June. 
is, Ibid., 14 June 1944. 
1'3 Ibid., 15 June 1944. Monty's understanding of airpower. interdiction, and the relative equality of the 
forces in battle was well known and thoroughly published throughout both the British army and the air 
force. See Pamphlet, High Command in War: Post-Ovrrlord. 1, Memo from Plans Staff, 10 June 1944. 
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greatly by unseasonably bad weather. Montgomery was forced to 
fight to break- the 
stalemate, regardless of weather. 
Despite his views, Leigh Mallory showed a positive face to Montgomery, and 
they became more empathetic toward each other's problems and plans. The air-ground 
team that Monty had forged with Coningharn for Alam Halfa and Alamein began to 
reappear, despite AEAF Forward (Coningham) and SHAEF's Deputy Supreme 
Commander, who was content to separate the air and ground battle. 
Leigh Mallory's diversion to CROSSBOW targets, the V-1 launch sites, added 
further strain to air-ground relations. Doolittle, in particular, resented Eighth Air 
Force's task of attacking them, a task handed down by AEAF. Tedder, moreover, 
undercut Leigh Mallory by authorizing a massive air raid on Berlin in "retaliation" for 
V-1 strikes, while simultaneously cutting off rail attacks to compensate. EPSOM, 
which received little support due to weather, hardened Leigh Mallory toward the 
Second Army's support. He noted: 
My mind is very clear on one point which I feel very strongly indeed. It 
is that we must be prepared to use every bit of air we've got, every 
single aircraft, in order to unstick the Army if, as I fear, it gets bogged. 
Studying a photo depicting a 1,000-yard radius of obliteration around a 100- 
bomber aiming point, he wrote: "I am convinced that we can do this sort of thing to 
eight different points along a battle front. " Continuing with his reasoning, he outlined 
ideas that would both transform the campaign and radically change his own position, 
and that of Montgomery's, for the worse in many people's eyes. Seeing that the Army 
couldn't get forward on its own, he outlined his operational concept: 
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We can find 6-8 "blobs", that is to say, battery positions or strong 
points, along the edge of the assault area. This can be done at first light 
by heavy bombers. Then an immediate follow up should be an artillery 
barrage covering the first 1000 yards in the depth of the area to be 
attacked. When that was lifted I should put in my medium bombers to 
clobber in front of the advancing Infantry up to a depth of from 1000 to 
4000 yards. I am convinced that the moral effect of this triple form of 
assault would be terrific. 
Finally, I should put the day heavy bombers on to more distant battery 
targets. If this be done, I truly believe that it would have the effect of 
getting the Army through. If it is not done, then there is unhappily, a 
great chance that the Army will continue to stick. ' 8' 
EPSOM, and the failure of O'Connor's 8 Corps to break- the front. completed 
the final conversion of Leigh Mallory. Leigh Mallory knew that Tedder would oppose 
this action, but the current situation in fact was no more than a replication of the basic 
185 0 
assault on D-Day. Its very conception shook the roots of the Trcnchard-inspircd 
anti-Army clique that ruled the RAF and was mirrored by Spaatz and Doolittle and the 
senior elements of the AAF. Its promulgation separated the airmen and soldiers at 
SHAEF permanently. CHARNWOOD on 8 July had begun this schism. 
GOODWOOD and COBRA would finish it. 
While Monty's M. 510 outlined his gcneml objectives, two battles had to be 
fought: The first was to obtain use of bombers for both plans. Tedder had opposed the 
use of heavy bombers in the tactical role, a reversal of his own actions while -air 
commandee' for Eisenhower in the Mediterranean. He had orchestrated Spaatzs 
attack to save Lt. Gen. Mark Clark's imperiled Salemo beachhead. Now, Tedder 
balked at helping Montgomery, and at supporting ideas originated by Leigh Mallory. 
Leigh Alalloýy Diary, 26 June. 
Ibid. 
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Moreover, Coningham, had opposed such "blitz" attacks. tactics developed by 
Broadhurst, a Monty-ally and friend of the anny. I So 
The Deputy Supreme Commander reported in his diary that upon 
confinn[ing] to Montgomery that his opposite number was 
Coningham, and Dempsey's was Air Vice Marshal Broadhurst [83 
Group], Montgomery seemed relieved to have this confirmation. 
187 
Tedder's disingenuousness fooled Eisenhower, not only during Normandy but 
throughout the war. Tedder, had, while professing to Dempsey that plans for the use 
of bombers would be studied, quickly killed Leigh Mallory's attempt to bolster the 
failing PERCH offensive. By the time weather, army-air relations, and tactical 
planning had been harmonized, a needless blooabath, a second stymied offensive, and 
the month of June had all expired. This was the measure of Tedder's dedication to 
army-air cooperation. 1 88 
Tedder bridged two schools. He had supported the Transportation Plan, 
essentially requiring half of the sorties flown preceding the invasion. The strategic 
commanders, Harris and Spaatz, vehemently opposed diverting their bombers to 
support OVERLORD, and Eisenhower's delayed appointment in gaining operational 
control reflected the power held by their sponsors, Portal and Arnold, even against the 
alleged main effort of the entire Allied cause. Spaatz's main strategic commander, 
Doolittle, was frequently hostile to any diversion. Harris seemed to be beyond all but 
general control. Spaatz summed the true problem in his diary after arriving in England 
'" Hamilton. Master of the Battlefield, Tedder, Wth Prejudice, 465467; Gooderson, AirPower at the 
Battlefront, 134. 
"'Tedder, 117th Prejudice, 552. 
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in January. 1944. OVERLORD. he feared. would preclude, -Air Operations of 
sufficient intensity to justify the theory that Germany can be knocked out by 
Airpower. " 189 
This summed the problem. To the American airmen. the AAF was fighing for 
its independence. to the British airmen, the RAF sought to justify its independence. 
POINTBLANK, not OVERLORD, was their true quest. Hence. the Army's requests 
for bomber support had to be ignored except for transportation targets. At no time was 
the division between the airmen and the soldiers greater. 
Owing his allegiance to Portal, Tedder supported this line until Eisenhower 
exerted his authority. On 25 June, Ike signaled Monty, saying. 
Please do not hesitate to make the maximum demands for any air 
assistance that can possibly be useful to you. Whenever there is any 
legitimate opportunity we must blast the enemy with everything we 
have. 190 
Leigh Mallory had indeed resurrected the bomber idea as promised. and events 
forced the unwilling airmen to respond. Not only Harris, who had "gardened" Cacn, 
but also Spaatz and Doolittle were soon tasked. COBRA. like GOODWOOD, would 
be launched following an extensive air preparation. Monty considered the two plans 
inseparable, as he submitted a single request for air for them both. 191 
"' While the Army maintained the hope of a bomber assault to aid EPSOM. this never materialized due 
to weather. 
'" Eduard Mark, Aerial Interdiction in Three Warr: Air Po%rr and the Land Battle in Three American 
Wars (Washington: Center for Air Force History, 1994), 225. 
'90 EL, Correspondence File, MSG S-54520,25 June 1944, Eisenhower to Montgomery. 
'9' EL, Correspondence File. M-50,13200 July 1944. It is important to note that Monty had requested 
air from Eisenhower for GOODWOOD in M49, and from Tedder for both operations in M-53. 
140830 July 1944. He noted here, -Plan if successful promises to be decisive and therefore necessary 
III 
GOODWOOD relied upon a clean break-through, the quick passage of three 
armoured divisions through the enemy's defensive depth, and the seizure of the high 
ground approximately six miles from the start line. Originally intending the 
Bourgcbous ridge to be an intermediate objective on the way to Falaise. 
Montgomery's decided to restrict GOODWOOD's objective to the ridge itself, but left 
the door open to exploitation if success was immediate. He ordered that, then and 
during the battle, reconnaissance was to be pushed as far as Falaise, "to study the 
form. " His limiting the advance to an objective, and then an on-order exploitation. 
may have been due to the withdrawal of German panzers into reserve, signaling that 
no clean breakthrough would be possible, or to his lack of confidence in good weather 
for the two operations to take place in tandem. The Armor vs. Armor plus Antitank 
Guns problem also loomed. Bradley soon added to this worry by asking for more time. 
COBRA would not be ready until 21 July. 192 
With Tedder in tandem to Eisenhower in hoping for a breakout and seizure of 
the Caen plain's airfield sites, more rode on the attack than simply a holding action for 
a one-two operational punch. With Bradley obviously failing in the west, and Tedder 
and now Marshall and Stimson carping because the British weren't 16 doing their 
share, " SHAEF wanted a massive victory. So intense was Eisenhower's belief that 
Monty was intent on solving Ike's own problem with his superiors and staff, that he 
grew to believe or concoct the idea that a breakout from the east "was always the 
that the air forces bring full weight to bear. " These words were the catalyst for the firestorm that 
followed. 
192 PRO, CAB 106/1061, Conversations between General Dempsey; NAC, RG 24, Volume 10791, G 
Branch HQ 8 CORPS; CORPS COMD'S NOTES ON -GOODWOOD MEETING. " Neither Dempsey 
nor O'Connor offered military reasons concerning limiting GOODWOOD to a limited-objcctive 
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plan. "" 93 Eisenhower's failure to see GOODWOOD and COBRA as linked operations. 
and Ike's own ignorance of holding, fixing, and secondary efforts versus main efforts. 
would plague relations not only in Normandy but for the rest of the war. 
GOODWOOD's tactics were crafted by Dempsey, not Montgomcry as his 
critics at SHAEF reported. The reality of the small bridgehead posed restraints on both 
mounting and maneuvering, and as in the Alamein mineficids, restricted limits 
hampered armor deployment. Worst of the problems would be a lack of accurate 
intelligence of the location and depth of the German defenses. The air preparation was 
intended not simply to neutralize lanes into the combat zone, but also to replace 
artillery that could not reach into the depths of the defense, and to saturate it in a near- 
simultaneous bombardment to prevent its resiting. (See figure 13. ) 104 
Leigh Mallory awaited what he called "the air-blast battle, "' noting in his diary 
that the "Leigh Mallory plan" for bombing and breakthrough should work. but 
presciently said, 
There are people in a high quarter who won't be sorry if it does not 
succeed. But it is equally true to say that there are others who wish it 
every success. 
Tedder remained silent throughout their conferences, and Coningham, stunningly, had 
become cooperafive. Referring to Tedder, he noted, "I think he had been told by Ike to 
leave things to me. " 
195 
attack. Dempsey believed it was to clear up -misconceptions" at the execution level. He noted that Monty oversold GOODWOOD to secure air support. 
'93 COSSAC Plan. 29, Paras. 4045. 
'0' Goodwood Meeting, 8 Corps Comd Notes: CAB 106, Conversation with General Dempsey, Baynes, The Forgotten Victor, ibid. 
1" Leigh Afalloq Diaýy, 14th, 15th, 17th July. 
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In Francc to obsmc the bombing, Lcigh Mallory rccorded: 
The plan was a good one and the air could play its full part because we 
knew where the defences were and the bombs fell on them. The whole 
thing went quickly until IIa. m. 196 
Leigh Mallory was partially correct. The attack rolled forward, but the 
bombardment achieved limited results. The towns to the flanks were not neutralized 
and required the lead armored division's motorized infantry to deploy. The surviving 
enemy in the bombed areas were dazed, but recovered after some time passed. Tanks 
survived in rubbled towns, as did some antitank guns within the bombardment area, 
and these were manned after the shock of the bombing wore off. II th Armoured 
Division drove 10,000 yards, nearly to the limit of advance, and suddenly found itself 
fighing both tanks and 88-mm guns. Congestion and caution delayed 7th Armoured's 
deployment, and Guards Armoured found itself mired in fights to the flanks. The 
reconnaissance screen of armored cars meant for Falaise found no passage off the 
battlefield. German reserves from the unlocated parizer divisions responded quickly. 
By day's end, 8 Corps was in a ring of hot steel. 197 (See figure 14. ) 
By afternoon, two contrary opinions had emerged. Montgomery, unfortunately, 
told the press that the line had been broken, and subsequent reports soon proved him 
wrong. Leigh Mallory, who had watched the bombing from a captured Storch aircraft, 
soon visited Dempsey asking for reports of a breakthrough. Dempsey felt the absence 
196 Ibid., 18th, 19th July; RAF Narrative, IV, 36-59. This provides the most in-depth record of air 
operations in support of GOODWOOD. 
'"Second Arm Histoty. 123-128: Montgomery, Normandv to the Baltic, 100- 105, Montgomerv's 
Scientists. OR Report 6 Bombing in Operation Goodwood, 79-85; RG 24 including Corps Comd Notes 
"Goodwood Meeting. " Of interest also is the statement made in Second Army Intelligence Summary, 
No. 46,20 July 1944: -The so-called tank country doesn't really exist-thcre arc too many inhabited 
places and the very successful armourcd break through has now had to give place to infantry with tank 
support. " 
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of complete reports was normal after only a few hours, but Leigh Mallory "believe[d] 
the real reason for the lack of reports was because by then the Army was not making 
much progress. " 
By the next day, Leigh Mallory reported: 
[I]t does not seem to me that the breakthrough which we produced has 
been exploited and pressed to a conclusion. There we were, having 
helped the Army over all the preliminary gun positions of the enemy, 
but it was a disappointment to the Air Force that they didn't go further. 
After all, they must expect to be shot at a bit. '98 
8 Corps continued battering forward, but failed to clear the ridge. In the 
pouring rain on the 21 st, Montgomery ordered Dempsey to shut down GOODWOOD, 
as the Canadians had completed the capture of Caen and its approaches. Bradley's 
assault, meanwhile, went on hold due to the weather. The operational rhythm of the 
one-two punch had been lost. The synergy of being able to consume the enemy 
reserves between hole-filling on two fronts had been stopped. Four hundred ninety- 
three British tanks were destroyed or temporarily put out of action, and 5500 
casualties were suffered by the 1,8,12, and 2 Canadian Corps. Montgomery moved to 
coordinate another fixing attack using the 2 Canadian Corps while he ceased major 
operations to conserve men. 199 
The airmen demanded Monty's head, and a manipulated and enraged 
Eisenhower, they hoped, would be the headsman. Tedder pressed Eisenhower. His 
false claim, that "his government would support any necessary action taken, " was 
intended only for one thing-to encourage Ike to demand Monty's relief. Tedder 
198 Leigh Mallog Diary, 18th, 19th July 1944. 
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approached Portal. trying to engineer support for Montgomery's relief. Failing this. he 
went after Leigh Mallory, "to place on a more solid footing the arrangements for 
control of our air forces. " Upset, but sensitive to the fact that such an action may cost 
the coalition far more than hurt feelings, Eisenhower retaliated as only a staff officer 
would-with paper-after failing to say anything about his concerns to Montgomery 
at a conference the day before. The correspondence file on GOODWOOD shows 
where Ike's bitterness was born. Montgomery had begun his explanation of his plan 
on the 13th saying, "Am going to launch two very big attacks next week, " and 
specified that his assault would use three armored divisions while Bradley's attack 
would use six divisions. Eisenhower, however, responded, 
[W]hen this thing is started you can count on Bradley to keep his 
troops fighting like the very devil, twenty-four hours a day, to provide 
the opportunity your armored corps will need, and to make the victory 
complete. 200 
Having reversed the roles of the annies in his mind, Eisenhower wrote on the 
21st expressing his disappointment that Dempsey's army had stopped after breaking 
through the front lines, and noted that Monty's reliance on Bradley's attack (inferring 
this was new because of Second Army's failure) was problematic. He noted that in 
Bradley's sector, 
the country is bad, and the enemy strong at the point of main assault, 
and more than ever I think it is important that we are aggressive 
throughout the front. 
'" SecondArmv Histor)-, 122-128; Ellis, Victory in the West, 1,327-353; D'Este, Decision in 
Normand),, 38i -390. 
NO EL, Corrrcspondence File. Montgomery, Msg. M-50,132000 July 44; letter Eisenhower to Montgomery, 14 July 1944; D'Estc. Decision in Norman4v, 391-399; Butcher, Atv Three Years with Eisenhower, 617-626; Tedder. INih Prejudice, 562-570. 
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Adding insult to injury. he stated, 
I realize the seriousness of the reinforcement problem for Dempsey ... 
But while we have equality in size we must go forward shoulder to 
shoulder, with honors and sacrifices equally shared. 
1.01 
Having already issued M. 512. which ordered continued operations to widen 
the breach and to direct First Army south and east, Montgomery tartly replied. 
, rhere is not repeat not and never has been any intention of stopping 
offensive operations on the eastern flank. 
He noted in his lettff, the insertion of Canadian First Army into battle to provide 
concentration for Dempsey toward Falaise and noted a corps-sized attack planned for 
25 July. Eisenhower failed to reply, but stepped up his attacks via Churchill. To avoid 
further misunderstandings of simultaneous operations, Montgomery sent AL514 on the 
planned day for Bradley's assault, 24 July, noting Bradley's mission to break in. pass 
more divisions through the gap, and drive for Coutance and Granville. Dempsey 
would launch a series of corps attacks east and west of the Orne as preliminaries to a 
larger armored thrust towards Falaise. . 
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Bradley's COBRA began inauspiciously with a bombing on the start line by 
his supporting air on the 24th after the operation was postponed. The next day's 
bombing repeated a friendly-fire incident that killed the US Army Ground Forces 
Commander, Lt. Gen. Lesley J. McNair, who was observing the operation. That same 
bombing did, however, stun the entire Panzer Lehr Division and lcft a hole in the 
German main line of resistance. COBRA ground forward. VII Corps commander Maj. 
20' EL, Correspondence File, Eisenhower to Montgomery. 21 July 1944. 
2w EL, Correspondence file, M-5 14,24-7-44. 
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Gen. J. Lawton Collins had modified Bradley's plan. which had been based on 
Monty's M-505. Passing the armor rapidly while the infantry was still achieving its 
breakin objectives, VII Corps shook free of the defense and was soon into the 
Germans' rear area. Bradley's front was neither manned as heavily by the Germans 
nor in any sufficient depth to reform. With Dempsey launghing probes along his front, 
the German defensive depth remained in the east until it was too late to prevent a 
rupture. Montgomery who had refused to attack enemy strength throughout its entire 
depth had been proven operationally correct. The battle in depth, had, as in the Great 
War, always been dependent upon the enemy's operational reserve and the ability to 
use it. The battles around Caen had both fixed that reserve and ground it up. SHAEF, 
however, painted a different story. 203 (See figure 15. ) 
Monty's double assault on the 25th left Eisenhower with gripes but no 
substantial case. Temporarily buoyed by Churchill's mercurial disdain for 
Montgomery, Eisenhower found that Churchill soon swayed to Montgomery's support 
after visiting 21 Army Group Tactical Headquarters. Eisenhower's hopes for relieving 
or somehow overpowering Monty's seeming independence were shattered. Perhaps, 
203 FUS, 4 Report of Operations Oct 43-Aug 44,96-102. Situation Map No. 6 (St. Lo South); NARA. 
RG 407,103-5, First Army Plans, -Conference Held in war tent-12 July 1944-Gcn. Bradley and Staff; 
Collins, LightningJoe. 232-245; Blumcnson. Break-out and Pursuit, Chapters XI, XII, XI 11, NARA, 
RG 407, Entry 427, Box 1978. Amendment No. 2-Outlinc Plan Cobra, 18 July 1944. Hansen Diary, 19 
July, reveals the pride and prejudice of COBRA. The Anglophobic Hansen recounts proudly of 
Bradley's masterful coordination of air support that, "Brad kept it an all American show, " keeping 
RAF aircraft from supporting, wrongly alleging that they could carry only heavy bombs. In Hansen 
Diaq, 25 July, he records that Eisenhower announced for all the scribbling aides to hear, after 
McNair's death, "I look upon heavies as an instrument for strategic attack on rear installations. I don't 
believe they can be used in support of ground troops. That's a job for artillery. I gave them a green 
light on this show but this is the last one. " This is an incredible and untrue turn-around from his 
position early in July prior to GOODWOOD. Nor did he forbid use of heavies again two weeks later. 
The Hansen Diaty section for 1-31 July 44 has entire Bradley Memorandum exonerating himself for 
his coordination of the -short bombing. " Hogan, A Command Post at War, 104-110. 
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characteristically, Eisenhower falsely reported to Monty himself on his meeting with 
Churchill during which he had hoped to remove Montgomery, 
I reported to Churchill your general plan plan for continuing attack in 
the Eastern Sector and he was delighted to know you will have attacks 
on both flanks in that sector supporting the main effort down the 
middle. 
Montgomery, of course, had indicated no main effort in the middle. The next day 
Monty clarified the situation simply by issuing N1.515, stating: 
On the western flank- the First US Army has delivered the main blow of 
the whole Allied plan, the main effort is making excellent progress ... 
The main blow of the eastern flank- will be delivered in great strength 
by the right wing of the Second British Army.... What it all amounts 
to is that I am planning to fight the enemy really hard on both flanks 
simultaneously... The really big victory is wanted on the western 
flank-, and everything will be subordinated to making it so. 204 
Conceptually, Eisenhower seemed to misunderstand that the American and 
Commonwealth forces were joined by a common campaign plan under a single Army 
Group headquarters. To Ike, Monty commanded the British, and Bradley commanded 
the AMCýCan forces. Eisenhower never mentioned Dempsey as the commander of the 
eastern flank's Second Anny, nor did he ever acknowlege the British chain of 
command. This was a habit of mind Bradley continued to foster in their personal 
discussions. 203 
Bradley's huge First Army, set to subdivide into the First and Third US 
Armies on I August, looked forward to declaring their independence from 
Montgomery. They were, however, disappointed. Informed that 12th Army Group 
2'4 EL. Correspondence File, letter to Montgomery 26 July 1944; Butcher. A(v 77tree Years with 
Eisenho wtwr. 625,626; 
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would remain under Montgomery's operational control until SCAEF could assume 
full control, Bradley*s staff, and particularly the volatile Third Army commander, 
intended to control their own fates. Moreover, Eisenhower, whose small forward 
headquarters was in France, intended to insert himself into the ground battle without 
assuming command. 
GOODWOOD had smashed Montgomery's reputation for all time with 
SHAEF, the airmen and, in a psychological sense, with the Supreme Commander. 
Rather than crediting Montgomery, the ground commander, with the unfolding victory 
in Normandy, a different interpretation evolved through press leaks, Eisenhower's 
own correspondence to Marshall, SHAEF's official dispatch, and the prevailing 
attitude of the American press corps. None of these explained the tactics or the 
difficulties of the campaign. The poetry of "attack all the time all along the front" 
would cloud the issue. The airmen would continue to say the army's lack of guts, not 
the aid of airpowcr for the battlefield, was an issue in explaining why the lodgement 
developed so slowly. 206 
While this pustule broke and infected the coalition command atmosphere, 
Montgomery achieved what he had wanted from the time of his May discussions with 
Bradley and Dempsey. He was probing deeply with armored formations before the 
enemy could reform a cohesive defense. Moreover, he was executing what he laid out 
201 This campaign would reach outrageous proportions by mid-August, when Marshall again raiscd the 
specter of Eisenhower assuming ground command due to bad publicity at home. 
"* Eisenhom-er Papers. 11'. 2074-2077; Eisenhower, Report kv the Supreme Commander, 39,61. 
Eisenhower began to go to great lengths to disassociate Montgomery's name from the Normandy 
victory. In SHAEF's official dispatch. he denigrated Montgomery's role, calling him a "coordinator of 
activities. " When Marshall began demanding Eisenhower's assumption of operational command, he 
signaled: -11]t would be a great pity if Bradley failed to get full credit due him for his brilliant 
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Eisenhower in M. 512 on the 21 st at the height of Eisenhower's ragc. a swing of the 
western flank- to the south and east, with the object of capturing the Brittanyporis and 
taking the Brittany peninsula, "so that we can develop the full resources of the Allies 
in western Europe. " 
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On the 25th, as COBRA appeared to be floundering, the German operational 
reserve, the majority of the German panzcr divisions, remained in front of the Second 
Army and the newly committed First Canadian Army. Not wishing to insert a new 
headquarters for the eastern attack-, Montgomery gave Lt. Gen. Crcrar the I Corps on 
the east flank, while keeping Simonds' 2 Canadian Corps temporarily within 
Dempsey's sector. Simonds' men would jump off on the 25th. Following their role in 
OPERATION SPRING, the battle for Bourgebous Ridge, Simonds" new mission 
placed his corps opposite the strongest concentration of enemy troops on the entire 
Allied front. Of the seven panzer divisions facing Dempsey, five-plus fronted on the 
Canadian sector. 
208 
While Simonds briefed deep objectives %rith an on-order exploitation south of 
the heavily fortified Verrieres Ridge, he personally believed his mission more of a 
holding attack for Bradley's offensive, and that the force-ratio on his front precluded a 
breakthrough. 209 SPRING proved to be one of the bloodiest operations fought by 
performance merely because general instructions and policies he has pursued have been channeled 
through Montgomery. " 
207 EL, Correspondence File, M. 512,21-7-44; M. 515,27-7-44. 
20s NAC, RG 24, Volume 11001.11'arDiary, Lt. Gen. H. D. G. Crerar, Ist Canadian Army, 1-31 July 
1944, Memorandum of Conference with C-in-C 21 Army Group, 20 July 1944. Crerar assumed 
command of the 3rd. 49th, 5 Ist, and 6th Airborne Divisions, an all-British force; Stacey, ; ictory 
Campaign, 111,183-185. 
"9 Ibid., 186. 
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Canadian troops. and characteristically received no comment or credit from SHAEF or 
the Americans. 
Coutances-the objective Montgomery had been stressing since June and was 
the object of the V Corps drive that Bradley refused to launch at that time-was 
reached on 27 July. SHAEF intelligence assessed that the 18 infantry and 9 panzer 
divisions within the battle area actually equated to a force of 16-10 infantry and six 
panzer divisions-due to losses. The SHAEF G-2 went on to say that 
the enemy seems finally to have realized that, if the line in 
NORMANDY collapses, the game is pretty nearly up, and is willing, 
therefore, to go on feeding divisions from other sectors to the flames as 
often as required and as rapidly as practicable. 210 
SHAEF's optimism, however, had to have been restrained. Though 
FORTITUDE miraculously still held forces in place both on the north coast and in the 
south of France, the enemy order of battle in the west stood at 63 divisions--46 
outside the OVERLORD lodgement area. Moreover, only one panzer division, the 2d, 
was known to be shifting towards Bradley's penetration. With six divisions having 
been milked from Brittany's original force of eight to bolster the Normandy front in 
the previous days, the long-term OVERLORD object of the Brittany ports seemed an 
easier target providing First Army could maintain its southern movement and pass 
Third Army through to take the ports. 211 
Montgomery's intentions followed-plan LUCKY STRIKE B, a variant of the 
plan produced in late June by 21 Army Group. That plan, which had been circulated to 
both SHAEF and First US Army, now fit the planning assumptions listed as necessary 
"i 0 SHAEF Weekly Intelligence Summary No. 19, week ending 29 July, 2. 
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for a major operational change from the contemplated side-by. side offensivc foreseen 
in the original Initial Joint Plan in February. These conditions, a considerable 
weakening of the Brittany defense forces, a general weakness of force in the sector 
proscribed by the Loire and the line LAVAL-LE MANS-CHARTRES, and the 
absence of a strong mobile enemy south of the Loh-essentially a wide open flank to 
the south cxisted-mcant that Third Army's role would shift to making a wide swccp 
to block the Paris-Orleans gap while seizing Brittany with minimal forces and not a 
full army. 212 (See figures 16,17,18, and 19. ) 
LUCKY STRIKE had been percolating in the background, and the belief that 
Brittany would not require a full-army assault had been prevalent since Carly July as 
German divisions began to transfer to the Normandy front. Though Montgomery's 
planners had produced the plan in the expectation that Bradley would shake loose of 
the bocage the first week of July, SHAEF, and others, sought to disassociate the plan 
from 21 Army Group and Montgomery despite the fact that Montgomery's directives 
outlined the conditions and axes from the original plans. 213 
Ibid., 3, order of battle map. 
212 Report ofthe General BoardStu4r No. 1,30. The General Board report states: -As early as June. 
the planning staffs of the Allied High Command had visualized that events might develop as they wcrc 
now unfolding on the ground. This particular sequence of events was forecast in Plan LUCKY 
STRIKE, a series of studies based on the possible acceleration of OVERLORD timings. Plan B of 
Lucky Strike was premised on ... [lists complete plan]. " First Army Plans File, Operation LUCKY STRIKE, 2. See conditions for Plan B and accompanying map sketches. 
213 NARA, RG 319,2-3.7 CB Supreme Command, Box 215. Letter to Chief of Military History from 
Major General Franklin A. Kibler, 14 June 195 1. Kibler, who served as Bradley's G-3. denied that 
Bradley took orders from Montgomery, but merely informed him of his actions. He also denied the 
existence of LUCKY STRIKE. Kibler, however. sat on the General Board and helped author the report 
citing the plan as the basic Allied strategy. It is important to note that Bradley and Montgomery talked 
personally, that no staff officers were present. and while mutual accord was the aim, it is impossible to 
diverge from the written record based on what was claimed after the fact. It is also important to note 
that Montgomery often told his Chief of Staff or Plans officer to develop certain courses of action; 
Bradley likewise considered himself his own G-3. 
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With new command relations frothing. and the German front broken through. 
July ended with the Americans executing LUCKY STRIKE B. Patton's forces. 
committed from behind Hodges' First Army, drove south and were gaining ground 
rapidly into the enemy's operational depth, where no enemy existed to stop him. 
Across the front. however, the two army groups were still at grips with a strong 
enemy. Bradley expressed considerable concern over a possible large-scale German 
countcrattack. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
Decision Points 
August opened new dimensions to the Allied campaign, the true development 
of military operations and significant questions relating not simply to seizing 
opportunities to complete the NEPTUNE stage of OVERLORD, but questions that 
would affect the conduct of the remainder of the European campaign. Three facts 
sigmaled the opening of "an operational phase. " First, the creation of the 12th Army 
Group alongside 21 Army Group under the operational control of a single commandcr 
finally gave a substantial force over a large enough area to achieve a true operational 
decision under a single concept of operations. Second, concerted operations by both 
forces during August's increasingly fluid situation permitted true -operational 
decisions, " rather than tactical fixes to operational problems. The most important 
result Of this was that attrition battles were no longer required, and that large enemy 
forces could now be targeted for destruction by overrunning them or encircling them. 
A harmonized rhythm, rather than jerk-s and starts dictated by local conditions, could 
now characterize operations. Third, and finally, the bickering and sniping conducted 
by Tedder and the strategic air commanders would be muffled and finally evaporate as 
the tactical air forces were able to develop their full range of operations with less need 
for assistance by heavy bombers, except for two more occasions during the 
NEPTUNE phase. After this, the primacy of POINTBLANK, not OVERLORD, 
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would rule strategic air operations. Moreover. for the first time, both the weight and 
effect of fighter-bombers would be apparent on the battlefield. 
214 
These operational changes, however, brought significant command changes 
and problems as the original Allied command structure matured into operational 
control by SCAEF and SHAEF with the elimination and creation of headquarters. Not 
simply the campaign plan, but the nature and evolution of operations under the plan, 
sparked concerns, controversies, and inefficiencies that would exceed those occurring 
during the first phases of NEPTUNE. Here, the result, however, would not shape a 
limited timescale and operations as in Normandy, but would effect the conduct of the 
rest of the war in Europe. 
However successful, August was not to prove to be an easy month for 
controlling operations. Personality, politics, and pride hampered an efficient 
development of operations, which, under'the strain of events, would lead to a 
dispersion of effort despite the centralization of command. New personalities entered 
the fray in both the American and Commonwealth camps, and with the addition of a 
214 Headquarters. Army Air Forces, Air-Ground Teamwork on the Western Front., The Role of the XIX 
Tactical Air Command During August 1944 (Washington: Center of Air Force History Reprint, 1945. 
1992), 20,2 1, passim. RAF Narrative, IV, Chapter 4; NARA, RG 33 1. SHAEF SGS 314.8 to 314.8 1.1, 
Box 27, Despatch ByAIr Chief Marshal Sir Trafford Leigh Mallopy. Allied Expedi(ionaty Air Forces. 
285-297, PRO, Air 371876, Report BY Air MarsholSirArthur Coningham Concerning Operations bv 
Second Tactical Air Force Between 6th June 1944 and 9ih MaY. 194S, Second Phase; Amy Air Forces 
Evaluation Board, European Theater of Operations, The Effectiveness of Third Phase Tactical Air 
Operations in the European Theater, 5 May 1944-8 May 1945,23-255; Gooderson, Air Power at the 
Battlefront, Chapter 5. Numerous reports abound of fighter-bombers, particularly at Mortain, being 
decisive in August, The US Amy Air Force hastily produced a historical pamphict-Air-Ground 
Teamwork: The Role of the XIX Tactical Air Command During August 1944-to celebrate Patton's 
supporters. Air Vice Marshal (Retired) J. E. Johnson told the author in conversation in 1990 that tactical 
air was ineffective during the early Normandy operations because of their inability to find targets. 
uOnce they got out of the com and moved, we killed them" The mobile b3ttle had proved far more 
conducive to close air support than to breaking positions or attacking defenses. 
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third Army Group looming, the cracks in the coalition threatened to bccome 
chasms. 213 
Following COBRA's success, Montgomery's overriding concern (besides 
establishing a secure lodgement) was to obtain OVERLORD's second strategic object. 
the early capture and development of a port or series of ports for the US forces. 
Through these portals, the great liberation force would be landed and supplied. 
Cherbourg alone could not accommodate this aim. The Brittany ports, the second 
strategic object, were the objective of Lt. Gen. George S. Patton's Third Army. 216 
No change in strategy had been communicated to Montgomery in August. and 
he proceeded beyond the missions outlined in the Initial Joint Plan. While the Initial 
Joint Plan had covered operations to capture Cherbourg and the airfields south of 
Caen, it was Montgomery's issue of his Forecast of Opcrationsý which combined with 
the NEPTUNE PLAN, that became the basis for the campaign. 21 Army Group issued 
planning directives for further operations, and Bradley, -hatted" as the -First US 
Army Group Commander, " issued planning directives to Patton in March 1944. 
Bradley, assuming SHAEF's scheme would go well, would have his own Army Group 
under Ike by mid-July. Whether Bradley developed his own guidance from 
Eisenhower, which is doubtful, or discussed operations with Montgomery, which is 
more likely, it is clear that Patton's missions reflected Montgomery's overall concept 
demonstrated in the Forecast of Operations. 217 Concerning Brittany, 21 Army Group 
213 NARA. RG 33 1, Entry 3 1. Box 211. Background files for Despatch. 
2'6 Initial Joint Plan, Section Cý Para. 26. 
2" NAC RG 24, Vol. 10433,21 Army Group Planning Forecast of Operations. 26 Fcbruary 1944; 
Montgomery, Norman4v to the Baltic. Chapter 4; Third Anny. After Action Report., Third USArmy. I 
August 1944 [hereafter referred to as ThirdArm. v AfterAction Report]. 1. Special Annex C. Third Anny 
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had issued planning directives for two plans to Bradley as -Commanding General. 
First US Army Group" to cover the situation unfolding in July. Issued on 22 June 
1944 at a meeting, these were followed by a written planning directive. The first. 
HANDS UP, a combined airborne and scaborne assault, had been planned in mid-Junc 
to take advantage of the fact that divisions were being withdrawn from Brittany, 
]caving low-grade, non-German defensive troops in place. Following the dropping of 
the British I Airborne Division in the Quiberon Bay area, US troops would be landed 
on beaches in the area up to a strength of two divisions. Additionally, an airfield 
would be seized for aerial resupply. Heavily reliant on both French resistance 
(Maquis) and British SAS (Special Air Service) troops, the plan was predicated on 
Third Army's advance to the south of Avranches and Patton's force being within 
"three weeks" of linking with the air-sea force. 218 
With the German front nonexistent in front of Third Army and with not 
enough time to mount both air and sea landings, the logical alternative was LUCKY 
STRIKE, a plan being formulated at the time of HANDS UP but completed by June's 
end. SHAEF's logisticians had evaluated the plan, recommending its consideration in 
lieu of BENEFICIARY or HANDS UP. LUCKY STRIKE's two variants, "A" and 
"B, " were predicated on the remaining enemy strength within the lodgement area 
OUTLINE PLAN-OPERATION OVERLORD, 1-10, Maps 1-7; Theater General Board Stu4v No. /, 
21-26. 
2"NAC. RG 24, Volume 10539, File 2l5A21.013(D17). 21/A. Gp/20720/G(Plans)dated 17 June 1944; 
NARA RG 407. Entry 427.101-3.5 Ist Army OVERLORD, Box 1978.21 A Gp/20698/G/(Plans), 24 
June 1944, Subject: Subsidiary Operations to further OVERLORD. Commander, British Airborne 
Troops coordinated the airborne planning directly with 21 Army Group 
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facilitating a drive to destroy a portion of the enemy force against the Seine with the 
remaining portion to be destroyed by a tuming movement. 
219 (See figures 17-19. ) 
In LUCKY STRIKE A, if the enemy's strength resided in the south bet%%-ccn 
the Loire and Laval-Le Nians-Chartrcs, 21 Army Group would press against the wcak- 
northern scctor. while part of First Army held the southern flank. The "13- variant was 
predicated on a reverse enemy disposition with its southern formations weak or 
nonexistent. thus permitting a wide sweep with an armorcd force along the north bank 
of the Loire toward Paris where it would block the Paris-Orlcans Gap. 
Simultaneously, minimal troops would be needed to clear Brittany. By August. these 
conditions existed and Montgomery ordered its execution. Soon, thereafter. SHAEF 
and 21 Army Group explored an airborne "plug, " to be inserted simultaneously in the 
Orleans Gap (OPERATION TRANSFIGURE) to be the anvil against the armored 
sweep's hammcr. ""O 
LUCKY STRIKE filled out the Army Group's controversial Forecast of 
operations, giving the campaign a complete "Master Plan. " Despite its August 
implementation, its key components were well known to planners at every level to 
2 '9NAC, RG24. Volume 24. File 10540. File 215A21.013 (D28) SIIAEF/17100/41/Plans (file 34383)- 
Op "LUCKY STRIKE"; NARA File 1013.5. -Operation Lucky Strike, " ibid.: NARA, ML-200 
LUCKY STRIKE, ibid4l3elchem, i7cioq in Norman4r. ibid. The conceptual framework of this plan. 
the drive to the neck of the peninsula on the right flank. can be found in planning sketches begun in 
April at 21 Army Group. While critics may believe this is another attempt to predate the -master planý" 
the planning phase and the first look at the second strategic object no doubt occurred at this timcý and 
the logic of seeing this concept of operation as both feasible and desirable is unquestionable. 
Documentary evidence exists that this plan had received priority emphasis by the plans staff at 21 
Army Group early in June. 
2" Ibid. 
129 
include the critical shift of cffort from Brittany to the cast to complete the destruction 
of the enemy in the lodgement area. 
221 
While the drama of Patton's rapid drive captured the imagination, the German 
operational reserve-the panzer divisions-remained in front of Second Army and the 
newly created Canadian First Army. The Canadians began their attack coincident with 
COBRA. 222 Not wishing to insert a new headquarters for the vital attack, Montgomery 
gave Lt. Gen. Crerar I st Corps on the east flank, while keeping Simonds' 2 Canadian 
Corps temporarily within Dempsey's sector. Crerar's immediate clash with his new 
subordinate, Lt. Gen. J-T. Crocker (as difficult a personality as Montgomery), soon 
became the trip wire for launching Crerar's Canadian nationalist campaign to assure 
that his command was treated not merely as a part of the British Army but as a full 
ally in a Commonwealth Army Group. It was a theme that would hamper later 
operations and one that would be both invisible to and unreceiving of sympathy from 
SHAEF. 223 
2, 2' LC. Papers of General George S. Patton [hereafter referred to as Patton Diaty), July 7.1944; 
Hamilton, Afaster ofthe Battlefield, 699. Patton was briefed by Bradley on what was LUCKY STRI KE 
B. Characteristically, Patton considered the idea broached to him by Bradley in discussion as an 
"American idea. " M. 505 had outlined the concept in June; Bradley would have also been aware of the 
plan due to work done at First Army. Bradley, on 29 June, wrote Montgomery concerning the wide 
sweep to the west south of Paris: -1 feel that this is entirely feasible due to the fact that he [the enemy] 
has placed so much of his strength in front of Dempsey. " Note this idea percolated at the time the 
Americans were believed to be capable of launching a breakout in the west on 3 July. Bradley needed 
three more weeks to reach his start line, for what was then called COBRA. 
222 NAC, RG 24, Volume 11001,11'ar Diaq, Lt. Gen. H. D. G. Crerar. Ist Canadian Army. 1-31 July 
1944, Memorandum of Conference with C-in-C 21 Army Group. 20 July 1944. Crcrar assumed 
command of the 3rd, 49th. 51 st. and 6th Airborne Divisions, an all-British force. 
223 NAC, RG 24. Crerar; Vartliaq, op. cit., Memorandum of Conversation with GOC I st BRIT 
CORPS. COMMENCING 1015 HRS 24 JULY 1944; MEMORANDUM ON MEETING WITH C-IN- 
C 21 ARMY GROUP AT TAC HQ 21 ARMY GROUP. COMMENCING 1500 HRS 25 JUL; 
A4ontgomeq Log, 26 July 1944. Montgomery's recorded entry is sympathetic to Crerar, though his 
confidential note to Alanbrooke shows his lack of faith in Crcrar's command technique. 
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Following their role in the battle for Bourguebous Ridge, OPERATION 
ATLANTIC, 2 Canadian Corps' Simonds new mission placed him opposite the 
strongest concentration of enemy troops on the entire Allied front. Of the seven parizer 
divisions facing Dempsey. rive-plus of the parizer divisions fronted the Canadian 
sector 
2.14 
. While 
Simonds briefed deep objectives with an "on-ordcr" exploitation 
south of the heavily fortified Verricrcs Ridge. he personally believed his mission more 
of a holding attack for Bradley's attack-. and that the force ratio on his front precluded 
a break-through. 
2_25 
SPRING proved to be one of the bloodiest operations fought by Canadian 
troops, and characteristically received no comment or credit by SHAEF, or the 
Americans. Bradley had emerged as winning the war in Europe. Ike signaled 
Montgomery, reinforcing what Montgomery had outlined for him, 
Above all the dislocation of enemy forces you have engineered on your 
extreme right must be exploited to the full. I am counting on you and as 
always will back you to the uttermost limit. 226 
Resonating with the boss's confidence. Monty replied with his situation report. 
that, 
I have ordered Dempsey to throw all caution overboard and to take any 
risks he likes and to accept any casualties and to step on the gas for 
Vire.... On the West flank the battle is going splendidly.... It begins 
22-4 Stacey, Victog Campaign, 111.183-185; 21 Army Group Intelligence Summary No. 149.25 July 
1944. Montgomery's G-2 assessed that, having been forewarned by the abortive 24 July pre-COBRA 
air attack, the Germans were prepared for the assault. a fact that did not help troops in the target area. 
but which assisted movement of reserves and the preparedness of the defenses in depth. 
223 Stacey, Victory Campaign, Ill, 186. 
2"" EL, Correspondence File, cable, personal for Montgomery. July 28.1944. Eisenhower smtesý 
reinforcing Montgomery's current assessment (M315). -Arn delighted that your basic plan has begun 
brilliantly to unfold with Bradley's initial successesý" and that he -beg[s) of you to insist that Canadian 
and 2nd British Armies carry out their assignments with vigor and determination so that Bradley may 
bring your plan to full fruitioný" 
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to look as if the general plan on which we have been working for so 
long is at last going to pay dividends. 
227 
As July ended, the frequent sypathetic messages between Montgomery and 
Eisenhower seemed to indicate that each finally understood the other, that Eisenhower 
seemed confident that the campaign would unfold both quickly and successfully, and 
that all was well within the Allied camp. Even the activation of Bradley's 12th Army 
Group on I August, with Lt. Gen. Courtney H. Hodges moving up from Deputy 
Commanding General to Commanding General of First US Army, and the 
introduction of Third US Army under Lt. Gen. George S. Patton, Jr., seemed 
uneventful, with Montgomery retaining operational control of the US forces. Once 
seen by the Americans as another Declaration of Independence from the British, 
Bradley's move to command 12th Army Group lacked the comfort of an operational 
SHAEF headquarters on the continent to separate it from Montgomery's plans or 
broad control. 228 
SHAEF had believed it would be able to assume control of the lodgement by 
about D+45, and Montgomery's role had been loudly touted (behind his back) as 
minimal and temporary. 229 The hard slog on the continent failed to make the phase- 
lines drawn by the planners. leaving no room either to fully develop the base support 
area or to provide room for a burgeoning SHAEF Headquarters to occupy. Apart from 
a small camp claiming to be "a tactical headquarters, " Eisenhower had few staff and 
227 EL. Correspondence File, M-68. 
22' NARA, RG33 I. entry 201. Box 277, After-Action Report, 12thAriny Group. August 1944. This 
report contains orders for activation, background of the headquarters, and order of battle and senior 
personnel rosters for 12th Army Group. Complete organizational data and staff reports for the cntirc 
war arc included in 12th Army Group Fi1cs. 
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limited facilities to deal with his own responsibilities, let alone to take over 
Montgomery's ground conunand role. An c3gcr commander. content to delegate his 
administrative and political responsibilities, might have moved forward to take over 
the campaign. Eisenhower didn't, at least not completely or overtly. 
230 
Success would test the coalition's mettle. SHAEF's 29 July Weekly 
Intcliigcnce Summary of the prcvious week tnunpctcd succcsscs but carcfully laid 
bare the problem at hand. Bradley's forces had yet to penetrate the operational depth 
of the German forces and their open and vulnerable rear areas, but the prediction of 
German reaction was clear 
Within the WEST, there have been quite considerable changes. 
Fifteenth Army has consigned some more of its fat, and Seventh Army 
some more of its skeleton, to the battle cauldron: the enemy seems 
finally to have realized that, if the line in NORMANDY collapses, the 
game is pretty nearly up, and is willing therefore. to go on feeding 
divisions from other sectors to the flames as often as required and as 
rapidly as practicable. 231 
Two days earlier, when Montgomery issued M. 515, he sought to fine-tune the 
swing by First Army with synchronized moves by Dempsey, who was ordered to 
produce a six-division attack on First Army's left flank near Caumont. VII Corps' 
breakthrough would be expanded to six corps in three armies. He added that 
[Tjhe main blow of the whole Allied plan has now been struck on the 
western flank.... The armies on the eastern flank- must keep up the 
pressure in the CAEN area... Second British Army must hurl itself 
2' '9 EL, Papers qfLt Gen. Harold R. Bull [hcreafter referred to as Bull Papers), Memorandum: 
Proposed Command Organization After D Day, 9 May 1944. 
2'0 The Americans believed Monty fought the creation of the 12th Army Group. This was not true. 
have found no documents substantiating this claim. 
231 SHAEF G-2, Weekly Intelligence Summary No. 19, for the week ending 29 July 194,2. 
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into the fight in the CAUMONT area so as to make easier the task of 
the American armies fighting hard on the western il 
'32 
OPERATION BLUECOAT, Dempsey's attack, began on 30 July, three days 
earlier than the deadline mandated in M-515. Montgomery's earlier divisional shift 
had placed Dempsey's weight of effort west of the panzers. Dempsey's attack would 
block for Bmdlcy's advance, a two-corps flank guard. Crerar was ordered to keep the 
enemy fixed in his sector. The attack was designed to do several things. In seizing key 
terrain, and by running up the east side of the Vire River, it split the German boundary 
of the Seventh Army and Panzer Group West as well as knocking the props out of a 
terrain-based defense and withdrawal designed to swing back the German line and 
contain the Allies in front of the Seine. Dempsey's key objective. Mt. Pincon (near 
Caumont) was the last major terrain feature east of the Vire. Attacking across a series 
of perpendicular ridges and streams, 8 corps found that the increasingly hilly country 
offered the enemy viewpoints from which to coordinate fires and counterattacks. 
233 
(See figures 20 and 2 1. ) 
Planned with eight target areas for heavy bomber saturation attack, Dempsey's 
8 and 30 Corps launched three infantry and one armored division in a sector only nine 
miles wide. (See figure 22. ) More than 1,300 heavy and medium bombers were 
ticketed to drop their loads from a mcre 1,500 feet, though poor visibility caused more 
than 200 aircraft not to bomb. Mt. Pincon fell on I August, and the attack continued 
232 M. 515.27-7-44.3. 
233 Second ArmvHisroq. 163-171, Appendix B, Chapter I ll. NAC. RG24, volume 10542, File 
21SA21.016(9i. Main Headquarters First Cdn Army, 30 July 44, NOTES ON MEETING WITH C-IN- 
C 21 ARMY GROUP. 29 JUL 44. It is probable that Montgomery's rush to move up Dempsey's attack 
was sparked not only by the move of panzers westward, but by the shift of divisions from the Pas dc 
Calais area, which would free the panzer divisions in front of Crcrar to go into local or front reserve. 
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southward despite increasing resistance. Five infantry and four panzer divisions were 
in front of Dempsey, but only three weakened infantry divisions barred the axis of 
attack. with no reserves in depth. As Second Army gained depth. two panzcr divisions 
moved into sector over two consecutive nights, %%ith a third following on 6 August. 
Second Army estimated this force to include 340 tanks and 175 assault guns. 
including estimated 80 Tiger tanks and 125 Panthers. Mines and antitank guns %%-ere 
particularly heavy in Dempsey's sector, and Dempsey's slowcr-moving force again 
2 became a shield for the Americans whose advance was then lightly opposed . 
'34 
Bradley's initial Army Group directive, issued on 29 July and effective at 1200 
hours, on I August as 12th Army Group became operational, had parrotcd 
Montgomery's 27 July orders. In it, Third Army was to turn west to take Brittany 
while First Army continued to drive south to Mortain-Virc. 235 
Within several days, Bradley wrote his army commanders privately, spurning 
the official "Letters of Instruction" required by American staff doctrine. Reiterating 
the formal instructions, he gave specific short-term objectives: for First Army to 
secure Vire and Mortain, and for Third Army to secure a line to protect 12th Army 
Group's flank while additionally seizing Quibemn Bay and b)passing St. Malo if "its 
,. 236 reduction takes too large a force and too much time. 
Bradley's success and the shift of enemy forces over time from Brittany 
spurred Montgomery to finalize LUCKY STRIKE's execution. Until this point, 
2`4 Ibid., 165,168; RAFNarrative, It', 70-73; Alontgomery's Scientists, 87-93. 
235 12th Arm 
*v 
Group Report of0perations, V, Appendix D. 65-67. 
236 NARA, RG 33 1. Entry 199. Box 10 1.12th Army Group. 371.3 Military Objectives, 1. -Directive for 
Current Operations, " 2 August 1944. 
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Monty had ordered forces that accomplished the plan's initial objectives. but had not 
fully committed his forces to the plan's entire course of action. With the Germans 
conforming by maintaining strength on Crcrar's front and at Dempsey's left, wheeling 
both Army Groups eastward against the Seine was possible. Montgomery also had 
confirmation that Lt. Gen. Brian Horrocks was en route to take over 30 Corps, 
Bucknall's failing having been that "he is very slow; he does his stuff in the end but is 
always 24 hours late'. 237 
Montgomery believed that the enemy's defense could be disintegrated, having 
knocked out the key "rivets" holding that defense together. (See figure 16. ) His M. 516 
directive finalized Third Army's swing both into Brittany and south of First Army. 
Second Army's conforming attack to shield First Army, and the Canadian assault 
from Caen toward Falaise. He summarized his concept to assure its understanding: 
The broad strategy of the Allied Armies is to swing the right flank 
round towards PARIS, and to force the enemy back against the 
SEINE--over which all the bridges have been destroyed Paris and the 
sea. 
A strong airborne, air-landed force would land 
in the CHARTRES area at a suitable moment-thus blocking the gap 
between the Seine at PARIS and LOIRE at ORLEANS. 238 
Privately, Montgomery was ecstatic, and considering the trials of SHAEF's 
lack of confidence and Tedder's conspiring to effect his relief and humiliation, he felt 
that the campaign's operations were proceeding as he had planned them. He now 
21 "Alonigomen, Log, 31 July, August 3. 
238 M516,4-8-44. 
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considered it timcly to issue -orders for the destruction of the Gcnnan forces south of 
the SEINE. oj39 
These ordcrs were aggressive, flexible. and oriented toward dcstro)ing the 
cncmy by maneuver. From the time of the COBRA breakout. Montgomery had added. 
within his dircctivcs. cxhortations to his commandcrs 13)ing doum what the British 
Amy referred to as -operational policy" and what the Americans more mundanely 
includcd as "coordinating instructions" in their more rigidly formatted orden. 
Beginning with hl. 515 ("we must secure the Brittany ports before the winter is on 
us"), he expanded his views as the front became more fluid. 240 In M. 516, noting the 
possibility of breaking the entire front. he noted: 
To achieve this great result. very determined and energetic action is 
necessary on the part of us all. 
Once a gap appears in the enemy front we must press into it, and 
through it, and beyond it into the enemy rear areas. 
Enemy personnel and equipment must be written off in large quantities. 
Everyone must go all out. a day and every day. 241 
In the same directive. Montgomery ticketed Cimm's army to attack Falaisc. 
While this attack was being prepared, be issued finther orders in M-517, orders that 
would not only dramatically change the nature and direction of the Normandy 
campaign, but would lead to a reevaluation of SHAEF's yet-to-be-unveiled campaign 
plan for Northwest Europe. Montgomery's appreciation noted that the enemy was 
falling back "to some new line" yet unknown and that "he is definitely trying to pivot 
2*" Alontgomety Log, 4-5 August 1944. 
140 1 bid, X1.5 IS. 
141 lbid- N1.516. 
137 
on the CAEN area. " Most important, he noted that if the enemy held on a succession 
of possible defensive lines in front of the Canadian attack, this would provide "the 
chance for our right flank to swing round his southern flank and thus cut off his 
escape. " 242 
He announced his revised concept: 
Plan in Outline 
(a) To pivot on our left, or northern flank. 
(b) To swing hard with our right along the southern flank and in 
towards PARIS, the gap between PARIS and ORLEANS being 
closed ahead of our advance. 
(c) To drive the enemy up against the R. Seine, all bridges over which 
between PARIS and the sea will be kept out of action. 
The Canadians would drive to Falaise to assist Dempsey, then shift their main 
effort to their left toward Lisieux-Rouen as the battle shifted eastward. Dempsey 
would lead with his right toward Argentan and eastward. Bradley's Army Group, 
while simultaneously clearing Brittany with minimal troops, would bave its "main 
business to the east. " Moving east, Montgomery designated Bradley's right (Patton) as 
the main effort. But his plan went beyond the original "press the enemy against the 
Seine" plan that he announced earlier. The maneuver had changed from frontal attack 
to turning movement. He directed 12th Army Group: 
Plans will be made for the right flank to swing rapidly eastwards, and 
then north-eastwards towards PARIS; speed in this movement is the 
basis of the whole plan of operations. 
212 
M. 517,6-8-44. 
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Reiterating his intention for an airborne plug to be inserted in the Orleans Gap. 
he ftirther directed Bradley to incorporate the plan being coordinated by British I 
Airborne Corps with SHAEF "to block the escape gap for the enemy between PARIS 
and ORLEANS. " 
Perhaps more dramatically, in noting how far and formal the air-ground 
operational dimension had evolved with Leigh Mallory and not Tedder calling the 
shots, he added an entire section titled "Air Support. " Incorporating both a "weight of 
effort" and specific tasking decision, it stated: 
The Air C-in-C has been asked to direct the air effort so as to ftirther 
the general plan.... 
In particular he has been requested 
(a) to direct his main power to help the rapid swing of our right flank 
toward the SEINE. 
(b) to prevent all the enemy movement across the SEM between 
PARIS and the sea, so far as is possible. 
Montgomery's new operational policy was: 
It must be impressed on all commanders that now is the time to press 
boldly and to take great risks. 
If we can achieve the intention as given in para 5 above [Intention], and 
achieve it quickly, we shall have hastened the end of the war. 243 
The evolving campaign, however, was dogged by Bradley's own desire for 
independence and Eisenhower's new role as kibitzer in residence. Thus, the 
problematic circumstances of battle, which had not changed appreciably from the 
earliest days, again were screened through a prism of national jealousies and distrust 
as well as fanned by the politics of SHAEF and the airmen. 
243 Ibid., M. 517. 
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Again, these problems centered on 21 Army Group's role in dealing with the C 
main strength of the enemy's armor and his eastern front quality SS Divisions. 
Additionally, the problems of a lack of infantry replacements; grave artillery 
ammunition shortages due to high expenditure rates and the inability of the across-the- 
beach supply system to keep pace with constant battle; the necessity to stop battle to 
coordinate heavy air attacks as deep substitutes for artillery-, and the bureaucratically 
slowed-motion response of the airmen to shift air attacks to support friendly efforts or 
to challenge enemy counterattacks, meant that maintaining fire and movement 
superiority in a fluid situation teetered as much on local luck as on the timing and 
coordination by commanders. 
GOODWOOD had underscored these issues with 500 burning Allied tanks 
and thousands of Allied casualties. Eisenhower, the airmen, and the Americans had 
responded by citing Montgomery's "caution" as the problem. Yet here, Montgomery 
had changed his own rules on attrition; he would press attacks regardless of casualties, 
rather than recock to "tee up" another battle. He was determined to finish the 
lodgement phase of the campaign within the 90-day period outlined by the 1943 
planners, the fast-approaching winter rather than the unsupported logic of a three- 
month campaign being his operative concern. 244 
The enemy, however, was neither defeated nor on the ropes. The apparent 
slide to defeat, envisioned due to the "pivot" of the enemy line from Caen to 
Avranches and the passage of Third US Army's armor to fan out in an unprecedented 
270-degree arc west, south, and east seemingly could not be stopped. The German 
244 Montgomety Log, 4 August 1944. 
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High Command was of two minds in assessing the first week of August. Hitler's 
generals wanted a fighting withdrawal to a defendable line, probably on the far side of 
the Seine. The Fuhrer, operationalizing the German tendency to counterattack every 
advance, wanted a counteroffensive to cut the thin neck of the Allied line at 
Avranches. The Vire-Mortain area would be the concentration area for Hitler's 
panzers. 245 (See figure 16. ) 
Montgomery's operations followed on BLUECOAT's success to press its 
right, with Dempsey and Hodges shifting corps to close the gap at Vire (that British 
reconnaissance troops had abandoned) to permit the commitment of the US V Corps 
and XIX Corps. While Americans battled to gain abandoned ground, a valuable 
lesson-that battles developing along "Allied" boundaries cannot be easily shifted to 
accommodate short-term tactical necessities without close cooperation and the 
surrender of command of units in place rather than ground already held-was again 
demonstrated and lost. 246 
Meanwhile, the Caen-Falaise problem again loomed as key in a campaign 
based upon multiple, complementary attacks. No longer content to merely fix panzers 
in the area, Montgomery wanted a general advance to assist the swing of 12th Army 
245 Joachim Ludewig, The German Retreat From France in 1944, Draft English Translation (Freiburg: 
Rombach Publisher Military Research Office, 1994), 43-53. 
246 CM H, Diary ofMajor W. Sylvan, 2-5, August 1944, Dempsey Dialy, 2-5 August, D'Este, Decivion 
in Normanotv, 423; Patton Diýry, ibid. Boundary issues posed fatal results several times throughout the 
war and were most difficult at Army Group boundaries. In this case, Montgomery acceded to 
American desires to have maneuver room to introduce another corps in their narrow sector. Having 
failed to keep up, the American attack failed, though analysts have damned Montgomery for the move. 
Montgomery did not want to introduce Third Army until room had been gained in turning the corner at 
Avranches. Montgomery's view was based purely on space to conduct operations. Lack of space to 
develop operations would prove critical in slowing the following operations. Bradley and Patton 
viewed this as a political move on Montgomery's part. Whenever proven wrong on military counts, it 
was always Patton's and Bradley's policy to blame Monty. More timely intelligence concerning 
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Group and the inside turn of Dempsey's Second Army. Falaise would be the internal 
pivot point for 21 Army Group's full shift to the east and northeast. The operational 
problem facing the debutante army, however, was the sanie one that faced every major 
21 Army Group offensive. The enemy "had the advantage of dominating ground, good 
,, 247 fields of fire and very strongly prepared defenses. (See figure 23. ) 
Crerar designated Simonds to lead the attack, code-named TOTALIZE. Prior 
to receiving the warning order for the Falaise attack, Monty had asked Crerar to "keep 
the Boche worried'ý-an order which the Canadian passed on to 2 Corps to "'put on 
,, 248 further prods to continue to pin the enemy down. Crerar laid out the basic concept 
for Simonds on 3 August. Late on the afternoon of the 4th, Montgomery, Leigh 
Mallory, Crerar, Simonds, Broadhurst, and Crerar's airman, Air Vice-Marshal L. O. 
Brown of 84 Group, discussed the plan. 249 
Simonds' attack was to be the true combat debut of the Canadian First Army, 
and Crerar and Simonds, gunners both, were to ensure it was a fire-supported attack to 
rival the Canadian offensive of August 1918. Bombers would, in the GOC's words, 
provide "overwhelming fire. " Moreover, Simonds had added a new dimension to the 
attack-60 improvised armored personnel carriers made from gun-stripped "priest" 
self-propelled artillery mounts. Simonds insisted that the infantry be carried onto their 
German intentions would have prevented some of this problem. ULTRA's frequent last-minute 
decrypts did not provide adequate time to react at the operational level. 
2" NAC, RG 24, Volume 10494, File 212CI. 8000(DI7), The Campaign In North West Europe 6 June- 
8 May 1945: A Review, para. 54. Brig. C. C. Mann, CBE, DSO. (Mann, Chief of Staff of First 
Canadian Army, delivered this as a lecture. A shorter version was delivered earlier in the war 
concerning operations in 1944. ) 
248 Crerar War Diaty, I August 1944, NAC RG 24, Volume 10798, "War Diaries, " 2 CDN Corps, nA 
"Notes for War Diary 'G' Branch, Main Hq. 2 CDN Corps, " n. d. Crcrar had issued a warning order to 
Simonds concerning an attack toward Falaise on 28 July. 
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actual objectives, it would be a mounted battle. Assessing the terrain as requiring a 
double breakin battle, and favoring the German use of their long-range weapons as 
well as counterattacks by their close reserve (the 12 SS Panzer Division), Simonds 
intended to strip them of long-range observation and direct fires by attacking at night. 
He outlined what would be the controversial element of the plan: 
In essence, the problem is how to get armour through the enemy gun 
screen to sufficient depth to disrupt the German anti-tank gun and 
mortar defence, in country highly suited to the tactics of the latter 
combination. 
Appreciating that "it requires practically the whole day bomber lift to effect" 
the destruction or neutralization of the armor-mortar defense, and that if two defense 
zones are to be penetrated, a pause with the loss of speed and momentum must be 
accepted, " he made his plan. The only alternative was a successful infiltration and 
night penetration of the first line, with the bombers deployed against the second. 
Breaking the battle into phases, Simonds projected the first breakin for 2300 on 8 
August, using full bomber support and two infantry divisions plus two tank brigades. 
The second line, to be broken by the attack of two armored divisions (the "break- 
through"), would be assaulted tentatively at 1200 on D+I, also following a heavy 
bomber assault. An exploitation would follow by the two armored divisions plus a 
fresh infantry division leap-frogged forward. On the eve of the attack, Simonds had 
predicted that the enemy would react immediately to fill the gaps created by the 
preparatory bombing, but that an immediate move by the attackers closely following 
the bombing would negate any attempt by the reserve to restore the front line. He 
249 Ibid., Crerar War Diaq, 4 August, ibid., Appendix. 1. Remarks to Senior Officers CDN Army, 
Operation TOTALIZE, 2. 
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therefore predicted that the real battle would begin in the area 
between the enemy's 
defenses, and that the second line could not be effectively defended until after first 
light. 
250 
Crerar held an orders conference on 5 August, giving a formal address to 0 
initiate the operation that included his operational ideas concerning initiative, 
weapons usage, ancl maýmI2&img momentum in the attack. Afterwards, printed copies 
were circulated to commanding officers. Having been given more than a week to "tee 
up" this operation, Crerar was dismayed to firid that the defense had side-stepped into 
the line two fresh infantry formations-the 272d and 89th Infantry Divisions-and 
had shifted the previous front owners, the I SS and 12 SS Parizer Divisions, into 
reserve. Crerar widened Simonds' front with the Polish Armoured Division to 
accompany the 4th Canadian Armoured Division in the "second break-through" 
phase. Simonds agreed that the key would be maintaining movement for the attack in 
its early phases to offset the strengthened defenses in depth. Simultaneously, 
Montgomery's latest directive, M. 5 17, had outlined his own advance to the Seine, a 
key element of which would be the First Canadian Army's seizure of Falaise to permit 
its full eastward wheel onto the axis Lisieux-Rouen, to place it in its pre-D-Day 
planned sector to clear the Channel Coast. 251 
2"0 NAC RG 24, Volume 10649, File 215CI. 016(DI5). 2 Aug 44, Memorandum to Maj. -Gen. R. F. L. Keller, GOC 3d Cdn Inf Div., Appreciation, Operation TOTALIZE, I Aug 44; Outline Plan 
(TOTALIZE) n. d.; Appreciation, 7 Aug 44, Enemy Reactions. 2 CDN CORPS INSTRUCTION 
NUMBER FOUR OPERATION "TOTALIZE, " 5 Aug 44. 
211 Montgomeiy Log, 5 August 1944; RG 24, Crerar Papers, 1. File 958C. 009(040), "Notes on 
Telephone Conversation with 2 CDN Corps, 1745,7 August, Operation Totalize"; Crerar War Diary, 
ibid., Memorandum to Lieut. -Gen. H. D. G. Crerar from G. C. Simonds, Licut. -Gen., "Operation 
Totalize, " 6 August 1944. Montgomery visited Crerar and emphasized the necessity of the armor 
closely following the bombing strike, as we]] as the relationship of Crcrar's operation to the ongoing 
Mortain counterattack. 
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12 th Army Group's activation had done more than just salve American 
sensitivities. Bradley's own operations had propelled him into a new realm. He had 
written Eisenhower in late July noting that his First Army Headquarters, "is riding 
high. " Bradley noted that he had predicted being in Coutances in 48 hours, and was 
now only slightly behind. 252 Two days later, Bradley expressed concern, telling VIII 
Corps' Commander Maj. Gen. Troy H. Middleton that: 
Some people are more concerned with the headlines and the news 
they'll make tha[n] [i]n the soundness of their tactics. I don't care if we 
get Brest tomorrow or ten days later. If we cut the peninsula, we'll get 
it anyhow. But we can't risk a loose hinge. 
The criticism was of Middleton's new boss, the Third Army commander. 
Bradley, whose mistrust of Patton's judgment from his experiences in Sicily had not 
yet subsided, then went forward and personally overrode and bypassed Patton, 
ordering the 79th division to build up near the area in question. During the conference 
with Middleton he noted, speaking of Patton: 
He's not used to having three or four German divisions hit him. He 
doesn't know what that means yet. 
While Patton later took the verbal assault well when they met over the incident, 
Bradley's G-3 spoke virulently to Bradley's aide, noting that 
Patton's orders specifically directed that he build a firm line before 
turning, his movement was a violation of the [12th Army] group 
directive that he had been given. 253 
252 EL, Correspondence, Letter Bradley to Eisenhower, 28 July 1944. 
253 Hansen Diaq, 2,5 August 1944. The G-3, Brig. Gen. A. Franklin Kibler, complained later that 
Patton continued to ignore orders and plans. 
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Patton. in fact, had ordered the 5th Armored Division to that same area. so Patton 
cancelled these orders. Patton moved to assemble a three-division force to hold the 
"hinge, " the 4th Armored and 8th Division to move on Rennes, and the 6th Armored 
and 83d Division to press westward into Brittany. 
254 
Bradley's earlier prescience proved incorrect concerning the Brittany ports. but 
deadly accurate concerning the threat of a counterattack. SHAEF's intelligence noted 
that the Germans had failed to form a hinge upon which to turn their front due to First 
and Second Armies' attacks, but that panzer divisions migrating from the Caen front 
launched limited counterattacks near Vire on 3 August. SHAEF estimated enemy tank 
strength at about 1,300, and noted that four panzer divisions belonging to the 47th 
Panzer and H SS Panzer Corps had moved westward after thinning their eastern 
sector. The panzer threat had shifted from the Caen front, but Dempsey and Hodges 
"shared" the panzer division symbols fronting their lines, roughly three divisions each, 
with the newly arrived SS Panzer Corps in front of Second Army. SHAEF, however, 
did not predict a counterattack as a possible course of action. Rather, they questioned 
how long the Germans would maintain forces on the Pas de Calais front while their 
Normandy front crumbled. 255 
ULTRA and other intelligence, however, had portrayed more specific threats. 
The formation of the Fifth Panzer Army from the battered Panzer Group West and the 
shift of divisions along the front were accurately portrayed. Moreover, on 6 August 
2. '4 MHI, Papers ofLieutenant General Hobart R. Gay, Third Amy Chief of Staff Diary (incl. Maj. 
Gen. Hugh J. Gaffey), 2-3 August 1944; ThirdArmy After Action Report, 1,16-20. 
255 SHAEF G-2 Weekly Intelligence Summary No. 20 for the week ending 5 August 1944,1-4, and 
Order of Battle Maps; NARA, RG 407, Box 1956, First Army Estimates, 21 June-31 October 44, G-2 
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several signal intercepts warned of the attack toward Avi-anches-using 116th. 2d, I 
SS, and 2d SS Panzer Division under 47th Panzer Corps-that would be launched the 
next day. Additional signals were transmitted and decrypted throughout the night 
warning Bradley's and Hodges' headquarters. 
256 
The corps at the point of impact, Major General "Lightning Joe" Collins' VII, 
had no advance warning of the German attack and was executing a relief in place of 
one division by another shortly before the attack. 257 This division. the 30th, prevented 
a breakthrough, with elements of four attacking panzer divisions, losing about 80 
tanks the first day. The full weight of both the 9th and 2 Tactical Air Forces responded 
with great success. Second Army fought heavily at this time; Mount Pincon had just 
fallen, and two British corps worked hard at fighting off panzers while continuing 
their swing to the east and southeast. 258 
Neither Montgomery nor Bradley was shaken by the attack. Hodges' 
headquarters was confident it would stop the panzers, its current intelligence estimate 
heading its assessment of enemy capabilities with the words, "When the current 
Estimate No. 13,1 August 1944. First Army's G-2 had earlier predicted that the most likely enemy 
course of action would be to defend on a line Trouville-Falaise-Mortain-Renncs. 
256 Hinsley, British Intelligence, 3, Part 2,238-245. 
257 Collins, LightningJoe, 250,251. In discussion at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, in 1983. General 
Collins assured the author that he had received no warning of the attack from ULTRA or any other 
source. Bradley had been cautious about the "hinge" since the beginning of Patton's turn toward 
Brittany, and Collins states that both he and Bradley were concerned about establishing themselves on 
defensive terrain to prevent a fatal German attack. 
258 SHAEF G-2 Weekly Intelligence Summary No. 21 for the week ending 12 August 1944,2, Map 
Enemy Order of Battle in West Normandy; Second ArmY History, 168-173; Short Histopy of 30 Corps, 
18-2 1, Maps 7-9; FUSA Report of Operations Aug 44-Feb 45,1 August 1944-February 1945,1,5-9; 
M HI, Ninth Air Force: April to November 1944: Army Air Forces Historical Study No. 36,1945,169- 
171; RAFNarrative. IV, 73-84;. ývlvan Diapy, 7 August 1944, Sylvan notes that Ninth Air Force 
claimed 109 tank kills on the day the attack began. 
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Panzer attack is defeated or contained. .. . 
"59 Montgomery's first response to the 
attack was to ask Leigh Mallory to shift the entire weight of air to attack the panzers. 
Montgomery noted, 
This enemy concentration at MORTAIN, and attack westwards 
towards AVRANCHES, is a real mistake; if he persists here I will turn 
the southern wing up northwards to ALENCON and ARGENTAN. and 
get in behin . 
260 
As First Army blunted the German counterattack, Simonds' Canadians began 
TOTALIZE at 2330 hours on 7 August. A gain of five miles justified the unique night 
attack. The momentum, however, was broken by the overly complicated set-piece 
attack plan. Simonds was unwilling or unable to call off the bombers timed for the 
second phase, so units sat for six hours after they had penetrated the defenses, as the 
next echelon filtered through in a passage of lines to their start line. The momentary 
advantage of a break in the defense had been lost. The second attack was marred by 
short-bombing by four US bomb groups of the 8th Air Force flying in support. The 
Germans stopped 4th Canadian Armoured with a hastily thrown together gun-line, and 
the Polish Armoured Division found itself facing fresh reserves of Tiger and Panther 
'59 FUSA G-2 Estimate, "G-2 Estimate No. 14,8 August 1944"; FUSA Report of Operations A ug 44- 
Feb 45,43-13, Hansen Diary, 8 August 1944; 5ývlvan Diaq, 7 August 1944; ThirdArmY COS Diapy 
(Gaffey) 7 August 1944. The aides' diaries reflect the lack of emotion at the top concerning the German 
attack. 
260 Montgomery Log, 7 August 1944; Montgomery's Scientists. 173-180. RAFNarrative, IV, 84-92; 
Gooderson, Airpower at the Battlefront, Chapter 3. Montgomery noted that the air forces claimed 120 
tank kills. An analysis of air support at Mortain is found in Montgomery's Scientists. Gooderson offers 
commentary on the results of air force claims being investigated on the ground, and the furor raised 
over Army operational research teams studying close air support effectiveness. Coningham, of course, 
refused to cooperate. 
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tanks. TOTALIZE halted after a nine-mile advance on II August. 261 Falaise lay some 
nine miles away. 
Hitler's insistence on a counteroffensive doomed his Normandy forces and 
played into Montgomery's operational design for a drive to the Seine. With 
BLUECOAT's culmination with the capture of Mount Pincon on 6 August, and the 
pocket now formed by the defenders of Mortain, the advance of Patton's XV Corps 
toward Le Mans made a clear but different course of action-an envelopment. rather 
than destroying the enemy against the Seine-was obvious. The 7 August situation 
map placed three panzer, eight infantry, and one parachute division in front of 21 
Army Group; four panzer, one motorized, and two infantry divisions in front of First 
Army; and two panzer and three infantry divisions on Patton's eastem front. None 
were complete, rested formations, and all had been badly battered. With Crerar's 
Canadians already preparing to cut the German line in front of Dempsey with 
TOTALIZE on a narrow front, Patton's continuing advance offered more than just 
easing the run toward the Seine in one sector. 262 
A tuming movement had been the centerpiece of LUCKY STRIKE B and had 
been ordered in M. 515 and M. 516. Variations of the plan also offered a more 
northeasterly axis toward Paris with the objective for an "armored force" centered 
there on the Seine River between Dreux and Paris. Sketched about 20 June, this 
2" NARA, RG 338, ML-2250, Report No. 146, Historical Section, Canadian Military Headquarters, 
"Operations of the First Canadian Army in North-West Europe, 31 July-I October 44- RAFNarrative, 
IV(Preliminary Report), 5-15; Effectiveness of Third Phase TacticalAir Operations, 92-100. Leigh 
Mallory Diaq, 8 August 1944. Both Leigh Mallory and Coningham witnessed the short-bombing, 
Leigh Mallory was highly critical of the 8th Air Force effort, claiming he did not believe the "smoke 
and dust obscuration" excuse for the bombing. 
262 Third ArmY After Action Report, 1, Operations map for August 7,1944. 
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possibility was noted by Montgomery in his log on 7 August when he mentioned 4P 
turning the southern wing northward. (See figure 19. ) 
Before the Mortain attack, Bradley, when discussing his future plans, noted he 
wished to bypass Paris from the south and cut off the German armies in front of the 
British, "right up to Dieppe. " More revealingly, his aide, Major Hansen, summarized 
the discussion concerning a requirement to move toward Calais (apparently due to the 
I rocket threat): 
[H]e [Bradley] replied that military contingencies require that 
campaign go as it is planned-that the closest way to the rocket coast 
will be around through Paris up to the coast. We are on the way, Army 
boundaries have already swung to the east. 
Hansen further elaborated on Bradley's plans: 
Gen hopes to build up on Domfront-Le [Mons) and there collect 
supplies necessary for movement. Supply may limit the rapidity with 
which we move towards Paris. Gen hopes to get going by September. 
When attack to Paris gets underway, Airbor[ne] will get three 
divisions. 263 
Hansen, whose brief did not inc)ude attending meetings with Montgomery. or 
apparently reading operations directives and plans, further noted: 
His [Bradley's] airborne plan for employment of armor in swift thrust 
towards Paris and destruction of German army of 26 divs now facing 
us is most ambitious yet. He views [it] calmly, weighs its mathematical 
chances and plots it deliberately. Worked the whole thing out in a 
series of definite lines tonight, assigning bulk of mission to Third 
Army. 
Finally, quoting his general, Hansen noted: 
I- "First Army will have plenty of fighting to do where they are now. "64 
213 Hansen Diary, 6 August 1944. 
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The failed counteroffensive at Mortain, TOTALIZE's gain toward Falaise. 
Montgomery's earlier directives, and obviously Bradley, who had embraced 
Montgomery's plan as his own, left the door wide open for an envelopment. But 
would the movement be the operationally decisive turning movement earlier sketched 
out in M. 517, or would it be a tighter, tactical envelopment seemingly demanded by 
the battlefield situation as painted by intelligence? 
That answer came from Bradley on 8 August as Eisenhower visited 12th Army 
Group. Bradley and Eisenhower together decided that a move northward by Patton 
toward Argentan would bag the remnants of the German Seventh and Fifth Parizer 
Armies. Executing the turn presumed that Crerar's Canadians would gain Falaise and 
that Patton could effectively be turned north if the longer move toward Alencon could 
be temporarily halted. Montgomery agreed, perhaps too hastily. The move would 
effectively mask much of the Allied force from participating in the trap, and time, not 
necessarily maneuver mass, would determine the success of the envelopment. 
Moreover, a tight envelopment lessened the possibility of catching the entire enemy 
force at the river itself when they defiled to cross. 265 
264 Ibid. It is interesting to note, Hansen further adds. "Meanwhile we aides live in Mortal Fear that 
Patton may unjustly crab [grab? ] credit for the breakthrough which was made and sealed before he 
became active. " 
20 Montgomery Log, 8 August; Report ofthe Supreme Commander, 43; Montgomery, Norman4v to the 
Baltic, 124-130; Eisenhower, Chisade in Europe, 275; Hansen Diary, 8 August 1944; Bradley, A 
Soldier's Story, 375,377. Virtually everyone involved took credit fýr the idea. As confirmation of his 
minor status. Bradley's "Boswell" displays no knowledge of his boss's momentous decision. 
Montgomery appears to have seen little diversion in his original plan and ignores Eisenhower's 
"presence. " He states simply, "I ordered Bradley to halt that spearhead there [referring to Patton near 
Le Mans], and then operate strongly with 3 or 4 divisions northwards to ALENCON. " Of those 
claiming credit, Montgomery was the one responsible, as Eisenhower issued no order, verbal or 
otherwise, and Montgomery retained overall command of ground forces. Bradley ignores Eisenhower 
in his account and fails to signal a change in plan, but takes time to denigrate Montgomery, saying, "As 
field arbiter on boundaries for Ike, Monty became responsible for coordinating the maneuvers of all 
four Allied Armies. " Significantly, the issue of "fixing the enemy" by continued attack plus destroying 
him in place, was criticized by Bradley as "squeezing the enemy out of the pocket. " 
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Montgomery did, however, record the connectivity of the new move with his 
undiminished intentions as stated in M. 517; he saw Falaise and Alencon as not simply 
the key to capturing the retreating Germans, but as a maneuver to ensure that "our 
advance to the SEINE will be easy. ', 
266 The next day, recognizing the limitations of 
Bradley's recommendation, he recorded: 
I instructed Bradley that, while operating with his right toward 
ALENCON, he must be ready to strike quickly from LE MANS 
towards CHARTRES and PARIS. If the Germans slipped out between 
ALENCON and FALAISE, then we must swing our right forward to 
PARIS quickly---as in M. 517.267 
Patton seized the reins, full well feeling the advantage of having minimal 
opposition. Road clogs, not combat, were his largest impediment. Patton's capable 
chief of staff, Maj. Gen. Hugh Gaffey, recorded that Patton's orders, written on the 
8th but not delivered until morning on the 9th, listed as the purpose of the orders: 
[T]o drive the German army, heretofore confronting the First American 
Army and Second British and Canadian Armies along the channel 
coast, against the SEINE between PARIS and ROUEN. 268 
Simonds' attack, battered by German panzer reserves missed by the 
bombardment, forced a reevaluation of the Falaise attack. Crerar and Simonds, a true 
gunners' union, planned another set-piece with a massive bomber assault. Convinced 
that Harris, not Doolittle, could do a better job based on the earlier short bombing, 
Crerar asked for Bomber Command's night bomber force to strike in daylight on 14 
266 Montgomety Log, 8 August 1944. 
267 Ibid., 9 August 1944. 
26' ThirdArm 
,v 
CqJS Diary (Gqffiiýi), August 8,1944,12th ArmY Group Report of Operations. V, Letter 
of Instruction Number Four, 8 August 1944,77,78. Gaffey, citing Third Army Letter of Instruction, 8 
August 1944, should have noted that Patton's order exceeded his brief. His orders from Bradley were: 
"Advance on the axis ALENCON-SEES ... prepared for further action against the enemy flank and 
rear in the direction of ARGENTAN. " 
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August. (See figure 23. ) Shifting the axis of attack westward, the new thrust followed 
a 690-bomber assault with a push by two infantry divisions and an armored division. 
"TRACTABLE, " Simonds' new effort shifted the direction of attack westward. 
adding miles to the approach and avoiding TOTALIZE's original path. In addition to 
the standard staggered defense, approximately ninety 88-mm guns dotted the attack 
zone. The plan encountered TOTALIZE's double problem: how to break through the 
defense; how to get the armored force beyond the gun-line. Smoke, not darkness, was 
269 
seen as the best way to screen the attack . 
The attack was bombed during the second air-phase but continued, repeating 
Simonds' use of armored personnel carriers. The ground fighting soon devolved into 
fending off German armored counterattacks and breaking the antitank screen laid out 
'170 
in depth. Falaise fell on the 16 th after heavy fighting. 2 
As Patton swept westward and the Canadian First Army recocked and fired a 
second major salvo from the north, the center front bore great weight but little notice 
in the Allied camp. (See figure 24. ) Dempsey's men began to turn south and eastward, 
while Hodges' First Army continued its movement. The Germans attempted to fight a 
strong delaying action on all quarters while moving westward toward the funnel 
caused by the advancing Allied armies. Given the tightening trap, German vehicular 
269 ML 5220, Canadian Historical Report No. 146,15-17. Worse still, the Germans captured a complete 
corps attack order about 12 hours before the attack. This caused at least one AT battery to be moved 
forward to contest the attack. 
270 Ibid., 17-2 1. 
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moves, constricted by the pocket's shrinking size and confined to roads. became air 
targets ravaged by American and British fighters. 
171 
As the situation developed, Montgomery stressed to Dempsey and Crerar the 
necessity to dominate roads by artillery fire during darkness, and had designated army 
objectives to define the ring: Crerar (Falaise), Dempsey (Conde), and Bradley 
(Argentan). Earlier (by 10 August) intelligence had noted that six panzer divisions 
were reforming for attack on Mortain, intelligence that Montgomery met with the 
phrase, "Now they are doomed. " He reacted quickly to intelligence indicating that a 
withdrawal would take place by closely coordinating Dempsey and Crerar, Bradley 
would coordinate operations for the First and Third US Armies. M. 518 reflected 
Montgomery's belief that the Germans would fight between the Seine and the Loire, 
and that any withdrawal from their general line of Caen-Le Mans would necesitate 
blocking 12th Army Group's moves. He modified his original intention to 
concentrate our energies on closing the gap behind the main enemy 
forces, so that we can possibly destroy them where they are now. 
The new pocket would be defined by a meeting of Second Army and Canadian 
First Army at Falaise, while 12th Army Group formed on the line Alencon-Sees- 
Carrouges. The wider net defined earlier would remain as a contingency mission, as 
would as airborne planning for the Chartres area. Given the known circumstances, 
211 Second A riny Histort, , 174-178; FUSA Report of Operations Aug 44-Feb 45,1,14-16; Leigh Mallory Despatch, 60, para. 296; Brereton Greenhous, Stephen J. Harris, William C. Johnston. and 
William G. P. Rawling, The Cnicible of War. Official History ofthe RoYal Canadian Air Force. 111 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, Inc., 1994). 317; RAF Narrative, IV, 99-102. Leigh Mallory is 
highly critical of ground commanders for failing to move "bomb-lines, " permitting his aircraft to attack 
targets more closely. The Canadian official history lists phenominal kill claims. 
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Montgomery had accounted for every operational line, he left the fine points of tactics 
to those actually in conimand on the field. 27.1 
Identifying the actual units within the trap, as to both type and strength. 
became an imperative to determine how wide the trap should swing, but estimates 
varied even as the battle continued. First Army's G-2 estimated that elements of 17 
divisions plus corps and flak troops were trapped on 15 August a total of about 50.000 
troops if none escaped. Significantly, under "Enemy Capabilities, " the same report 
listed that the enemy could continue to hold open the shoulders of "the FALAISE- 
ARGENTAN gateway, " and that the highest probability was that the enemy's next 
sequence of actions was "to fight a series of delaying actions in rearguard while he 
retires to the SEINE and the MARNE. " British Second Army's G-2 tracked enemy 
formations but did not speculate on their strengths. Patton's G-2 estimated that on 18 
August approximately 75,000 troops and 250 tanks remained in the pocket. The 
enemy, to date, had extricated about 25,000 men to the east of the Seine, and had 
approximately 150,000 troops remaining in the Fifteenth Army's 13 divisions in the 
the Pas de Calais and the lowlands. SHAEF listed 18 divisions within the pocket by 
19 August, but made no strength estimate. Montgomery's G-2 told him on the 15th 
that the bulk of the "fighting portion" of the German army had been trapped; he 
estimated that though some administrative echelons had exited the corridor, the bulk 
of the enemy still remained. 273 
2.72 M. 518,11-8-44. 
273 First Army G-2 Estimate No. 16,15 August 1944; Second Army Intelligence Summaries, 74-78, 
August 1944; Third Army G-2 Estimate No. 7,18 August 1944; SHAEF Weekly Intelligence 
Summary No. 22, week ending 19 August 1944. 
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Montgomery set three priorities for the forces circling the pocket: that the gap 
must be closed, that constant pressure must be kept around the pocket, and that 
escaping forces must be headed off to the northeast. He ordered 
Crerar to extend his 
attacks west to Trun, and Bradley to extend westward to link with the 
Canadians. As 
further insurance, the next day he transferred an armored division to Crerar to 
reinforce a further envelopment from Lisieux. Crerar's moves, if quick, 
he felt. might 
174 -capture over 100,000 Germans. " 
Falaise would be considered one of the decision points of the campaign. As 
with the operations in June and July, operations again developed headquarters-centric 
interpretations. Montgomery again followed traditional command procedure. Visiting 
or calling his commanders, he followed up orders and conversations with written 
directives, including his assessments of operations and their relationship to his 
intentions. He kept Eisenhower informed by both message and letter. as he did the 
CIGS. At the front, appearances never strayed from the image of a band of brothers, 
working to finish a campaign without strife or controversy. 
275 
The headquarters put differing interpretations on the battlefield actions, 
interpretations that illustrate the extent of hostility that undergirded basic decisions 
within the coalition and which made mush of the appearance of a band of brothers. 
2'4 Montgomery Log, 15-17 August 1944. 
2" Murray, Eisenhower versus Montgomety, passim, Martin Blumcnson, The Battle of the Generals: 
The Untold Storv of the Falaise Pocket-The Campaign That Should Have Ifon R'orld Kar // (New 
York: William Morrow and Company, 1993), passim. The "Falaise Gap" has spawned a virtual cottage 
industry of claims for Allied failure, generally divided along national lines. With the exception of 
Patton and his acolytes, the diary material of the key players is generally absent the hatred manifested 
by postwar commentators. Falaisc is a large part of the American attack on Montgomery and the 
British. Any belief that the war could have been won there, as claimed by some, can be dispelled by 
merely counting the number of German divisions that were not engaged there and still holding the 
north coast. For example, the figures cited by Blumenson are inflated and based upon suspect sources. 
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SHAEF buzzed with unprecedented smugness. Eisenhower had began writing LI 
Marshall weekly letters outlining "his decisions" on the campaign, decisions that 
remarkably paraphrased Montgomery's M-series of "General Operational Situation 
and Directive[s]" that emanated from 21 Army Group following every meeting with 
Monty's commanders. 276 Once terrified that OVERLORD would meet the Anzio 
landing's fate of stalemate, Eisenhower now reported that he had cooperated in 
creating the strategy used in Normandy. 
277 
The southern swing, however, had been making spectacular gains and, with 
Pattonesque flair, Third Army's commander soon convinced Bradley and SHAEF that 
he was in a "horse race" with the British. Patton, Eisenhower told Marshall, is the 
646marching wing' of a great envelopment. ', 178 
The success of that marching wing, however, became a major bone of 
contention within Allied command circles, especially since Bradley focused his 
energy on the envelopment and began to view the annihilation of the German armies 
in the pocket as his military masterpiece. 279 Montgomery saw a wider operational 
maneuver designed not merely to finish the enemy west of the Seine, but also to 
complete the entire campaign in the west. As part of this, he viewed the wider 
envelopment and the opening of the Orleans Gap to a wide operational move south of 
216 Eisenhower Papers, IV, 2059,207 1. 
2'n Ibid., 2059; "Our Strategy is to swing the right flank of the Allied Armies toward Paris, hold the 
Paris-Orleans gap and to force the enemy back on the Seine. " 
27' EL, Butcher Papers, Letters Eisenhower to Marshall, August 10,1944; August 11,1944; Diary 
Entry, August 11,1944. 
279 Bradley, A Soldier's Story, 375. Bradley told Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgcnthau on 9 
August, "We're about to destroy an entire hostile army . .. " after which, "[W]c'll go all the way to the German border. " 
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Paris and thence to the coast as both decisive. and insurance against problems in the 
tight, pocket envelopment. 
280 
Bradley had halted Patton's push north on 13 August, influenced by ULTRA 
intelligence that identified elements of three Panzer divisions moving to hold open the 
shoulders of the pocket for the trapped enemy to flee. The same day, Dempsey 
recorded the joint decision of Montgomery and Bradley regarding closing the pocket: 
So long as the Northward move of Third Army meets little opposition. 
the two leading Corps will disregard inter-Army boundaries. The 
whole aim is to establish forces across the enemy's lines of 
communications so as to impede-if not prevent entirely-his 
withdrawal. 281 
This understanding Bradley apparently sought to ignore, and the legend of 
Monty's ordering a halt was spread both by Bradley's staff and Patton. 
282 Moreover, 
as intelligence began identifying moves of "divisions" within the pocket without the 
precision of identifying strengths and capabilities, Bradley continued to see Patton as 
the sole solution. He refused Hodges' request to shift boundaries to permit VII Corps 
an aggressive move toward the gap. 283 Bradley began moving forces to the northeast 
to conform with a wider envelopment in front of Paris by Third Army. On 16 August, 
the day the Canadians closed on Falaise, Bradley ordered V Corps to shift its 
'go Hansen Diary, 12 August. Hansen attacks Montgomery's seeking to take terrain, and not to follow 
the "principle of destroying the enemy. " Montgomery, Norman4v to the Baltic. 269-270; M. 516, 
M. 517, refutes this claim, which is probably repeated from his boss. Bradley. 
28 'Dempsey Diary, 13 August 1944. 
282 Hansen Diary, 13 August 1944. Hansen records: "it is suggested in G-3 that we were ordered to 
hold at Argentan rather than to continue to drive to Falaise since our capture of that objective would 
infringe on the prestige of the forces driving south and prevent them from securing prestige value in 
closing the trap. " 
283 SvIvan Diary, 13 August 1944; Hansen Diary, 14 August. Hansen claims that the opportunity to 
close the gap had been lost due to Montgomery, and that the drive to the Seine was the proof of this 
admission. 
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headquarters east to assume control of two of Patton's divisions. Seeking to speed 
operations, Patton placed them under his own chief of staff and several staff officers 
to form a "provisional corps" that he intended to launch into an attack. The V Corps 
commander, upon his arrival, disapproved the dispositions, plan, and arrangements, 
and he halted the attack for a full day to make his own plan. 
284 
The Americans further extended east and closed with the Polish Armoured 
Division at Chambois on the 19th. 285 At the close of the pocket battle, elements of six 
panzer divisions attempted to break out from within or to batter the Polish Armoured 
to break a hole from without, indicating that the battle for the pocket had not been 
easy, nor had the enemy been willing to surrender despite their position. Montgomery 
recorded that elements of fourteen divisions were "more in than out of the pocket. " He 
noted that these were mostly infantry divisions, and that the SS and panzers, though 
mauled, probably escaped. Airpower had taken a terrible toll on German equipment 
but again had failed to seal the battlefield. 286 
Coningharn railed at ground commanders for their use of "a rigid Inter-Army 
Group boundary" that precluded targeting during the closing of the gap. Considering 
284 Martin Blumenson, "General Bradley's Decision at Argentan (13 August 1944), " in Kent Roberts 
Greenfield, ed., Command Decisions (Washington: US Army Center of Military History, 1959,1987), 
401418. Blumenson, the American official historian, miscasts Montgomery's intentions, 404. 
28" FUSA Report of Operations Aug 44-Feb 45,14-18 and Situation Map 1; Blumenson, Breakout and 
Pursuit, 507, fn 7; 527-530; History of V Corps (Headquarters, V Corps, n. d. ), 182-188, operations 
maps 16-20 August 44. 
286 Montgomery Log, 19 August; Montgomery, Normandv to the Baltic, see map 25; Second Army 
History, 175-18 1; Second Army which, according to Brýdley, did little but squeeze the Germans'out, 
suffered more than 5,000 casualties from 13 to 21 August, as well as the loss of 10 1 tanks destroyed 
and a further 118 damaged. The number of enemy that escaped is estimated to be 20.000 to 40,000, but 
their actual survival during the retreat is unknown. Large POW hauls were netted in late August and 
early September, further clouding the issue. 
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this another case of army rigidity, he blamed army generals for preventing Cý 
-completing the work of the air forces in an annNIation role. 
287 
The pocket battle had prevented a deliberate withdrawal and expedited the 
wider envelopment to complete the planned lodgement position. 288 Focusing on the 
Falaise pocket, however, had prevented the wider turning movement from gathering L- 
greater spoils. First Army, and not the Third, should have provided the bulk of the 
enveloping and Exing force west of the Seine while Patton raced off toward Paris. as 
Monty and Patton had individually envisioned. However, the battle of movement 
continued at a faster pace beyond the pocket as the attacks and exploitation operations 
of early August evolved into a pursuit operation by 12th Army Group. 21 Army Group 
battled the only forces maintaining a defensive posture in the West. 
The invasion of Southern France, OPERATION DRAGOON, began on 15 
August. Under the temporary control of the Supreme Allied Commander, 
Mediterranean, the DRAGOON force was planned to come under SCAEF, as was the 
operational control of 21 and 12th Army Groups. 289 Recognizing this future, 
Montgomery met with his commanders on the 19 August to shape the campaign's 
next phase. 
On 20 August, M. 519 announced Montgomery's intentions. To complete the 
destruction of the enemy forces in northwest France, his plan was to continue his 
battle, 
287 Coningham, Report on Operations 2 Tactical Air Force, 71-73, )ZAF Narrative, IV, 112 
2" Second Army History, 182. A captured 11 SS Panzer Corps order indicated that a four-line delay and 
withdrawal to ihe Seine had been planned. 
289 pogUC: The Supreme Command, 265-266,272-278. 
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[t]hen to advance northwards, with a view to the eventual destruction 
of all enemy forces in north-east France. 
290 
As always, Montgomery began his directive with his "operational policy" for 
the future. He called for relentless attacks, stating: 
I call on all commanders for a great effort. Let us finish off the 
business in record time. 291 
Montgomery ordered the reduction 
of 4the bottle" that had been the Falaise 
pocket while directing that 12th Army Group's wide envelopment along the south 01 
bank of the Seine to Louviers and Elbeuf to continue severing the Gennan lines of 
withdrawal to the Seine. Importantly, he directed that Bradley 
take advantage of any opportunity to secure a bridgehead over the 
SElNE in the MANTES area, or anywhere else. 
He also directed that 12th Anny Group 
[a]ssemble its right wing west and southwest of PARIS, and [it] will 
capture that city when the Commanding General considers the suitable 
moment has arrived-and not before. 
The capture of Paris was to be on Eisenhower's orders only, but this was not 
the key intention published in the directive. Montgomery's 18th section defined his 
operational vision and intent for finishing the campaign. It was, he thought, in accord 
with Bradley's own ideas, a perception that would be changed in the next days. He 
directed Bradley's forces: 
Having secured PARIS, or passed to the south of it, 12 Army Group 
will advance to the general area ORLEANS-TROYES-CHALONS- 
REIMS-LAON-AMIENS. 
290 M-519,20-8-44. 
29' Ibid. 
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It will be so disposed in this general area that it retains the ability to 
operate north-eastwards towards BRUSSELS and AACHEN, while 
simultaneously a portion of the Army Group operates eastwards 
towards the SAAR. 
Alternately, the whole Army Group may be required to move to the 
N. E., on the right flank of 21 Amy Group. 292 
21 Army Group's own tasks involved destroying the forces "in the bottle, " 
then moving rapidly to the Seine with 2 Army preparing to move to the Pas de Calais 
and Canadian First Army taking Havre "very early. " As with his Normandy directives 
for the breakout strategy (M. 505) and then the execution of LUCKY STRIKE B 
(M. 517), this directive was intended to become an outline campaign plan, fine-tuned 
as operations developed. Montgomery, however, had recognized both his position and 
the necessity for future coordination of a campaign. He stated early in the order: 
General Policy for Forward Movement 
As the situation develops, the Supreme Allied Commander will be 
issuing orders regarding the general movement of the land annies. 
Meanwhile, we must be so disposed that we can very quickly develop 
operations in any way he requires, and to meet any situations that may 
suddenly arise. 
As a first step we have got to cross the SEINE, and to get so disposed 
beyond it-tactically and administratively-that we can carry out 
quickly the orders of the Supreme Allied Commander. 293 
Crossing the Seine had been Montgomery's idea-an idea unanimously 
approved without consideration both at SHAEF and at 12th Army Group. The order 
reflected the mood of "getting it over in record time, " but it also put on hold the basis 
for the OVERLORD logistical estimate that called for an operational pause to build up 
forces and supplies. It also presupposed that Patton would fulfill his orders to capture 
'92 Ibid. 
"3 Ibid. 
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the key Brittany ports of St. Malo, Lorient, and Brest, as well as open Quiberon Bay. 
the key underpinnings to the OVERLORD campaign agreed to by the Combined 
Chiefs in 1943. Montgomery's plan called for First Army to shift north, requiring a 
radical turn by his three northern-most armies with Patton's Third Army continuing on 
its unopposed rampage to the east. 
294 
SHAEF's weekly intellfigence estimate noted that the enemy had suffered 
losses of about 200,000 men, including 80,000 prisoners, with only a 10 percent 
replacement rate. (See figure 25. ) The report further stated that the general withdrawal 
begun was now confined to the enemy's last route-the Seine river crossings. 
Elements of seven divisions, all shifted from the Calais area, were identified within 
the area now being swept by 12th Army Group's turning movement. Stating that the 
enemy's "battle front has fallen apart, " the report noted that drastic measures were 
being taken by the Germans to control their own lines of communication, including 
merging unit fragments ("cannibalism") based on panzer elements, with no evidence 
of any planned defense line being apparent. Estimating that about 20 division 
equivalents existed for the 30 division headquarters identified, SHAEF stated that 
about 500,000 men comprised the German force west of the Seine and north of Loire, 
with about 100,000 of them in the Brittany Peninsula or the Channel Islands. Most 
significantly, intelligence listed under "Enemy Capabilitiesý' the new propaganda 
'94 Ibid., M. 519; Roland Ruppenthal, Logistical Support of the Armies, 2 Volumes (Washington: Office 
of the Chief of Military History, 1953,1959); 21 Army Group, Administrative History of2l Army 
Group, 6 June 1944-8 May 1945 [hereafter referred to as 21 AMY Group Administrative History] 
(Germany: 21 Army Group, 1945), passim; Chief of Information, USFET, American Enterprise in 
Europe: The Role ofthe SOS in the Defeat of GermanY [published commercially as Randolph Leigh, 
48 Million Tons to Eisenhower (Washington: Infantry Journal, 1945)). 
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effort launched within Germany to convince the population that it had its back to the 
wall, and that superhuman effort would be required to survive. 295 
Despite the drama playing out in the newspapers and the bold arrows moving 
across France, the enemy was fragmented, not destroyed, and only the continued speed 
of Allied movement could guarantee keeping the enemy from forming a cohesive 
defense. Bradley's dream of cutting off the enemy's retreat in front of the British came 
to fruition; as First Army drove its XIX Corps directly north to reach Elbeuf. and 
spread the XV Corps north of Paris crossing the Seine at Mantes Gassicourt, V Corps 
took Paris and VH Corps spread out across the Seine south of the great city. Unlike 
Patton's manuever, this pursuit by 12 American divisions cut into the remaining meat 
of the enemy Fifth Panzer Army and compressed the bulk of the remaining enemy in 
the West northward across the Seine and toward the coast. 296 Patton meanwhile, 
pressed east to Troyes south of Paris. 
21 Army Group's fight, however, moved more slowly, as it reduced "the 
bottle" while shifting to cross the Seine. Having cancelled airborne operations in the 
Orleans Gap, Montgomery and SHAEF looked to employ the airborne army, now 
designated as SHAEF's reserve, in the Pas de Calais area or somewhere to speed the 
advance up the channel coast to the V-1 and V-2 launching sites. O'Connor's 8 Corps 
'95 SHAEF Weekly Intelligence Report No. 22 for week ending 19 August, 2-6; Enemy Order of Battle in West Normandy (map); Enemy Order of Battle in the West (map). 
196 
' FUSA Army Report of0perations Aug 44-Feb 45,30-37. 
164 
paid the price of success as its transport was taken to support the move of the Second 
Army northward. 
297 
On 26 August, Montgomery issued his last orders as "ground forces 
commander. " He repeated as his intentions, the tasks he had identified as confronting 
21 Anny Group: 
To destroy all enemy forces in the PAS DE CALAIS and FLANDERS, 
and to capture ANTWERP. 
His plan beyond the immediate tasks was: 
[t]o advance eastwards on the RUHR. 
Montgomery's operational policy stressed the urgency of the situation. He stressed 
that the requirement for set-piece operations and detailed preparation was over: 
Speed of action and of movement is now vital. I cannot emphasize this 
too strongly, what we have to do must be done quickly. Every officer 
and man must understand that by a stupendous effort now we shall not 
only hasten the end of the war, we shall also bring quick relief to our 
families and friends in England by over-nmrung the flying bomb 
launching sites in the PAS DE CALAIS. 298 
Ordering Crerar's Army on to Dieppe and then to Bruges, he also directed a 
corps' diversion to take Havre with minimal forces, noting that for the Canadians, 
"the main business lies to the north, and in the PAS DE CALAIS. " For this 
"business, " the Airborne Army would be dropped ahead of Crerar's First Army with 
planning for the operation to take place at Army Group. Monty left no mystery as to 
2" NARA, RG 407,21 Army Group, 99/21-26-99/21-150, Box 1817, "21 Army Group WOSTEL No. 
12, period up to 2400 hrs. 24 August 1944"; Montgomery, Normandy to the Baltic, 135-139; Chapter 
10. A "WOSTEL" was a "War Office, Summary Telegram. " 
299 M. 520,26-8-44. 
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how this was to be done. He designated Crerar's main effort as his right. emphasizing 
that enemy strength can be dealt with by outflanking operations and "right hooks. ' 
Crerar assessed the position for his two corps commanders, Crocker and 
Simonds, saying: 
It is clear that the enemy no longer has the troops to hold any stronger 
position-or to hold any positions for any length of time-if it is 
aggressively outflanked or attacked. Speed of action and forceful 
tactics are, therefore, urgently required from commanders at every level 
in First Cdn Army. We must drive ahead with utmost energy. Any 
tendency to be slow or "sticky" on the part of subordinate commanders 
'300 should be quickly and positively eliminated . 
Dempsey was ordered to ignore his flanks and to advance to Arras-Amiens-St. 
Pol, both to continue moving through northeastern France and Belgium and to place 
forces to support the execution of the airborne operation. As with Crerar, Montgomery 
issued specific operating instructions for the Army: 
The Army will move with its armoured strength deployed well ahead-, 
its passage northwards must be swift and relentless. By this means it 
will cut across the communications of the enemy forces in the coastal 
belt, and will thus facilitate the operations of Canadian Army. 301 
Having been given power to coordinate the left boundary of the 12th Army 
Group, and given some degree of authority over US First Army's operations, Monty 
noted that its axis of advance would be Paris-Brussels and would establish itself at 
Brussels-Maastricht-Liege-Namur-Charleroi. 
Montgomery specified tactics for his commanders: 
"9 1 bid. 
300 Crerar War Diaty, August 1944, Appendix 11, Memo 26 August 1944. 
301 M. 520,26-8-44. 
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The proper tactics now are for strong armoured and mobile columns to 
by-pass enemy centres of resistance and to push boldly ahead, creating 
alarm and despondency in enemy rear areas. 
Enemy centres of resistance thus by-passed should be dealt with by 
infantry columns coming later. 
I rely on commanders of every rank and grade to "drive" ahead with 
the utmost energy; any tendency to be "sticky" or cautious must be 
stamped on ruthlessly. 302 
The last days of August saw the war of movement bear fruit. By D+79,24 
August, each Allied army had reached its D+90 phase line save those portions of 
Patton's Army still penned outside the ports. The limits of the lodgement that had 
been designated by the COSSAC planners had been reached, but the vital Brittany 
ports needed for the Americans had not been captured. 
Eisenhower had announced his intention to assume command of the ground 
armies beginning I September by message on 19 August rather than personally to his 
senior subordinate commanders. While stressing the options open for the pursuit in 
several messages, he issued no formal orders until 29 August. On that day, he 
announced an attack on a broad front using the two army groups then under his 
command, with priority to the northern thrust which was to be supported by the First 
Allied Airborne Army. 303 
Montgomery felt that his issuance of M. 519 marked the end of the Normandy 
Campaign; however, it did not mark the end of the OVERLORD plan's requirements, 
nor did it solve the critical issues of command and strategy. Paris was liberated on 25 
August by elements of the Free French 2d Armored Division, and the 4th Infantry 
302 Ibid. 
'O'Eisenhower Papers, IV, 2077-2079; 2100-2102. 
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Division from the US First Army. Montgomery declined Eisenhower's invitation to 
visit Paris with Bradley, the same day, SHAEF formally informed him that SCAEF 
would take command of ground forces on I September. Montgomery was not the only 
one who lost forces; Eisenhower's authority over the Allied Strategic bombing force 
was shortly to be revoked except in times of emergency. SHAEF became a "Supreme" 
headquarters with limited influence over the Allied air or sea campaign. Its function. 
had been defined by Eisenhower's directive, which began with the words. "You will 
enter the continent of Europe. " The Allied Expeditionary Forces had accomplished the 
original OVERLORD task. It was now Eisenhower's and SHAEFs responsibility to 
complete the victory. SHAEF was now a ground headquarters commanding forces in 
the field. 304 (See figure 26. ) 
301 Montgomery Log, 20,27 August 1944, NARA, RG 331,322.01PS to 327.22, Box 47, C. C. S. 
304/12,12 February 1944, "Combined Chiefs of Staff Directive to Supreme Commander, Allied 
Expeditionary Force. " 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
Creating The Prince's Greatest Fear 
Where is the Prince who can afford so to cover his countly with troops 
for its defense, as that ten thousand men descendingftom the clouds, 
might not, in ma? ýv places, do an infinite deal of mischief before a 
force could be brought together to repel them. 
303 Benjamin Franklin, 1784 
The German landing of gliders and reinforcement by parachute forces in 
complementary operations to seize the Belgian fortress of Eben Emael jolted military 
observers worldwide into seeing that a new manner of war, "vertical envelopment, " 
could change the face of air-ground battle. OPERATION GRANITE, the actual glider 
assault, was complemented by additional special operations supporting CASE 0 
YELLOW, the mass assault in the west by Hitler's armies. OPERATION NIWI, the 
landing of small parties of combat engineers in light Storch aircraft to create abatis 
and other obstacles to French military movement, also took place simultaneously. 306 
The reality of an attack from the air was not new, and had in fact occurred a 
month before the attack in the west saw its use. The Germans had air-landed troops in 
Norway in April 1940, during OPERATION WESERBUNG (WESER CROSSING), 
the attack on Denmark and Norway. Here, airborne and air-landed forces seized key 
airfields and strategic points to support ship-landed forces. 307 
30.5 Sign kept in the office of the Commanding General, First Allied Airbome Army, 1944. 
306 CMH, MS, Charles Kirkpatrick, ed., The Attack on EbenEmaeln. d.; Jean Paul Pallud, Blitzkrieg in 
the West., Then and Now (London: After the Battle, 1991), 78-93; C. S. D. I. G. (U. K. ), Genobst Student 
and Genmaj Bassenge, Hisimy of German Airborne Forces, 24 September 1945. 
307 T. K. Derry, The Campaign in Norwa 
,y 
(Nashville: Battery Press, 1995); The Admiralty, Tactical and 
Staff Duties Division, The German Campaign In Norway, 1948; Headquarters, Northern Army Group 
and Second Allied Tactical Air Force Study Period, 1974, "Norway, " parts one and two. 
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Neither operation was based on a new idea. Parachuting troops or the transport 
of troops by air-landing aircraft had been theorized in World War I by American 
Brigadier General William "Billy" Mitchell and had been practiced on a limited scale 
within the US Army Air Corps by luminaries such as then-Captain Claire L. 
Chennault. Russia introduced airborne forces in a mass exercise in 1936 attended by 
Major-General Archibald Wavell, who reported on it, and Germany unveiled an 
airborne force in 1937. The shock of its use, however, caused immediate response in 
both the combatant armies and those armies not yet engaged. 
308 
Britain's response was to form an "Airborne Corpe' in June 1940, under 
Brigadier F. A. M. Browning, a Grenadier Guardsman who had participated as a 
commanding officer in Eastern Command's anti-airborne exercises in the late 
193 OS. 
309 
The experience of war shaped the ardor and azimuth of the airborne forces. 
The successful operation by German airborne and air-landed forces in the invasion of 
Crete halted further major German airborne operations due to the Germans' own risk- 
assessment for probable future losses, though several minor operations were launched 
later in the war. Additionally, German airborne troops became more a "fire-brigade" 
308 Arnold, Global Mission, 84; Claire Lee Chennault, Wa 
,v ofA 
Fighter. The Memoirs of Claire Lee 
Chennault, ed. Robert Hotz (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1949), 16,17; John Connell, Wavell: 
Soldier and Scholar (London: Collins, 1964), 182-183. 
309 Lieut. -Col. T. B. Otway, DSO, Airborne Forces: The Second World War 1939-1945 Series (The War 
Office, London: Imperial War Museum, 1990), 21-36. 
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of elite troops used to hold key areas of the front or to act as normal infantry. The 
Allied experience, however, led to far different conclusions. 
310 
Allied airborne operations reflected a changing doctrine plus operational 
realities. Browning's original charter, under the supervision of Combined Operations 
Headquarters, led him toward precision strikes in the form of raids or the seizure of 
key tactical points by small bodies of men. Staunch opposition from Bomber 
Comm, md, fearing the dispersion of multi-engined bombers for conversion into troop 
carriers or as glider-tows, also stymied both training and the creation of large 
formations. Moreover, the creation of glider-borne forces from the redesignation of 
formed regiments as glider troops was opposed by the Royal Air Force due to the 
requirements of pilot training and towing that would fall to the airmen as part of this 
scheme. Browning's ideas, however, shaped the British airborne forces and, as a 
result, were a driving factor in the employment of British airborne forces throughout 
the war. 
311 
As an evolutionary force, the airborne concept was driven by the personalities 
of the commanders as well as operational requirements and achievements. Browning's 
dominant ideas were that airborne forces should be employed as divisions and that the 
overarching planning, organizational and administrative duties required to maintain 
the force should be centered higher, on Airborne Corps and on Headquarters, Airborne 
Forces, and not on individual division commanders. Browning achieved these goals 
3 10 Airborne Operations: A German Appraisal (Washington: US Anny Center of Military History, 
1989), 1-23. The original author and editors were German generals under the supervision of General 
Franz Halder. The principal author of this study was Gencralmajor Hellmuth Reinhardt. 
311 Otway, Airborne Forces, ibid.; Major Victor Dover, The Sk-v Generals (London: Cassell, 198 1), 
Chapter IV, passim. 
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during 1941-1944. Operationally, Browning's force evolved from the raid stage 
(Bruneval, February 1942) to the use of dispersed battalions (Tunisia. 1942) and to the 
use of large brigade-sized forces (Sicily, July 1943). In each case, Browning had been 
relegated to "adviser" status, and the operational concepts came from Army level or 
Combined Operations' planners. The concerted use of a complete airborne division as 
part of a larger operational plan would not come until the invasion of Northwest 
Europe-the Normandy invasion. The lack of airlift had hampered the operational 
employment of the British airborne forces in the past and would become the key 
consideration in their use. 
312 
The American experience with airborne forces showed some parallels both in 
its evolution and in the politics of the support for such forces within the overarching 
command structures, Headquarters, US Army Ground Forces, and Headquarters, US 
Army Air Forces. As with the British experience, airborne development was greatly 
personality-driven, and its oversight was given to senior ground officers who by 
assignment or personal belief became airborne advocates. Starting from an 
experimental platoon in 1940, by 1943 the force included an "Airborne Command, " 
four divisions, and several separate regiments or battalions. As with the British, it was 
used in battalion operations (Tunisia, 1942), regimental operations (Sicily), and 
Division-minus operations (Italy, 1943). Its large-scale debut would also be the 
Normandy invasion. Unlike the British force, it had several "fathers" both 
organizationally and operationally, but their purpose had always been to create 
divisions as the Germans had done. Organizationally, the American airborne forces 
312 tway, Airborne Forces, chapters 3-11, passim. 
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differed significantly from the British, and unlike the Royal Air Force, the commander 
of the AAF believed it to be an "air weapon" of great potential and dedicated 
significant air assets for its support while simultaneously demanding a say in their 
313 
use. 
As with the entire 1944 campaign, the Mediterranean Allied experience and 
the COSSAC planners found their mark in shaping attitudes and plans for the use of 
airborne. From the start, airborne planning produced a battle over command. assets. 
forces, and tactical missions. COSSAC's planners had specified tasks for the airborne. 
and detailed drop-zone information was included as part of the planners' working 
papers. 314 21 Army Group's assumption of the planning responsibilities modified 
these greatly, but battles fanned by personalities erupted. The Americans, particularly 
Major General Matthew B. Ridgway, took issue and offense at any higher-imposed 
plan and particularly harbored resentment over Browning's I Airborne Corps 
Headquarters, a resentment fueled by his belief that it existed solely "to take over the 
entire American airborne effort. "3 
15 
313 James A. Huston, Out ofthe Blue: USA rm ,v 
Airborne Operations in World War 11 (West Lafayette, 
Indiana: Purdue University Studies, 1972), Chapters 2-6. passim, CMH, MS. Major John Huston, 
Airborne Forces (Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1954), Chapters 1-5, passim; 
Clay Blair, Ridgwqvs Paratroopers: The American Airborne In World War // (Garden City, N. Y.: The 
Dial Press, 1985); Kent Roberts Greenfield, Robert R. Palmer, and Bell 1. Wiley. The Armv Ground 
Forces: The Organization of Ground Combat Troops (Washington: Historical Division, LjS Army. 
1947), 93-98,339-350. Out of the Blue is the edited version of the otherwise unpublished US Army in 
World War 11 official history volume that was dropped from publication due to funding. Huston was its 
sole author. 
314 See COSSAC Plan 87-9 1, Appendix "0"; Major General James M. Gavin, Airborne Warfare 
(Washington: Infantry Journal Press, 1947), 3 74 1. 
315 Interview, Lt. Gen. James M. Gavin, Ft. Leavenworth. Kansas, 1984 by author, General Matthew B. 
Ridgway, Soldier: The Memoirs ofMattheis, B. Ridgwqy as told to Harold H. Martin (Westport, Conn.: 
Greenwood Press, 1956,1974), 66-67. Ridgway referred to Browning as his -sparring partner. " 
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Morita mery's battle with Leigh Mallory over airborne missions, both during go 
NEPTUNE's planning and early in the invasion, also exposed grave philosophical or 
doctrinal differences that festered along with personality issues. These attitudes 
continued throughout the campaign. 316 
Both the American Army and the British forces possessed printed doctrine 
establishing basic views and organizational tenets for the use of airborne forces, and 
SHAEF had produced a detailed Operational Memorandum outlining the stated 
requirements for operational planning of such operations. 317 Tactical usage and 
operational missions, however, remained the responsibility of the employing 
commanders, and the definition of those missions. and the views of those 
commanders, shaped the detail of tactics and procedures prior to deployment. The 
nature of the airborne mission itself posed complicated problems whose solution was 
sought by creating a series of headquarters to plan, coordinate, and eventually 
command airborne operations. 
Central to the issue of airborne employment was also the one of troop lift and 
glider-tows. The AAF had addressed this problem with a large troop-carrier effort 
centralized in Europe under IX Troop Carrier Command, a component of the 9th Air 
Force that provided tactical air support for Bradley's 12th Army Group. British 
transport aircraft were not centralized formally, but were provided by the RAF's No. 
38 and No. 46 Groups. While Browning had previously sought to centralize airborne 
"6 Harrison, Cross-Channel Attack-, 186; EL, Correspondence File [Leigh Mallory], 
A EAF/TS/836/Ops. 3,29th May 1944, Employment of Airborne Forces in Operation "OVERLORD. " 
3" NARA, RG 331, SHAEF G-3 Administrative Subject File, "Operational Memoranda, " Operation 
Memorandum Number 12,13th March 1944, Standard Operating Procedure for Airborne and Troop 
Carrier Units; Otway, Airborne Forces, Appendix F. 
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forces and to provide an overarching tactical headquarters, SHAEF, encouraged by 
Washington's views on airborne, sought to unify the airborne forces and troop carriers 
under theater control. 
318 
Washington's airborne views percolated throughout 1943 and 1944, leading to 
increased support by both Marshall and Arnold. Arnold believed that the use of 
airborne troops had been discovered as a sound theory by General "Billy" Mitchell 
and heartily approved their use in Sicily. Uter, he supported the creation of the I st Air 
Commando Group to support Major-General Orde C. Wingate's operations and the 
aerial invasion of Burma that took place in March 1944.319 
The Chief of Staff of the Army and the Commanding General, Army Air 
Forces, however, held stronger views on airborne employment. Arnold's staff, 
believing that airborne forces should seize "strategic objectives, " proposed a 5-6 
division air drop near Paris as a component of OVERLORD. Eisenhower's refusal to 
accept this proposed "airhead" as a prelude to an air-delivered army and a mooring 
point for French resistance fighters raised the ire of both generals. Arnold accused 
Eisenhower of thinking tactically. Eisenhower believed that the relative ground 
immobility of the airborne divisions would prove their doom if a rapid link with 
ground forces wasn't established. Marshall, eventually straddling both viewpoints, 
withdrew from his early disappointment but urged Eisenhower to seek bolder 
employment of the airborne force after OVERLORD. 320 
318 Otway, Airborne Forces, Chapters V. Vl; Huston, Out ofthe Blue, 57-64. 
319 Arnold, Global Mission, 398,442. 
320 Arnold, Global Mission. 520-522; Marshall Papers. IV, 284,285; Bland, Reminiscencesfor Pogue, 
465-466; Eisenhower Papers, 111,1736-1739. 
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The SHAEF staff s own conclusions paralleled Washington's in one sense: 
they proposed that all airborne operations be centralized under SHAEF. 
On 20 May 
1944, the G-3 recommended creating a headquarters on the level of Army Group to 
unify control of all airborne forces while the AEAF remained the overseer of 
Troop 
Carrier forces. The Airborne Subsection of G-3 would form the nucleus of this new 
3ZI headquarters. The plan received Tnixe(l support. 
21 Army Group recommended that such an organization could work-, but that 
any changes should be implemented when the Supreme Commander assumed control 
of ground forces in NEPTUNE. 12th Army Group objected to SHAEF's scheme, 
recommending that a separate American airborne command be formed. Not only were 
doctrine, equipment, and staff requirements different, they held, 12th Army Group 
noted that carrying all the American forces available would require the entire theater's 
troop carrier assets. No "combined" command was wanted. SHAEF's control of 
airborne forces through the respective army groups was their answer. 322 Their 
underlying logic was clear. Bradley intended assuring that American divisions could 
never be part of an Allied operation supporting 21 Army Group. The British would 
have their own force. This logic would persist. 323 
Eisenhower's "conversion" to mass vertical envelopments had been assured by 
Marshall's interest in airborne operations. Before leaving the Mediterranean, he had 
32' Huston, Out of the Blue, 76. 
322 
Ibid., 77. 
323 NARA, RG331, SGS Decimal File, 322 1 st AAA, entry I. Box 38, SHAEF/17281/Ops/Ops (A), 
Subject: Airborne Forces, 30 July 1944; Ninth Air Force, Subject: Organization and Contemplated 
Operations of Air Army, 28 July 1944; Hqs AEAF, Organization of Combined US/British Airborne 
Troop Headquarters, 17 July; Bull Papers; Bull informed Bradley that Ridgway's intent to form an 
airborne section at 12th Army Group would probably fail. 
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written to the Chief of Staff saying, I do not believe in the airborne division. " Now. 
after his disagreement with Marshall and Arnold4 he moved to use them en masse 
without the bickering that had characterized the NEPTUNE planning. While his staff 
designed tighter controls for an airborne command, he wrote Marshall that he was 
attempting to visualize an attack behind OVERLORD's beaches combining "a big 
armored attack in conjunction with a deep and heavy penetration by airborne 
troops. 1,324 
Eisenhower's own ideas exceeded his staff s recommendations and reflected 
more Arnold's philosophy than those of his commanders. This would become more 
apparent as directives for planning were issued and missions were sought for the 
airborne command, but other factors may have spurred the Supreme Commander to 
action. Eisenhower's own role as the future ground Commander needed definition, not 
simply as a writer of directives for individual army group commanders, but as a 
commander who affects the battlefield situation and intervenes to seize opportunity or 
prevent disaster. This had been the argument for his total control of theater air assets. 
Once established as ground supremo, he would need a strategic reserve to be 
committed on his order in concert with any army group maneuver that he directed. A 
separate headquarters under the operational control of SHAEF was essential to keep 
these reins in his hands. Implicit in its use was that the reserve force could be readily 
324 Eisenhower Papers, 111,1736-1739,1878; Eisenhower's conversion obviously came from 
Marshall's discussions with him in Algiers. The verbal tussle over the rejected plans likewise solidified 
Marshall's interest in Eisenhower's mind. 
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moved to any front, irrespective of national sector. An airborne force was the only 
command that fit this bill. 
325 
Eisenhower proposed that the organization combine command of both the 
troop carriers and the ground forces to optimize training and planning. For battle. a 
corps commander would command on the ground until his force linked with a ground 
army that would provide overall command and administration. Until then, the air 
commander would provide logistical support. The proposal was approved by 
Marshall, Arnold, and Spaatz, but Leigh Mallory questioned AEAF's role if such a 
headquarters were established. Moreover, Leigh Mallory reminded Eisenhower that 
the air transport groups of the RAF would have to be assigned for missions by the Air 
Ministry, as they were neither organic elements of 2 TAF or AEAF nor assigned for 
operations to SHAEF. 326 
Eisenhower increasingly saw the airborne force and its use as a struggle 
against the weather clock. He noted in a memo to Smith on 23 June 1944: 
By September 20, at the latest, we can count upon the beginning of 
winter weather. After that date air operations will be spasmodic. 
His concerns reveal both his operational ideas and his problems: 
The air represents the one important factor in which we enjoy 
tremendous superiority. As a consequence of these facts we should 
32"' NARA, SHAEFSGS381 Post-Overlord, Volume 1, S"AXF11%rj0%130ps, 11 May 1944-pogue, 
The Supreme Command, 269. S"KEIF's plans staff, PTOduced an outline plan in May to commit the 
strateg: ic TeseTvt onlabout 'D+'2cj under cenain conditions. The plan entailed using airborne forces to "to 
seize an area in the centre of PARIS by air transported forces, from which we should deny the enemy 
crossings over the SEINE, divert his reserves from the main battle and generally disrupt his 
communications and control. The force envisaged for the task was four divisions.. . minus artillery, transportation and impedimenta. " 
3" Eisenhower Papers, 111,1988-1989; Huston, Out of the Blue, 77-79; Otway, Airborne Forces, 202; 
NARA, 322 1 st AAA file. 
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strive in every possible way to make maximum use of our air during 
the next 60-90 days. This includes every type of air operation, such as: 
a. Normal close support of ground forces; 
b. Smashing of communication lines; 
c. Neutralizing of CROSSBOW; 
d. Airborne operations; 
e. Supply of troops by air. 
He summarized his view on the air campaign, saying, 
The direct attack against Germany is of second priority as compared to 
the necessity of getting all the above tasks in hand, but in any event, 
there will unquestionably be sufficient days when other types of 
operations are impracticable, to continue the striking assault upon 
Germany, and there will be days during the winter when this can 
likewise be carried out. 
He continued, saying, 
The one place in which we must make sure there is continuous and 
energetic staff planning is in the airborne operations. This should not 
be limited to Airborne Divisions but should be extended, where 
practicable, to include the transportation and temporary supply of 
normal Divisions by air. 327 
Besides setting the tone for "his" campaign once he replaced Montgomery, 
Eisenhower began fishing for an airman as the most likely commander; he suggested 
Major General John Kenneth Cannon, then the Commanding General of the Twelfth 
Air Force in Italy. 318 This search for an airman, once joined, was debated by the senior 
airmen in Washington and in Europe. Eisenhower finally recommended four 
candidates, with Major General Hoyt S. Vandenburg, Leigh Mallory's deputy, at the 
top of the list. The job fell to Lieutenant General Lewis H. Brereton, then 
327 NARA RG 338 SHAEF Office of Chief of Staff Decimal File May 43-Aug 45, Box 65, entry 1. 
Post-Ovcrlord Planning, Memorandum for Chief of Staff; Eisenhower Papers. 1//, 1946-1948. 
328 
Ibid. 
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commanding Ninth Air Force, on Spaatz's recommendation but possibly on Arnold's 
insistence. 
329 
Eisenhower named Brereton as Commander, Combined Airborne Forces on 27 
July 1944, and simultaneously created the US XVIH Corps (Airborne) under Major 
General Matthew B. Ridgway. 330 The precise function and authority of Combined 
Airborne Forces, however, was still a matter of discussion, a discussion that had 
started in May and theoretically had been decided on 20 June, when Eisenhower 
approved the basic command concept. Brereton's directive, dated 8 August 1944, gave 
him wide administrative and training responsibilities over the airborne force, to 
include overseeing their reconstitution after battle. Brereton's primary operational 
responsibilities were defined in paragraph L(g. ) of his directive: 
The preparation and examination in conjunction with the SHAEF 
Planning Staff of the outline plan for the employment of Airborne 
Troops and preparation of detailed plans for the employment of 
Airborne Troops in conjunction with the Ground Force and Air Force 
Commanders. 
Brereton asked that his headquarters be designated as the First Allied Airborne 
Army (FAAA), stating that the assignment of British, US, and Polish forces, would 
merit such a name to further "the esprit de corps of the units. "' Eisenhower accepted 
this as, well as clarifying AEAF's role and that of the troop carriers. On 16 August, 
329 LC, Papers of General Carl A. Spaarz [hereafter referred to as Spaatz Papers]. Personal File, 1944- 
1945. Following a series of teletype conferences and messages, Eisenhower named Brcreton based 
upon Spaatz's recommendation. Vandenberg replaced Brcreton at Ninth Air Force. Teletype messages 
in Spaat. - Papers. Cannon and Vandenberg were both considered too junior to command, as a 
lieutenant general of some experience would be needed over Browning, who would serve as a Corps 
Commander. In the event, Brcreton actually was "junior" to Browning in time in grade. 
330 NAR. A, RG 331 entry 253, Box 4, First Allied Airborne 322, Reorganization and organization, 
SHAEF/322-3/0&E, 27 July 1944, RG 33 1, Entry 253, Box 38,322 1 st AAA, Organization and 
Command First Allied Airborne Army. FAAA Headquarters was announced 18 August 1944, 
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First Allied Airborne Army was created. from the nascent Combined Airborne Forces. 
with the formal assignment of operational command of British Airborne Troops. 
XVIII Corps (Airborne), IX Troop Carrier Command, and the Combined Air 
Transport Operations Room (CATOR). Since CATOR controlled 38 and 46 Groups, 
RAF, their operational assignments were assured. Lt. Gen. F. A. M. Browning was 
named as Deputy Commanding General while also retaining command of I Airborne 
Corps. 331 
Brereton had, in fact, influenced more than simply the renaming of the force 
and was not simply a creative operator expressing his own ideas. Washington had 
planted firm seeds, and they were about to bear fruit. Brereton and Spaatz met with 
Eisenhower at Brereton's headquarters on 17 July, and the topic of airborne forces 
was discussed in detail. Brereton, not knowing his own command might change, 
followed up the meeting with a memorandum outlining his views. He strongly 
recommended that all US airborne divisions be put under Ninth Air Force. As he saw 
it, the air commander would not only ensure transport and training for the airborne, 
but would personally direct air support operations while the ground commander 
fought the ground battle. He noted that command in an airborne operation "'must be 
vested in a single commander ... a necessity to coordinate air drops, aerial protection 
for transports, and air support. " This would, in effect, create a single fighting air- 
ground command. Moreover, under this system, AEAF would be relegated to 
Combined Airborne Headquarters had opened on 2 August. Ridgway formally assumed command on 27 August 1944. 
331 RG 33 1, Box 38.322 Ist AAA File: Headquarters, Combined Airborne Forces. subject: Designation of Combined Airborne Forces, 4 August 1944; SHAEF /1728 I/Ops (A) Redesignation of Airborne Forces, 9 August 1944; SHAEF AG 322-1 (First Allied Airborne Army) GCT-AM, 
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coordination, but actual command would stay within US channels from SHAEF 
(Eisenhower) to USSTAF (Spaatz) to Ninth Air Force (Brereton). 
This contradicted Leigh Mallory's view that AEAF should 
remain responsible for all air aspects of airborne operations, while the 
Airborne Commander would control all ground operations. 
Moreover, as Leigh Mallory defined airborne operations, he saw that, 
From time of take-off to landing, an airborne operation being a purely 
air operation-must be the responsibility of the Air C. -in-C., who must 
retain the power of veto. 
Eisenhower rejected Brereton's views and assured Leigh Mallory that 
the air movement plan is an indivisible air operation and, of necessity, 
will be prepared by the Air Commander-in-Chief and the Airborne 
Commander. 
His final statement would prove ironic: 
Your responsibility for air support, subject to the decision of the 
Supreme Commander, is of course, unquestioned. 
Smith later confirmed in writing the state of responsibility, that 
the Commanding General, First Allied Airborne Army will control the 
air lift of the First Allied Airborne Army and that the responsibility for 
supporting air operations rests with the Air Commander-in-Chief. 
332 
Assignment of Units, 16 August 1944; SHAEF/17281/l/Ops (A), Reorganization of Airborne Forces, 
19 August 1944. 
332 Ibid., 322 Ist AAA file: Memorandum Subject: Organization and Contemplated Operations of an 
Air Army, 28 July 1944; Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Air Force, Subject: ORGANIZATION 
OF A COMBINED US/BRITISH AIRBORNE TROOP HEADQUARTERS, 17th July 1944; 
SHAEF/17281/Ops (A) 31 July 1944, Subject: Organization of a Combined US/British Airborne Troop 
Headquarters; SHAEF/17281/Ops(A), I August, Subject: Organization of a Combined US/BRITISH 
Airborne Troops Headquarters; SHAEF/17281/i/Ops(A), 19 August 1944, Subject: Reorganization of 
Airborne Forces. 
182 
The same day Brereton's orders were published, Eisenhower showed his impatience 
with the job at hand. He sent this memo to his chief of staff, who passed it on to the 
new commander: 
Brereton should be working on his new job instantly. Please inform 
him that I am particularly anxious about the navigational qualifications 
of the Transport Command crews. He is to get on this in an intensive 
way. He is to keep me in touch with his progress. There is nothing we 
are undertaking about which I am more concerned than this job of his. 
I want him on the ball with all his might. 333 
Washington's views, however, would never be far from Eisenhower's mind. 
Obviously, his March tussle with Arnold remained a concern. Arnold's views, 
essentially rubber-stamped by Marshall, could not be ignored either by the Supreme 
Commander or by Arnold's own man, Brereton. These views, simply stated, were that 
an air army should be flown into an airhead. Arnold, in fact, shared these views 
throughout the Army Air Forces. Seeking to influence the airborne operations in 
support of ANVEL, Arnold both recommended and reviewed plans. Writing to the 
Mediterranean Deputy Allied Supreme Commander, Lieutenant General Jacob L. 
(Jake) Devers, he stated, 
I believe that the employment of airborne forces in mass has 
tremendous potentialities which we have not yet exploited. As long as 
we have the general initiative and can control the air, we should bear in 
mind the potential value of those forces as a means of avoiding or breaking stalemate periods as well as a means of spearheading main 
ground efforts. 
Sooner or later the opportunity of mounting a well-planned mass 
airborne operation will be exploited and we are looking forward to 
giving it our maximum support. 334 
333 Ibid., Memorandum to Chief of Staff, 2 August 1944, "DE. " 
334 RG 18, entry 294, decimal 312.1 -k, Operations letters, Ltr Arnold to Lt. Gen. Jacob Devers, 26 July 1944. 
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Eisenhower. who was not an addressee of this correspondence. did. however. 
receive all key summaries and cables going to the Mediterranean, including those 
recommending airborne support for the invasion by Arnold and his staff. With this as 
part of his daily Cable Log at SHAEF, the War Department, in keeping Eisenhower 
informed, was also reminding him of their views concerning airborne operations. 
Moreover, Spaatz, who was kept informed of everything by Arnold, apprised 
Eisenhower of the Commanding General, Army Air Forces' views on this issue. 335 
Devers, as the former European Theater of Operations (ETO) commander. and 
now the Allied Deputy Supreme Commander Mediterraenan Theater, was seen as a 
great friend of airpower, having been responsible for supporting the American air 
buildup in England in 1943. His air commander, Lt. Gen. Ira Eaker, had %Titten 
Arnold, furthering the discussion begun by Arnold on the topic of an air army, a topic 
which he had Spaatz and others looking into. Eaker had recommended Cannon as 
commander, but waxed further on the subject seeing it as the solution for ground 
operations. He stated: 
If we had an airborne army headed by a bold, energetic Jeb Stewart 
[sic] type of a fellow, I think he might shorten this war in Europe by 
almost a year. In short, you will see that I am for your airborne army 
every way from Sunday. It is the boldest, most forward looking concept 
which I have seen yet in this war. I think it might be a critical operation 
against a bold, versatile army, flushed with success and supported by a 
strong air force. If an airborne army captured a group of airfields and 
we set our tactical air forces down on them we could absolutely 
prevent enemy tanks from disturbing the airborne force and could also 
prevent enemy artillery close enough to do it any damage. 
333 Ibid. 
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The "Jeb Stuart" Eaker had in mind was Jake Devers. Devers, who would lead 
the invasion of Southern France, by then was considered persona non grata by 
Eisenhower and, of course, did not fit Eisenhower's belief that an airman needed to 
command Combined Airborne Forces in order to assure the air forces' cooperation. 
336 
The "approved" Army Air Force doctrine appeared to follow the pattern that 
Wingate had set in Burma, an experiment that Arnold had furthered and which he 
believed to be universally applicable. Eisenhower both understood this idea and was 
apparently moving not only to centralize the airborne planning and execution process, 
but also to finiher the "air-landed" division as part of future operations. In July, he had 
requested that the War Department give three weeks' training to every other infantry 
division ticketed for the European Theater in the use of the C-47 transport aircraft and 
gliders as means of transportation. 337 
Creating the headquarters, however, did not solve arguments over actual use of 
the force. SHAEF's planners had categorized operations into two types: 
An airborne operation proper, in which up to the three airborne 
divisions are landed by parachute and glider and maintained by 
parachute and glider. For such an operation the capture of an airfield or 
construction of an air strip is not essential. 
An airhead in which the airborne forces seize an existing airfield or 
construct strips on which air landed formations can be put down and on 
which maintenance stores can be landed. 338 
33, Ibid., Ltr. Lt. Gen. Ira Eaker to Arnold, 14 July 1944. 
33' RG 331,322 1 st AAA files: msgs. E-3646, Eisenhower to AGWAR, 5 July 44 and E-37012,9 July 
1944; PRO WO /203/ 5213, Forces of Long Range Penetration: Future Development in Burma. 
Memorandum by Brigadier Wingate offers a comparison with Wingate's views. 
33g NARA, RG 33 I, SHAEF SGS, 2. Employment of Airborne Forces in Overlord, PS-SHAEF (44) 30 
(Final) Memorandum by Planning Staff, 18 August 1944. See Draft, 14 August, for a detailed 
appreciation titled "Airheads. " This appreciation forms the basic planning estimate for possible 
operations delineating forces, capabilities, time estimates on availability of aircraft. aircraft limitations, 
and outlines of basic data on airfield and terrain capabilities within range of FAAA's aircraft. This 
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The Eisenhower-Amold "airhead" strategy was but one possibility for its 
employment. Both types of operations had restrictions. The airborne, it was felt. could 
defend itself for only several days, after which the armor threat would be too great, the 
airhead, which claimed the possibility of supporting up to six divisions, was at the 
mercy of weather, terrain and, of course, the enemy, so it too had to be reachable by a 
relieving force. The Army's deputy commander and the American commander of the 
XVIII Corps (Airborne) would be the prime interpreters of whether any airborne 
operation was a "sound operation of war. " 
Their respective armies had published airborne doctrine of a remark-ably 
similar nature. Indeed, the prime missions and uses for the airborne force seemed 
nearly identical. The tactics of employment, however, varied; this was reflected by the 
organizations and equipment of the American and British Airborne divisions. The 
planning for airborne missions had already by standardized by SHAEF in March, 
during the planning for OVERLORD. This was to be the planning model for use by 
First Allied Airborne Army, but no standard doctrine for airborne tactics had been 
attempted. 339 
Both Browning and Ridgway had battled to get airborne forces viewed as a 
strategic weapon used en masse, but Ridgway, particularly, viewed any strategic use 
study was not published as part of the final memorandum. Earlier drafts, dated 4 August and 28 July, 
contain additional detail. All drafts are in the same file. 
339 Ibid., United States War Department Training Circular, 113,9 October 1943, Emplqvment and 
Training ofAirborne and Troop Carrier Forces; British War Office, May 1943, Airborne Operations 
Pamphlet No. I General (Provisional); SHAEF Operational Memorandum No. 12,13th March 1944; 
NAC, RG 24, Volume 20420, File 969(D20), SHAEF/2297/4/Ops, Employment of Airborne Forces, 
19 January 1944. 
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of his corps by Montgomery's 21 Army Group as anathema. 340 SHAEF's planning 
section, however, had an active file of outline plans, and Brereton's mission was to 
66get on the ball with all his might. " Considering Eisenhower's fever to use airborne. 
one of these existent plans seemed most likely to be executed. 
The lack of an airborne headquarters had not stopped operational airborne 
planning since the creation of COSSAC. SHAEF's airborne subsection of the plans 
staff and Montgomery's own 21 Army Group planners had devised a series of outline 
plans as contingencies for NEPTUNE. These were extant in July when Brereton 
entered the picture, and the ongoing planning demonstrated clearly the state of 
thinking in the airborne arena. Browning's I Airborne Corps had been the primary 
"filter" for airborne plans conceived at SHAEF, or at 21 Army Group. Only one 
airborne division existed as the available airborne force until the withdrawal of the US 
airborne divisions from Normandy in July. This division, British I st Airborne, was the 
main force for any of the contingency plans created. 
During THUNDERCLAP, Monty had referred to using "air hooks" of brigade 
or division strength to keep the situation proceeding according to plan. (See figure 
27. ) Some of these detailed plans were initiated as early as May and included 
operations to reinforce the beachhead (TUXEDO and WASTAGE), to pull forward 
the beachhead (WILD OATS), to seize ports in the Brittany Peninsula or to cut them 
off (BENEFICIARY, SWORDHILT, and HANDSUP), to block the enemy's line of 
retreat (TRANSFIGURE), or to support the movement on the north coast by seizing 
'40 MHl. Papers of Lt. Gen. Floyd L. Parks, The Parks Diag, August-Septemher 1944 [hereafter 
referred to as Parks Diwy] passim. Parks was Chief of Staýi, First Allied Airborne Anny. His diary 
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key areas or ports (BOXER. AXEHEAD. and LINNET). Additionally. dropping 
airborne troops in conjunction with operations on the Caen-Falaise road was 
examined twice. These were essentially Montgomery's plans and, due to the available 
forces, almost all British affairs. 341 Additionally, 21 Army Group coordinated SAS 
operations, which Bradley, Parks, and Brereton disparaged as "harassing operations" 
unworthy of the Allied Airborne Army. These operations remained under 
Headquarters, Airborne Forces, but were orchestrated by SHAEF. 342 No similar 
special operations capability then existed in the American forces, though the OSS 
(Office of Strategic Services) Jedburgh teams did have the ability to coordinate 
resistance groups. They were not, however, a functioning part of FAAA. 343 
During the interim period, as organizational problems were being solved in 
order to create a combined airborne command, SHAEF's planners considered 21 
Army Group's planning with I Airborne Corps as their airborne program. This 
program covered broad areas already in planning for possible implementation. In 
outlining them for the long-suffering Leigh Mallory, who wanted clarification, these 
covered three eventualities: a seizure of a port in Brittany; a drop in conjunction with 
an armored thrust toward Paris from the lodgement area; and two separate plans for 
operations to support crossing the Seine either north or south of Paris. SHAEF 
constitutes the best operational record of the headquarters and its thinking. Relevant conference notes 
and memos are appended to the diary entries. 
341 Otway, Airborne Forces, 206-212, MHI, Papers ofLt. Col. Chester B. Hansen, Op Thunderclap; 
NAC, RG 24, Volume 10539, File 215A21.013 (1) 17), 21 A. Gp/00/450/Ops (A): Overlord: Operation 
Hands-Up is an example of a completed outline plan. 
342 Parks Dia? y, II August 1944; Lewis H. Brereton, The Brereton Diaries: The War in the Air in the 
Pacific, Middle East and Europe. 3 October 1941-8 May 1945 [hereafter referred to as Brereton 
Diaries] (New York: William Morrow and Company, 1946), 333. 
343 SJ. Lewis, Jedburgh Teams in Support ofthe 12th Arm. y Group. August 1944 (Fort Leavenworth: 
Combat Studies institute, 1991). 
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believed the possibilities for the first would be in August, for the second from mid- 
August to mid-September and crossings in the north possible in September, and in the 
south in October. When published in mid-July, this estimate still followed the 
assessment that the lodgement would be established by September despite the lag in 
the early phase-line arrivals. 344 
The rapidly evolving situation in early August and the creation of First Allied 
Airborne Anny did little to spur new planning. Brereton's headquarters shifted for 
a 
jobs, but the "trigger" for launching airborne operations remained with Montgomery 
and his increasingly unwilling subordinate, Bradley, and no serious plans were 
advanced beyond those already on the boards. Moreover, in Eisenhower's mind. he 
remained the sole arbiter of the fate of any airborne plan. 345 
Mid-August, and the impending doom of the German forces within the 
"NEPTUNE" area, prompted new efforts to seek the "mass envelopment" promised 
by Eisenhower to Arnold and Marshall. SHAEF issued two planning directives to 
FAAA, the first on 16 August, with a categorization of priorities following on 18 
August 1944. Brereton's small staff, and their counterparts at I Airborne Corps and 
the still organizing XVIII Corps (Airborne), soon tumbled to create plans following 
six contingencies. As stated, these were: 
Priority I-Oper-ation NORTH of the Lower Seine between the OISE 
and Rouen to facilitate the crossing of our advance forces. 
3" NARA, RG 33 1, entry 1, Box 65, Folder 373/2 volume I Employment of Airborne Forces in 
Operation Overlord, 27 July 43 thru 24 December 45, SHAEF/24500/00/3/Ops, 14 July 1944, "Future 
Airborne Operations In Furtherance of 'Overlord'. " 
343 Parks Diary, 15 August 1944. This had been SHAEF's view since the beginning of the NEPTUNE 
planning. 
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Priority H-Operation to seize the crossings over the Oise bemeen the 
Seine and Compiegne, to protect the right flank- of our advancing 
forces. 
Priority 111-0peration NORTH of the Upper Seine between 
FONTAINEBLEAU and JUVISY to facilitate the crossing of our 
advancing forces. 
Priority IV-Operation NORTH of the River SOMME between 
PERONNE and ABBEVILLE to facilitate the crossing of our 
advancing forces. 
Priority V-Operation NORTH of the River AISNE in the 
neighbourhood of SOISSONS to facilitate the crossing of our forces 
advancing from the SOUTH. 
In conjunction with Allied Expeditionary Air Force and 21 st Army 
Group: 
Priority VI-Operation to seize the ST OMER area with the view to 
hindering the withdrawal of enemy coastal forces from the PAS DE 
CALAIS coast. 
SHAEF stipulated that planning these operations would be completed by 25 
August except for operations north of the Seine, which had a target date of 7 
September or later. 346 Existing operations TRANSFIGURE, BOXER, AXEHEAD, 
and LINNET actually fulfilled several of the priorities, but SHAEF, or 21 Army 
Group, still failed to fulfill the dream of "a strategic" operation with all but a few of 
these plans. Only TRANSFIGURE and BOXER offered strategic results, and these 
only if a massive catch of enemy forces were made or if a deep-water port were 
captured along with maintaining a rapid pursuit. While planning for these operations 
was prudent, the reality of using the Airborne Army as anything more than a tactical 
or operational adjunct to the then rapidly unfolding operational situation was meeting 
the problem of diminishing returns. 
346 RG 331, ibid.. Airborne operations to assist crossings of the SEINE-Dircctive, 16 August 1944; 
APPENDIX 'A' to PS-SHAEF(44)30 Final dated 18 August 1944, SUBJECT: AirbomcOpcrations 
To Assist Our Overland Advancc-Dircctive. 
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Arnold's dream and Eisenhower's enthusiasm to fulfill it also met with 
internal problems-the same problems that had plagued the coalition since its 
inception. Nationalism, service prejudices, and the personality problems enhanced by 
the uncontrolled enthusiasms of the national press made a concerted effort to support 
and utilize the Airborne Army as it was intended very difficult. Remark-ably, 
considering Arnold's views, the problems were American-inspired. 
Browning continued to respond to 21 Army Group, following the established 
pattem-with outline plans to fit Monty's long-term ideas and with detailed planning 
and coordination with ground army commanders on order-as specific contingencies 
appeared to be possible. But apart from Brereton and his staff, the Americans dragged 
their feet. Beginning in July, Major General Maxwell Taylor, the commander of the 
101" Airborne Division, answered SHAEF's query concerning the mounting time for 
an airborne operation. If accepted, his estimate of thirty days would have thrown 
planners into a frenzy as they realized that "opportunities" must be seen a full month 
or more out in order to capitalize on the Airborne Army's capabilities. SHAEF's 
August directives proved it believed the opposite to be true. In the Mediterranean 
Theater, airborne missions had been conceived on a short timescale, and no one 
seriously questioned or studied the results of such an assumption. 347 
347 USAF Historical Division, Airborne Missions in the Mediterranean 1942-1945: USAF Historical 
Studies: No. 74 [hereafter referred to as Airborne Misions in the Med] (Research Studies Institute, Air 
University, 1955), passim, MHI, Papers of General Matthew B. Ridgwqv, Personal File, 
Correspondence, "Lessons of Airborne Operations in Italy, 25 October 1943. " Ridgway urged that the 
airborne division be used only as "a division" and cited problems of piecemeal commitment of forces 
in the Mediterranean. While Ridgway made extensive comments on the use ofairborne divisions, his 
main points included that the airborne commander should participate in planning, but the timescale for 
preparation was never discussed. 
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Moreover, Bradley saw airborne operations as both limited and. as August 
progressed. a threat to his air-supplied fuel stores that were being carried by IX Troop 
Carrier Command under the aegis of CATOR. He particularly saw any commitment to 
support 21 Army Group's operations as nonbeneficial to Ms own. 
348 
Most importantly, FAAA found itself supporting two opposing cliques. 
Montgomery saw utility in the airborne, and had consistently kept his planner, 
Brigadier Charles Richardson, and Browning's planners in constant contact both 
furthering the outline plans on the planners' boards and exploring possible plans for 
the unfolding campaign. Throughout, Monty considered Browning to be "his" 
airborne commander. Likewise, the anglophobic Ridgway, who had stumped to create 
an American airborne corps under his own command, became Bradley's self- 
designated "airborne commander" to prevent FAAA from supporting 21 Army Group. 
FAAA's staff soon became segmented supporting these opposing interests. and this 
state of affairs continued well into the second month of FAAA's existence. First 
Allied Airborne Army was dominated by Americans, and the Deputy. Browning. was 
very much the odd man out. This situation was exacerbated by the fact that tactical 
planning for the ground operations was conducted in Browning's I Airbome Corps 
headquarters, whereas the "air plan, " and essentially the outline concepts for 
operations, were produced at Brereton's headquarters by his American G-3.349 
349 Bradley, A Soldier's Stoq, 401,402: the Bradley Commentaries noted his preference of aerial 
resupply and the problem of coordinating an airborne operation with an ongoing ground offensive. 
349 Parks Diary, August-Septernber, passim. The daily situation as it unfolds for a series of four plans, 
TRANSFIGURE, LINNET, LINNET 11, and COMET. as one where the Americans continue to look 
for a way to support 12th Army Group in lieu of their designated mission of supporting 21 Army 
Group. 
192 
Further complicating matters was the state of First Allied Airborne Army's 
headquarters as it evolved. One day after his assumption of command, Brereton, who 
still temporarily commanded the Ninth Air Force, "occupied" his former headquarters 
as the ffiture home of the Combined Airborne Forces. Ninth Air Force, awaiting the 
arrival of Hoyt Vandenburg, was in the midst of moving its main elements to France. 
Assured facilities, and most important, good communications by remaining in his 
previous headquarters, Brereton met with four American brigadier generals and set the 
"tone" for FAAA. One-his current Chief of Staff, Brigadier General Vincent 
Stralun-would soon depart. The other three provided the senior staff of his airborne 
command. Brigadier General Floyd L. Parks, a ground officer, would be Chief of Staff 
and in reality, the command glue for his new command. Brigadier General Ralph 
Stearley, who came from commanding Ninth Air Force's First Tactical Air Division, 
was named G-3. Brigadier General Stuart Cutler became the Plans chief A former 
assistant division commander of the newly forming 13th Airborne Division, he had 
been chief of the airborne section of Bradley's headquarters since May. 350 
Brereton made key decisions concerning the staff. He disagreed on several key 
points with the Eisenhower philosophy and had stated such in a previous letter to the 
Supreme Commander. Having received a directive governing his terms of command, 
Brereton chose to interpret them with an Army Air Forces eye. 351 
Brereton's first meeting with his principal staff generals on 3 August 1944, 
importantly defined its own "doctrine" of operations, a doctrine that would have far- 
350 Parky Papers, Box 3, Conference Notes, Combined Airborne Forces Headquarters, 3 August 1944. 
FAAA was located at Sunninghill Park. Browning's headquarters was at Moor Park. 
351 322 1 st AAA, Brercton to Eisenhower, 28 July 1944. 
193 
reachim, results in FAAA's fh-st combat operation. "Accepting7 SHAEFs staff 
proposals of 50 percent participation by American and British officers, Brereton stated 
he would implement the SHAEF staff plan to save time but would make changes as he 
saw fit along the way. Designating the American -G" system for use in his 
headquarters, Brereton stated that the Adminstration and Logistics (G-I/G4) would 
work closely together. He asked for a British officer to head G-2, as one of the 
concessions to the British. with Park's summary stating, "They have the means 
through their own channels and access to more than we have. " This meant ULTRA, 
and perhaps agent reports through SOE (Special Operations, Executive). He asked for 
Browning's Chief of Staff, Brigadier Walch, for the job. 352 
Brereton stated that an airman must head the G-3 section for two reasons: 
First, the operational side of airborne operations is an air operation 
until you deliver troops where they are to be delivered. Second. no 
control over ground forces [by FAAA would be exercised] except to 
the air support they need. 353 
Brereton said the G-3 must be an American, and he chose Stcarley, an airman. 
Parks thought Cutler should have been appointed to the job due to his airborne 
planning experience. Brereton, however, made Cutler the Deputy Chief of Staff for 
Plans, but noted that Stearley would retain control of executing operations. 334 
Park's cryptic notes concerning planning deserve direct quotation due to their 
effect on operations: 
352 MHI, Parks Papers, Box 3, Conference Notes, Combined Airborne Forces Headquarters, August 3, 
1944. He did not obtain Walch, who was not. as Brereton may have assumed, an ULTRA-indoctrinated 
officer. Brercton's G-2 was an American, Col. J. A. Celia. 
3*13 Ibid., 1. 
3"' Ibid., 2. 
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Planning 
The tactical ground planning was decided upon as not being half as 
important as the air planning. Must get a competent air staff. The air 
plan must be drawn up by us and AEAF is responsible for execution of 
it. This means we must get the very best air planners and also airborne. 
General Cutler stated that the planners must have a common 
conception [to) what our three jobs are [and] what the organization of 
the Staff will take in order to proceed with the other work at the same 
time. 
CG stated that other organizations have had a period of organizing and 
training but we do not have the time. 
This is an air operation(s). Two requirements that are not [ours are to] 
parallel5plan to a minor degree of training and actual movement of 
troops. 
3 
Unknowingly, Parks had identified First Allied Airborne's key operational 
shortfalls. The air attitude that an airborne operation was an air-delivery operation, 
that the ground phase was relatively less important, and that AEAF would execute the 
FAAA plan was an invitation to disaster-a disaster that would eventually be 
forthcoming. 
Browning's absence from the Headquarters (he lived and worked at I Airborne 
Corps), and what would become Ridgway's favored treatment by Parks. Bradley, and 
Brereton, also would not bode well. Parks developed close ties with Bull and his 
deputy, Brigadier General Arthur S. Nevins, at SHAEF. While Brereton and Parks 
would frequently visit SHAEF and 12th Army Group, there was but a single visit to 
21 Army Group, and none to I Airborne Corps or Second Army, who would assume 
command in battle of the major operations under discussion. 
355 Ibid., 3. 
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Yet, as August progressed and the skeleton FAAA staff created a 
smorgasboard of unused, outline plans, little indication of the true state of affairs 
leaked either to SHAEF or to the two Army Group commanders. If anything. the 
hectic planning phase begun by the SHAEF directives and priorities list helped 
produce the training in coordination and teamwork that would be needed when the 
actual call for battle came. So it appeared, until September approached. 
Brereton, responding to Eisenhower's fiat, had taken the bull by the horns. 
Immediately, he confirmed with Major General Ralph Royce, Leigh Mallory's new 
American deputy, to coordinate their positions concerning the airlift of supplies. Put 
shortly, Brereton stated that FAAA, who controlled CATOP, would haul nothing, 
spending its time training and preparing for combat. Royce convinced Brcrcton that 
limited hauls of wounded and emergency items would be possible without stymieing 
his training efforts. This was accepted in principle at SHAEF, though SHAEF did 
mandate air shipments in August. 356 
The same day Brereton and Royce talked, SHAEF added the US 101st 
Airborne Division to the troop list for OPERATION TRANSFIGURE to reinforce 
Montgomery's alert notice for LUCKY STRIKE B. Given that this operation would 
support 12th Army Group in the Paris-Orleans Gap, Ridgway had been quick to 
recommend adding a US division, It was immediately apparent that, despite 
Browning's role as Corps Commander for the operation, it was viewed as an 
3"' MHI, Parks Papers, Box 3. Conference Notes, 7 August, 1944. Meeting with General Royce and Colonel Bagby. 
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American family affair, with two British divisions to be commanded on the ground by 
the US Third Army after it relieved the airhead. 357 
TRANSFIGURE's planning displayed the nationalistic and service issues that 0 
plagued planning by FAAA. Leigh Mallory immediately complained that his planners 
had been ignored, a charge that Parks unfairly assured him Browning had been guilty 
of Once consulted, Leigh Mallory acceded to the basic concept of operations, quickly 
informing Parks that AEAF "had all air necessary and that he [Leigh Mallory] would 
be responsible for all air cover and air protection. " Later, a perturbed Brereton, 
realizing that FAAA was losing the initiative in planning airborne operations, 
informed his staff that they "were out of the picture here, " and immediately sought 
intelligence and plans appreciations from SHAEF and the Army Groups. Brereton 
intended to be the catalyst for the use of First Allied Airborne Amy. 358 
TRANSFIGURE's cancellation on 18 August left the field open for a shift in 
operations that favored the northern approach. SHAEF ordered preparation for 
BOXER to seize the Boulogne area and to expedite capture of the flying-bomb sites. 
357 MHI. Parks Papers, Box 3, "Discussion with General Bradley from my point of view, " 7 August 
1944. Parks Diaq, 5 August 1944; Parks Diary, II August 1944; Parks Dian,, 14-15 August. Parks 
notes that Cutler and Browning had been alerted that "General Montgomery had directed that 'LUCKY 
STRIKE B' be reviewed and held in readiness for execution on short notice. " This confirms that 
Montgomery had sought the wide exploitation that he had planned in late June prior to Falaisc, and that 
Bradley and Patton were reacting to plans in existence. SHAEF confirmed their interest in this plan on 
II August. Dcten-nined that his "Falaise envelopment" would be decisive, Bradley wavered on the 
"Long Hook. " He asked that FAAA consider dropping divisions slated for TRANSFIGURE, to close 
"the pincer. " He objected to FAAA's warning that a 72-hour notice was required to launch such a drop. 
On 14 August, FAAA was informed that "EAGLE" (Bradley) was "not enthused" with 
TRANSFIGURE plan. The next day, 12th AG's stance changed as it was made to note that SCAEF 
directed that TRANSFIGURE must be implemented. 
3"s MHI, Parks Papers, Box 3, Conference Notes, II August 1944, NARA, 322 Ist AAA, 
SHAEF/17281/l/Ops(A), 19 August, 1944, "Reorganization of Airborne Forces, " confirmed Leigh 
Mallory's authority of veto over airborne operations. Brcrcton's concern was not only perceptive, it 
stated the problem that would dog his operations throughout the war. FAAA's insertion under SHAEF, 
without close links to the Army Groups or the air headquarters, denied it key information as operations 
unfolded. 
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Almost immediately, parallel planning and preparations for AXEHEAD to support 21 
Army Group's Seine crossing, and L114NET-the seizure of the Tournai area in 21 
Army Group's zone of advance-were begun. BOXER and LWNET utilized US 
airborne divisions under British command, with LINNET essentially absorbing 
Ridgway's command under Browning. 359 AXEHEAD, however, was very much the 
legacy of Montgomery's own pre-OVERLORD planning. Crerar's Canadian First 
Army had begun study of this operation in March, with the airborne planning added to 
the original concept. 360 
In this case, however, Eisenhower had initiated this new planning. using both 
De Guingand and Tedder as catalysts for ground and air planning. 
361 Eisenhower's 
two-fold intention was not merely to maintain the momentum of his campaign, 
apparently, in any direction, but also to assure the use of his airborne assets before 
weather eliminated the possibility of large-scale airborne or airhead operations. More 
important, Eisenhower probably agreed with his G-2, who advised that "the primary 
object of any airborne operations should be to assist in the annihilation of the main 
,, 362 German Armies in France. 
359 Otway, Airborne Forces, 212-213. NARA, RG 33 1. SGS Box 65, entry I Vol 2. -Employmcnt of 
Airborne Forces in Operation Overlord. " Directive to Licutentant General Lewis H Bructon. 16 
August 1944, Subject: Airborne Operations to assist crossings of the Seine-Dircctive. 
360 NAC RG 24, Volume 10452.21 A Gp/00/9 I/G (Plans), I March 44. 'NEPTUNE'-Dircctivc to First 
Canadian Army; APPRECIATION AND OUTLINE PLAN OF OPERATION AXHEAD DATED 8 
MAY 44, NAC, RG 24, Volume 20420, File 969. (D20), 21 A Gp/20748/G(Plans) 16 August 44. 
Subject: Boundaries and SEINE crossing sites. 
361 NARA. RG 33 1, SGS SHAEF, Box 65. entry 1,373/2 volume 1. "Employment of Airborne Forces 
in Operation Overlord, MSG SHAEF, CPA-90226, TOR 162330B Eisenhower to Air Chief Marshal 
Tedder, MSG SHAEF, FWD 12912, to AGWAR, 161650B, Vol. 2. Memorandum for Chief of Staff, 
"Outline Plan for Airborne Operation to assist 12 and 21 Army Groups in Crossing the River Seine. " 
36'NARA, ibid., Memorandum for the Chief of Staff, "Allied Airborne Armies, " 21 August 1944. 
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However, logistics shortcomings played a role. Bradley viewed airborne 
operations as a threat to his pursuit toward Lorraine. This was encouraged by 
SHAEF's G4 planners, who drafted a message announcing a 1,000-ton per day airlift 
capability for either Army Group. Montgomery and Bradley had already tapped this 
source in August, but its long-term viability became of particular concern to Bradley, 
from whom airborne priorities had been taken away. 
363 
Brereton had been concerned, however, with more than the trend to air supply, 
which he characterized as "inimical to the maintenance of the degree of proficiency 
required to lift airborne troops. " Noting the short-term, frenetic nature of the ten 
airborne plans created since D-Day, he shifted responsibility for problems to the 
ground forces while avoiding any hint that SHAEF and the Supreme Commander 
might be culpable also, saying in a letter to Eisenhower, 
Many of the plans were cancelled owing to the fact that 21 Army 
Group was unable to give a timely indication of what operations they 
required and a reasonably accurate forecast as to the timing in relation 
to ground operations. I conclude, therefore, that the mounting of 
airborne operations in relation to ground operations, when very close 
cooperation, timing and contact is required, is very difficult of 
achievement in a war of movement. I believe that unless the Supreme 
Commander can give an accurate indication of the trend of operations, 
which I realize is difficult in a quickly moving situation, airborne 
operations should be confined to strategic objectives phased in relation 
to the main battle but not closely dependent thereon in time and 
364 space. 
363 NARA RG 33 1, SHAEF/I 16/4/GDP, II August 1944, Supply by Air in Advanced Areas, and draft 
cable, attached, "Supply by Air. " Final published letter is 24 August 1944 that ended the allocated 
2000 tons daily on 25 August. 
RA Ibid., Letter, Brereton to Eisenhower, August 20,1944. It is important to note that the -tcn 
operations" were planned by Browning's I st Airborne Corps, not FAAA or XVI II Corps (Airborne). 
Some of Brercton's views, particularly concerning the frenetic nature of the planning, comes from 
Browning's letter to him, dated 18 August. The quoted paragraph in Brereton is a near literal lift from 
Browning. Moreover, Brereton's desire for "strategic missions" is also paraphrased from Browning. 
What Brereton did not repeat was Browning's appeal for a clear directive on command and control of 
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Brereton's letter pointed out a belief transcending the ground commanders* 
inability to decide or place priorities; he offered up both contingencies and far- 
reaching change. He questioned the value of the operations currently on the boards- 
operations that, of course, pulled First Allied Airborne Army away from commitment 
in support of American forces. He claimed that planned operations against Calais and 
Boulogne, followed by ground link by 21 Army Group, might appear to be -strategic 
operations of high value, " but that this depended "primmily upon whether it is the 
enemy's intention to defend a line from the English Channel to the cast or southeast. " 
He noted that this operation, or operations to the cast of Paris to the limit of 75 miles 
would be possible from English fields on short notice. At the time of his letter. 
SHAEF's intelligence officer was stating that " the battle front has fallen apart. " an 
additional prod in Brereton's favor. 365 
Perhaps the most far-reaching implication of Brereton's letter came earlier in it 
within a different context. He noted that three questions must be answered: Should 
British bases provide a near-future operation? Should French bases offering longer 
operations be used? Or should a launch from England be contemplated, with a move 
of troop carriers to France to follow? Noting that French bases-not in Normandy, 
which would grant little range advantage, but from near Paris-would make possible 
operations as far east as the general line, Karlsruhe-Frankfurt-Donmund, Le, the Saar 
and the Ruhr on the west bank of the Rhine. Brereton ended by dropping the gauntlet: 
airborne troops. See Parks Papers, Box 3. Letter, Headquarters, Airborne Troops (Main), IS August to 
Lt. Gen. Louis [sic] H. Brereton. 
365 SHAEF Weekly Intelligence Summary No. 22. for week ending 19 August 1944,4. 
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"I must emphasize that continued cargo carrying will render the Troop Carrier 
Command unfit for a successful airborne campaign. 366 
Eisenhower hedged. His reply noted that he shared Brereton's concern 
regarding the question of supply versus airborne capability, but he offered no comfort 
conceming the timing of ground and airborne operations other than his agreement that 
it is difficult to coordinate such operations. Nor did he feel it was necessary to move 
elements of the Airborne Army, troops or planes, to France, thou2, h he noted that 
following the possible landings near Calais, the dropped divisions might be left on the 
continent. 
367 
Eisenhower's response was, in fact, no decision when a operational decision 
was warranted. Brereton, justifiably, wanted a priority mission in the campaign plan, a 
priority that Arnold supported. Content to await events, Eisenhower chanced neither 
the boldness of imagination to prepare to attack the enemy rear nor a decision to 
launch forces. Both points of view illustrated the chasm that neither perceived. 
Brereton, imbued with the belief that an airborne operation is an air operation and of 
value against strategic targets, wanted to move away from a shallow-distance link-up 
operation. Eisenhower, seeing that any large drop could trap enemy forces in close 
proximity to an Allied maneuver force intent upon relief of the airborne, would accept 
that his strategic reserve had been well spent, but he was hesitant to order his reserve 
employed merely to employ it. 
3"0 Brereron Diaries, 20 August, 333. Most important, Brereton knew he was operating from a position 
of strength due to Arnold's support and Marshall's interest, not as a merc subordinate. 
367 Ibid., Eisenhower to Brereton, 22 August 1944. 
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Brereton's view, practical or not. was the view of 3 Visionary airman. 
Eisenhower's view was that of a practical ground soldier ordered to be -air-minded. 
- 
Only the circumstances and outcome of battle could prove either commander right or 
wrong. But, as theater commander, Eisenhower had temporarily scotched the idea of a 
strategic airhead. 369 
What neither man had accomplished was the end of the parallel plans for 
BOXER and LITJNET, now that TRANSFIGURE had been removed from the boards 
on the 17th to provide air-transportcd tonnage and as AXEHEAD moved forward 
without apparent need of airborne support. Moreover, the Airborne Army 
Headquarters seemed more inspired by Tedder's personal interest in airborne 
operations than by their possible value to 21 Army Group. The political reality was 
that Tedder was maneuvering to eliminate Leigh Mallory, ostensibly by helping the 
new Airborne Army. The price of this was to help Monty, though TeddeT avoided 
coordinating with him. 369 
While BOXER strained Ridgway's belief systems by offering American troops 
to help the British, it would be a yet unconceived operation. LINNET 11, that surfaced 
open conflict. Tedder had become the proponent of the idea that clearing the coast of 
3"' Brereron Diaries. 333. On 14 August, Brereton quotes in his diary a message sent by Arnold to 
Eisenhower saying. -in view of the situation in France today. what is your plan in a very broad outline 
for the employment of the Brcreton command? Troop Carrier planes are not comparing at all favorably 
with combat plane missions (other than supply and training) accomplished and hours in the air? - 
3" Parks Diary, 17 August. Conference Notes. 17 August 1944; Parks Diao-, 18,20 August. 
Eisenhower Papers, IV, 2070-207 1. Parks refers to BOXER operation as the -Tedder Operation" and 
details his involvement. Eisenhower seemed happy to let Tedder influence airborne planning. Parks 
notes he withheld key information on Tedder's forward planning during a planning conference with 
Montgomery's Plans Officer. Charles Richardson. The implication was that the airmen had dccidcd 
that they and not the ground commander (Montgomery, who by Eisenhower's directive. was the 
commander to be supported) would select the specific areas for future operations. More interesting is 
that SHAEF, Tedder, and FAAA decided to shelve this "secret" plan without ever revealing it to 21 
Army Group. 
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the V-2 rocket sites would finish the German high command. The north coast, not 
Bradley's advance, captured the airmen's fancy. Range was a critical factor. Without 
moving to the continent, the Metz-Saar approach was unreachable by a large airborne 
force firom British bases. Tedder believed seizing a port was too difficult for an 
airborne force, so he essentially supported an area "drop and link" with a ground 
maneuver force that included an airfield seizure. 370 
FAAA's azimuth had been set with BOXER, but not in the commanding 
general's mind. With Brereton believing that he and Eisenhower-and not the Army 
Group commanders-should be involved, he strained to sell a purely air-inspired 
operation. He asked for Eisenhower's "scheme of maneuver, " in order for him to 
coordinate directly with SHAEF. Operations UNDERSTUDY and FIELDS OF ETON 
apparently passed between Brereton and Eisenhower, or more likely Tedder, though 
no planning records confirm their existence, their objectives or state of planning. The 
reality then, was for FAAA to execute BOXER, the major operation being pushed at 
higher levels. 371 
Parks, hoping to prevent Montgomery from hatching ideas of his own, 
informed I Airborne Corps that requests for airborne planners by 21 Army Group 
must be referred to FAAA. De Guingand addressed this at a conference at 21 Army 
Group Main to coordinate BOXER. He stated that Montgomery's aim was 
to concentrate on a north-east thrust, destroy the enemy there, occupy 
the coastal regions and the low countries and establish airfields from 
which to strike into the Ruhr region. After obtaining Paris and 
"0 Parks Papers, Conference Notes, 17 August 1944; Parks Diary, 18,21,24 August 1944. 
371 Ibid., 21 August 1944. 
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marshalling a sufficient force 12th Army Group to strike casm-m-d into 
the Metz area. 372 
While Montgomery still acted as de facto ground commander. his "intentions- 
took into account Eisenhower's dual-thrust plan. It was stated that capturing the 
Brittany ports would delay a thrust toward Metz for perhaps three weeks. and De 
Guingand estimated that a major airborne operation would be launched in the middle 
of September. 21 Army Group, however, here was speaking of BOXER. then still on 
the boards. The 21 Army Group Chief of Staff also indicated that. once dropped, the 
airborne would be retained under First Canadian Army control for operations in the 
coastal sector for an unknown period. Brercton stressed that such a plan would rule 
out a further airborne operation supporting any operations until after the fall 
campaign. He emphasized that any plans for employment must keep -the long-range 
development in mind at the same time. . 373 
Brigadier Williams outlined the estimated enemy opposition for the entire 
front as "23 divisions" plus reserves capable of transfer from other fronts. Seven of 
the 23 divisions faced Bradley, five were pinned to the coastal region, and a total of 
eight remained to be committed against either 21 Army Group or 12th Army Group. 
He also noted that the selected objective area, the vicinity of Boulogne, gave concern 
due to flak belts that would cause a dogleg, straining the range of the transport 
aircraft. Naval craft, cooperating with an amphibious landing, would not ferry troops 
ashore until the coastal strip had been cleared of coastal batteries. Williams stated that 
Doullens; offered the greatest ground advantage in blocking significant escape routes. 
312 Parks Papers, HIGHLIGHTS OF A MEETING HELD AT HEADQUARTERS 21ST ARMY 
GROUP 25 AUGUST 1944. 
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Brereton thought that the operation in the "Boulogne area ... would not 
answer your requirements. " He noted that the airborne decision should be what the 
Airborne Army could deliver within their capabilities that would fit 21 Army Group*s 
requirements. Having thus shifted the ground plan to Doullens, Brereton appears to 
have crafted an adequate compromise without abandoning his independence. 
374 
Significantly, Montgomery was absent from the 'Vlans" meeting, having stated his 
intentions. His staff had accepted the plan, which cancelled BOXER and sent the 
planners looking for suitable drop and landing zones for Lille, Arras-Cambrai, or 
Doullens. Lille, which was favored by Brereton, was accepted as the priority target by 
21 Army Group. In moving up the target date to 3 September, SHAEF had to accept 
that air-transport of supplies by troop carriers would end by 28 August. Moreover. in 
adding 52d (Lowland) Division to the troop list at Montgomery's request, Brereton 
told his Chief of Staff that he would change the command plan. Hitherto, Browning 
and I Airborne Corps would have commanded the airborne troops. Brereton now 
segregated the British troops into I Airborne Corps and the Americans into Ridgway's 
XVIII Corps. FAAA would "command both, " Ridgway was told. LINNET looked like 
it was on. 375 
Parks directed Stearley to investigate creating 
an advance command group in the LINNET area in the event that the 
Commanding General proceeds to the combat zone to actively 
command British and American Corps. 
373 Ibid. 
311 Ibid. Brereton ignored the ground planners' concerns over seizing Lille due to its size, industrial 
buildup, and the implicit requirement of establishing military control over a huge city. Brercton, 
concerned about the airstrip, said Lille was an important ground objective because -it would facilitate 
the advance to the northeast. " 
3"" Parla Diary, 26,27,28 August 1944. 
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No changes in command were announced for the airborn'e phase. however. and 
Browning was designated as the Airborne Task Force Commander. However. signals 
were planned to insert XVIII Corps (Airborne) in a later phase, with FAAA'S 
command echelon following. Here, Brereton clearly exceeded his reach. His command 
directive did not stipulate tactical ground command, though perhaps he assumed the 
corps would command themselves until relieved and taken under command by a field 
army. His own control of resupply and coordination with AEAF for air support would 
have been made simpler had he remained at Sunninghill Park or coordinated through I 
Airborne Corps Rear at Moor Park. 376 
Montgomery, meanwhile, had been given authority to commit FAAA to assist 
21 Army Group's advance. 377 LINNET, additionally, was to be reinforced with 
another division to be flown in. While priority would go to the US 17th Airborne if it 
could be operationally ready by 15 September, the US 94th Division was to be 
designated as aerial reinforcement by airlanding if the 17" Airborne was still 
considered nonoperational. 378 
The LINNET mission, as stated by FAAA to its commander, was to: 
376 Ibid., 28 August. NARA, RG 33 1, SHAEF, G-3, Entry 256, "Linnet" Book I and 2: Operational 
Signal Requirements for Headquarters, First Allied Airborne Army, 30 August 1944; First Allied 
Airborne Army Signal Communication Instruction No. 1, OPERATION LINNET, Army 
Communications During Phases III and IV of OPERATION LINNET; Minutes of Corps Commanders 
Conference Held At Moor Park At 1600 Hrs 28 Aug 44. 
377 
Parks Diary, 30 August. 
37' Ibid., 31 August, Parks Papers, Box 3, Memorandum from Cutler for Chief of Staff, 30 August 
1944. 
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Seize a firm base in the vicinity of TOURNAL Belgium. secure and 
hold [a] bridgehead over the ESCAUT river and control the principal 
road nets leading through TOURNAI, LILLE, and COURTRAI. 379 
Intelligence estimated that the maximum enemy force that could be marshalled 
against the airborne area in the first week of operations was two divisions (12 
battalions) with a total of 28,500 troops from all formations, including 20,000 
divisional troops of all types. All enemy troops were estimated to be of low calibre, 
with the enemy armor in the projected operational area "believed to be extremely 
IOW.,, 380 
In launching the operation, Montgomery intended to cut the enemy's line of 
retreat and to create conditions for a vertical envelopment of enemy forces caught 
between his advancing Army Group and the LINNET airhead. 381 LINNET had gone 
farther than any operation planned to date, but three days before "Y" day, a crisis 
arose. 
On I September, Brereton ordered that planning for an alternate target for 
LINNET concentrate on the Aachen-Maastricht Gap. He "informed" the Deputy 
Supreme Commander that, in the event that LMET is cancelled, the operation 
would be redirected onto the new target. Browning was informed in a letter which, 
after referring to his outline plan for the operation, stated: 
2. An alternate target area has been selected for this operation as 
indicated below: 
3" NARA, RG 331 entry 29A, Box 119, "Operation Linnet, " Headquarters FIRST ALLIED 
AIRBORNE ARMY, Task Force for Operation LINNET, 27 August 1944. 
390 "Linnet Book 2. " HEADQUARTERS FIRST ALLIED AIRBORNE ARMY, Outline Plan for Allied 
Airborne Operation "LINNET, " 29 August 1944. All relevant plans, messages, and planning 
documents are contained in this file in -Linnet" Books I and 2. 
381 Ibid., 21 A Gp/20760/G (Plans), Subject: Operation Linnet, 31 August 1944 
207 
a. Mission. 
(1) Seize a fu-m base in the general area LIEGE- 
MAASTRICHT. 
(2) Seize and utilize an existing airfield for airborne resupply. 
(3) Secure and hold the bridges over the River MEUSE from 
LIEGE to MAASTRICHT, both inclusive. 
3. Y Date: 
5 September. 382 
Only three days before, Eisenhower had confirmed, in his first directive as 
"Ground Commander, " that First Allied Airlvrne Army would. in conjunction with 
Montgomery, 
plan and direct the employment of the entire Airborne force which is 
made available to the Northern Group of Armies to expedite the 
accomplishment of its assigned missions. 383 
No hint of this mission had been given to Montgomery, who still counted on 
LINNET, nor was any discussion offered to 21 Army Group for an alternative if 
LINNET went the way of TRANSFIGURE, BOXEI?, and the earlier plans. The sector 
chosen by Brereton was, in fact, not within 21 Army Group's boundaries but was 
assigned to Bradley's 12th Army Group. This plan surprised the Airborne Army staff 
and should have stunned Browning, who was aware that First Airborne Army was 
under 21 Army Group's operational control for planning. Brcreton. for whom the air 
didn't seem to be effected by ground boundaries, had, of course, continued with 
Ridgway in seeking employment for XVHl Corps, ostensibly in a period during which 
they were to support 21 Army Group. "LINNET Il, " as it was being called, would 
382 Parla Diaty, I September 1944, Linnct Book 1. Hdqs, FAAA, I September 1944, Subject: 
Alternate Target Area for Airborne Operation "LINNET. " Brerelon Diaries, 31 August, 336. 
Brereton's account, which probably was crafted after the event, is mistaken on the date ordered. The 
Headquarters War Diary kept by Parks, as well as written notification of the change, confirms the date 
as I September. 
383 Eisenhower Papers, IV, 2100-2 10 1. 
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reverse Eisenhower's decision. Characteristically, the free-wheeling Brereton sought 
to inform SHAEF through Tedder rather than through Bull, who probably would have 
disapproved the venture in Ike's name. Given that I Airborne Corps was virtually 
4-cocked and ready to fire, " Brereton had made no change in the airborne task force's 
command, though his intent may have been clearly to eliminate Browning. The logic 
was clear. The bulk of I Airborne Corps would be American troops, with XVIII 
Airborne Corps inserted for command of the two American divisions. The force, if 
dropped in the Liege-Maastricht Corridor, would link with US XIX Corps and would 
communicate on American links. Was I Airborne Corps then even needed? Obviously 
not. 
Discussion on I September, however, revolved not around going to Liege- 
Maastricht but around executing LINNET as planned. Air Marshal Hollinghurst, who 
had not been consulted before Cutler cut the air plan, was upset, but as yet no 
command crisis seemed apparent. Tedder, whose hammer over the Bomber barons 
remained significant, was ftirther involved over weather issues. Leigh Mallory, who 
should have been coordinating LINNET's tactical support (which included heavy 
bombers), was strangely unconsulted. Parks did visit SHAEF, informing Bull of 
LINNET H's preparation. Bull believed the original LINNET would be executed, but 
noted that the 52 (L) might be left off the task organization to ease logistics-a 
recommendation that had not been broached to Browning, the Task Force 
Commander. 
384 
394 Parks Diary, I September 1944. Note that Browning was told, not asked, about the 52 (Lowland) 
decision by Parks, though Parks did not believe Browning would accept this and no doubt would speak 
to Brereton. 
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On 2 September, Brereton told Parks that he had decided 
that the iactical situation now wan-anted cancellation of LINNET and 
recommended that an operation in the Liege gap be undertaken and that 
we could mount such an operation on 36 hours notice. 
This, Brereton stated, he would signal to Eisenhower immediately, and Parks 
immediately informed Browning and Hollinghurst of Brereton's actions. That night, I 
Airborne Corps informed Parks that Montgomery had cancelled LINNET due to 
weather, and that new plans were being investigated, but that the troops would remain 
on the airfields to accommodate the launching of LINNET II. Calling Montgomery's 
Chief of Operations (Belchem), Parks found that he did not know of LINNET 11 and 
that Richardson (Plans) had only a vague notion that the idea existed. While 
Richardson discussed this with Parks, Parks also informed him that a plan using 
British troops for a seizure of airfields near Rotterdam was under study. Parks then 
convinced Brereton to see Eisenhower on 3 September after speaking with Tedder. 385 
Early on 3 September, Stearley, the G-3, informed Parks that Brereton 
Ih intended to tell Eisenhower he would launch LINNET Il on the 4. While Parks 
immediately notified the airmen to finalize their plans for the next day's missions, 
three headquarters appeared unconsulted: I Airbome Corps, who would execute the 
operation; 21 Anny Group, whose priority had just been usurped; and 12th Army 
Group, in whose sector the actual operation would take place. 
Montgomery's Brigadier Plans, Charles Richardson, on 2 September had 
recommended that the Polish Airborne Brigade, made redundant by the addition of the 
52d (Lowland) Division to LINNET, be assigned a coup-de-main mission on the 
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Meuse bridges between Maastricht and Liege to assist Bradley, who later turned down 
the proposal. 
386 
But it was no brigade coup-de-main that Brereton was proposing as he traveled 
to see Eisenhower on the original date selected to execute LINNET. Only on that day 
was Browning's Headquarters publishing "INSTRUCTION NO. I, " a revised outline 
plan for LINNET Il. Browning listed as the plan's "INTENTION" that 
Airborne Corps will prevent the enemy from withdrawing across the R. 
MEUSE from inclusive MAASTRICHT to inclusive LIEGE. 
A new troop list naming only the I st, 82d, and 10 1 st Divisions was included, with 
Airborne Corps landing to provide command and communications. Division plans had 
yet to be rawn up. 
387 
The original LINNET had been cancelled as the ground forces moved forward 
and the airborne lay grounded due to weather. Second Army was getting its stride in a 
pursuit that would rival Patton's best August days. Lt. Gen. Brian Horrocks' 30 Corps 
was in the van. with three armored divisions moving abreast, covering a fifty-mile- 
wide sector-the Corps de Chasse that Montgomery had so mistrusted after his North 
African Campaign. 
Brereton's revelation to Stearley was soon revealed to Browning. Browning's 
operations officer called Parks, apparently as the formation commanders were 
meeting, stating: 
85 Ibid., 2 September 1944. 
386 General Sir Charles Richardson, Flashback: A Soldier's Story (London: William Kimbcr, 1985), 
187. 
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The consensus of opinion was that if the expedition were mounted 
tomorrow morning the drop would be bad and we must be prepared to 
accept an extremely ragged disposition on the ground. 
Parks responded, saying Brereton would accept such a result. Three-quarters of 
an hour later, Browning spoke personally with Parks, advising him that it was his 
opinion-and that of his commanders-that Tuesday, 5 September, would be the 
earliest the operation could be mounted. No maps had arrived, and with sorting and 
distribution the next day, they expected that no real planning could begin until the 
morning following the arrival of the maps. 
Parks, however, continued to push the operation forward based on a predicted 
weather window scheduling the drop for the next afternoon and the following 
morning, before the weather was scheduled to turn bad for a day. Parks informed 
Browning, who refused to push the operation forward. Parks stated that Brereton 
would be making the decision upon his return from SHAEF, but that his "Warning 
order" was meant to save Browning time if Brereton ordered the operation to go 
forward. 
Brereton returned, stating that the Supreme Commander, Deputy Supreme 
Commander, Smith and his deputy had all stated that the operation should go forward, 
contingent upon the approval of Montgomery and Bradley, who were conferring on 
the subject. That evening, Browning was greeted at the formation commanders' 
meeting by Brereton, who stated that "the operation would have to be mounted 
I 
tomorrow or not at all. " Browning restated his views concerning maps and briefing. 
38'NARA, "LINN ET Book I, " Headquarters, AirbomeTps, 3 September 1944, "INSTRUCTION NO. 
J. " This two-page outline appears to be the only formal planning done for LINNET 11, with no 
overlays, maps, estimates, or orders in existence. 
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Brereton stressed that "the situation with regard to the disorganization of the enemy 
was one which demanded that chances be taken, " and that only orders or bad weather 
would cause it to be postponed or cancelled. 
Afterward, Browning spoke to Brereton alone, stating that he 'Vroposed to 
submit in writing his protest and those of his division commanders. " Brereton asked 
Ridgway, after Browning left, if his "division commanders" included the two 
American commanders. Ridgway stated that they might offer an opinion prior to the 
decision being made, but that once a decision was made, they would carry it out. 
Brereton had what he wanted. 388 In his mind, he had already fired Browning and 
replaced him with Ridgway after successfully moving the airborne operation from 
Montgomery's area. 
Within an hour, Belchern warned Parks that LINNET H would probably be 
scrubbed, and that another operation would replace it. Shortly thereafter, a messenger 
arrived with Browning's written protest. Brereton's plan, however, had misfired. 
Within twenty minutes, De Guingand called with orders: 
The Second Army advances on the line BRUSSELS-ANTWERP, 
September 6th, directed on WESEL and ARNHEM and moving around 
the north side of the RUHR requiring airborne operations of one 
British division and the Poles on the evening of September 6th or 
388 Parks Diary, 3 September 1944; Brereton Diaries, 337,338; NARA, LINNET Book 1, Notes on 
Conference at Moor Park, 3 September. Brcrcton's diary, which appears to be a postfacto creation, 
replete with errors, and which bears remarkable resemblance to the Parks Diar),, repeats the episode 
verbatim but adds material concerning Brcrcton's intent to relieve Browning; Parks. who was not privy 
to Brereton's conversation with Ridgway, has no such statement in the Headquarters diary. Brcreton 
apparently also wrote a letter to Browning. Neither appears to have been made public, and Brercton has 
no such correspondence in his papers at the Eisenhower Library; the actual conference notes do not 
reflect either Parks or Brereton's statement of "tomorrow or not at all" for the operation and state that 
one decision was made firm: the operation would be executed on Tuesday (5 September) at earliest. 
These conference notes are absent from the Headquarters Diary (Parks) and the separate file of 
conference notes in the Parks papers. There is no doubt that a confrontation took place. 
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Morning of September 7th to secure bridges on the RHINE between 
WESEL and ARNHEM. 
The airborne would seize the bridges and the ferries operating there intact. The 
Rotterdam plan, which had not yet been assigned a name, would be set aside. Asking 
for a 1,000-tons-per-day airlift, Parks informed De Guingand that aerial supply would 
have to be coordinated with SHAEF. Informed of the change of events, Brereton 
stated that the "next move" for the Headquarters was to initiate steps to move the 
remainder of the Airborne Army, i. e., the American formations, to the Continent for 
future operations. 389 
The Paris airfields, not the Rhine, were Brereton's goal. He would ensure that 
Bradley gained the use of XVIII Corps. Brereton's was very much an American 
agenda, not an Allied one. The Airborne Army existed in Brereton's mind because of 
Arnold and Marshall and it was, to him, a proof of the American air weapon. Using it 
to support the British was never his goal or that of Washington. 
LINNET H had torn asunder the film of unreality that had covered airborne 
planning. One of the critics of the airborne plans created at Sunninghill Park referred 
to Brereton's staff as "a bunch of enthusiastic cooks who viewed plans like creating a 
salad, and afterwards added the Germans to taste. " 390 There was no doubt that 
Brereton and Ridgway resented Browning and that, having trapped him "refusing 
orders, " they would have liked to see him off, with Ridgway made Deputy Army 
commander. Yet the planning problems during the August festival of plans had 
nothing to do with Browning. Instead, they were due to the perceived need to use the 
389 Ibid. 
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airborne quickly. not simply as a way of employing two corps of picked troops, but to . Cý 
justify the tremendous air and personnel assets that had been sunk- into the airborne 
forces. This urgency had been passed on by SHAEF daily, and FAAA accepted the 
challenge with relish. 
Brereton wanted to work directly for Eisenhower as a free-lance. the airman 
who would change the ground picture by a brilliant "strategic" blow from above. It 
was doubtful that either Browning or Ridgway had revolutionary views other than 
using their forces as tactical adjuncts to an ongoing ground operation, though in 
Browning's case he was more ammed to fitting his operation to a wider scheme, 
whereas in Ridgway's case there had never been a case of his proposing anything 
other than a mass drop and linkup. 
Eisenhower had created the Airborne Army as an Allied affair. Recognizing 
that it would be Eisenhower, and not Brereton, who would have to accept Browning's 
resignation, Browning, in discussion with Brereton, agreed to withdraw his letter and 
forget that there had been a severe disagreement over LR, 4NET 11. Given that 
Browning's corps would be executing the next operation regardless of whether he 
held the twin titles of Corps Commander and Deputy Army Commander, both men 
had little choice but to forget the incident. But the atmosphere had changed for the 
new operation known as COMET. 391 
390 interview with General Sir John Hackett by author, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 1984. 
391 Parks Dian? ,6 September 1944; Brereton Diaries, 338. Brereton says this event took place on 4 September, Browning was then away at Dempsey's and Montgomery's Headquarters planning 
COMET. Parks, whose diary is the only headquarters diary, states it was the 6th. Moreover, Browning 
states, falsely, that he withdrew his letter knowing that Ridgway would command LINNET If. 
LINNET 11 was already canceled-almost at the moment of receipt of the original protest or 
"resignation, " if there was one. 
215 
CHAPTER FIVE: 
Campaign Plan 
As NEPTUNE's planning devolved from high-level decisions dealing mainly 
with force allocation and command, the operational and tactical planning for the 
operation was supervised by the air, ground, and naval commanders in chief. 
392 
Absent their influence, the SHAEF plans staff developed their vision for the campaign 
followin- NEPTUNE 0 
The "Joint Planners, " SHAEF's triumvirate of senior British officers charged 
with campaign development, began drafting the post-OVERLORD strategy in the 
spring, in the absence of any discussions with 21 Army Group. 
393 The staff first 
surfaced its memos (which became the genesis of "The Broad Front") very early in 
May, and after weeks of internal staffing, presented a final memorandum to the 
Supreme Commander by May's end. 394 
This memorandum paper was not circulated outside SHAEF, AEAF, or 
ANXF. For SHAEF, the "Broad Front" was the basis for its liberation campaign and. 
from a command perspective, was its main effort to exert and retain operational 
control-a control that had temporarily been delegated to the conunanders in chief 
then executing the NEPTUNE landings. 
392 Eisenhower refused to name Montgomery as ground commander in chief. though for all intents and 
purposes he functioned as such as 21 Amy Group Commander. (See chapter one for discussion). 
'93 These planners were: Brigadier K. G. McClean (SHAEF); Captain P. N. Walter, R. N. (ANXF), 
Group Captain H. P. Broad, R. A. F. (AEAF). 
394 NARA. RG 33 1. -OVERLORD 38 1. " Box 77. Post-Overlord Planning Vol. 1, February 1944 to 25 
Sep 44. 
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In terms of Grand Strategy, Churchill and the British Chiefs of Staff 
Committee continued to exert pressure to cancel the invasion of Southern France in 
order to continue a decisive campaign in Italy. This argument, which the US Joint 
Chiefs had relegated to Eisenhower as the "unbiased Allied commander" to decide. 
consumed much of Eisenhower's time and energy while his staff crafted "options" for 
his just-beginning campaign in Northwest Europe. The Southern France argument did 
not end until early Augzust and helped solidify the US Chiefs and their agent. 
Eisenhower, in opposing any further British influence in strategic or even operational 
matters, to include eliminating British command influence. Meanwhile, Eisenhower's 
participation both in Normandy and in the follow-on planning was hampered. 
395 
The often-touted "Broad Front Plan" was, in fact, not a plan at all but a study 
titled "Post-'Neptune' Courses of Action After Capture of [the] Lodgement Area. " 
Part Il of the study, entitled "Method of Conducting the Campaign, " was published 
several weeks after Part 1. Staffed within SHAEF, the paper was never finalized into a 
separate guidance document for senior commanders nor, more important, was it 
promulgated as a full-blown campaign plan with specific taskings, boundaries, force 
priorities, and complementary logistical and air plans. In itself a crude offering, its 
importance equaled the COSSAC and NEPTUNE plans for its influence on the war in 
Northwest Europe. 
'9* Pogue, The Supreme Command, 108-121. While Churchill and Alanbrooke saw correctly the Grand 
Strategic issues over removing landing craft from the Mediterranean and ANVIL, Montgomery tended 
to see only the shortage of landing craft as an operational issue and urged Eisenhower on these grounds 
alone to cancel ANVIL in order to provide for landings by I May. As mounting ANVIL was 
Marshall's desire, in no way would Eisenhower ever seek its cancelation, though he was forced to 
accept its postponement until August. 
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The Post-NEPTUNE Courses of Action memorandum was the initial offering 
in a veritable landslide of "forecasts, " independent situation-based analyses and 
guidance messages to the senior commanders that loosely comprised Eisenhower's 
campaign "master plan. " 396 This process of trickling short-term guidance invited 
continuous debate, gross redefinitions, and confusion as to Iong-terrn objectives. 
Rather than harmonizing flexibility during its campaign, SHAEF's secretive 
theorizing and Eisenhower's tendency for short-term directives became the center of 
continous disjointed arguments over the campaign's most basic intention-an 
intention that was given to the Supreme Commander as a directive. Eisenhower's 
directive from the Combined Chiefs stated: 
You will enter the continent of Europe and, in conjunction with the 
other United Nations, undertake operations aimed at the heart of 
Germany and the destruction of her armed forces. 397 . 
Freddie Morgan, Ike's Deputy Chief of Staff, defined the problem. 
OVERLORD was an operation with no stated object. 398 Finding that object-and 
constructing a campaign plan to achieve it-was SHAEF's challenge beyond 
mounting the invasion. As COSSACs planners' had selected Normandy for the 
Combined Chiefs to approve, SHAEF's Joint Planners decided how best to reach the 
'9' Post-Overlord Planning, 1; Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, 228,229; US War Department, FM 
100- 15, Field Service Regulations: Larger Units [hereafter referred to as FM 100- 15 ] (Wash ington: 29 
June 1942); The War Office, Field Service Regulations, III. Operations-Higher Formations (London: 
1935). Eisenhower claimed that a formed campaign plan, never varied from in its key components, had 
been created prior to D-Day. Both the Americans and the British defined essential components for 
campaign planning in their Field Service Regulations. 
397 RG 33 1, SHAEF 322.01 PS, Directive to Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force, 12 
February 1944,1. 
398 Morgan, Overture to Overlord, ix. 
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object not defined by the NEPTUNE plan. Eisenhower's acceptance of their 
recommendation would put his mark, on the campaign. 
399 
Part 1, "Courses of Action After Capture of the Lodgement Area, " dated 3 May 
1944, laid the foundation for the campaign plan. The planners sought to define "the 
heart of Germany" in light of the CCS directive. Believing that Berlin was too far east. 
the planners stated, 
A study of economic and political factors shows that the only area in 
the WEST of vital economic importance to GERMANY is the RUHR. 
If she were to lose the* RUHR, and consequently FRANCE and 
BELGIUM, she would lose sixty-five per cent of her present total 
production of crude steel and fifty-six per cent of her present 
production of coal. While no other area in the WEST is vital to [the] 
GERMAN war economy, failure to keep the RUHR in production 
would rapidly starve GERMANY of the means to continue the war. 
Moreover, the effect on GERMAN morale of a penetration of 
GERMAN soil would be enormous; and, if that penetration included 
the RUHR, GERMAN hopes of carrying on the war for any length of 
time would be slight. 400 
Having pronounced the Ruhr as the key objective for the Allied Expeditionary 
Force, the planners could do no less than estimate that German defensive policy in the 
west would center on "keeping the Ruhr in production, " using "all available resources 
to defend that vital area as soon as it is threatened. " They concluded that 
an attack aimed at the RUHR is likely to give us every chance of 401 bringing to battle and destroying the main GERMAN forces. 
3" Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, ibid.; PostOverlord, 1, passim. No formal guidance tasking for the 
Joint Planners is in the SHAEF records. Moreover, Eisenhower, who often dealt by memo on such 
occasions, left no evidence of formal intervention for the post-Overlord period's planning in its early 
stages. 
400 PostOverlord, 1, "PS-SHAEF (44) 11, Planning Staff SHAEF, 3' May 1944, Post-Neptune Courses 
of Action After Capture of Lodgement Area, Section I-Main Objective and Axis of Advance, 1. 
401 
Ibid. 
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Having designated the Ruhr as the key objective. the Joint Planners' analysis 
of the topographic avenues to reach that ob ective was the most important discussion j 
of geographic considerations since COSSAC's selection of Normandy for 
OVERLORD. Analyzing Northeast France and the Low Countries, four areas stood 
out for the movement of large forces. Following British staff practice. these were 
noted from right to left facing the enemy, a south-to-north orientation. (See figure 28. ) 
The Nletz Gap, south of Gennany, was noted as: 
a possible opening into GERAkNY, but the country is broken and 
wooded and topographically canalises the attack. Even if the RHINE is 
reached4 the narrow RHINE valley offers an unsatisfactory approach to 
the RUHR. Moreover. the greater part of this mute offers few facilities 
for building airfields. 402 
North of this area, the planners noted the region often seen as an obstacle. but 
more often the scene of attack, the Ardennes. The scene of decisive actions in 1870. 
1914, and 1940, its drawbacks were noted: 
The ARDENNES themselves, although not a complete obstacle, afford 
a very difficult passage to a mixed force and are easily defended. 
Furthermore, any advance through the ARDENNES will lead into hilly 
and heavily wooded regions extending from AACHEN to the 
HUNSRUCK, SOUTH of the MOSELLE. The whole of this area 
403 offers few aircraft sites. 
Violating their own orientation, they skipped an avenue north to Flanders, 
Britain's area of strategic interest from the Great War, but one which had brought 
untold difficulties. The planners objectively noted the problems: 
The plain of FLANDERS is intersected by water obstacles and 
considerable areas subject to inundation. It provides traditionally 
40' ' Ibid., 2. 
403 
Ibid. 
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difficult going in the wet part of the year. There are many airfield sites, 
but construction and maintenance would be difficult in the winter 
months. 404 
Using the technique favored for staff papers, the best course of action was 
enumerated last, and in complete detail: 
The route NORTH of the ARDENNES on the general line 
MAUBEUGE-LIEGE, although it becomes a fimel with the most 
formidable obstacles at the neck in the area ROERMOND-DUREN- 
LIEGE-MAASTRICHT, is, from the topographical point of view, the 
easiest approach to the RUHR. Good airfield sites are found 
throughout the greater part of the route, although the terrain is less 
favourable for this purpose about ATH at the entrance of the ftinnel 
neck mentioned above. 405 
Knowing the weight of effort of the entire Allied ground operation might ride 
on their analysis, the Joint Planners wrote a careful but flexible summary that in fact 
became their as yet unstated recommendation: 
To sum up, from a topographical point of view the only suitable axes 
of approach to the RUHR are: 
a. NORTH of the ARDENNES on the general line MAUBEUGE- 
LIEGE. 
b. SOUTH of the ARDENNES on the general line VERDUN-METZ- 
SAARBRUCKEN. 
Both are only, relatively speaking, "gaps. " Each contain[s] possibilities 
for defence, which increases towards the EAST: topography canalises 
the attackers on to narrow fronts in both cases. In the NORTH, 
however, are more suitable sites for airfields than in the SOUTH; and 
the Northern route leads directly to the RUHR. The Southern route, on 
the other hand, only leads directly to the comparatively unimportant 
objectives of the middle RHINE cities: and a wide turning movement 
through the RHINE valley would have to be made to reach the RUHR. 
404 Ibid. 
405 Ibid. 
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From a topographical point of view the MAUBEUGE-LIEGE route, 
therefore, forms the best axis of advance to the RUHR. 400 
While topography weighed heavily, the "size' of the avenues discussed in 
terms of friendly maneuver-mass, namely how many divisions. airfields, and logistic 
areas could fit into each region, was never analyzed. Perhaps feeling this analysis 
premature, the planners moved on to the enemy, noting that the Siegfiied Line "'apart 
from the coastal defenses" constituted the sole prepared defenses to be considered 
usable by the Germans, and ruling out the Maginot Line as a defense in reverse and in 
disrepair. Considering the existing defenses, especially in front of Liege and Metz, the 
planners stated unequivocably that: 
Existing prepared defences, therefore, do not influence the decision as 407 
to whether the Northern or Southern route should be selected . 
Certainly, the enemy defense at the time of the lodgement's capture, the goal 
of NEPTUNE, would influence the campaign plan. The Joint Planners believed that a 
total deployment to the West of 55 divisions, with 20 retained in coastal defense 
positions, was most likely. A widespread abandonment of areas such as Norway, 
Denmark, Italy and the Aegean would net 26 more divisions, but these, they felt. 
would never materialize. While predicting Southern France would not be held, 
SHAEF's planners assessed that the Germans would define the battle area as Holland, 
Belgium, and the Channel Coast once the lodgement had been achieved. With the 
increasing inability to replace men and material, they predicted that huge sacrifices 
406 Ibid. 
407 Ibid., 2. It is crucial to note that the "disrepair" of the defenses reflected their state at the time of 
analysis. The planners did not note that these could be part of a reinstated defense, a factor that did 
materialize. Moreover, the key factor-timc to establish a defense-also was not considered. The 
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would not be made anywhere by the Germans "except in defense of a vital area such 
as the RUHR. " 
The planners assumed that if the lodgement deployment was achieved as 
planned, a force of 36 divisions would be in the Allied force by D+60, evenly divided 
between the US and British Army Groups, and 
thereafter the BRITISH forces will NOT be increased and may become 
a wasting asset, while US forces will increase at an average rate of 408 
some four divisions per month . 
The Allied Air Forces, assumed to have achieved unchallengeable superiority, 
would be influenced by the campaign plan significantly as 
the support that they will be able to afford our land operations will be 
considerably affected by the axis of advance selected, as on this will 
depend the availability of airfield sites on the Continent and the degree 
of support which can be afforded from bases in the UNITED 
KINGDOM. 409 
Prior to their final assessments, the Joint Planners listed a paragraph marked 
"Deductiorf': 
The main deduction we can draw from this is that there will be no great 
disparity in land forces for a considerable period. In fact, it may be as 
long as eight months after D Day 'OVERLORD' before the Allied land 
forces can be assured of a steadily increasing superiority in the number 
of divisions in the field. 410 
The deduction went beyond assuming force ratios; it established a key 
consideration that confined future action even before it offered an analysis and 
Siegfried Line and the Metz and Maginot defenses eventually claimed more than 100,000 US 
casualties. 
408 Ibid., 3. 
40' Ibid., 4. 
410 Ibid., 3,4. 
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comparison of courses of action. In rough terms. it -situated the appreciation. "' As 
stated, this said: 
We must, therefore, avoid a line of advance which leads us to a head- 
on collision with the main GERMAN forces without opportunity for 
manoeuvre. In the early stages we must make all possible use of 
deception, surprise and manoeuvre, including the use of airborne and 
seaborne operations and threats to cause the GERMANS to extend 
their forces and lay them open to defeat in detail. 
As operations progress and our superiority becomes more marked. wc 
must advance on a front sufficiently broad to threaten an advance by 
more than one of the "gaps" into GERMANY. By so doing we should 
be able to keep the GERMANS guessing as to the direction of our 
main thrust, cause them to extend their force, and lay the GERMANS 
open to defeat in detail. 
Throughout the operations we must exploit the superior Allied air 
forces to the greatest possible extent. 411 
The planners felt that air considerations would be concerned not with defense. 
but with the offensive use of the air forces to continue breaking the German economy 
and supporting land operations. Any land advance would not halt air operations, but a 
northern axis would facilitate operations against the Ruhr and Northwest Germany. A 
southern advance would tax shipping and transportation in that the 250-300 mile 
maximum operational radius for fighter aircraft would preclude supporting operations 
from the United Kingdom and require the forward placement of airfields. Tactical 
fighters, in any case, needed to be based on the continent, requiring placement of at 
least 75 percent of airfields within 60-70 miles of the forward line of troops. Airfield 
411 )bid., 4. 
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availability and logistics would then be critical issues. more favorably found on the 
412 
northern route. 
The Joint Planners noted that the port capacity of the lodgement area. even 
when built up, would be insufficient to support the forces needed to defeat Germany. 
Noting the quick turn-around for the Channel ports and their location on the northern 
axis, the planners estimated that these ports would "enable a faster rate of advance to 
be maintained. " Given the shortage of shallow-draft shipping, these ports would be 
essential in order to maintain the rate of buildup of US forces. Antwerp, the largest 
port on the route assessed, was not mentioned by the Joint Planning Staff in relation to 
the campaign during this stage of planning. 413 
Based on these premises, the planners finished their appreciation with an 
enumeration and discussion of courses of action, noting four broad possibilities: 
a. To advance South-East from the lodgement area with the intention 
of cutting off the GERMAN forces in the SOUTH of FRANCE- 
thus attempting to deal with the GERMAN forces in detail. 
b. To advance Eastwards from the lodgement area with the main 
threat directed SOUTH of the ARDENNES on METZ and the 
SAAR. 
C. To advance in a generally North-Easterly direction with the object 
of striking directly at the RUHR by the route NORTH of the 
ARDENNES. 
414 d. A combination of b. and C. 
"2 Ibid., 4-5. It should be noted that most RAF fighter aircraft were "short-] egged, " with far less 
operational range than their American counterparts, which were designed as long-range escorts, not 
short-range interceptors. 
4'3 Ibid., 5; PostOverlord Concurrences. The Commander, ANXF contested this statement, noting that 
after D+60 the main flow of men and material would be in cross-Atlantic shipping, "for which most 
Channel ports are unsuitable. " 
414 Ibid. 
226 
The Joint Planners discussed the ramifications of each within the parameters 
of their "deduction" and the basic assumptions identified. Beginning in the south. the 
planners noted that a drive southeastwards from the lodgement area toward Dijon or 
Lyons might isolate and destroy the German forces in Southwest France, particularly 
if the thrust was in conjunction with landings in Southern France. Such a thrust. 
however, would be nondecisive and would outrange medium and light bomber 
support from the United Kingdom. Logistics from the OVERLORD ports would also 
be difficult for such a thrust. Not recommending this approach as the "main axis of 
advance, " the planners noted that 
a subsidiary operation of this type would be of value if it could be 
carried out without diverting forces from our main advance. 415 
The advance due east from the lodgement towards Metz, the second approach 
identified, would gain good airfield terrain and traverse good armor terrain, initially 
favoring a quick approach to the gap. Stretched maintenance (logistics), the lack of 
ports, and the undoubted necessity to rebuild railways would pose problems on this 
approach, as would as the belts of terrain past Chalons that would narrow an approach 
toward the German border. The distance of this approach would prohibit the 
employment of tactical bombers from the United Kingdom. The Metz gap was 
summarized with two statements: 
[T]his line of advance does not directly threaten the RUHR. It is 
considered, therefore, that the axis of advance should not be directed 
exclusively on the METZ Gap. 416 
415 Ibid., 6. 
416 Ibid. 
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The third approach, (third from the south) an advance northeast by the route 
north of the Ardennes from the lodgement area, stated the planners. 
[w]ould ensure a secure left flank resting on the Channel and the 
maximum use of our sea power to open up and operate the Channel 
ports progressively with our advance, thus greatly easing our a 
maintenance problem. We should be in good airfield country and 
within range of air bases in the UNITED KINGDOM. Moreover, such 
an advance would be a direct threat to the RUHR. 
The planners noted that water obstacles within the approach would hinder the 
use of armor and that along with a narrowing gap at the border would favour a 
defender. Their assessment of this was telling: 
It would confine our advance to a narrow front, with little opportunity 
to carry out any form of surprise or outflanking movement. Our lines of 
communication would be open to counter attack by GERMAN forces 
to our Eastern flank; and the GERMAN garrison in Southern FRANCE 
would be able to make good their escape and to enter the campaign in 
417 
the NORTH . 
The planners, rather than comparing avenues and then assessing them. 
concluded their avenue analysis: 
It is considered that this course alone should not be adopted, as it leads 
only to a head-on collision of the opposing main forces on a narrow 
front, with no opportunity of manoeuvre. 418 
Having failed to note the size of avenues, the weather considerations, and the 
enemy defense possibilities on each, or having rank ordered avenues by priority, the 
planners offered a half-page analysis of an advance "through both the METZ Gap and 
NORTH of the ARDENNES. " Rather than assessing, it bore the language of a 
conclusion, before the conclusion was offered. The planners began by saying: 
411 Ibid. 
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An advance on a broad front both NORTH and SOUTH of the 
ARDENNES would have the great advantage that the whole of our 
forces would not be irretrievably committed to one or other of the 
comparatively narrow "gaps. " We should have the advantage of 
manoeuvre. and the ability to shift the main weight of our attack. 
thereby increasing the possibility of gaining surprise. The enemy would 
be compelled to extend his forces, and our initiative would enable us to 
keep him in a state of indecision as to whether our main thrust was 
419 coming in NORTH or SOUTH . 
Clearly, the planners emphasized that the multiple threats of defending several 
4-gaps" simultaneously while attempting to maintain defenses on the coastal strip 
would stretch the German defense, particularly if "a deep penetration" north or south 
of the Ardennes was achieved. They held that the situation theorized following a 
single penetration, north or south, would permit the Ardennes to be developed west of 
the line Liege-Luxembourg for lateral communications, as the enemy would probably 
not maintain such a salient as the Ardennes, despite their normal tendency to hold the 
maximum amount of defensive terrain possible. 
Reiterating their abhorance of meeting the enemy head-on in "a narrow front. " 
the planners stated that a mutually supporting advance astride the Ardennes was the 
most beneficial mode of advance, offering possibilities for surprise, deception, 
achieving superiority of force, and the defeat in detail of the enemy defense while 
permitting the flexibility to shift air force elements to support attacks. 
The planners offered their "conclusion" in the 29th paragraph of an often 
redundant appreciation, which was more appropriately their recommendation-a 
recommendation that would be offered later in a separate document: 
418 Ibid. 
1'9 Ibid., 7 
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In the light of these considerations it is concluded that the best method 4-- 
of undertaking operations aimed at the heart of GERMANY and the 
defeat of her armed forces would be to advance on two mutually 
supporting axes, in order to retain flexibility of manoeuvre: 
a. With our main axis of advance on the line AMIENS- 
MAUBEUGE-LIEGE-the RUHR. 
420 
b. With a subsidiary axis of advance on the line VERDUN-METZ . 
Having posited what they considered to be a thorough analysis, the planners on 
30 May 1944 set forth in "Section H: METHOD OF CONDUCTING THE 
CAMPAIGN"' their principal recommendations. Following only a week after their 
first section had been approved, the key to this study was 
the assumption that the GERMANS will contest our advance right up 
to the frontiers of GERMANY. 421 
Section H offered the first scheduled buildup of Allied forces to D+330, 
showing a progression of primarily American divisions being added. This buildup 
would bring a superiority in infantry for the Allies no sooner than D+200, though the 
Allies were predicted to have a definite superiority in armor following the 
establishment of the lodgement at D+90 (Sep 4). 422 The planners, in fact, stated that 
4'0 Ibid. Note that this section was approved on 23 May 1944 by the Chief of Staff after presentation 
and discussion. 
421 PostOverlord 381, SHAEF (44) 11 (Final), 30" May 1944, Courses of Action After Capture of the 
Lodgement Area Section 11-Mcthod of Conducting the Campaign, 1. 
42-1 Ibid. Divisions were the "measure of strength" shorthand adopted by the staff, a measure that was 
both unsophisticated and incredibly misleading. The planners offered no discussion of combat power 
superiority, the factor of weapons quality, or the effect of weather on air operations that were assumed 
to be a key component of the Allied force's power. More misleading is that both the American and 
Commonwealth armies had huge contingents of armor, artillery, antitank, and engineering assets in 
separate battalions, brigades, and other unit structures rating below divisional formations, but attached 
for combat missions to corps or armies. Nor were the accompanying fighter-bomber and medium 
bomber wings and groups supporting the armies adequately considered part of the calculus of battle, as 
opposed to the logistical bill of lading that was uppermost in most minds and measured in division 
"slices, " which do not equate to fighting power. While the additional logistical requirements were part 
of the logistical estimate, the additional weight of this combat power found no sophisticated system of 
analysis by the operations planners. Of particular note should have been the weight of airpowcr, which 
was limited by national boundaries and not applied in a centralized or mission-centric role as the 
airmen claimed it should be. 
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the Allies would maintain unchallenged superiority in naval. air. and airborne forces. 
including the lift capability for one amphibious assault division from D+60 onwards. a 
capability thought best to mount a threat "to contain coastal garrisons. " Reflecting the 
influence of the air planner, airfield capture and construction were seen to be prime 
requirements for any advance. 423 
The planners recommended conducting a campaign that would prevent an 
orderly withdrawal to subsequent river (defense) lines that would prolong the Allied 
advance. They outlined what may be assumed to be a recommended operational 
policy- 
Our object must be to force the enemy to fight on ground favourable to 
armoured forces and in firont of areas where communications offer 
suitable targets for our superior airpower. After every such action we 
should use our air and armoured forces to harass the enemy's retreat 
and give him no time to reform, at the same time using our airborne 
forces to facilitate the crossing of rivers and other natural obstacles. 
Our amphibious forces should be used to contain the enemy's coastal 
424 garrisons. 
Key factors assessed as affecting the Allied course of action were logistics, the 
capture of Paris, topography, German defense policy, the availability of airfields, and 
the weather affecting operations after D+90.425 With the invasion yet to begin, the 
planners laid out contingencies, as had the COSSAC planners for the lodgement, but 
with the same "theoretical" basis, lacking preknowledge of the lodgement battle 
outcome, actual German strengths and dispositions, and realistic battlefield 
'23 Ibid., 2. 
424 Ibid., 2,3. 
425 Ibid., 2-6. 
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assessments. Upon this, the SHAEF Chief of Staff was willing to base his 
recommendation for the campaign plan. 
Logistics, as for COSSAC's outline plan, lay at the root of the operational 
desigri. The predicted phase lines that became bones of contention during the 
lodgement battle provided the most basic logistic assumption. Planners felt that by 
D+60, the maintenance and buildup for the British forces would be handled by 
Mulberries (prefabricated artificial harbors) and over the beaches, while the American 
forces would be receiving support from Cherbourg, St. Malo, and the minor ports of 
Brittany and Quiberon Bay, not at full capacity but in a rising tide of maintenance 
support. At the same time, Brest and Nantes were predicted to have been captured by 
this time but not yet opened. 
British forces were to turn north to capture Rouen and Havre before severe 
weather set in and, because of shorter lines of communication, were seen as being able 
to mount attacks toward these ports a full month before US forces could thrust 
forward south of Paris. Havre's capture, the JPS predicted, would end the dependence 
on over-the-beach maintenance, but the planners made one firm statement: 
However, until after the development of ANTWERP, the availability 426 
of port capacity will still limit the forces which can be maintained . 
The planners estimated that Havre would be needed until Dunkirk and the 
Belgian coast ports-and "possibly" Antwerp were opened for the British. US forces 
would be supplied from Cherbourg and Brittany as well as from Havre, which would 
be transferred for US use. Railway repair was considered to be a limiting factor for 
'2' Ibid., 3. 
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any advance after crossing the Seine. Due to coal requirements. the planners 
recommended that the coal fields near Valenciennes be designated as an objective. 
The planners stressed that Paris was an important objective worth capture. as 
its loss would deprive the Germans of a main center of communications. The heavy 
logistical pricd noted as a "civil affairs commitment" would require the operation of 
Havre to be completed to assure its accomplishment. 427 
The thumbnail topographic description given by the planners cited the areas 
both west and east of the Seine as being favorable armor country, but noted that the 
rivers astride any axis of advance would be substantial obstacles. The rivers in 
question included the Seine, the Somme, the Scheldt, the Dendre and canal, the Albert 
Canal, the Meuse, the Maas and the Rhine. The Oise and Marne, that had defended the 
Paris line in the Great War, were seen as possible "switch lines" for the German 
defense of Paris. The planners noted: 
From a topographical point. of view, therefore, we must endeavour to 
force the enemy to fight in the good tank country ... and at all costs 
avoid granting him respite to perfect defences along the river lines. 428 
DUKWs, LVTs, and amphibious cargo carriers would be needed to speed the 
seizure of bridgeheads that would pennit a sustained advance. 429 
The planners accepted SHAEF's G-2 estimate of 22 April as the structure for 
their enemy defense assessment. This predicted that the lines of the Seine, the Somme 
to the Argonne, the Flanders waterways and the areas of Maubeuge and Argonne, and 
'2' Ibid. 
428 Ibid., 4. 
"9 Ibid. DUKWs were amphibious trucks; LVTs were "landing vehicles, tracked. " 
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the line Antwerp-Namur-the Meuse would comprise the enemy's successive defensive 
lines. The enemy's final line, indeed their "last resort, " would be to withdraw their 
remaining forces, fOllowing their separate defense "stands, " to the "network of 
f.., 430 
waterways covenng the SIEGFRIED Line and on the SIEGFRIED Line itsel 
More restricting to any Allied plan was the deduction offered by the planners 
that the Gennans would "hold strongly the coast NORTH of HAVRE" while 
maintaining strong forces on the Bay of Biscay and the Mediterranean to resist 
landings until isolated. Repetitively calling for a fluid campaign, the planners stressed 
the necessity of mounting threats to fix German defenses to the coasts. 431 
The Joint Planners repeated the COSSAC staff s preoccupation with airfields. 
noting the limited capabilities of the tactical air forces to develop their full capabilities 
from bases in the United Kingdom. The planners recommended that to do so. 
seventy-five per cent of the fighter airfields should be within sixty 
miles, and the remainder within ninety miles of our forward troops. 
Further, the planners noted: 
It is also desimble that airfields should be sited so as to allow the 
maximum concentration of the force as a whole in support of 
operations in any one sector. 
Estimating that the airfield terrain of the projected lodgement was poor until just west 
of Paris, the planners stated that these areas would have to be developed prior to any 
breakout. Thereafter, the northern axis offered superior airfield terrain in the US 
430 Ibid. 
131 Ibid., 5 
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sector, though this should not slow the development of the southern axis. Prior to 
432 
Verdun the ground was seen as good, afterwards, it would be a limiting factor. 
The 90-day estimate, imposed by COSSAC and unchallenged by any 
subsequent staff or commander, implied a greater limitation-the possibility of 
worsening weather. The 36-day delay of D-Day imposed by the shortage of landing 0 
craft ate further into good campaigning weather, and the planners noted that bad 
weather would greatly hinder the use of naval forces for maintenance. assault. or 
mounting a credible threat to the coastal garrisons. Significantly-especially in light 
of the tremendous engineering and logistical effort needed to support the tactical air 
forces, and the "operational imperative" to capture good airfield territory-the effect 
433 
of fall or winter weather on airpower, was not mentioned . 
As in Section 1, the planners stated deductions for their vision of the campaign 
to be launched: that an early exploitation to the Seine from the lodgement should be 
made; that the offensive should carry as far as the Somme to cover the port of Havre. 
that Paris must be isolated or captured; that a direct thrust to the Maubeuge area must 
be made to force a withdrawal from the Pas de Calais; and that the North French 
coalfields should be seized. Finally, the planners hinted at what they believed would 
be a culminating point for the advance when they stated the necessity of the: 
432 Ibid. 
433 Ibid. Considering the repetitive nature of the -method of campaign" section from the courses of 
action portion, it is strange that weather limitations played so little a factor in describing air operations. 
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forcing of the ANTWERP-NAMUR position with a view to opening 
up the port ofANTWERP preparatory to the undertaking of operations '-"I 
against the lines further EAST, and finally the SIEGFRIED Line. ' 
Significantly. the planners asserted: 
Operations in South-West FRANCE would not in themselves 
contribute to the accomplishment of our mission but we may be 
pressed for political reasons to dispatch forces there as early as 
41S possible . 
The history of the Broad Front paper is less clear than was claimed by the 
Supreme Commander, nor does it advance recommendations beyond maintaining 
offensives toward the "two gaps" noted in Section 1. Eisenhower notes that the 
strategy was approved on 31 May. but the staffing of the paper Indicates that this 
-vis on- was not necessa ily seen as a bluep int, a plan, or anyt ing bey nd a concept Inn hi g .0 
of' operations. When forwarding the final draft, SHAEF G-3 H. R. Bull, in his 
summary memo to the Chief of Staff, stated, 
This paper is principally of value as a basis for procurement 
plannin(,. '-"(' L- 
Importantly, SHAEF issued no subsidiary or subsequent plans to the Initial 
Joint Plan of I February and, unlike COSSAC's "plan. " copies of this paper were not 
circulated to lower levels below ANXF and AEAF. Eisenhower's "approval" is not 
re-olstered in the SHAEF files. Of more import was the fact that this paper was never 
Ibid.. 0. Each of these deductions was later listed as a "Phase" and described in some detail, with 
further rationale for operations. I have chosen to exclude their discussion as the campaign overtook 
these considerations, and that planning at 21 Army Group had already accommodated most of the 
considerations. 
"' Ibid., 9: F, isenhower, Crusade in Europe, maps following 224,228.229. This seems to confirm that 
AN VIt. was not unanimousIv seen as essential to OVERLORD, despite Eisenhower's assertions that 
the staffhad studied the problem of having an open flank. 
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staffed to the Combined Chiefs. who had, of course. approved the COSSAC Outline 
Plan and reviewed the NEPTUNE variant published in February. SHAEF. by 
eliminating the Combined Chiefs' right of review, was essentially taking them out of 
the decision process. 437 
Bradley began to look actively at a post-NEPTUNE campaign in mid-August. 
in a series of meetings with his commanders and planners, he began to sketch out an 
attack by 12 th Army Group to the German border and on to the Rhine. Bradley. who 
met with Eisenhower on five occasions in early August, was no doubt in full 
possession of Eisenhower's ideas and intentions and would have been fully aware of 
"the Broad Front, " as Montgomery was not. These Bradley began to modify into a 
plan of his own. 
438 
Bradley continued to plan for the northern swing of the XIX and XV Corps to 
the Seine and across the Seine, but following a conference to coordinate this with 
416 RG 331, SHAEF/18008/Plans, G-3, Post-'NEPTUNE'Courscs of Action after capture of the 
lodgement area. Section II-Method of conducting the campaign. Bull had concurred with both 
segments of the study and recommended their approval by the Chief of Staff. 
4" Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, ibid. Ike lauds this study in his memoir. but distorts both the scope 
of the paper-which DOES NOT include the picture he describes-and goes on to fabricate a single 
master plan for the entire campaign in Europe. The purpose of the accompanying map in Crusade is 
likewise a fabrication on Eisenhower's part. (See figure 29. ) Divisions were never displayed in the 
original phase line studies. The Eisenhower map implies both a weight of effort decision and an 
articulated logistic plan to supply the divisions depicted. Neither existed at this time. PRO, WO 205 
660. A copy of part I of the Broad Front Paper, dated 3 May, found its way to 21 Army Group's plans 
section, where it was reviewed by the American planner and marked "NOT APPROVED. " The key 
conduct of the campaign component does not appear to have surfaced at 21 Army Group from any 
source. It is doubtful that the first part had been brought to Montgomery's attention, and the author has 
been unable to find evidence that Montgomery was aware of the section of the Broad Front 
recommending the structure of Eisenhower's Post-OVERLORD Campaign. 
43' The "Broad Front" concept paper does not appear in 12' Army Group's plans files, nor in the poor 
collection of papers retained by Bradley or his aide. The headquarters plans files are suspiciously bcreft 
of paper from this period, to include an exclusion of FUSAG (First US Army Group) files, which 
should have been retained after FUSAG was redesignated the 12' Army Group, but which seem to 
have vanished. Conjecture on Bradley's planning can be made by commentary inserted in the aide's 
diary, and from a series of memoranda beginning in mid-August that have survived. The Patton Diary 
also indicates some discussion on long-term plans beginning in early July, when Patton moved to the 
continent. 
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Montgomery,, Bradley met with Patton to plan the move of his Army eastwards. This 
plan-that the corps west of the Seine (XV) would revert to Ninth Army control for 
supporting the Tournai airborne drop, while the 12 Ih Army Group "coiled for the next 
move'ý--was unknown to his nominal commander (Montgomery). The intent of this 
move was clearly stated: 
The Twelfth Army Group then consisting of the First and Third Armies 439 
will move directly towards the RHINE in the area of the METZ Gap. 
Having already been informed three days earlier of Montgomery's own plans. 
on 20 August 1944 Bradley issued Operation Plan NORMANDY TO THE RHINE, a 
concept dramatically different from Montgomery's plans and within the confines of 
Eisenhower's Broad Front concept (which was still unbriefed to Montgomery). 
Bradley announced in a paragraph titled "Directive" that: 
This tentative plan for future operations is published for the 
information and planning of all concerned. Details herein are subject to 
final approval of higher authority and to change according to the 
situation. 440 
Bradley intended to insert Ninth Army's Headquarters, with the US XV Corps 
to act as the required flank guard for Crerar's Canadians thrusting toward Rouen and 
beyond to the Pas de Calais to act in concert with a planned airborne operation, either 
439 NARA, RG 33 1, X11 Army Group, Box 24143,12'h Army Group Memoranda. Memorandum for 
Record 19 August 1944, -Additional Notes taken at Conference between General Bradley and General 
Patton at 1730 hours, 19 August. " These notes arc interesting for several reasons. This separate set of 
notes does not cover this plan. These notes claim, falsely, that they were based on "general plans for 
operations as determined in conference between himself, General Montgomery and General 
Eisenhower on this date. " Montgomery, in fact, had not attended this conference. 
440 RG 33 1, Box 24143, X1 I Amy Group Operational Plans and Studies, Operation Plan Normandy to 
the Rhine, 20 August 1944,1. As with many US records in NARA, the maps cited for the study arc 
missing. 
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BOXER or LINNET. Bradley's own conception for the remainder of his Army Group. 
the First and Third Armies, was in line with Eisenhower's basic plan. 
12 Ih Army Group's plan was that, following the Falaise operation, it would 
regroup and resume its advance to the northeast in zone, cross the 
SEINE, encircle PARIS and continue the advance to seize the crossings 441 
of the RHINE River from STRASBOURG to MAINZ inclusive. 
Hodges' First Army would encircle Paris by driving to the Rheims area while 
Third Army would advance on order toward the Neufchateau-Toul area. While 
Hodges was required "maintain contact" with 21 Army Group, his major mission 
would be to launch a "rapid advance with an armored-motorized infantry force to 
,, 442 
seize the crossings of the RHINE River from MANNHEIM to MAINZ inclusive. 
Patton's Third Army was also to "be prepared for ftirther rapid advance with 
armored-motorized infantry to seize crossings of the Rhine River from Strasbourg to 
Speyer inclusive. " Additionally, Patton would have to prepare to dispatch forces south 
of the Vosges Mountains through the Belfort Gap to secure the upper Rhine Valley. 
Reducing the Brittany peninsula, one of the key objects of the NEPTUNE operation, 
was listed as the fourth of Patton's tasks-a task that reverted to the VIII Corps, which 
443 
by then received little pressure to finish quickly. It was a task that had been primary 
of Third Anny's assigmments in the original OVERLORD concept, and one of the 
"true objects" of OVERLORD that Montgomery had spoken of in his early plans. 
"' Ibid., Patton Diarj,, August 19,1944. Bradley had intended to offer a weakened, inexperienced new 
Headquarters the Ninth Army as a sop. Patton resented this and commented on it. 
442 NORMANDY TO THE RHINE Plan, 2. 
443 Ibid. Bradley's plan makes no mention of the Southern France invasion forces, now renamed 
DRAGOON forces. ANVIL had been dropped as a codename at Churchill's request; he said had been 
"Dragooned" into accepting the Riviera landings. 
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Three days before the publication of NORMANDY TO THE RHINE, a 
remarkably unaware Montgomery met with Bradley to vent his own ideas on the Post- 
OVERLORD Strategy. As always, Bradley's silence Montgomery mistook for assent. 
His outline notes for their discussion, in their entirety: (See figure 29. ) 
1. After crossing the Seine, 12 and 21 Army Groups should keep Cý 
together as a solid mass of forty divisions which would be so strong 
that it need fear nothing. This force would move north-eastwards. 
2.21 Army Goup, on the western flank, to clear the channel coast. the 
Pas de Calais, West Flanders, and secure Antwerp and South 
Holland. 
3.12 Army Group to form the eastern flank of the movement and to 
move with its right flank on the Ardennes-being directed on 
Aachen and Cologne. 
4. The whole movement would pivot on Paris. A strong American 
force to be positioned in the general area Orleans-Troyes-Chalons- 
Reims-Laon, with its right flank thrown back along the R. Loire to 
Nantes. 
5. The Dragoon force coming up from southern France to be directed 
on Nancy and the Saar. We ourselves must not reach out with our 
right to join it and thus unbalance our strategy. 
6. The basic object of the movement would be to establish a powerful 
air force in Belgium, to secure bridgeheads over the Rhine before 444 
winter began, and to seize the Ruhr quickly. 
Montgomery's memoir explanation is apt for what he saw as his plan's key 
points: 
In its simplest terms this was the German "Schlieffen Plan" of 1914 in 
reverse, except that it would be executed against a shattered and 
disorganized enemy. Its success depended on the concentration of 
Allied strength, and therefore of maintenance resources, on the left 
445 wing. 
444 
Montgomery, Memoirs. 239. 
445, 
Ibid. 
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Monty summarized his views in his periodic message to Brooke that night. 
Received at 1030 on 18 August, it equaled Montgomery's earlier challenge of the 
near-sacred COSSAC outline, whose outdated tenets had harried the 21 Army Group 
in shaping a campaign to meet the requirements of the moment. Unaware of a decided 
line of operation, Montgomery was again "proposing change" in what he felt was a Zý 
lacuna of guidance from SHAEF and from a "Supreme Commander" perenially absent 
from the front. It was his proposed Master Plan for the continuation of the campaign: 
M99 cipher 18 Aug TOP SECRET 
Personal for C. I. G. S. from Montgomery. 
Have been thinking ahead about future plans but have not (repeat not) 
discussed subject with IKE. My views are as follows. After crossing 
Seine 12 and 21 Army Groups should keep together as a solid mass of 
some 40 divisions which would be so strong that it need fear nothing. 
The force should move northwards. 21" Army Group should be on 
western flank and should clear the channel coast and the Pas de Calais 
and west Flanders and secure Antwerp. The American armies should 
move with right flank on Ardennes directed on Brussels Aachen and 
Cologne. The movement of American armies would cut the 
communications of enemy forces on channel coast and thus facilitate 
the task of British Army Group. The initial objects of movement would 
be to destroy German forces on coast and to establish a powerful air 
force in Belgium. A further object would be to get enemy out of VI or 
V2 range of England. Bradley agrees entirely with above conception. 
Would be glad know if you agree generally. When I have got your 
reply will discuss with Ike. 
Two hours later, four copies of this message were delivered to Brooke's 
Military Assistant. 446 Brooke, en route to Italy and later to the Quebec conference, did 
not see the plan, but the Vice Chief of the Imperial General Staff, General Nye, 
446LHC, Papers of Field Marshall Lord Alanbrooke [hereafter referred to as Alanbrooke Papers], M99 
cipher, Rccd. 18 Aug 44. Note that his digest for Alanbrooke deletes the specific details pertaining to 
12' Army Group that were raised with Bradley, but adds detail such as the V-missile sites pertinent to 
the BCOS strategy discussions. 
241 
signaled Montgomery Alanbrooke's approval of the concept. Unk-nouingly. 
Montgomery was about to fuel a fire that determined the fate of the campaign. 
Montgomery's logic for proposing action was faultless. SHAEF had failed to 
give guidance; Eisenhower had neither spoken with nor signaled Monty since 13 
August. Considering that 12'h Army Group had begun its wide swing up the west bank 
of the Seine and that the original phase-lines for the OVERLORD lodgement were 
essentially occupied, Brigadier Belchem's postwar statement understates the 
command requirement: 
In good time, before we reached the Seine, the British would have 
expected a clear-cut master plan to suit the changed conditions, which 
rendered obsolete the assumptions that had been made during the 
planning period before D-Day. 447 
Still in operational control of both Army Groups and as the senior conunander 
on the ground (an allegedly inviolate American operational principle, at least when an 
American is in charge), Montgomery had every right both to expect to be consulted 
over future action and to receive his commander's intentions, as well as to express his 
own ideas and plans for the future. Eisenhower had obviously given these to Bradley, 
but decided to announce his own changes in a staff conference on 20 August, Monty 
then being off trying to coordinate the closing of the Falaise gap and the sorting of his 
own Army Group for operations in a different direction across some American lines of 
communication. "8 
"' Major-General David Belchem, All in the Day's March (London: Collins, 1978) 212,213. 
448 Montgomery Log, 21 August 1944. A number of historians and Montgomery's official biographer 
misleadingly state that this conference occurred on 19 August. Eisenhower's appointment diary. 
reproduced in the Eisenhower Papers, V, Montgomery's messages to Brooke, and the TAC LOG of 21 
AG have no record of this alleged conference for commanders. Bradley did not attend, but Smith, Dc 
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That Bradley had not previously informed Eisenhower of Monty*s ideas of the 
17 August is unconscionable; Bradley was a cautious, career-minded man who viewed 
Ike as his boss and his opinion not that of some foreigner (especially Montgomery) as 
the determinant of his future. Bradley had everything to gain in keeping Eisenhower 
informed. Eisenhower, in facL agreed with this and had sown the seeds for a complete 
emotional break from alleged "British dominance, " not just from pique inspired by 
Tedder, Morgan, and SHAEF's staff, but from definitive "front channel" guidance 
from General Marshall. Marshall had signaled Eisenhower on 17 August referring to 
adverse publicity concerning Bradley's being under Montgomery's command: 
[T]he Secretary [Mr. Stimson] and I and apparently all America are 
strongly of the opinion that the time has come for you to assume direct 
exercise of command of the American contingent. I think you will have 
to consider this matter very carefully because the reaction here is 
serious and will be, I am afi-aid, injected into the debates in Congress in 
the next 24 hours. 449 
Eisenhower needed no caution to "have to consider this matter very carefully. " 
From the time of his direction to mount ANVIL, he had been waging a campaign to 
dominate the plans for Northwest Europe with Marshall's strategy. ANVIL's conduct, 
and its placement under an American commander, was designed to eliminate the 
Mediterranean as a serious theatre of war. The Americans would run the "suction 
pump" in reverse and remove their best formations from Clark's Fifth Army and 
effectively halt any serious offensives in Italy. 450 
Guingand, and senior staff from SHAEF were present. This was not another of the SHAEF "Monty 
refuses to visit" conferences popularly cited by historians. 
449 Marshall Papers, 4,550,55 1. 
450 General Mark W. Clark, Calculated Risk (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1950), 368-372. Clark, 
whose Anglophobia is unchallengeable, agreed with the British analysis of the Mediterranean Strategy 
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in an emotional meeting on 9 August. Eisenhower had con&onted an 
overwrought Churchill, who attempted to reverse the Southern France landing 
decision in favor of a continued offensive in Italy- 45 1 Refusing to add his support to 
that debate, Eisenhower (as spokesman for the American Chiefs on ANVIL) had dealt 
a death blow to the British Mediterranean strategy. Ike had essentially ended military 
discussion of the issue, much as Marshall had personally quieted Clark in Italy. That 
chore accomplished, Montgomery (who had been demonized by SHAEF's staff. by 
the American generals, by the airmen, and by Eisenhower in private to his aides and 
commanders), had to be eliminated from influence and from publicity concerning the 
war. This was especially true now that success had been obtained. Monty, who could 
be blamed for the stalemate, was never to be permitted credit by the Americans for 
any of the breakout or capture of the lodgement. It was an election year and. more 
important, Marshall's confidence in Eisenhower was at stake. Ike intended not only to 
take command, he intended to put Monty in his place. As Supreme Commander. 
Eisenhower intended that the NEPTUNE campaign be seen as his own. 432 
in the post- Rome-capture phase, and sought to keep his Fifth Army intact for a drive into Austria. He 
discussed this personally with Marshall, and viewed the subsequent decisions as "political. " 
451 Pogue, The Supreme Command, 225-227; Eisenhower Papers, 11'. 2065,2066 fn 1. 
452 Eisenhower, Report ofthe Supreme Commander, 39,61, Eisenhower Papers, IV. ibid., 2074-2077. 
Pogue, The Supreme Command, ibid., 263. Eisenhower denigrates Montgomery's role by rcferring to 
him as a "coordinator of activities. " Pogue repeats this by claiming that Montgomery's command had 
become "that between the direction of an operation and the coordination of a joint effort. " If this is 
true, it is because Eisenhower set out to undermine his subordinate's authority. or that Bradley chose to 
disobey or be disloyal to his operational commander, an American trait in coalitions practiced by 
Stilwell in Burma and Clark continuously throughout the Italian Campaign. Eisenhower's 19 August 
cable to Marshall downplays Montgomery's role as well as defines how Eisenhower always intended 
to divorce Army Groups. By itself, this is one of the most revealing of the signals sent during the war 
and underscores not only the self-generated hostility concerning command that Eisenhower had built 
up within himself, but also his long-term plans, which he had not shared with anyone except his 
immediate entourage or Americans. 
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Ike had begun this offensive with a three-point response to Marshall: that 
Bradley deserved credit, not Montgomery-, that in his owm plans, he had always 
intended to separate the army groups; and that he had been in overall charge of every 
dimension of the campaign. Testily responding to the litany of press charges on both 
sides of the Atlantic, he replied: 
It seems that so far as the press and the public are concerned a 
resounding victory is not sufficient; the question of "how" is equally 
important. 453 
Alluding as much to his own role as that of his American subordinate, 
Eisenhower stated: 
[I]t would be a great pity if Bradley failed to get the full credit due him 
for his brilliant performance merely because general instructions and 
policies he pursued have been channeled through Montgomery. 454 
Noting his staff s ideas as well as his own concerning the plan for taking over 
the control of ground forces, he stated: 
In forecasting probable developments it was clear to us months ago that 
about D plus 60 an American army group would be formed and soon 
thereafter the battle against the enemy in Normandy should be won and 
diverging lines of operation would then indicate the desirability of 
cutting loose the Commander in Chief of the army group of the north 
from the anny group of the center. Detailed, day by day coordination of 
tactical arrangements would then be in the hands of these two group 
Commanders in Chief, with broad coordination and allocations 
455 determined by me.... 
453 Eisenhower Papers, IV, ibid. 
4 54 Ibid. Montgomery might have made the same case for himself after Eisenhower became "Land 
Forces Commander. " 
455 Ibid., 2075. 
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Finally when DRAGOON comes farther north. we will have 
Commander in Chief Southern Group. 456 
Ike continued his message with the following, 
Some time ago I ordered my staff to be ready to function on the 
Continent by September 0... no major effort takes place in this 
theater by ground, sea, or air except with my approval and that no one 
in this Allied command presumes to question my supreme authority 
and responsibility for the whole campaign. 457 
Eisenhower clearly had decided to assume "direct exercise of command, " a 
foregone conclusion from his appointment; however, the clarity of his intentions had 
yet to be aired. Ike had done nothing to maintain a band of brothers, instead permitting 
bickering and backbiting while he awaited the destruction of others, like Leigh 
Mallory, by his favored subordinates. Strong leadership would have curbed this; he 
demonstrated none. Nor had he ever approved "every major effort" as he had claimed. 
with the exception of using bombers to support ground troops and the too narrow turn 
towards Falaise that failed to destroy the enemy. Air and ground operations had fallen 
more to the respective commanders than to SHAEF, whose plans section produced 
nothing usable, and whose G-3 section did little more than read operations plans 
forwarded from 21 Army Group. 458 
It was characteristic of the men that Eisenhower did not tell Montgomery that 
he would assume command soon and that a campaign directive would follow, but 
4% Ibid., 2076. Note the term DRAGOON replaced ANVIL as the code name for the Invasion of Southern France. Also, that the northern, center, and southern Army Groups never shed their numbers 
and were eventually simply referred to by them, rather than by their geographic arrangement as 
prefered by SHAER The southern Army Group was the Sixth. 
457 
Ibid. 
458 The G-3 section in fact failed to update or refine their Broad Front analysis, which never matured past a typed draft with crude pencil sketches and mineographed, cartoon-like maps. 
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chose to use his staff, and that Montgomery, fighting a battle. asked his Chief of Staff 
to explain his ideas. Ike was no commander. He shirked the "hard" argument even 
with his American commanders using Smith or Bull to convey potentially 
confrontational news. Moreover, as Monty wrote his own directives and did his own 
operational thinking, it was always clear that 21 Army Group plans were 
Montgomery's, not a potpouri of choices offered up by the staff. Eisenhower generally 
accepted his staffs proposals and had them draft directives. This in fact had been 
done by the time Montgomery had learned of the changes in both command and 
strategy. The staff had provided a plan and Eisenhower, compelled by Marshall, had 
filled in the execution date. 459 
Acceding to Montgomery's request to delay sending the directive, Eisenhower 
no doubt considered De Guingand's arrival at SHAEF with Montgomery's "points" 
for discussion to be part of his Stations of the Cross in dealing with the British. As he 
listened to and then denied Churchill so often, hearing Freddie De Guingand was no 
more than a pro forma duty as "Allied" commander. 
Montgomery included a copy of the points carried by De Guingand to SHAEF 
in his message to the absent CIGS, via Lt. Gen. Nye at the War Office: 
1. The quickest way to win this war is for the great mass of the Allied 
armies to advance northwards, clear the coast as far as ANTWERP, 
establish a powerful air force in Belgium, and advance into the 
RUHR. 
2. The force must operate as one whole, with great cohesion, and so 
strong that it can do the job quickly. 
459 Alanbrooke Papers, 6/12/30, Eisenhower Papers. IV, 2087-2089. Eisenhower's intentions were sent 
to the Combined Chiefs on the aftemoon of 22 August as SCAF 67. 
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3. Single control and direction of the land operations is vital for 
success. This is a whole timejob for one man. 
4. The great victory in N. W. France has been won by personal 
command. Only in this way will future victories be won. If staff 
control of operations is allowed to creep in, then quick success 
becomes endangered. 
5. To change the system of command now, after having won a great 
victory, would be to prolong the war. 
Failing to accept Montgomery's points as outlined by De Guingand, 
Eisenhower traveled to Montgomery's headquarters on 23 August at the British 
commander's request. Their meeting would change the carnpaign, but its arguments 
require analysis of three factors: strategic relevance, operational relevance, and the 
effect of command on any of the possible courses of action. Moreover, these factors 
should be assessed as a military appreciation, not merely a political or personality 
conflict. Strategy, the Duke of Wellington observed, is an option of difficulties; it is 
these options that should determine the verdict on the next step in the c=paign. 460 
4W Attributed to Arthur, Duke of Wellesley. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
AN OPTION OF DIFFICULTIES 
By late August 1944, the end of the planned OVERLORD campaign had been 
reached, but its true object had not been achieved. The lodgement area determined by 
the original COSSAC planners, bounded by the Seine and Loire, had all but been 
occupied. The original port objective, Cherbourg, had been captured and was being 
reconstructed for use after extensive German demolitions. The Brittany port of St. 
Malo had been captured on 17 August, but the critical ports of Brest, St. Lorient, and 
Nantes had not. The essence of NEPTUNE had been to establish these ports, not 
simply for immediate supply, but for the deployment of the more than 30 divisions 
still waiting transport in the United States. The invasion of Southern France, renamed 
DRAGOON, had gone forward on 15 August, its object to capture and develop the 
key Riviera ports of Marseilles and Toulon. 461 
Logistics, as much as designating a concentrated operational thrust line, 
underlay Montgomery's proposal for a concentrated thrust, though the possibilities of 
developing such an offensive as originally conceived would meet with increasing 
modification as the situation developed along the dispersed front ordered by 
Eisenhower. Any option, however, was always laid over a history of cautious, 
pessimistic forecasts. SHAEF's G-4 had estimated in April that demolition of 
461 The Seventh United States Army: Report of Operations: France and German), 1944-1945 [hereafter 
referred to as Seventh Arm ,v 
Report of Operations], 1, passim; Jeffrey Clarke aný Robert Smith 
Thompson, Riviera to the Rhine (Washington: Center of Military History, 1993), 198; Field Marshal 
Sir Henry Maitland Wilson, Report by the Supreme Allied Commander Mediterranean to the Combined 
Chiefs ofStaffon Operations in Southern France August 1944 [hereafter referred to as Wilson, Report 
by SACMED] (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1946); PRO, WO 205,21 A 
Gp/51 1/1 I/G(Plans) 18 Feb 44, Subject: Subsequent Maintenance of British and US Forces- 
'OVERLORD! 
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facilities by a withdrawing enemy would average 25 percent universally. except that 
this level of devastation would climb to at least 50 percent for facilities within 30 
miles of the Seine or any port and also for facilities within 20 miles of the coastline 
north of Dieppe, the actual planned forward maintenance area for 21 Army Group. 
Worse still, at least a 75 percent level of demolition was predicted for the ports of Le 
462 
Havre, Rouen, and Dieppe, all key logistics centers in the Allied logistical scheme. 
The landing and transportation of supplies from the ports of Brittany and the 
Seine ports were estimated to be a significant brake on operations. The supply of the 
total complement of landed OVERLORD forces at the German border without the 
development of Antwerp was estimated to be achievable at about D+240. The forward 
army depot areas at that point were estimated to require a shipment of almost 26,000 
tons daily alongside the shipment of supply reserves totaling nearing 189,000 tons. 463 
Early planning, in fact, had theorized the advance of either both Arnij, Groups 
abreast, or the 21 Ar? ny Group alone to the northeast if the Brittanýy ports had not 
been developed. The lines of communication essential for these advances required an 
unrestricted use of the ports from Cherbourg to Caen for the British forces, while the 
American forces would require the use of ports from Nantes to Chartres, possibly 
requiring 
4'2 NARA, RG 33 1, entry 35, Box 228, SHAEF/E/9007,4 April 1944, Subject: Post-OVERLORD 
Railway Construction Study, 1; NAC, RG 24, Volume 20568, File 952.013(DI23). MS "Liberation 
Campaign North West E' urope, Administrative Development From the End of June 44 to Opening of Port of Antwerp Nov 44" [hereafter known as "Liberation Campaign"] (4 vols. ), passim. 
463 RG 33 1, Entry 35, Box 228, SHAEF/1062/Log P. 25 March 1944, SUBJECT: Logistical Planning- 
Post-"OVERLORD" Operations, Tab A, "Assumed Phasing Post Overlord, Representing Optimistic 
Estimate of Process, and Tab B, "Estimated Tonnages Required to Support Each Advance. " 
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a comparatively long preliminary stand-still until these lines of 
464 
communication are organized . 
From the beginning, logistics was seen as the arbiter of any operational thrusts, 
as the planners appreciated that ports, reserves of supplies, the formation of fully 
functioning army rear maintenance areas, and the operation and construction of 
airfields would require a two-week period of reorientation (under the original estimate 
D+50 to D+65) before any major reorientation of planned thrusts from the original 
maneuver planned could be made. 
465 Considering that none of the "optimistic" 
advances predicted by the NEPTUNE phase-lines permitted the development of 
supply, port, airfield, or rail facilities as originally forecast, any rapid movement 
forward would require either a prolonged logistic pause, or drastic efforts to support 
selected units, or variations on the thrust-lines selected. The logistics planners 
considered this early in NEPTUNE's execution, though no comment on the Broad 
Front concept cpnceived by the Joint Planners was made. 
In mid-June, "Post-NEPTUNE" Operations Administrative Appreciation No. 
1, of 17 June 1944, offered an estimate based on the planners' latest effort, "Post- 
NEPTUNE Planning Forecast No. I, " which offered a Broad Front scheme of 
maneuver for D+60 to D+330 and a new set of phase-lines and a buildup forecasting a 
force of 63 Allied divisions on the continent by D+300. Along with it came a forecast 
464 SHAEF/1017/6/Log P, 4 March 1944, Logistical Planning PosW'OVERLORD" Operations, 
Minutes of meeting, 1430 hours, 2 March 1944. Italics are the author's. 
"' Ibid., Annex A, 3. It should also be noted that a key logistical planning figure was the "division 
slice, " a term encompassing the number of personnel/vchicles required from divisional to theater level 
to maintain a single division. For the Americans, the planning figure for a divisional slice was 40,000 
men and 7,600 vehicles and for the British, 40,000 men and 8.000 vehicles. Additionally, three 
equivalent divisions" were added to British forces for Indcpen. dent Tank Brigades and LOC Brigades 
in the initial troop list. 
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of ports to be captured by certain dates. Considering their impact on the land 
battle. 
these should be noted: 
Rouen ......................... 
D+95 
Dieppe ........................ D+100 
Le Havre .................... 13+110 
Boulogne .................... D+195 
Calais ......................... D+200 
Dunkerque ................. D+210 
Antwerp ..................... D+280466 
The American port of Brest would be used primarily for the landing of troops 
and vehicles and the ports south of the Loire were not considered part of the 
maintenance of American forces. The early capture of ports in the American sector 
were forecast as: 
Cherbourg .................. D+7 
(this varies from FUSA estimate, D+ 17) 
Granville .................... D+17 
St. Malo ..................... 
D+26 
St. Nazaire ................. D+40/90 
Nantes ........................ 
D+40/90 
Quiberon Bay ............. D+40 
Brest ........................... 
D+50 
Lorient ........................ D+50 
466 MHI, Papers of Colonel Frank Osmansk! [hereafter referred to as Osmanski Papers], SHAEF G4 
Division, 381 (GDP) SHAEF 11062nlGDP, "Post-'Neptune' Operations Administrative Appreciation 
No. 1,17 June 1944,1,2. Note that Annexure A of this document contains a complete discussion of 
the "summary of manoeuvre" forecast by the G-3 planners as well as planning maps delineating phase 
lines and illustrating the development of advance bases and forward depot areas. This appreciation was 
not approved and forwarded until 3 July 1944. 
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All ports were expected to be producing some tonnage by D+60- 467 In addition 
to supplies, bulk POL (petrol, oil, lubricants) delivery in tonnage was predicted to be 
468 
in excess of 13,200 tons daily by D+90 and 15,271 tons by D+ 180 . 
Rail transportation was to be a key element of any movement beyond the 
lodgement area. Allied airpower had done much to devastate main rail lines. the 
withdrawing Germans demolished most of that which remained. 
469 Lines were needed 
from the Brittany ports to maintain US forces and to supply the Paris area. British 
forces would need rail support dramatically after the period D+90/120 as they moved 
up the coast, but if the phase line development forecast for both operations and 
logistics were met, much of the rail capacity south of the Seine would revert to US use 
as the Channel ports and their rail lines were restored. 
470 
The logisticians offered three inescapable conclusions among their many 
observations: 
1. That port capacities would support forecast operations only if ports were captured 
and developed per the forecast. No margin for additional capacity would exist except 
for the ports south of the Loire, which were not scheduled for use. 
467 Ibid., Annexure C. 
418 Ibid., Annexure K. Note that the G4 planners estimated that the supply requirement for a divisional 
slice was 800 tons daily for an operating US division-, 500 tons daily for a staging US division; and 700 
tons daily for an operating British divisional slice. (See Annexure D). 
469 Administrative Appreciation No. 1,7; Joseph Bykofsky and Harold Larson, Tile Transportation 
Corps: Operations Overseas (Washington: Center of Military History, 1957,1990), 242-244; The War 
Office, Transportation: The Second World War 1939-1945, ArmY (London: 1950), 147-149; The War 
Office, Administrative Planning: The Second World War 1939-1945, Army [hereafter referred to as 
Administrative Planning) (London: 1952), Chapter XV, passim, Appendices E, F. 
470 Administrative Appreciation No. 1,7. 
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2. That reserves of supply beyond 21 days would not be acc=ulated until late in the 
campaign due to port development. 
3. With the known road/truck capacity. the movement of stores inland could be met 
only if the rail development plans were met! 71 
While ports and their development dominated the administrative plan, it was 
known that the shift of ports northeastward by the British would reduce tonnage and 
distance for their own forces and that the prime support of the American forces would 
come first through the Cotentin ports, and then through their development of the 
Brittany ports and the Quiberon Bay project. As a result, the logistical planners 
estimated that: 
The main thrust by the US forces from the lodgement area is not likely 
to take place before D plus 120. 
Moreover, the Americans required additional sustenance as their forces grew. 
It was noted that: 
Soon after the capture of PARIS about D plus 135, it will be advisable, 
in view of the length of the [lines of communication], to form a second 
US advanced base in the neighbourhood ... it will thereafter hold a 
major part of US reserves brought in after this period, except those 
required further forward for greater accessibil ity. 47. 
Logistics, of course, was the most complex of the Allied relationships. 
Operations such as air were driven by urgency of time; logistics had a theology all its 
own that the major Allies never agreed upon. The OVERLORD debate over adequate 
shipping was indicative of this, but now the mechanics of delivery took on a 
4" Ibid., 8,9. 
4'2 Ibid., 12. 
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remark-able role, the determiners of which seemed to be faceless bureaucrats. overly 
complicated procedures, and men who consistently warned against doing some plan 
but who never seemed to advise the commanders "what they can do. " Worse, the 
machinery for logistics had never been fine-tuned to the reality of war. 
Eisenhower's own role in failing to prepare his American theater "COMZ" 
(Communications Zone) was a significant problem. While reforming his overall 
ETOUSA (European Theater of Operations, US Army) organization and un-naming 
his hated logistics chief, Lt. Gen. John C. H. Lee, as Deputy Theater Commander, 
Eisenhower had not solved the same problems that overshadowed the first great 
American Expeditionary Force commander, General of the Armies John J. Pershing. 
His field commanders continued to bicker and blame logisticians; for supply problems, 
problems were not solved, and Eisenhower, fearing a showdown with the Chief of 
Army Service Forces in Washington, Lt. Gen. Brehon Somervell, was remarkably 
timid in complaining or demanding a more effective structure when visited by 
473 Somervell's troubleshooters in April 1944 . 
Moreover, the stopgap measures favored by the ground commanders brought 
horror to the planners, who saw that they led not only to diminishing returns but to 
unquenchable future demands. These would be unfilled due to the impending 
473 Steve R. Waddell, United States Armj, Logistics: The Norman4v Campaign, 1944 (Westport, Conn.: 
Greenwood Press, 1994), Chapters 1,5; Graham and Bidwell, Coalitions, Chapter 12; John Kennedy 
Ohl, Supptving the Troops: General Somervell and American Logistics in World War 11 (DcKalb: 
Northern Illinois University Press, 1994), 227-229. Eisenhower was a master player in US Army 
politics and fcarcd Marshall and his henchmen, the heads of AAF and ASF. Given Somervell's 
tremendous standing with Marshall, Eisenhower's cffectiveness in dealing with supply issues was 
neutralized in the same way his dealings with air issues were for fear of antagonizing Arnold. While 
Eisenhower complained to his subordinates, he needed a crisis in the winter of 1944 before he would 
act. Even then, the crisis had to be painted as reflecting neither on Marshall's War Department nor on 
Eisenhower's own theater. 
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maintenance disaster of running unseTviced trucks and aircraft at a high tempo for 
indefinite periods. These trucking lines, the Red Lion and Red Ball Express. were 
delivering rates adequate to sustain movement, but not to stock supplies and fuel 
forward, a spiraling diminution of future capabilities. The use of air transPOrt, 
temporarily solved by the formation of CATOR (the Combined Air Transport 
Operations Room) for assigning priority lift, was directly in opposition to 
Eisenhower's own creation of the First Allied Airborne Army, whose charter was to 
combine air transport and airborne forces to mount combat operations. FAAA 
demanded that air transport of supplies stop for the training of troop carrier and 
airborne units, a direct blow to the ground commanders wishing only supply. Bradley. 
the biggest benefactor of air supply, steadfastly opposed airborne operations. 474 
Eisenhower, therefore, had more than simply the allocation of forces to 
predetermined avenues as a problem. Montgomery had stressed the operational 
concept of a concentrated operational thrust, both to Bradley and Alanbrooke and to 
Eisenhower via De Guingand in his "pointe' paper. Yet, in these written 
communications, he failed to gain acceptance on the obvious element of priority of 
logistics, the basic conclusion that had driven him to propose the maneuver itself As 
he sought to meet with Eisenhower, this topic would be one of his key points, no less 
than a determinant of how operations would progress. And, in the argument, as time 
made the logistics situation more unfavorable, Eisenhower viewed the Montgomery 
proposal as "exclusionary, " not a rationale for continued decisive action. Thus, 
logistics became the sword that cut the cord to the other key elements of 
474 21 Arm, v Group Administrative History, 31-61; "Liberation Campaign, " 3345. see Chapter Four for 
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Montgomery's proposal, which were the thrust itself. and command and/or control. 
neither of which followed Eisenhower's preconception as defined by the Joint 
Planners. Though Monty was offering a logistical stopgap, Eisenhower neither saw 
this, nor did he hark back to the obvious conclusion-that the Americans had failed to 
carry out their part of the OVERLORD plan in capturing ports-nor would he permit 
temporarily halting the American advance while Montgomery moved up to establish 
the Seine ports base as had been foreseen by the planners. 
475 
Clearly, the Brittany ports were essential to the American portion, indeed, the 
larger portion of the Allied Campaign Plan. Yet, by 22 August, the day that 
Eisenhower disapproved De Guingand's proposal on Monty's behalf, the Americans 
had done little to fulfill the original concept. Brest, which had been Pershing's major 
port for deploying the AEF, was likewise chosen for the new AEF for the same 
reasons. Its deep-water facilities, port capabilities, and open approach to the Atlantic 
made it the prime port considered for Eisenhower's follow-on force of American 
divisions. Yet Brittany's ports still tied up four divisions, including a priceless asset, 
an armored division, parked in the bocage outside of a port-a totally useless 
instrument and a stark commentary on Bradley's knowledge of mobile, armored 
warfare. 476 As before in Normandy, Bradley could not fight in two directions, a 
problem that would arise continually, but not simply in the American camp. 
discussion of effect of First Allied Airborne. 
45 '* Alanbrooke Papers, 6/2/3 1: M99, M52 1, Appendix B. It should be remembered that the object of 
OVERLORD was to gain a lodgement capable of supporting 26-30 divisions. 
476 ThirdArmj, AfterAction Report, I Situation Map, 21 August 1944; Patton Diaýy, 4,13 August; 
Hanson W. Baldwin, TigerJack (Fort Collins, Colo.: Old Army Press, 1979), 42-46. Patton's haste to 
turn into Brittany both the 4" and 6" Armored Divisions, arguably the two best formations of armor to 
serve in his Army throughout the war, demonstrated that the Americans more than Monty were 
concerned about following the original NEPTUNE design. Indeed, the 4' Armored's tempestuous 
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Montgomery's administration posed more unique problems. Close to his main 
base, the War Office handled supply and administration until late in the Normandy 
campaign, and his own need for rail and long-haul road supply did not match 
Bradley's forces on the outside of the Allied armies, the "marching wing" spoken of 
so dramatically by Eisenhower. While Red Lion was as much a stopgap as the overly 
praised Red Ball Express, the frantic supply technique using long-haul trucks made 
more sense in Montgomery's 21 Army Group sector as he was actually moving 
forward toward his planned advanced base area and the major ports to supply his 
campaign against the German West Wall. 477 
Montgomery had foreseen this. In March, he had initiated planning by Crerar's 
headquarters for AXEHEAD, the crossing of the Seine and seizure of his planned 
administrative base and ports on the Channel in conjunction with the Second British 
Army. 478 AXEHEAD was unpopular with the SHAEF logistic planners, as was 
LUCKY STRIKE, because both jeapordized a methodical move forward while 
commander, Maj. Gen. John Wood, argued that -we are winning the war the wrong way (in the wrong 
direction)" when ordered westward by an irate Patton. Once it was clear that Brest and Loricnt would 
be defended, releasing the armor, the only self-contained and self-mobile formations in the American 
camp should have been obvious. Bradley held back. Patton remained silent on the topic. 6" Armored 
"contained" Brest and then Lorient, not being relieved of duty in the bocagc until 12 September. 
Contrary to the Germans, who considered their panzer formations to be their true operational weapon, 
the Amcricans--dcspitc their printed doctrinc-nevcr grasped the operational import of concentrating 
armor or using it as an operational-level weapon; interview with Maj. Gen. Peter C. Hains Ill. 1991. by 
author. 
477 "Liberation Campaign, " ibid., Administrative Planning, 52-54,88-9 1; 21 Army Group 
Administrative Histo? y, 33-34,46-47. During early September, some 1,400 British trucks were found 
to have defective pistons; how many of these trucks were -non-runners" on any specific day is not 
clear. nor is the time span of the problem. 
478 NAC, RG 24, Volume 10452, "Operation AXEHEAD, " Volume 10433, HQ Airtps/2500/80/G, 3 
June 44, "Employment of an Airborne Division During AXEHEAD. "These two files contain 
information on the forecasts for NEPTUNE, and detailed planning guidance for the assault across the 
Seine to seize the Seine port areas. Indications are that AXEHEAD's conceptual planning began early 
in March, the earlier files being destroyed when replaced by more developed plans. Included in f Ile is 
discussion for use of 79" Armoured Division's specialized vehicles known as -Funnies, " special 
engineer requirements, outline planning for attacks on Le Havre and Dieppe, planning directives for 
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establishing dumps, depots, pipelines, and rail from the "scheduled- openings of 
ports. Moreover, AXEHEAD led to an unpopular notion that 21 Army Group's 16 
divisions would move forward past D+90 while 12 tb Army Group built up stores and 
reserves. Nor did SHAEF's logisticians see Monty continuing simply to move up the 
coast in a continuous maneuver. The planners estimated that the Seine ports would not 
be captured until D+120 and, until "developed, " would require an additional one- 
month "stand-down" by Montgomery's forces. 479 
That the ostensibly logistics-cautious Monty had both advocated and then 
executed LUCKY STRIKE-focusing on the battle at hand while pushing for the 
wider envelopment to the coast combined with an execution of AXEHEAD, despite 
the obvious logistical risks for the future-must have inspired additional resistance to 
SHAEF's support for any plans he advanced. Lt. Gen Humphrey Gale, Eisenhower's 
Chief Administrative Officer, was one of Montgomery's critics at SHAEF. Helping 
Monty, even to hurt the Germans, was anathema at SHAEF. This was especially true 
since SHAEF's G-4 Plans and Movements Sections were headed by Americans. 480 
AXEHEAD, an inventory of landing craft available (for planning purposes) for a "Provisional Naval 
Assault Force" and two detailed appreciations of current planning by Crerar concerning AXEHEAD. 
479 Roland Ruppcnthal, Logistical Support ofthe Armies, I (Washington: Office of the Chief of Military 
History, US Army, 1953), 461,487; NARA RG 407, Entry 427, Box 1978,1' Army 101-3.5 
OVERLORD, "21 A Gp/20698/G(Plans), 14 June 1944, " Directive to Commanding General First 
United States Army Group, "Subsidiary Operations to further OVERLORD. " This memo and its 
attachments outline the relative issues of HANDS UP, LUCKY STRIKE, BENEFICIARY, and 
CHASTITY (Quiberon Bay project) as seen by 21 Army Group. It shows the continuity of plans that 
were expressed in Montgomery's "M" series directives; NAC RG 24. Volume 10540, File 
215A21.013(D28) has most complete logistical assessments and overlays concerning LUCKY 
STRIKE. It also includes the complete logistical "problems" appreciation of having "minimal time" 
between phase lines-the actual situation that developed. 
480 MHI, Osmanski Papers. The head of the plans section wrote a bitter memoir attacking the Field 
Marshal. See "Field Marshal Montgomery" in his papers. Eisenhower also apparently dealt directly 
around the SHAEF G4 with them while planning to keep the Americans moving, if need be at the 
expense of the British. See memos on wide envelopment included within the papers. Montgomery 
thought Gale was incompetent and blamed him for logistics problems in Italy during the 1943 
campaign. 
259 
SHAEF also relied heavily on poaching on 21 Army Group's organic 
transportation assets to supply 12 th Army Group. This was apparent not only during 
the breakout phase from Normandy, but also during the encirclement operations for 
the Falaise pocket. The turn north across the Seine continued this trend. Given the 
delayed start of the invasion, the predictable gale season which would close down 
over-the-beach supply operations, the failure to capture and develop their own ports, 
and the perceived need to simultaneously land more divisions and a supply reserve for 
them, the specter of "wintering in Normandy" for 12 th Army Group loomed as a 
possibility in August despite the operational successes of NEPTUNE. Five British 
truck companies were given to Bradley on I August and were later joined by British 
rail engineers to support American construction. These loans were extended to 
operations beyond the Seine. Air transport of supplies, of course, all went to US forces 
except for a few scheduled sorties. 481 
Central to the unsolved Brittany port problem was the CHASTITY Plan. or the 
Quiberon Bay Project. Quiberon Bay, northwest of the Loire Estuary, was chosen for 
the creation of a large artificial port to offset the need to develop the Loire ports of 
Nantes. and the heavily defended U-Boat base at St. Nazaire. It required the 
neutralization of St. Nazaire's batteries, and the capture of Belle Isle that dominated 
its approaches. Once established, it offered the possibility of deferring the capture of 
St. Nazaire and Nantes. 
CHASTITY was crucial for more than just portage. SHAEF was pressed to 
reduce the amount of shipping allocated to supporting NEPTUNE, a large backlog of 
48t , Liberation Campaign, " 19-21. 
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which was awaiting unloading. Due to the projected withdrawal of critical -coasters- 
after D+42, this would require that deeper-draft US Liberty ships assume a greater 
load. This meant that lighters were needed until the projected D+90 period. Quiberon 
Bay's sheltered beach, four nearby minor ports, and a local rail and road network 
would not only be more efficient, but would also make possible the transfer of future 
arrivals of divisions from the more distant Brest port, the Cotentin or St. Malo ports. 
and would be closer to the US First and Third Armies, respectively. 
482 
The late capture of Brittany ports, the rapid advance, and the failure to capture 
Brest all led to different considerations for CHASTITY. Quiberon Bay was reached by 
5 August, but the key Belle Island positions were not fully cleared even two weeks 
later. The creation of the full anchorage then was held in abeyance at the height of the 
turn both into Brittany and eastwards towards the Seine, at the exact moment when 
logistics was beginning to show its greatest strain. 
The conduct of the Brittany Campaign was the culprit. Montgomery continued 
to name the Brittany ports within his operational directives, but the focus on "business 
to the east" left Bradley to manage his own forces, and he and Patton ignored 
Brittany. 483 Moreover, the American Theater Commander, Eisenhower, for whom 
American supply and deployment were key responsibilities, failed to ensure his 
American subordinates understood the full implications of the entire Brittany plan. 
492 General Board Study, No. 1,21,22; CMH MS, ML-754, Outline Chronolo&qfNotes on the 
Histoty of Continental Operations, 11,3542. 
4" Bradley's ascension to Army Group Commander left Montgomery with broad operational directive 
control but far less ability to discuss individual objectives and tactics with Bradley, who grew 
increasingly prickly under British command. Monty might have suggested that the divisions "masked- 
by the Bradley-inspired tight envelopment at Falaise be transferred to Third Army to clear the southern 
Brittany port areas of Quiberon Bay and St. Nazairc, but this was one of the hazards of a coalition 
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Brest, the port selected for deployment. did not equal Quiberon Bay. which had been 
carefully chosen by the Chief of Movements of CONIZ to solve the problem of 
supplying Third Army. However, the reduction of Brest was claimed by ANXF as 
essential before attempting to maintain Quiberon Bay as a base. Bradley, of course. 
strained to do neither. 484 
Patton, who had permitted Wood's 4'h Armored to turn eastward without 
capturing its key objectives when the enemy's defenses were unfortned. and without 
replacing the armor with attacking infantry, gained ground but lost a chance at solving 
his own problems beyond the Seine. 485 Eisenhower, who had written to Montgomery 
in late July stressing the need to capture Brittany, and who, more than anyone, was in 
daily contact with and obviously superior to Bradley, had failed to stress the need to 
assure CHASTITY's implementation. 
Eisenhower's failure to deal with this issue throughout the first three weeks of 
August also demonstrated his inability to balance Supreme Allied Command. 
American Theater Command, and his "'oversight" of the battlefield. CHASTITY's 
lingering silent death required major attention if either the Broad Front or 
whose protocol openly discouraged discussion of operations within another nation's opcrational scctor. 
This practice would be a fatal flaw later in the campaign. 
484 Outline Chronologv ofNotes. ibid. Neither American Official History, The Logistical Support of the 
Armies, 1, nor Blumenson, Breakout and Pursuit adequately explains the CHASTITY Plan and its 
variant supporting plans, BENEFICIARY, HANDS-UP, and SWORDHILT, nor the failure of Bradley 
and Patton to press for the capture of the ports, which they told SHAEF on 9 August would be sccurcd 
'within a few days. " Nor is the delay of the decision to cancel CHASTITY for one month into 
September by SHAEF explained. The complete chronology and excerpts of the issues and plans can bc found only in the cited document prepared by the theater headquarters. 
4" Harold L. Mack, "The Critical Error of World War I L" National Defense University: National 
Security Affairs Paper 81-1; (Defense Technical Information Center AD A097275), 4-12. Mack was 
the Chief of Movements for COMZ. He blames Bradley for failing to inform Patton. His 
unsubstantiated criticisms of Montgomery are typical of American staff officers passing on headquarters gossip and the jingoism that pervaded the American army. Most of this discussion is irrelevant to his topic. 
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concentrated thrust strategy was to be implemented and a continued offensive 
maintained. As Monty and Eisenhower met on 23 August, this had not been done. 
4st' 
The logic of the situation. as graphicly portrayed by the planners in their 
forecast, was to immediately mount an attack to the northeast, to clear the coast and to 
capture the Seine ports simultaneous to an encirclement of Paris. 
487 A full press to 
execute AXEHEAD, and the cancellation of air supply to mount airborne operations 
either to capture the Boulogne area (BOXER) or Tournai (TRANSFIGURE). mounted 
a considerable logistical threat to Bradley and his anxious charger, Patton. Executing 0 
either plan essentially would cancel Bradley's NORMANDY TO THE RHINE plan. 
These options posed a large problem to Eisenhower in his consideration of a rapid 
thrust to the northeast or two "equally" balanced thrusts eastward. SHAEF's planners 
were not the only logisticians seeing a problem with executing AXEHEAD in lieu of 
an operational and logistical pause. 21 Army Group's "Q" estimate for 17 August 
warned that a pursuit beyond the Seine might outstrip the ability to develop Le Havre 
and Rouen in time to support these operations, though the planners stressed the need 
to continue developing these ports as they would also affect the feeding of Paris and 
the future support of the Americans. More important to Montgomery's plans, the 
British estimate noted that the 
small channel ports in the area DIEPPE must be developed to the 
maximum ... since in the event of a quick advance these will give us 
the only intake by sea until we reach ANTWERP-ROTTERDAM. 
486 General Board Study No. 1,21, OutlineChronologvoffttes, 39; SHAEF considered weather 
considerations would require capture of Quiberon Bay by I October. Since Brest did not fall until 18 
September, and no attacks had been made to complete the capture of Belle Island, the plan apparently 
was dropped "for the present. " 
48'NARA, RG 33 1, Box 75. MAPS D+90 and D+120 to accompany Post-Neptune Planning Forecast 
No. 1, May 1944. 
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Circumstances will decide whether BOULOGNE and CALAIS are 
opened. 488 
The same estimate stressed that the Americans would continue to need a 
2,000-ton daily air transport of supplies. The satisfactory fact for the future. however. 
was that following the opening of Le Havre, the British would be able to operate 
without over-the-beach maintenance, a benefit that would subdue the weather risk 
plus provide shorter lines of communication for the advancing Army Group. This. of 
course, presumed Le Havre was not handed over to the Americans. which was 
SHAEF's intent to make up for Bradley's failure to develop his own ports. 
489 
The "Q" appreciation of 21 Army Group recommending the location of the 
Army Group's maintenance beyond the Seine stressed the operational situation of the 
enemy following their escape from the Alencon-Argentan Gap. Stating that the 
enemy, unable to reform a defensive line, would be pursued, and noting the benefits 
that an American advance offered, the appreciation stated: 
We must ensure that the pursuit of the retreating enemy by the British 
and Canadian armies shows an equal disregard for maintenance 
limitations. 
Stating that continuing a pursuit and its maintenance beyond the Seine was the sole 
problem for the British forces, it outlined possible courses of action. 490 These were 
soon finalized. 
489 "Liberation Campaign, " 35, quoting Q Plans 21 A Gp WD Aug 44 Appx H, Q Plans of 17 Aug 44 
HS/WD/NWE/9/l. H 
489 Ibid. 
490 Ibid.. Q Apprcciation, 21 August, 21 A Gp/5552/9/Q. 
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21 Army Group's long-term plan for logistics was issued on 22 August. the 
day of the Eisenhower-De Guingand meeting. It outlined a four-stage plan for the 
development of the area east of the Seine as the British advanced base-in the area of 
Le Havre, Rouen, and Dieppe. The Seine ports, it assumed, would always be 
needed-if not for British operations, then to support the feeding of Paris and for the 
support of American operations. Assuming that the Canadian Army would operate on 
the Army Group's left, clearing the coastal sector with two corps, while the Second 
Army operated toward Amiens with the American 12 th Army Group to its right, the 
plan additionally theorized an advance towards the Somme. For this operation. it 
stipulated road maintenance beyond the Seine but rail and road maintenance up to the 
Seine during Stage 1. Stage 2 would require the capture a port for maintenance, 
I probably. Dieppe, while Dempsey's army continued to be based on the rear 
miffitenance area. During Stage 3 following the capture of Le Havre and the minor 
Seine ports, the forward base would be stocked and the development of forward ports 
such as Rouen and Fecamp would begin. Stage 4 would see the transition from the 
Normandy rear base to sole supply from the advanced base as stocks were "eaten 
,, 491 down. 
Significantly absent from any "Q" appreciation at this juncture is the port of 
Antwerp. The planning for TALISMAN (renamed ECLIPSE), concerning a complete 
collapse of the enemy and a subsequent rush into Germany by the Allies, named 
492 Rotterdam and Hamburg as the key logistical bases for the 21 Army Group. 
491 NAC, RG 24, Volume D63, File "OP PLANS", 21 A Gp/5541/2/Q(Plans). 22 Aug 44, Development 
of British Advance Base EAST of the SEINE, 1-4. 
492 Ibid. 
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Antwerp, however, was not yet seen as essential for a British advance. though it is 
doubtful that 21 Army Group's MGA (Major General, Administration). had yet been 
advised of Montgomery's plan for a thrust deep into the Ruhr and beyond. 
On the Allied right, the Americans were advancing away from their ports and 
were not due to see sustenance delivered from either Antwerp (D+240 capture) or the 
Riviera ports for an extended period. Nor were these ports within the realm of 
operational planning on 22 August. The Americans had not abandoned their pre- 
NEPTUNE logistics plan, nor had significant operational guidance focused logistical 
planning for specific maneuvers. The broadest and most undefined of "fronts, " the 
phase-lines periodically issued by the G-3 forecast, appeared to be the only guidance 
for internal planning by SHAEF. 493 
"Forecasts"' by Eisenhower's plans staff provided "a basis for calculating 
future requirements. " Beginning in May, the planners periodically circulated these 
among plans staffs at SHAEF, AEAF, and ANXF, but did not apparently send them 
"downward" to the Army Groups. At various times, instructions concerning these 
included: 
[C]opies of this forecast must not be distributed officially outside the 
headquarters of ANXF, SHAEF, or AEAF; nor must it be quoted 
officially in correspondence. 
Such comments accented the theoretical nature of the work. The G-3, in a 
memo to the Chief of Staff conceming a request for a forecast by the British Chiefs of 
Staff, cautioned, 
493 NARA, RG 331, SHAEF Post Overlord Forecasts, Plans 370-32, SHAEF/18008/ I /Ops, 15 April 44, 
Subject: Post-'NEPTUNE' Planning Staff Forecast. 
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In a matter of this kind the answers will be largely guess-work. but an 
attempt has been made bý the planners to produce what they consider 
to be a reasonable guess. 44 
The forecasts, however, provide an accurate barometer of SHAEFS 
assessments at different periods and a reflection of what Eisenhower had been briefed. 
Besides the phase-lines that had come to shape impressions of success and failure, the 
forecasts also included summary statements concerning key issues or problems as seen 
by SHAEF or as reported by the lower headquarters. With the impending dissolution 
of AEAF and the lesser role of ANXF, these forecasts most likely became the 
planners' soliloquies-their own version of reality. 
By the time of the Eisenhower-Montgomery meeting, these estimates had been 
obsolete for a month. The last forecast, No. 1, had been introduced by a memo 
pointing out that: 
At D+270 an offensive will be launched NORTH of the ARDENNES 
with the object of capturing the RUHR. A subsidiary offensive will be 
launched at the same time SOUTH of the ARDENNES towards the 
METZ GAP. It can be taken that by D+360, IRANKIN''C' conditions 
will have arisen. 495 
Unknown to Eisenhower during his discussions with Montgomery, the 
DRAGOON forces would reach---on their D+30 (14 Septemberý-the position they 
had forecast for DRAGOON D+120. The DRAGOON forces had rapidly captured 
Toulon and Marseille and were able to close their over-the-beach support operations 
by mid-September. Being the beneficiaries of a full four-week acceleration in port 
414 Ibid., SHAEF/I 8008/l/Plans, 27" May 1944, Post-'NEPTUNE' Planning Forecast No. 1; 
SHAEF/18008/l/Plans, GCT 370-32 Plans, Memorandum, 27 August 1944, Forecast of Progress- Operation 'OVERLORD. ' 
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clearance, plus exceeding over-the-beach forecasts and an expanded minor 
harbor 
plan, the DRAGOON forces were granted a logistical support capability that was not . 
challenged by the shipping allotted to that part of the firont. 
DRAGOON should have been a major consideration in Eisenhower's 
estimates; characteristically, it was not. Rather than seeing the Southern 
France 
landings and the Riviera ports as assets, he saw them as Wilson's problem until 
handed over to SHAEF, thus maintaining an overly strict adherence to coalition 
protocol and lines of responsibility. Mentally, there seemed to be a barrier for 
Eisenhower to seeing the unfolding campaign. Southern France was not a part Of 
Eisenhower's maneuver plans except to link up at an unforecast future date. The 
logistical implications of absorbing the Southern France force seemed farther still. 
49" 
At day's end, Eisenhower seemed to have three choices: to support a single 
line of operations until logistics were improved by port clearance and capture, to 
disperse his resources until his advance petered out due to lack of maintenance.. or to 
order an operational pause as foreseen by the planners. Having ruled out a pause. he 
was left with Monty's proposal for a concentrated thrust or that of his staff to advance 
on a broad front. 
495 Ibid.. SHAEF/18008/l/OpsPost-'NEPTUNE' Planning Forecast. 9 May 1944. RANKIN was a 
contingency plan for troop movement in the case of German surrender. This later was replaced by 
TALISMAN and eventually, late in the war, ECLIPSE. 
496 Ruppethal, Logistical Support, 1,28,29,117,118; Clarke and Smith. Riviera to the Rhine, Chapter 
XI, 576, Table 1; Wilson, Report b. v SACMED. 3847. Eisenhower first communicates his ideas to his 
commanders regarding Southern France about this time, and in SCAEF 67.22 August. Of significant 
importance is the fact that the Southern France ports outproduccd Antwerp whenever convoys 
supported landing supplies. This poses a significant question as to whether the southern ports and not 
Antwerp should have been considered the prime supplier for Third Army. a decision that would have 
given Patton a one-month jump on adequate supplies during the fall campaign. Moreover. it calls the 
question on the true result of stripping the Mediterranean of naval resources to favor a Pacific advance 
by the Americans. 
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Logistics, the dominating force of strategy. momentarily took a rear seat to the 
strategic and operational picture as it appeared toward August*s end. "Victory 
Disease" dominated the Allied councils of war. The rapid pace of operations during 
August led to the destruction of both the German Seventh Army and the successor of 
Panzer Group West, the Fifth Panzer Army. The resulting intelligence picture, 
estimated at every level of senior command, fostered an assurance that old plans or 
new should be implemented immediately to complete the victory achieved in 
Normandy. apparently regardless of logistical shortfalls. 
The highest command echelons trumpeted victory in more strident tones than 
the field headquarters still fighting the battles. The Joint Intelligence Committee, who 
acted as the all-source integrator for the Allied high command, predicted on 14 
August that military defeat Germany would occur before the end of 1944, continuing a 
trend of strategic optimism that grew with each report until fall. 497 
SHAEF's Weekly Intelligence Summary No. 22, for the week ending 19 
August, summarized the effect of the great turning movement leaving only the Seine 
as an escape route for the remaining German divisions facing the 21 and 12 1h Army 
Group. More than 200,000 men were lost by the enemy and an additional 75,000 men 
were trapped in Brittany and the Channel Islands-60 percent of the total force in the 
West. Intelligence estimated that the enemy had committed about 1,700 tanks to 
4" Hinsley, British Intelligence, 3, Part 2,366,367; John Ehrman. GrandStralegý, V, August 1943- 
September 1944 (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1956), 396-403. 
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C battle, 700 of which were now destroyed; perhaps only 600 of the remaining 1.000 
were believed to be "runnem. 
498 
SHAEF Weekly Intelligence Summary No. 23 offered a more dramatic Proof 
of a favorable situation, not simply in the map graphics of a tighter pocket of enemy 
trapped against the Seine, but with representations of a general withdrawal from the 
south and southeast of France. The final word given on enemy capabilities was 
unadomed: 
The August battles have done it; the German Army in the West has had 
it. ... (T]he armies of Rundstedt, of Kluge, and ... of Model, are 
committed willy-nilly to what must shortly be the total surrender of 
more than two-thirds of FRANCE.... Two and a half months of bitter 
fighting ... have brought the end of the war in EUROPE within sight. 
almost within reach. The strength of the German Army in the WEST 
has been shattered, PARIS belongs to FRANCE again, and the Allied 
Armies are streaming towards the frontiers of the Reich. 499 
Victory disease was not merely an intelligence phenomenon. Eisenhower 
enumerated the enemy losses in a special message to the Combined Chiefs, not only 
as another confirmation of his own supreme command, but also feeding the 
impression that the enemy had been defeated in the field. 500 Witnessing the enemy 
destruction, the American press-distracted from their blame and critique of the 
"stalemate" and "British dominance of Eisenhowee'-now were keen to feed their 
readers unadorned claims of impending enemy collapse. The sources of these ideas 
were, of course, the army press camps. Bradley had told his court correspondents 
about the great psychological damage a penetration of the German border would 
4" SHAEF Weekly Intelligence Summary No. 22.3.14. 
499 SHAEF Weekly Intelligence Summary No. 23,4; Enemy Order of Battle in the West, 25 August 1944 (map). 
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have-setting the scene for his own planned thrust. SHAEF's correspondents began 
reporting victory. Universal euphoria seemed rampant in the Allied camp, even 
though Eisenhower appeared to attempt to mute this subject in his own dealingswith 
the press. 501 
Prior to D-Day, an internal SHAEF study noted that the Germans could not 
hope for a victory over the Allies, but might hope that war weariness or dissension 
among Allies might grant a compromise agreement. Summing up, it noted: 
In any event the Nazi leaders must realize that for them there can be no 
hope of survival under any peace terms. For them, their position of 
power, indeed their very existence, would depend on GERMANY 
being able to stave off fmal defeat for as long as possible. Thus 
German policy could have only one object-to prolong the war and 
inflict maximum damage on the Allies. 
502 
SHAEF intelligence, however, had not appreciated two eventualities: that the 
Germans would base their defense forward in Normandy and not fight a classic 
withdrawal along successive defense lines, and that Hitler's own generals would 
attempt a coup based upon assassinating the Fuhrer. The first had seen the near 
destruction of the German Army in the West, but had left the Allied armies without an 
adequate maintenance posture to mount a final offensive into the vitals of the Reich. 
The second, while commented upon at the highest levels, brought no serious 
consideration that Germany would self-destruct based on the leadership crisis at hand. 
50' Eisenhower Papers, IV, 2102-2104. 
'0' With the exception of Patton, whose frequent fulminations are not food for supportable analysis on 
the subject, no Allied general either predicted the time needed to finish the victory or ventured any date 
for victory, knowing full well that they would have to deliver on such "promises. " The general belief 
among Allied generals seemed to be that victory was achievable in 1944 or shortly after the new year. 
302 NAPLA, RG 33 1. Entry 22, Box 168, "JIC Correspondence, " SHAEF/CIS/102/INT, SHAEF 
Combined Intelligence Staff, Appreciation No. 3,4" April 1944,1,2. 
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Hitler and his decisions, one source notedý were a benefit to the Allied war effort. 
Killing him might strengthen the German military's ability to defend its borders-50ý 
Thus, defeating the remainder of the German Army in the West would be 
critical. The Luftwaffe had been crippled by the air battles of 1944. the U-Boat 
6-scourge"' that had frightened Churchill had been eliminated: the 1,000-mile Eastern 
Front still "fixed" the bulk of the German Army to prevent an invasion by the Red 
Army, a crucial factor in maintaining a favorable force-ratio in the West. A ground 
thrust in the West penetrating into the industrial heart of Germany would eliminate the 
German industrial ability to support the war and might end the war quickly. Equally 
important, the German Army in the West, unable to abandon either the industrial or 
population bases of their own homeland, would be brought to battle and destroyed by 
the temporarily superior Allied armies. 
Time, of course, was the major issue. A decisive force, able to destroy the 
German Army in the west as well as its industrial base in short order, was necessary. 
With the demonstrated German ability to rebuild units, to tap the huge unused 
potential of the young, the old, and slave labor, and the continued ability for dispersed 
industries to amass new weapons, the strength differential of the Allies would 
evaporate with time. Where and how to aim and concentrate a decisive blow or blows 
was the basic argument brewing between Eisenhower and Montgomery, but more 
accurately, between the Americans and the British. 504 Fed by the victory disease 
503 
' SHAEF Intelligence Summary, No. 22 for week ending 19 August 1944.6.21 Army Group 
Intelligence Summary No. 158,27 August 1944,2. 
104 SHAEF's planning staff had selected the most acceptable option, one which permitted the 
Americans, namely Bradley, to operate -independently, " a policy that had been underscored by Stimson, Marshall, Bradley and, despite his "Allied" hat, Eisenhower. While, Montgomery had 
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rampant in Washington, in London, at SHAEF and. to a degree, within the Army 
Groups, the validity of the strategy adopted-and the operational design that would 
spring therefirom-should have been the controlling factor in an military decision y 
taken. 
SHAEF's Broad Front strategy paper had named two objectives: the RUHR 
and the SAAR, each behind one of the two best "gateways" into Germany. Each was 
named the objective of the national Army Group facing that sector. The Planning 
Staff, however, had masked key considerations, ignored significant military and 
economic facts, and oversimplified the geographical factors involved. 
SHAEF's Combined Intelligence Staff (CIS-later renamed Joint Intelligence 
Committee, SHAEF), was chartered to "keep under constant review the military and 
political situation in the area for which SCAEF is responsible. " Producing military 
appreciations, the committee had representation from each nation, service, and special 
section, as well as from the political advisers. It had a coordinate relationship with the 
War Office JIC, which provided its own appreciations to SHAEF. 505 A primary 
producer of appreciations used by the SHAEF G-2 for his own reports and Weekly 
Intelligence Summary, it would have also been a key source for the Joint Plans Staff 
(JPS) that produced "Broad Front. " 
The Combined Chiefs had named the heart of Germany as SHAEF's objective; 
the Joint Plans Staff had expanded this to the Ruhr and the Saar. This varied, 
proposed the alternative plan, the concentrated thrust was embraced by both Alanbrookc and Churchill 
in turn, the British COS Committee, and the War Cabinet. The argument went beyond personal ities-it 
was political. It seemed to have less to do with ending the war than showing who was in charge and 
could get credit for winning the war. 
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however, from the critical CIS Appreciation No. 3 that predated the Broad Front study 
and which was heavily drawn upon by the Joint Planners, who reproduced significant 
portions of the appreciation within their own Broad Front study. The Combined 
Intelligence Staff had noted two economic areas of primary importance: Berlin- 
Leipzig-Dresden-Magdeburg (also noted as the political center of the country) and the 
Ruhr. Accepting, as the JPS would, that the Berlin area was too far to the East to 
affect SCAEF's conduct of a campaign in the west, the CIS instead balanced the Ruhr 
against other industrial areas in the west. Noting the importance of oil and rubber to 
the economy, the CIS estimated that the most accurate assessment could be derived by 
estimating capacity in steel and coal production. 506 
The percentage of production arrived at was estimated as: 
Crude Steel 
RUHR 50 percent 
SAAR 5 percent 
NE FRANCE/ALSACE 11 percent 
BELGE/LUX 4 percent 
Coal Production 
38 percent (inc SE KOLN) 
3 percent 
I percent 
7 percent 
Rest of EUROPE 30 percent 43 percent 
The economic analysis of the 36-40 million tons of crude steel produced 
annually and of annual production of the 296 million tons of hard coal stated these 
conclusions: 
[I]f GERMANY were to lose the RUHR (and consequently FRANCE 
and BELGIUM) she would lose 65 percent of her present total steel 
production. 
'0i NARA, RG331, Entry 22, Box 168, 'JIC Papers, ' JICSHAEF(44) (Final), 8h July 1944, Directive 
to Joint Intelligence Committee SHAEF, Annex A. 
306 CIS Appreciation No. 3,2. 
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The loss of the RUHR ... together with that of 
FRANCE and 
BELGIUM, would deprive GERMANY of 56 percent of her total coal 
production. 507 
The CIS identified another area of economic interest-the Middle Rhine 
(Coblenz-Frankfurt-Mannheim-Karlsrahe-Strasbourg). This area, it stressed. "is 
economically insignificant. " Further, the staff noted that coal production mostly fed 
local uses, so the loss of the Ruhr would affect other areas less, but that the loss of 
steel would eliminate Germany's ability to support several military campaiggns 
simultaneously. Thus: 
Failure to keep the RUHR in production would rapidly starve 
GERMANY of the means to continue the war. 508 
As the destruction of the German forces in the West had negated most of the 
forces estimated to remain following the capture of the lodgement, the more critical 4D 
section in the CIS Appreciation (Part H, German Conduct of the Campaign in the 
West), that was still relevant in late August revolved around the topographic 
estimates. These included Northeastern France, the Low Countries, and Western 
Germany. Importantly, the CIS Appreciation contained a detailed set of maps and 
estimates that included the area within Western Germany. 509 (See figure 28. ) 
The Broad Front analysis highlighted the terrain prior to arriving at the "gaps" 
or gateways into Germany, but deleted the CIS analysis of the terrain within 
Germany-a critical error considering its import to planning for the campaign. This 
attitude is also reflected by the G4 Plans phase lines. Not estimating that the armies 
107 Ibid. 
508 Ibid. 
CIS Appreciation No. 1, Part 11,22 April 1944,2, Annexurcs A and C. 
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would be far into Germany prior to -Conditions of RANK INI IC` obtaining. the 
campaign to breach the border, not to fight the German Army within Germany. was 
emphasized. This is a major difference underlying the Broad Front and concentrated 
thrust strategies, despite the fact that they both listed as the object the destruction of 
the German Army and the capture of the Ruhr. Moreover, it was the terrain that not 
only permitted movement and determined logistics capabilities, but also granted the 
defense or attack an advantage, while presenting obstacles or granting avenues. it was 
the nature of the terrain that determined both the deployment and tactics of battle-the 
entire essence of operational design. Not seeing operations within Germany as part of 
the campaign's maneuver was a deployment issue that would have to be faced sooner 
than forecast, and was an issue Montgomery had addressed in his concept of operations, 
but which had not been examined by SHAEF's planners. 510 (See figure 30. ) 
The CIS appreciation examined the difficulties of the terrain north and south 
of the "gaps" examined and later accepted by the Joint Planners for Broad Front, 
concluding that: 
[F]rom the topographical point of view alone, it is extremely difficult 
to attack from the WEST on a large scale. 
The CIS noted that even the two gaps had problems. In the north, the avenue 
of approach 
is roughly ft=el shaped with the funnel formed by the ALBERT Canal 
and the MEUSE which narrow to form the neck between 
MAASTRICHT and LIEGE, EAST of which it is possible to debouch 
on to the RHINE Plain in the direction of the RUHR. Even this 'gap' 
has a series of defensive possibilities running NORTH-SOUTH across 
the PLAINE BRABANCONNE. 
5'0 CIS Appreciation No. 3, Post-Ncptune Administrative Appreciation. 
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Canals and rivers-the Dyle. the Meuse. the Dendre. the Senne. and eventually the 
Roer-of course, provided the obstacles. 
The "South Gap, " likewise, 
is only relatively speaking a "gap. " It too, is crossed by a succession of 
potential defensive lines running NORTH-SOUTH. 
In addition to high plateaux, heavy woods would canalise any advance, with 
approazhes carefully covered in depth by the Siegfiied Line, which was termed 
"exceptionally strong"511 
It was not until after Eisenhower made his campaign decision that significant 
terrain studies concerning Germany appeared in the American and SHAEF camps at 
the command level. 12 th Army Group produced a 1: 1.250,000 scale map entitled 
"Generalized Enemy Terrain" during the late fall, and beginning in November 
circulated terrain estimates for individual areas through the medium of Weekly 
Intelligence Summaries. Likewise, SHAEF published terrain analyses through its 
Weekly Summaries, leaving unanswered the question of how much the commanders 
knew prior to their original selection of the campaign's major direction. 512 (See figure 
31. ) 
"' Ibid., CIS Appreciation, Part 11, Appendices A, 1-2, B, C. It is significant that concerning the entire 
appreciation, the LONDON JIC assessed that far too little significance was given to the effect of the 
strategic bombing campaign, which, in their words, gave them "doubt[s] whether Gcn-nany would have 
the ability to fight a prolonged campaign in the West. " See J. I. C. /676/44,8 1h May 1944, in 
accompanying file. 
5'2 12" Armv Group Report of Operations, III, G-2 Section, Parts I-IV, 69-72. Maps are included as 
special stuýics. No studies were done of the -middle ground" between Normandy and the German 
border by 12' Army Group. This shows the relative dependence of the Army Group on terrain and 
special intelligence from theater levels. See index of studies, Plate 1, also study "Generalized Enemy 
Terrain Central and Southern Germany, " 1: 1,250,000 both in map box accompanying Volume Ill. 
(Reproduced as f igurc 3 1. ) 
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The British and Canadians worked more methodically. Extensive terrain 
analyses of the Channel Coast were done prior to D-Day. 
513 It also must be stressed 
that Montgomery did hours of his own "terrain analysir in his map trailer. was a 
veteran of campaigns fought in Northeastern France, Belgium, and Flanders. and had 
conducted many bicycle tours of the battlefields following the Great War. He was also 
an avid student of the military history of Britain's army, which campaigned in the 
sector in question in the early 1800s. Montgomery and his generals were familiar- 
from their own experiences as commanders and staff officers in the First World 
War-not only with the terrain but with the difficulties of weather and season peculiar 
to European campaigning. 514 
Eisenhower had helped author the American Battlefield Monuments 
Battlefield Guide while in Washington and later, while on leave from the 
Commission's Paris office, had driven from Paris to Brussels, to Bonn, to Coblenz. to 
Heidelberg, to Neustadt, to Zurich. This route circumscribes much of the geography in 
question, and though valuable as an impressionistic tour, it did not provide a detailed, 
systematic, military analysis of terrain avenues, water-courses, bridging, road 
conditions (save for the road traveled), or the major planning considerations for the 
deployment of forces. Moreover, he did not traverse any of the terrain avenues from 
west to east as his armies would have to fight. Bradley first entered Continental 
Europe on D-Day; he had no experience of the terrain. 515 
513 NAC, RG 24, ibid., Operation AXEHEAD files, March-August 44, arc an example. 
514 Hamilton, Montv: The Making ofa General, passim. 
""' Daniel D. Holt and James W. Lcycrzapf, eds., Eisenhower: The Prewar Diaries and Selected 
Papers, 1905-1941 (Baltimore: the Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998); map titled Route of 
Gruber-Eisenhower Motor Tour, August 28 to September 13,1929 following 282. 
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While personal experience may have confirmed the ability to campaign in 
winter, conquer obstacles, and supply and move an army over limited tracks on 
sodden ground, what the impending strategy debate lacked was complete. honest 
analysis on the part of SHAEF. Naming the southern "gap" a secondary route neither 
adequately explained nor assessed the problems and gains fi7om using this avenue. 
Even a cursory inspection of SHAEF's maps, deleted fi7om the Broad Front study by 
the Joint Planners. who "borrowed" most other material fi7om the CIS study, indicated 
that the southern route led not to adequate maneuver ground for deploying large 
forces, but to increasingly constrained approaches that possessed the same problems 
of the northern route but in larger scale and without any great military benefit. 
Moreover, as the economic estimates proved, the Saar was no great war-sustainer, nor 
was it the population base that the Ruhr and northern Germany were at this time in the 
war. Instead, it was a terrain black hole that, once fought through, exited onto further 
constricted avenues leading away from the Ruhr, and off to Berlin or to 
Czechoslavakia and Poland in Central Europe. (See figure 3 1. ) 
These terrain avenues were the Kaiserslautern "Approach, " no real avenue but 
a cut through the woods between the Hardt and Pfalz Hills that led to the Rhine plain, 
a narrow lowland running from Basel northward to Frankfurt, a lateral obstacle and a 
narrow trench-like avenue which debouched in the Frankfurt area. Frankfurt canalizes 
movement and is sided by the Odenwald to the south, the Spessart Mountains to the 
east, the Vogelsberg to the northeast, and the Taunus Mountains to the northwest. 
Small corridors, the Fulda and Wetterau, climb through the foothills of the Vogelsberg 
and Taunus mountains. Passing the Ruhr far to the east north of Kassel, a debouching 
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force would fmd its rear flanked by the Rotharbirge and, 
farther north. the 
Teutoburgerwald. To the northeast lay the Harz Mountains. These "corridors" share 
similar characteristics: they are watered, lowland areas that would cramp two 
deployed divisions, and until the Hessian hills are gained north of the Hohe Rhon, 
maneuver room for two or more corps is not found. This is excellent defensive terrain, 
with narrow mobility corridors that are easily blocked, flanked, obstacled, and prone 
to poor off-road movement in wet weather. 516 
Thus, besides aiming a large part of the American forces at a secondary 
objective-the "economically insignificant Rhine cities'ý--after fighting for the 
Saarland, the southern "gap" fimneled the American forces into constricted terrain that 
would hamper their deployment against the major stated objective. the Ruhr, and 
should the Red Army be held by the Germans, the western approach to Berlin. a 
contingency that never should have been eliminated by SHAEF's planners. Moreover, 
the southern approach granted the enemy time by permitting a defense on terrain that 
was not operationally decisive to ending the war quickly. 
The Northern Plain of Germany offered the best avenue for large unit 
movement; it was heavily roaded, led directly across the Ruhr's northern cities, and 
continued on to Berlin. The most extensive rail network in Germany was located in 
this area. This approach was flat but laced with water obstacles, and off-road 
movement would have been hampered in heavy rain or the late fall. Winter would 
"" NARA, RG 407, ML 206, Box 24143, ML 206. The author's analysis is based on 12" Army Group 
Map study, "Generalized Enemy Terrain, Nov 44" attached to ML 206, "Estimate of the Situation' 
Major Effort in the Koln Plain, 30 Nov 44" and personal inspection of the ground (Reproduced as 
figure 3 1). The author has extensive military experience concerning this area. He served as a war plans 
officer at Central Army Group, NATO, 1987-1990, and served in armored cavalry units in the Fulda- 
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offer better movement once the ground was frozen. The open terrain lent itself to 
aerial observation, and hence made it difficult for the enemy to establish defense lines 
until late fall brought poor flight conditions. The approach on the Dutch-German 
border had the benefit of bypassing the Siegfried Line Defences, once the former 
Dutch defenses of the Grebbe Line (prewar "Fortress Holland") and the Belgian 
defenses of the Albert Canal and Meuse were captured. In late August 1944, this was 
the optimum maneuver approach for both concentration and speed of advance, for 
perhaps 60 days, as November and December would begin to minimize its 
advantages-a condition that would prevail until spring. 517 
Given the terrain and the influence of logistics, a detailed correlation of forces 
would have added immeasureably to the debate. On 23 August, the day of the 
Eisenhower-Montgomery meeting, the following division-sized forces were available 
to SHAEF in the approximate locations: 
21 Army Group (Montgomery) (17+3)* Northwest Europe: Seine 
River/Normandy. 
Armoured Divisions: Gds, 7 lh, II Ih , 
79th 4 th CDN, I" Pol. 
Infantry Divisions: 3d, 15th 
, 
43d, 49th 
, 
50th, 5 I't, 53d, 5 9th 2d CDN, 3d 
CDN. 
Airborne Divisions: 6th 
Armoured Brigades: 4 th 8 th 27 th ,31" 
Tank, 33d, 34 th Tank, 6 th Gds, 2d 
CDN. 
Frankfurt corridors. 1977-1980 and 1985-1987. The -two-corps" estimate is based on frontages for 
World War 11 corps. 
17 *' 2 Army Intelligence Summary No. 92,4 Sep 44,2,3,6-9, Map App. E.; Summary No. 93,5 Sep 44, 
Map App B; Summary No. 101,13 Sep 44, App A. Geographically, this "approach" is the widest flat 
approach across northwestern Europe and extends as far as the Urals, hence the Eastern Approaches to 
Berlin. The best appreciation of this ground in NOT found in SHAEF files, but in open-source material 
during the Cold War. For examples, see Hugh Faringdon, Confrontation: The Strategic Geography of 
NA TO and the Warsaw Pact (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1986), passim; and Hugh 
Faringdon, Strategic Geograpkv. NA TO, the Warsaw Pact, and the Superpowers, 2d ed. (London: 
Routledge, 1989), passim. The SHAEF map collection in NARA is badly organized and incomplete. It 
has terrain studies for this area in 1945, but none earlier. 
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Independent Bdes: Special Air Service. I' Belgian Inf. Royal 
Netherands. 
12'h Army Group (Bradley) (21) Northwest Europe: Seine, Brittany. 
Normandy. 
Armored Divisions: 2d, 3d, 4th, 5 th 6 th . 7h, 2d FR. 
Infantry Divisions: 1', 2d, 4 th ,5 
th 
,8 
1h, 9th 
, 28th. 
29th 
,3 
Oh 
. 35 
th, 79th, 
80th 
, 83d, 
90th, 
SHAEF (Reserve) (5+1 'equivalent'): England 
First Allied Airborne Army. 
th Airborne Divisions: I BR., 17 82d, 101' 
Airlanding Divisions: 52d Lowland 
Brigades: I" Pol. 
*These brigades contained enough tanks to be considered tank-only 
equivalents of an armored division. Given army artillery and other 
independent infantry units, a conservative estimate would be that they 
would equate to 3-5 division equivalents. 
* *In theater but not considered operationally ready until 15 September. 
Divisions undeployed (ETOUSA) in theater 
94 h, 95 Ih, 17 Ih Airbome, ** 91h Armd, ** 
*arrived in theater before 30 August 44. Additionally, the force 
"follow-on" in forces actually deployed included in divisions: 5 
arrivals in September, 9 in October, 4 in November, 2 in December. 
The planners estimated a 30-day period was required to make divisions 
operational from time of arrival in theater. 518 
6 th Army Group (Devers) under AFHQ, Mediterranean until date to be 
determined, expected to be no later 30 September/South of France: 
Montelimar-Grenoble. This force was available for planning purposes 
only- 
Armored Divisions: I' FR 
Infantry Divisions: 3d, 36 Ih , 45, 
h, I" FR, 3d Algerian, 9th Colonial. 
5" CARL. Army Operational Research Group Report Memorandum No. E. 20, -Some Statistics of the 
North West Europe Campaign June 1944 to May 1945. " 2-3, notes the following strengths for 31 
August 1944: 12' Army Group, 613,00 men; 21 Army Group, 537,000. 
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Airborne Divisions: I" Airborne Task Force 519 
Eisenhower then had 37 divisions on the continent. the equivalent tank, 
strength (British only) of no less than three more, the airborne equivalent of six more 
in England, the expected arrival within a week of four more to be operational by I 
October, and a force of eight divisions to be transferred upon mutual agreement of the 
Supreme Commanders, whose ultimate operational plan would be decided by SHAEF. 
Arrayed against this growing force, which would increase until the following 
spring, was a retreating enemy whose strength in the west was determined (by 
SHAEF's estimate) to be the equivalent of seven panzer and 13 infantry divisions. 
west of the Seine and north of the Loire. Within days, SHAEF's evolving estimates 
placed the strength at 33 divisions on the entire western front, including the scattered 
remnants of eight panzer, eight infantry, and one para division in the 21 Army Group 
sector. Nine divisions were arrayed along the Channel Coast, reaching to the Zuider 
Zee. 520 Within three days of the meeting, the G-2 of the 21 Army Group would 
estimate that the enemy had suffered approximately 400,000 casualties in killed, 
wounded, captured, or penned in the coastal ports and a loss of approximately 1,500 
tanks of the 1,700 estimated to have be deployed. 521 As the toll of prisoners, destroyed 
""' EL, SHAEF G-3, WAR Room Summary, No. 78,23 August 1944, Ruppenthal. Logistical Support 
ofthe Armies, 11, Table 8-Divisional Buildup in the European Theater, 282-283; Wilson, Report ýv 
SACMED, 3440; Ellis, Victoi: y in the West, 1. Appendix IV, 521-532. American infantry divisions 
would also add the equivalent of one tank battalion and one tank destroyer battalion per division, 
normally from the Army Group -pool. " These in equivalent strength would have doubled the armored 
divisions assigned to Bradley's forces in total number of tanks/armored tank-killers. 
520 SHAEF Weekly Intelligence Summary, No. 22,19 August 1944,3, No. 23,26 August 1944,2-3; 
Order of Battle Map, "Enemy Order of Battle in the West as at 25 August 1944. " Though this map is 
for three days after the meeting, there was little change in known enemy dispositions during the 
interval period. 
52 ' 21 Army Group Intelligence Summary, No. 158,27 August 1944,1; Charles B. MacDonald, The 
Siegfried Line Campaign (Washington: Center of Military History, 1963,1984), 5. The American 
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or abandoned vehicles, and enemy units attacked by strafing increased. these figures 
would only become better for the Allies for the immediate future. The German Army. 
short of the West Wall. was seen as teetering and decimated. 
Military plans are based upon universal elements that. while namedý formatted. 
or sometimes subdivided into several subelements. all must be considered to translate 
a plan into an operational order. These are: Assumptions, Situation. Intelligence. 
Mission or Task, Intentions, Concept of Operations or Method. Administration and 
Logistics, and Command and Control. Planners update these to meet changes and 
convert the "plan" into a directive or order prior to its implementation. At lowest 
levels, the "plan" minus the assumptions equals the actual order, as that which was 
6'assumed" now is replaced by the situation as known. 522 
Montgomcry, as a didactic, ex-staff collcge instructor, was rcnowned for his 
ability both to dissect and distill situations and to explain them in directives 
accounting for these elements. The "appreciation" (British) or "estimate of the 
situation" (US) was an inseparable component of his basic intellectual processes. 
Eisenhower, the staff officer, trusted the staff estimate, and as he became a senior 
commander and found less time to analyze, tended to support staff recommendations. 
Moreover, as an "overall commander, "' he was responsible to direct and coordinate, 
official historian, Charles MacDonald, estimated Allied superiority at 20: 1 in tanks, 2.5: 1 in artillery. 
and total air superiority as belonging to the Allies. 
4 *" Both American and British -orders" consisted of these elements but under different names. The 
above description attempts to harmonize the titles of the subelements. 
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not to command and execute specific forces or operations. The '*ho%%*" of things he left 
to others. 
523 
Montgomery questioned all analysis until he had mentally "emsed the board" 
and reconstructed it ruthlessly. Moreover, he merged his intentions with his methods, 
essentially cutting the cloth to fit his coat, a practice ingrained in men who have the 
responsibility of executing their own plans. The SHAEF estimates ignored method 
below the thin tissue combining strategy with operational design, thus selectincy an 
"'object" and avenue and leaving the mechanics or even broad concepts for conduct of 
the campaign to others, even when these methods were neither optimal nor 
practical. 
524 
The situation under discussion on 23 August reflected two realities. The first 
was a decision relying upon an estimate and courses of action based on assumptions 
totally irrelevant to the actual situation as known and remaining secret to anyone but 
the SHAEF planners and senior staff. Against this was judged a proposed course of 
action based upon a sound but risky appreciation independently derived from the 
situation as known. The 23 August meeting, however, went further. In legal terms, 
Montgomery was forced to defend himself against evidence he was never allowed to 
'523 Eisenhower once bitterly criticized an attempt to compare him with commanders who were not 
6-ovcrall operational commanders, " i. e., Supreme Commanders. He used this comment on different 
occasions concerning both Patton and Montgomery, who did not have to "take into account all 
factors. " 
521 SHAEF's belief in a single, unremitting, determined drive into the heart of nine panzcr divisions 
and hundreds of antitank guns as the simple "breakout in the east solution" in Normandy is a case in 
point. SHAEF never followed Ludendorfrs dictum, "A strategical plan which ignores the tactical 
factor is forcdoomcd to failure. " See Erich von Ludendorff, Ludendorfl"s Own Story. 11 (New York: 
Harper and Brothers, 1919), 221. While Ludendorff did not prove to be a successful practitioner of his 
own theories, his idea nevertheless is correct. 
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see and which could only be known after it was used in a trial whose verdict was 
predetermined. 
Examining SHAEFs assumptions, had he been given the "Broad Front paper. 
" 
Montgomery would have been justified to attack the following assurnptions: 
"rhe main deduction" of the Allies' not having a disparity in forces for an 
extended period and that it might be eight months after D-Day before a superiority Of 
divisions in the field could be achieved was. in fact. nonsensical at August*s end. Fc%%' 
formations directly in front of the Allies were up to strength, but then became the 
cadre for rebuilt formations, a state of affairs that could only have been prevented if 
Germany were penetrated en masse and a final decisive battle fought while the Army 
in the west was weak and disorganized. 
The Joint Planners had argued against 
a line of advance which leads us to a head-on collision with the main 
GERMAN forces without opportunity for maneuver525 
While the weakened state of German forces negated the requirement to avoid 
"head-on collision" of forces, Montgomery's concentrated blow did provide for 
tactical maneuver, as some units fronting the enemy would obviously be on the flanks 
of the enemy who was penetrated, or opposed by an enemy in many cases unable to 
form cohesive defense lines. Moreover, the operational threat to both the southern 
66gap" via Metz-Saarbrucken, and the Rhine plain east of the Vosges through the 
Belfort Gap, would be made possible by the DRAGOON forces of 6'h Army Group 
allowed for in the Montgomery concept. That SHAEF's plans had not assigned a 
52. lPost Overlord Courses of Action, 2. 
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theoretical mission for DRAGOON. based on the idea that the advance on Metz was 
theorized by SHAEF as talcing place after D+270, is remarkable. 
The SHAEF planners decried a concentrated advance as confining the Allies to 
a "narrow front, " devoid of surprise and maneuver. leaving the advance open to flank- 
counterattacks and permitting the Southern France German formations to escape. 
526 
Montgomery's concept allowed for complementary operations by the 6 th Army Group, 
moreover. Eisenhower did have the opportunity to form a mobile task force. an 
armored corps, to link with the Seventh Army, while retaining Patton's Army for the 
northeastward thrust. This corps, ideally, would then be attached to Seventh Army, its 
forces and logistics then being centered on the Riviera ports. This mission was 
accounted for by the SHAEF Joint Planners, who noted that 
a subsidiary operation of this type would be of value if it could be 
carried out without diverting forces ftorn our main advance. 527 
Rather than being "irretrievably committed" to one "gap, " the operations of the 
6 th Army Group would logically be the force on the obviously subsidiary "gap, " not 
the much stronger 12 Ih Army Group, as desired by Bradley. This is a key point; 
assigning the 6 Ih Army Group as the subsidiary advance retains some semblance of a 
Gfimutually supporting axis, " as was most desired by SHAEF, but proportions it to meet 
326 Ibid., 6. 
127 : Ibid., 5; Seventh Army Report of Operations, 11,335-357. It must be noted that Patton was, in fact, 
ordered to hand over the XV Corps in late September, with the 2d French Armored Division, the 79" 
Infantry Division, and the 106' Cavalry Group (Mechanized). 
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its subsidiary role. not off-balancing the attack by assigning a larger force to the stated 
secondary attack. 528 
The "Ardennes" sector that creates the broad front. and not dual thrusts. was 
not ignored by the Montgomery plan. Montgomery's plan implies a blocking force 
within the Ardennes, as the Rhine Plain as far south as Cologne (Koln) would be 
assaulted and the tactics of his extended flank would be handled by the American 
Army Commander, not specified by the 21 Army Group Commander. At any rate. the 
Roer River approaches would require some force to block as far south as the 
Monschau Corridor in the Arderuics-Eifel area, and lateral communications along the 
Liege-Luxembourg line most likely would have been permitted as foreseen by the 
Joint Planners if 6 th Army Group maintained the southern axis. 529 
But not every deduction or statement made by the planners would have been 
contested by Montgomcry-only their context. For example. their statement of 
operational policy, congruent with the basis for his own proposal, retains almost 
prophetical irony for those who opposed him, and it therefore deserves reiteration: 
Our object must be to force the enemy to fight on ground favourable to 
armoured forces and in front of areas where communications offer 
suitable targets for our superior airpower. After every such action we 
should use our air and annoured forces to harass the enemy's retreat 
and give him no time to reform, at the same time using our airborne 
forces to facilitate the crossing of rivers and other natural obstacles. 
528 SHAEF War Room Daily Summary No. 78,23 August, lists Patton's Third Army with four corps, 
and seven infantry and four armored divisions. The Seventh US Army then possessed only the VI 
Corps of three infantry divisions. 
5'9 Post Overlord Courses of Action, 7. Note that this would also alleviate logistical problems by 
"dropping off" infantry divisions to block the mid-Rhineland area. These could be maintained by 
reduced logistical scales. 
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Our amphibious forces should be used to contain the enemy's coastal 
garrisons 530 
To Eisenhower, the Broad Front plan did retain some elements of 
Montgomery's concerns, though the planners' primary belief proved the unraveling, of 
their logic, 
the assumption that the GERMANS will contest our advance right up 
to the frontiers of GERMANY. 531 
The completely different situation should have caused a new evaluation by the 
SHAEF Joint Planners. None was forthcoming. Just as SHAEF had no answer for the 
forward defense chosen by the Germans, they failed to see options to seize 
opportunity. Eisenhower believed, falsely, that moving forward the previously decided 
upon strategy filled this vacuum, and that, in retrospect, he had not varied from 
SHAEF's master plan. His decision, however, did not stifle dissent with the choice, 
dissent fired by the fact that key elements had not been solved even by moving up the 
original Broad Front advance. The logistical support of the armies and tactical air 
forces had not been addressed, nor did Eisenhower accept or seem to understand the 
operational difference between his choice and the alternative. It was the essence of the 
difference that plagued Ike's decision and caused Montgomery to extend the decision 
into a debate. 
The conceptual differences underscored the nature of Eisenhower's 
generalship versus Montgomery's. Montgomery's followed a defined operational view 
'; 30 Post Overlord Courses of Action, Section 11,2-3. 
131 Ibid., 1. 
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that embodied the components of operational art and the more simplified "principles 
of wax' accepted by both nations. 
53" 
Montgomery had defined both an operational objective (the destruction of the 
German army) and the geo-economic-political objective stipulated by the SHAEF 
analysis (the Ruhr), and provided for a sequenced operational maneuver or threat. an 
advance toward Berlin. The principles of Maintenance of the Objective, Offensive 
Action, Concentration, Mobility, and Cooperation were all incorporated into his plan. 
Moreover, Montgomery's plan followed US operational doctrine concerning the 
"main effort" for which the northern approach was to be designated by Eisenhower. 
The main attack or main effoM by the American text book dermition. was: 
[a]ttack into which the commander throws the full weight of the 
offensive power at his disposal, attack directed at the chief objective of 
the campaign or battle; main effort. 533 
Reading ftirther in the American textbook, the secondary effort (which Bradley 
was to command under Broad Front) was, in fact, listed as "a holding attack": 
Supporting attack made to hold the enemy in check. divert his attention 
from the main attacking force, and prevent his reinforcing his troops 
532 While the term "operational art" did not exist in western manuals in 1944. Montgomery both 
understood and had practiced its elements. In November 1944 he published his ideas concerning "thc 
art of war, " entitled Some Notes on the Conduct of ffor and in December. reissued Some Notes on the 
Use ofAir Power in Support ofLand Operations and Direct Air Support, a veritable catechism for air- 
land battle operations. Both were published by 21 Army Group as pamphlets based on his earlier 
Eighth Army pamphlets. Both the United States and the Commonwealth had accepted -doctrine" 
concerning operations. These were both expressed in each nation's Field Service Regulations. and both 
nations published a "higher formations" manual: for the United States, I'M 100-15; for the Unitcd 
Kingdom, F. S. R. Volume 111. 
533 Dictionary of US Army Terms, 162; US Army, FM 100-5, Field Service Regulations: Operations 
[hereafter referred to as FM 100-5,1944] (Washington: War Department, 15 June 1944), 110,111. 
John 1. Alger, The Quest For Victory: The History ofthe Principles of War (London: Greenwood Press, 
1967). The appendix lists a complete chronological list showing the development and terminology of 
the principles by nation. See also, pages 240,241,244,247,249-251. 
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along the line of the main attack; containing attack, secondazy 
attack. 534 
An abbreviated appreciation for 22 August would have recognized the 
following factors in the shorthand used by planners: (See figure 29. ) 
Aim: Capture of the Ruhr and the Destruction of the German Army In 
the West 
Courses of Action: 
I. A single concentrated thrust using the preponderance of 12 and 21 
Army Groups with its left flank- on the Channel and its right on the 
Axis AACHEN-COLOGNE to seize the Ruhr, destroy enemy 
forces in sector, and to prepare for future operations on the Axis 
RUHR-BERLIN. 
2. A dual thrust using 21 Army Group in the north on the Axis 
LIEGE-'AACHEN-RUHR to seize the RUHR and 12 th Army 
Group on the Axis METZ-SAARBRUCKEN-MANNHEIM. 
3. A dual thrust using 21 Army Group to seize the Channel Coast and 
ANTWERP, and to protect the northern flank of the MAIN 
EFFORT via METZ-SAARBRUCKEN-FRANKFURT-RUHR. 
Discussion: 
Course of Action 1: 
Can achieve operational decision by destroying enemy forces and 
strategic object of capture of the Ruhr directly. 
Concentrates superior air and ground forces on the most direct 
avenue and on a specified axis. 
Takes advantage of the best avenue both to the Ruhr and beyond 
for further operations. 
Concentrates all armor on best armor approaches. 
Moves towards supply ports and permits full use of one army to 
capture ports. 
Directly threatens the V. I N. 2 Rocket/Missile launching sites. 
Permits complementary operations of two army groups. 
Permits formation of an operational reserve from units temporarily 
grounded or not immediately needed within the axis of advance. 
In range for use of Allied Airborne Army. 
534 Dictionary of US Arnti, Terms, 136. 
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in range of U. K. based aircraft. 
Abandons operational surprise once launched except by use of 
grouping or airborne forces. 
Concentrates enemy defense area. 
Course of Action 2: 
Permits maximum use of forces on widest frontage to stretch 
enemy defense. 
Permits varying of maneuver between axes. 
Moves away from ports (Normandy) but closer to ANTWERP- 
MARSEILLES. 
Forms Cohesive Front to enemy. 
Uses all available avenues. 
Stretches own combat power and disperses forces on divergent 
axes. 
Disperses armored forces. 
Abandons superiority of forces. 
Will eventually "beach"' all forces due to lack of maintenance 
before achieving final object. 
Requires phased attacks due to logistics and operational pause of 
several months. 
Does not achieve operational and strategic object in shortest 
amount of time-protracts the campaign. 
Course of Action 3: 
Gives largest flank and frontage (Channel to Antwerp to Ardennes) 
to second-smallest Army Group. 
Does not develop best avenue of approach. 
Does not take advantage of 6 Ih Army Group as they are masked 
from adequate avenues into German border and beyond. 
Concentrates bulk of forces in worst airfield country. 
Reduces two-thirds of ground force to objectives that cannot 
achieve operational decision. 
Discussion: Course of Action I provides the quickest possibility of 
achieving operational and strategic decision while focusing forces on 
clearing Channel Ports and Antwerp. It also optimizes use of ground, 
airfields, concentrated armored forces, and weather during critical 
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period of four-six weeks remaining for adequate flying/maneuver 
weather. It takes advantage of temporary enemy weakness. It directly 
threatens the missile threat to the U. K., and releases strategic and 
tactical air forces from CROSSBOW missions. Course of action 2 
divides forces and places largest and hardest supporled force on a 
secondary approach, which exits onto restricted maneuver ground 
farthest from the designated objective. It is hardest to support by local 
airfields or by air from U. K. and is generally out of range of U. K. 
based airborne forces. It is generally out of range for complementary 
operations to assist northern army group. Course of action 3 abandons 
all advantage of temporary superiority, air superiority, or logistical 
its full support and restricts use of DRAGOON force from developin,. 
operational potential. 
535 
These factors should have been examined formally by the SHAEF staff and 
discussed with the Army Group Commanders, including Devers. More important, 
SHAEF's G-3 should have prepared a complete draft plan delineating clear 
boundaries based on force-space ratios, appropriate objectives, and the expected 
follow-on deployment for 12 Ih Army Group through the Brittany ports. Also to be 
included would be the forces (and their sustenance and buildup) absorbed from the 
Mediterranean, following the attachment of the 6 th Army Group from the 
Mediterranean forces to SHAEF. In preparing such a plan, the key operational and 
logistical factors would have been addressed and could have been studied by the Army 
Groups tasked to execute operations. The initiation of such planning was 
Eisenhower's responsibility as overall commander. Failing to back his own 
discussions with an in-depth analysis by his own staff, and armed with a shabbily 
done, out-of-date outline memorandum, Eisenhower was forced to decide the key 
operational plan of the post-OVERLORD campaign based upon the independent 
535 
Author's estimate. 
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briefmL, s of two advocates. and the knowledge that he had been ordered by Marshall 
to assure that "the American contingent- was firmly under American command. 
While the advocates often described the plans in terms of overall ground 
command, it must be stressed that when Montgomery proposed an operational design 
and control structure for the two Army Groups currently under his operational control. 
he did not specify a maneuver plan for Oh Army Group except in general terms, nor 
did he advocate assuming control of it. SCAEF would give direction both to the two 
Army Groups through Montgomery and to Devers, essentially permitting a weakened 
Broad Front. Devers' force would fix enemy attention to the Metz approach and 
perhaps the Belfort Gap, as well as provide for the defense of the southern front. More 
important, accepting Montgomery's operational design at no time precluded 
Eisenhower from assuming complete command and coordination of all ground forces 
while executing a concentrated thrust in the North. The true issue was strategy and its 
operational design, not command. 
While the operational factors seemed clearcut. command-thc great bugaboo 
of coalitions-emerged to dominate what should have been a clear decision. 
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CHAPTERSEVEN 
Decision, Debate, Pursuit 
Montgomery flew to see Bradley on the morning of 23 August, vainly hoping 
that he would support the concentrated thrust plan. Having already issued his plans 
and having in his mind successfidly and geographically separated himself from the 
hated Britisher, Bradley announced his support for Eisenhower's idea of a Dual 
Thrust, or Broad Front. 536 (See figure 29. ) Returning to his own tactical headquarters. 
Montgomery awaited the Supreme Commander, intent on pleading his case for a 
concentrated thrust under his command. Had he known the truth, he would have been 
more deflated than by Bradley's apparent turn-around. 
The afternoon before, Eisenhower had signaled the Combined Chiefs of Staff. 
Alanbrooke's copy arrived in the evening. It elucidated several key points: that the 
"final system of command, " made possible by communications for the accompanying 
air and naval sections, would permit a transfer of command to SHAEF of all forces by 
I September. (See figure 26. ) While stating that the air situation would remain 
"coordinated" by SHAEF, the 
coordination between the 21" and Twelfth Army Groups, will 
terminate coincidentally with the establishment of SHAEF on the 
Continent. 
5 36 Patton Diaty, 23 August. Patton noted that Leigh Mallory had visited Bradley that day, supporting 
Monty's -four armies" turning north. Patton railed against sending tanks through Belgium, "where 
tanks are practically useless now. and will be wholly useless this winter. " The opposite is true. Belgium 
is a superior avenue of approach aiming directly into the industrial heart of Germany, vice Lorraine, 
where Patton advocated going. Additionally, Patton notes: "I told Bradley that if he, Hodges and 
myself offered to resign unless we went east, Ike would have to yield but Bradley would not agree and 
said we owed it to the troops to hold on because if we left, the pickings [other generals as 
replacements] were poor. " 
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Ren=ing the Amy Groups by their geographic locations. Eisenho%, -*Cr 
assigned objectives for each. He directed that Montgomery's 21 Army Group. called 
the Anny Group of the North by SCAEF, would 
operate to the Northeastward, securing successive bases along the coast 
with its final base possibly ANTUERP. Eventually it will be directed to 
advance Eastward generally North of the ARDENNES. The 21 Army 
Group will probably be reinforced by the entire Airborne Command 
and by such other units as are necessary to enable it to accomplish its 
first and immediately important missions [that Eisenhower defined as 
capturing the Pas de Calais). 
The 12'h Army Group. called the Army Group of the Center. he directed to 
advance under General BRADLEY [read not under Niontgomcry] to 
the East and Northeast of PARIS, from which area it can either strike 
Northeastward [to assist Montgomery] ... and later advance through 
the Low Countries, or, if the enemy strength in that region is not 
greater than I now believe, it can alternatively strike Eastward. passing 
South of the ARDENNES.... 
The speed of Bradley's advance to the region East of PARIS will be 
governed by the speed at which the ports in BRMANY can be 
cleaned up, and our supply situation improved. 531 
Eisenhower released the Strategic Air Forces -to resume maximum pressure 
against targets in GERMANY, " but noted they would remain on call only when the 
ground battle's requirements so demanded. lie noted that when the Army Group of the 
South was placed under SCAEF, it would 
continue to maneuver to support the advance of the Army Group of the 
Center. 538 
537 Alanbrooke Papers 6/2/30, SCAEF 67 222655B. AGWAR for the Combined Chiefs of Staff. 
Eisenhower Papers, IV, 2087-2089. In later messages he refirs to it as -the Northern Group of 
Armies. " 
538 
Ibid. 
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Thus, having committed himself both to a command structure and to what 
appeared to be a course of action placing both the "Centee' and "South" Army Groups 
south of the Ardennes, any discussion between the generals would not be open to 
acceptance of a different course of action. Bradley obviously convinced Eisenhower to 
weight the southern approach. Directing 21 Army Group on its "'final base" and only 
"eventually" moving east, Eisenhower appears to have been convinced by Bradley to 
accept the course of action not recommended by either the CIS or later, the JPS 
estimates. He appeared to be open to making the secondary avenue the main effort, 
without ever naming it so, thus avoiding controversy. 
539 
Montgomery spoke with Eisenhower alone, asking Bedell Smith and 
Humphrey Gale to wait until the two commanders aired their views privately. 
Montgomery summarized the meeting in his M- 108 to the CIGS. It said, in part: 
Ike came to see me today. After a long and weary discussion he agreed 
on our left flank we must clear the channel coast and establish a 
powerful air force in Belgium and invade the Ruhr. He also considers it 
necessary to invade Saar and would like to split the force. After further 
discussion he agreed that left flank movement must be strong enough 
to achieve quick success and it was then suggested there would not 
(repeat not) be enough left over for Saar operation at present. The 
problem of Command and control was then discussed. It seems public 
opinion in America demands Bradley shall hold his command directly 
under Ike and shall not be (repeat not be) subordinated to me. I said 
that left flank operations into Belgium and beyond would require 
careful co-ordination and control and that one commander must do 
this. This was finally agreed. 
531 Bradley's NORMANDY TO THE RHINE Plan does not mention support from either the 21 or 6' 
Army Groups. Nor does it clarify how his two armies would be supplied up to and beyond the Rhine. 
Eisenhower's message is congruent with the principles advanced by Bradley's plan. The Joint 
Planners, as mentioned previously, recommended that -the axis of advance should not be directed 
exclusively on the METZ Gap. " Should 21 Army Group be confined to seizing and establishing bases 
on the Channel up to Antwerp, the advance on the Ruhr becomes exactly this. Eisenhower consiscntly 
would claim after September that the -northern group" of armies was the "main effort, " while ignoring 
all the ramifications of such a statement, claiming to give them actual priority as expected by 
Montgomery would be -exclusionary. " 
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Notin- he expected a draft directive before the final orders were published. 
he 
a 
stated hopefully, 
I think discussion was valuable and cleared the air and there is a good 5,0 hope that directive will be what is wanted. ' 
In his oum log, he added several personal notes. He said that he offered to 
serve under Bradley, so important was it to have one commander coordinate the push. 
This Montgomery saidL "horrified him. " Encouraged by Eisenhower's willingness to 
let him 
co-ordinate the movement and fighting on the left flank as between 21 
Army Group and 12 Army Group, 
the strategy, not the command issue, was the problem Montgomery felt. Ile stated that 
Eisenhowcr, 
is terrified of public opinion in America and is trying to find a solution 
that will not put Bradley under me. 541 
More revealing, Monty recorded early in his description in his log that he 
prefaced his remarks to Eisenhower thusly 
I made it quite clear to whatever he decided. that would be donc-and 
loyally. But he must be in no doubt ever as to my views on the subject, 
if, after hearing my views, he decides to disregard thcm-that is his 
business and he has a perfect right to do so. 542 
Montgomery had no right to expect to be the ground commander in chief and 
had been told officially in June that the command would devolve to Eisenhower. that 
-w Alanbrooke Papers, 6/2/30, M- 108,23 August 1944. 
'4' Montgomeq Log, 23 August 1944. It is clear that Montgomery believed the power to coordinate 
duplicated his role in Normandy, at least as far as the operations of the left flank of Hodges' forces 
were concerned. Bradley. as it will be seen, never accepted this. 
542 Ibid. 
298 
the Army Groups would thereafter be referred to geographically. that these Arm%, 
Groups would organize into "two distinct zones of advance on the continent. - and that 
21 Army Group would be reinforced by either an American Army or at least a 
543 reinforced corps. 
American forces were in the ascendant numerically, and the preponderance of 
ground forces would, by the period of NEPTUNE's forecast end, be American. 
Having failed to provide an American combat general of sufficient seniority and 
combat experience to merit the "ground commander in chief' designation, the 
Americans had always considered overall ground command tQ be Eisenhower's job. 
544 
Lt. Gen. Nye, the Vice-Chief of the Imperial General Staff (VCIGS), had been present 
in Monty's tactical headquarters on the night of the 22 August and, after hearing of 
the results of the Eisenhower-Dc Guingand meeting, had cautioned Monty not to bring 
on an Allied command crisis, that' the coalition and not command was the key 
consideration. 545 
While it was apparent that Montgomery believed that the required close 
control of a concentrated thrust could not be handled by the Supreme Commander and 
the SHAEF staff, he appeared far more concerned about executing what he believed to 
be the correct plan than about retaining ground command, though losing was no doubt 
14' Ellis, Victory in the West. 1,83, citing SHAEF 17100/5/Ops, I June 1944. Eisenhower, on 19 
August, drafted a letter to Monty stating he would assume command; the draft exists in the SHAEF 
OVERLORD 381 file as well as in the Eisenhower Papers, IV. 2077-2079. Its receipt is not 
acknowleged in the Montgomery Log or any messages to the CIGS. It is possible that this letter-and 
the directive noted "as attached'ý--was never sent to Monty, as these points were to be the subject of 
the 23 August meeting and no message to Montgomery seems to refer to this directive concerning 
command arrangements. -The SHAEF I June message likewise appears missing from the SHAEF files. 
Pogue, The Supreme Command, 44; Harrison, Cross-Channel Attack-, 116,105-118 passim. 
Hamilton. Masterofthe Battlefield, 810. 
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a blow to his substantial ego. He therefore pressed Eisenhower for the 12 divisions Of 
the First Army. a contingency permitted by Eisenhower's planning guidance Of I June. 
but more importantly, a sizable force that. alongwith Dempsey's army. would permit 
a full-blooded thrust on the primary avenue of approach-a. thrust that would be made 
by First US Army. This thrust would go into the Ruhr, not merely accompany 
Dempsey to Antwerp as flank protection. 54 
Eisenhower refused attachment or operational control of an American Army. 
stating that, politically, American opinion demanded a firm detachment of British and 
American forces, and that his orders, in this American election year. were to 
accomplish that separation. Montgomery believed that Eisenhower. however. had 
acceded to the key point desired, in Montgomery's words, 
that kft flank operations into Belgium and beyond would require 
careful co-ordination and control and that one Commander must do 547 
this. This was finally agreed. 
From Montgomery's discussion, this clearly mcant that the general 
coordination and operational direction of the northern thrust would be his. Moreover, 
he believed this would include First Army's direction of attack. the only logical fruit 
of having such responsibility. 548 Moreover, considering Eisenhower's immediate 
correspondence with Monty, it is clear that both men considered both the plan and the 
subject of command settled. On 24 August, Eisenhower wrote that he was issuing a 
*'4 Montgomery, Memoirs, 24 1. He does not mention the I June document. but had obviously 
considered that it was more likely to achieve acceptance of "the plan" versus -the plan & command" 
option and had carefully considered what force would make his concept viable. as wcl I as supportable 
logistically. 
447 Alanbrooke Papers, M- 108,23 August. 
548 Montgomery, Memoirs, 241-242. 
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confirmatory directive. He noted Monty's mission of clearing the coast, securing 
Antwerp as a base and eventually moving on to the Ruhr and, seeing the campaign as 
phased, stated: 
By the time Antwerp is reached the general strength and composition 
of the forces needed for the later task [i. e., taking the Ruhr] will have 
been detennined. 
Besides feeding Montgomery's expectation that the campaign was still 
considered flexible and situation dependent, Eisenhower "confirmed" Montgomery's 
ideas concerning control of the northern attacks but stopped short of authorizing a 
concerted push into the Ruhr. This letter also inserted both the seeds for 
misunderstanding and the direction of Montgomery's actions for the critical period of 
August and September, not simply in the location of Eisenhower's main effort, but in 
the commitment of the Airborne Army, SHAEF's only operational reserve. The key 
passages stated: 
Bradley's Army Group will be directed to thrust forward on its left, 
with its principal offensive mission, for the moment, to support the 
Army Group of the North in the attainment of the objectives noted 
above. He will likewise be directed to clean up the Brittany Peninsula 
as rapidly as possible, protect against any threat against 
, our communications from the general area of Paris, and to begin building 
up. out of incoming forces, the necessary strength to advance eastward 
from Paris toward Metz. 
You, as Commanding General of the Army Group of the North, will be 
given the authority to effect the necessary operational coordination 
between your advancing forces and Bradley's left wing. Mechanical 
details for effecting this will be left to you and Bradley. 
Proceeding further, Eisenhower stated: 
We must immediately prepare definite plans for the employment of the 
entire airborne force so as to speed up the accomplishment of the 
missions that you must attain rapidly in the Northeast. Unless we use 
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the Airborne Army, assuming it is practicable to do so. we will not be 
using all available assets and there would be no excuse for insisting 
upon the deployment of the major part of Bradley's strength on his 
extreme left. 
Bradley is coming to see you this morning with instructions to bend 
every effort toward speeding up the deployment of his forces in that 
direction. The faster we do it the more certain will be our success and 
the earlier will come our opportunity to advance eastward from the 
Paris area. 
In closing, Ike noted that speed was a necessity, and that SHAEF's logistics staff had 
assured him the plan was supportable. 549 
Montgomery's log records that he was certain that this "coordination" came 
with a limit. He noted, 
It is clear to me that when the northern tasks arc completed, then the 
whole American effort will go off into the SAAR and central Germany. 
Montgomery recorded that he and Bradley confirmed a boundary and that 
Hodges' First Army 
can produce up to nine divisions ... and these will be directed to BRUSSELS-LIEGE area, on the right flank of 21 Army Group. 550 
Eisenhower reported his intentions to clear the northeastern sector and seize 
Antwerp to Marshall, but indicated that Bradley would clear Brittany, 
to provide for the necessary maintenance and the accelerated flow of 
divisions into this theater. 
Eisenhower indicated Bradley would build up east of Paris before driving to 
Metz, but stated that the importance of the objectives to the northeast required him to 
$49 EL, Correspondence File, Eisenhower to Montgomery, 24 August 1944; Eisenhower Papers, IV, 
2090-2092. 
$50 Xfontgomeq Log. 24 August 1944. 
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concentrate there, and not to attempt a simultaneous move to the east. He noted that 
he was anxious to attack eastward to the French-German border, 
but there is no point in getting there until we are in a position to do 
something about it. 551 
While SHAEF seemed hesitant to publish a directive too far in advance of the 
I September takeover, the Army Group commanders issued orders based upon their 
discussions with SCAEF and each other. With troops already in Paris, Bradley issued 
"Letter of Instructions Number Six" on 25 August. Ordering his forces to resume their 
advance to the northeast, to cross the Seine and complete the encirclement of Paris, he 
directed that the "main effort initially on the left (west) flank prepare for further 
advance into Gen-nany. " Most important, he listed as Third Army's primary mission, 
after advancing to Reims, to 
[b]e prepared to continue the advance on Army Group order to seize 
the crossings of the RHINE River from MANNHEIM to KOBLENZ 
(both inclusive). 
Patton's secondary mission was to use VIII Corps to complete Brittany's 
capture. 552 First Army's advance was carefully drawn to support the planned airborne 
operation LINNET. but Patton's indicated "directions of attack" clearly were planned 
to cross the Rhine south of the Ruhr, with eight infantry divisions and one armored. 
Two of Patton's armored divisions comprised the Brittany force. 553 
Eisenho iver Papers. IV. 2092-2094. 
12'h Armv Group Report of Operations. V, G-3,85-87, plus accompanying map, Annex No. I 
Operation ýIap. 
"3 Ibid.. see para. 2 c. "Troops. " A -direction of attack" is a restrictive measure specifying the exact 
route of attack to the objective. It is rare for an army group to specify exactly how an objective is to be 
approachcd. Bradicy's instructions specified these for each of the First and Third Army's corps. 
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Montgomery's M. 520 was issued the next day. (See figure 32. ) Montgomery 
listed his Army Group's tasks as continuing to the northeast destroying the enemy, to z 
secure the Pas de Calais, and then to secure Antwerp. He specified: 
Having completed these tasks, the eventual mission of the Army Group 
will be to advance eastwards on the RUHR. 554 
Montgomery followed Eisenhower's directions to the word; he was, in fact, 
rapidly organizing the campaign specified, but to maintain flexibility he directed 
Crerar's Army to keep its main weight to the right flank and to deal with enemy 
resistance by "right hooks. " Speed, as he and Eisenhower agreed, was critical. 
Montgomery directed his main-effort army, Dempsey's Second: 
The Army will move with its armoured strength deployed well ahead; 
its passage northwards must be swift and relentless. By this means it 
will cut across the communications of the enemy forces in the coastal 
belt, and will thus facilitate the operations of the Canadian Army. 
Monty specified how his armored "blitz" would be conducted: 
The proper tactics now are for strong armoured and mobile columns to 
by-pass enemy centres of resistance and to push boldly ahead, creating 
alarm and despondency in the enemy rear areas. 
Enemy centres of resistance thus by-passed should be dealt with by 
infantry columns coming on later. 
I rely on commanders of every rank and grade to "drive" ahead with 
the utmost energy; any tendency to be "sticky" or cautious must be 
stamped on ruthlessly. 
555 
Montgomery had given 30 Corps the nod to spearhead the advance, hoping 
that Horrocks would lead the pack. O'Connor, whose desert laurels had not been 
burnished in EPSOM, GOODWOOD, or BLUECOAT, had been "grounded" in 
1ý4 M. 520.26-844. 
W Ibid. 
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Normandy and his main transport assets taken to support Second Army's advance. 
Within a week, his armor had also been taken and placed in the van of attack. Second 
Army advanced with 30 Corps and 12 Corps after shaking out from their original one- 
corps frontage to the First US Army's left as it moved on to the Seine and began its 
assault at Vernon. Three other crossings were made north of Paris to give 12 Corps its 
own bridgehead and to provide crossing sites for Crerar's First Army to move on Le 
Havre and Dieppe. 556 
The pursuit for both Army Groups required a careful logistical regrouping, a 
reapportiomnent of transport, and carefullY drawn boundaries to pemiit each force 
adequate road space and crossing sites. During this period Bradley and Dempsey 
clashed over use of roads, and Bradley, perhaps "getting even" for his Sicilian 
campaign experience, both provoked and ignored British concerns. The British press 
reported Dempsey's offhand comments on the affair, and this minor incident festered 
along with many rapidly growing feelings of hate within the American camp. 557 
These feelings. fed by Patton's histrionics and "off-the-record" comments to 
the American press, were encouraged at 12'h Army Group by their SHAEF 
556 Second ArmY Histoq. 182-190. Baynes, The Forgotten Victor, 222-226, Chapter Seven, passim. 
O'Connor fclt slighted by being left out. and his biographer implies that O'Connor, not Horrocks, 
would have done a bctterjob both in the pursuit and during the GARDEN operation had 8 Corps been 
2d Army's spearhead corps. 
ýý7 MH1. Pogme Papers, Pogue interview with Bradley, 6 November 1946; EL. Correspondence File, 
Eiscnhowcr to Dempsey, 12 June 51,2 June 5 1; Dempsey to Bradley, May 25', 195 1; Bradley, A 
Soldier *s Storv. 383. Dempsey was reported in the press as noting that American traff ic on his roads 
had slowed his advance to the Seinc during the turn to the north. After the war Bradley described to the 
official historian that -Dempsey's charge was one of the greatest injustices ever done to the American 
Army. " This incidcnt never ended. Dempsey bristled over what he considered was a misstatement by 
the press and wrote Eisenhower in 1951 after Bradley revisited it in his memoirs. Bitter feelings had 
been fanned by the First Army Staff (formerly the II Corps Staff), who had also felt slighted in Sicily 
during the Patton-Monty affair: after COBRA, they felt that they, not the British, were the great 
contributors in NEPTUNE. The plain fact was that sufficient maneuver space and roads were needed 
and that parking the First Army in front of the Second Army when forces were being argued over for 
supporting a northern thrust was ignorant on Bradley's part. 
305 
counterparts, who saw the -coming of Eisenhower" as the end of their nemesis, 
Montgomery, who had berated their COSSAC plan. 559 Had Eisenhower stepped up to 
the land-command plate, this might have died. Eisenhower's conspicuous absence 
from the field, his tendency to permit the Army Groups to negotiate their own 
positions without firm guidance or support, his contradictory private statements and 
correspondence to Marshall, Bradley, and Montgomery, and his remarkable failure to 
issue a long-term "master plan" rather than short-term guidance messages gave all his 
competing command interests license to debate, argue, and in Bradley's case, sabotage 
coordinated plans for a cohesive campaign. Men would die, time would be lost, and 
the campaign would be skewed in September due to these practices. While the issue 
of strategy was a real one, the issue of command-not just who exercised it, but 
how-would be the determining factor in turning a favorable strategic situation into 
victory. This was SCAEF's responsibility. 
As the American official history for the campaign noted, at this time 
Eisenhower's forces had a superiority of 20 to I in tanks, 2.5 to I in field guns, and 
total air supremacy over the battle areas. Yet this advantage would be fleeting. 
Intelligence had gilded their estimates with gold-laced prophesies of early collapse, 
and Eisenhower ignored the Maintenance of the Objective Principle for the old rubric 
of pursuit stated in American doctrine, "The pursuit is conducted on a broad front, " 
and that during a pursuit, the commander "utilizes all means to maintain the continuity 
551% Hamilton. Nfasterofthe Battlefield, 741-754. Montgomery's biographer tracks the discontent with 
Montgomery bcst. Unpublished comments to be found in the Eisenhower Library in the Butcher 
Papet-s. Pajers ofKqv Summersb. v (Diary), and at the Military History Institute in the Bradlev 
Commentaries. 
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of the attack and to exert a relentless pressure on the defeated enemy. "559 The fact 
most unacceptable at SHAEF at this time was that the pursuit was rapidly coming to 
an end due to the broad-front pursuit's inability to be supported. Both Montgomery 
and Bradley had argued for a way to maintain an attack once the enemy recovered and 
supplies had to be rationed severely-, Eisenhower's plans, however, made no such 
accomodations, yet. 
On 29 August as virtually every Allied army was in hot pursuit on European 
soil of a retreating, battered Wehrmacht, Eisenhower published his fust directive for 
SHAEF's campaign. (See figure 33. ) Eisenhower announced, 
It is my intention to complete the destruction of the enemy forces in the 
West and then advance against the heart of the enemy homeland. 
Repeating his original orders of 24 August concerning advance to Antwerp, he 
restated that the left wing of Bradley's advance would act in conjunction with the 
"Northem Group of Armies" with the 
principal offensive mission of assisting the Northern Group of Armies 
in the destruction of enemy forces west of the Oise and south of the 
Somme. It will then advance rapidly across the Somme, prepared to 
continue to the advance to the northeast.... The Commander-in-Chief 
Central Group of Armies will build up our incoming forces east of 
Paris. prepare to strike rapidly eastwards towards the Saar Valley to 
reinforce the Allied advance north and west of the Ardennes, and to 
assist the advance of the Seventh Army [still in Devers' DRAGOON 
Forces] beyond Dijon. 560 
Montgomery's 21 Army Group was given authority to draft, "in conjunction" with the 
First Allied Airborne Army, a plan 
559 FM 100-5.1944.151.153. 
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for launching an airborne assault to insure the destruction of the 
retreating enemy forces. Planning and initial employment, in 
coordination with the Allied Naval and Air Commanders concerned, 
will be as directed by the Commander-in-Chief Northern Group of 
Armies. 
Montgomery's own control of the northern advance was limited by his 
authorization to effect coordination with Bradley, but not to have operational control 
over any elements in Bradley's sector. As ground commander, Eisenhower should 
have coordinated operations, not Montgomery, who was forced to deal without 
authority with Bradley, whose actions demonstrated that he never intended to offer 
anything but the appearance of cooperation, not act in harness on a single plan. 
Nor was the First Allied Airborne attached to 21 Army Group, whose authority 
extended to planning until forces actually landed on the ground. Brereton's command 
umbilical cord to SHAEF and his invisible authority lines to Spaatz and Arnold were 
likewise neither cut nor curtailed. In every case with Bradley, Hodges, or Brereton, 
Montgomery had to rely on agreement to gain compliance with any plan or order. 561 
Montgomery decided to use the airborne army at Tournai (OP LINNET) on 29 
August and, while waiting for the weather to clear, briefed Alanbrooke on the current 
situation. Montgomery noted that despite Bradley's agreement to move nine divisions 
toward Belgium, with the lack of a -ground C-in-C, and no air C-in-C, " problems may 
arise because 
5"" Eisenhower Papers, IV, 2100-2102; NARA, RG 33 1, Overlord 38 1. Msg FX-86983, and SCAF 
256/24. August 24,1944. On the 24", Field Marshal Wilson and Eisenhower began coordinating the 
change of command status for the southern forces. 
ý"' I bid.: Montgomety Log, 29 August 1944. notes that he had failed to be given powers of operational 
direction. He recorded his disagreement with the coordination of the left wing, and that he would 
discuss this auain with Eisenhower. n 
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Eisenhower's ideas for the future were that 12 Army Group should 
head off eastwards [to the] to the SAAR; Third Army (Patton) was 
already heading for FRANKFURT alone, and may well get into 
diff iculties. 562 
On I September, as Eisenhower "took command directly" of both the 21 and 
12 th Army Groups, Montgomery was promoted to Field Marshal, an event met with 
derision in the American camp and at SHAEF. 563 The day, however, beckoned future 
command issues, not affected by promotions in status or rank. The operational 
situation swung further toward a decision on advancing not merely "on" but "into" 
Germany, a decision put off by Eisenhower on the 23d, his letter on the 20, and his 
directive on the 29th. 
On 2 September, Eisenhower traveled to 12'h Army Group's Headquarters and 
met with Bradley, Vandenberg, Hodges, and Patton. Eisenhower's corrunanders 
stressed that continuing the American movement east would obviate the "future great 
battle of Germany, " as Patton recorded in his diary, but Patton also noted that "waiting 
would cause a battle for Germany. " Despite his messages to Montgomery and his later 
explanations, Eisenhower chaired a meeting that essentially pulled the American 
effort southward away from the direct approach into the Ruhr. In addition to assigning 
objectives for each army, decisions were made to reattach the 79'h Division to Patton 
after the clearance of the "Pas de Calais-Le Havre"; that the 6 th Armored would be 
reassigned from Brittany; and that priorities for supplies would be to V Corps of First 
ý"2. tfontgomeiy Log, 29 August 1944, Danchcv and Todman, Alanbrooke War Diaries, 586. 
Alanbrooke was not so pessimistic, but stated, -[I[t remains to be seen what political pressure is put on 
Eisenhower to move Americans on a separate axis ftom the British. " 
56 *; Eisenhower Papers, IV. 2110; Patton Diaq, September 1,1944. Eisenhower wrote a fulsome 
congratulatory note. Bradley, apparently, did not. Patton recorded cynically Eisenhower's public praise 
for Montgomery at a press conference held to underscore Ike's total control of ground operations. 
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Army and to Third Army. Several days earlier. Patton had met urith Lt. Gen. William 
H. Simpson, whose Ninth Army Headquarters would begin assuming command of 
units in Brittany. 
564 
Bradley And his generals were convinced that victory was in their grasp and 
that only Montgomery and the air force's plans to drop airborne troops, thus cutting 
off their air transport of supplies, could slow their victory. Hansen records Bradley as 
saying, 
Give me 8,000 tons [of supplies] east of Paris and we'll get going. I'll 
stop effort over on the east flank almost altogether and turn everything 
toward Germany. We can start nine divisions almost immediately. Six 
should certainly get to the Rhine very quickly. 
Hansen's own record expands on this view: 
General expects to be on the Rhine a week from Sunday [10 
September] if Ike will give him the go ahead sign on the movement he 
wants to make. Had we been able to go, perhaps we should have been 
there today. 565 
Eisenhower's stated operational vision remained one of several punches-one 
toward the Pas de Calais area, one to the area toward Brussels, and one cast of Paris. 
Montgomery still viewed the possibility of a single, seamless offensive along the 
Channel Coast, with the inside force wheeling due east through Liege-Aachen-Ruhr. 
5(4 Patton Dian-, August 31,1944; September 2,1944; Third A rntv COS Diary, I September 44: 
Eisenhower Pýpers. V, appointment diary. The Chief of Staff diary, Third Army notes that Third Army 
was stopped that day for lack of fuel and records the meeting. The Eisenhower Diaty and Patton Diary 
state this meeting was held on 2 September. The Patton Diary, 2 September 1944. also comments, "Ike 
is all for caution. since he has never been at the front and has no feel of actual fighting. " Patton damns 
the Services of Supply Chief, J. C. H. Lee, decrying Eisenhower's comment that the Communications 
Zone had done a miraculous job, "whereas we consider that they have failed utterly and probably lost 
us a victory before winter, through their inability to keep us supplied with gasoline. " No comment was 
made regarding Patton's failure to capture the American-rcquired ports. 
565 Hansen Diaýr, I September. Eisenhower failed to give Bradley permission to move 12 di Army 
Group due cast on the 2d. The 10' of September would have great significance for the campaign. On 
that day. Eisenhower would give Montgomery permission to seize a Rhine crossing. 
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As his orders and reorganization of both Crerar's and Dempsey's forces indicated, he 
intended both to concentrate and lead with annored forces and airborne landings. 
566 
Eisenhower's vision modified Montgomery's concept of sequential punches 
on opposite flanks as used in Normandy, a frontage only one-eighth the length that a 
move to the German border entailed. Heavily influenced by the "victory disease" 
spread by his intelligence section, Eisenhower saw these not as coordinated or timed 
punches or attacks but rather extensions of an all-out pursuit on all fronts. Intelligence 
clearly pointed out the weakness of the enemy, but a careful study of the remaining 
order of battle indicated that the Germans were in a good position to contest the 
clearing of the north coast and could move forces to block penetrations on key 
avenues. Montgomery wanted all available forces to steamroller the remaining enemy 
divisions as well as to concentrate astride the northern two avenues in a sector more 
than 100 miles wide. Eisenhower's idea that the enemy would be "stretchecl"ý--ancl 
thereby unable to resist-addressed neither force-to-space ratios nor the rapidly 
diminishing returns of the dispersion of logistical resources. 567 
Within several days of issuing his directive, the operational picture changed 
significantly, requiring Eisenhower to promulgate a concept for his campaign. 
SHAEF's G-2 trumpeted the good news: 
The German Army in the WEST is no longer a cohesive force but a 
number of fugitive battle groups, disorganized and even demoralized, 
short of equipment and arms ... The enemy, in fact, has been out- 
generalled and out-fought and is no longer in a position to offer serious 
resistance on any line short of the WEST wall ... And so, GERMANY 
Monipmeiý- Log, 31 August 1944. 
$67 By stretching his own forces. he assured that they would not be strong enough to break through 
rcsistancc whcn it formcd. or have the logistical wherewithal to shift forces to concentrate. 
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is inevitably faced with continued withdrawal in the WEST and on all 
her fronts for she does not now dispose sufficient forces. particularly 
annour, to compete with the Allied armies. 568 
SHAEF had unsophisticated means to assess enemy troop strength or 
capability but assessed the enemy's 50 nominal divisions as equating to 27 with a 
rough strength of two panzer and 10 infantry divisions north of the Ardennes, two 
panzer/panzer grenadier divisions and four infantry divisions south of the Ardennes, 
one division in Southwest France, and one panzer and two infantry divisions escaping 
from the Rhone Valley. Five divisions were penned in the ports designated by Hitler 
as "fortresses. 569 
The operational picture begged the question of the soundness of Eisenhower's 
decision to advance on all fronts. The remaining strength of the German Army 
remained not only in the north on the route to the Ruhr, but in the key port "fortresses" 
that SHAEF needed captured to fully develop the theater's administrative base. With 
Allied armor temporarily rampaging with impunity, any major changes in deployment 
had to be made immediately, before dispersion and logistics forced the advancing 
troops to remain on their current axes of advance. 
At the time of the Eisenhower-Montgomery meeting in August, Patton's Third 
Army had pushed almost to the Seine south of Paris, its spearheads reaching 
Fontainbleau. By the time Bradley's commanders met with Eisenhower ten days later, 
Third Army had reached the Meuse at Verdun-Commercy. Its cavalry elements 
"s SHAEF Weekly Intelligence Summary No. 24.2 September 1944,4. 
46Q Ibid.. 2. SHAEF never conducted -force ratio" or equivalent combat power correlations per front for 
its army groups. armics. or forces in general, nor did they focus on combat power analysis on 
individual avenues of approach except in very general terms. This was much of the problem in the 
Normandy beachhead. and it pcrsistcd throughout the campaign. 
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patrolled the Moselle between Pont-a-Mouson and Nancy. Both Patton's XR and XX 
Corps reported -no established [enemy] front line. " 570 Hodges' First Army had 
extended its XIX Corps across the Belgian border south of Tournai, its V Corps on the 
line Cambrai-Le Cateau, and its VII Corps to Mons to the south of Charleroi, bagging 
an additional 25,000 prisoners in the process. 571 
21 Army Group, however, was not outdone. Dempsey's Second Army had 
crossed the Seine and the Somme, and was disposed with the Guards Armoured, I Ith 
Armoured. and Vh Armoured Divisions from Douai to Bethune to Lille on 2 
September. Dempsey's intentions were to move on Brussels, Antwerp, and Ghent 
without stopping to consolidate or resupply. 572 (See figure 34. ) Crerar's two corps had 
advanced with the 11 Canadian Corps on the right and forward and the British I Corps 
on the coast. The First Army's mission had been to complete the destruction of the 
German army northwest of the Seine and to capture the ports of Dieppe and Le Havre. 
By the end of August, three division-sized bridgeheads had been established on the 
Seine and. while infantry proceeded towards the ports, Crerar passed the 4'h Canadian 
Armoured and the Polish Armoured Divisions forward in column on his right flank. 
Dieppe fell on I September while armored division spearheads reached the area north 
of Abbeville. 573 (See figure 35. ) 
170 Third Arnn-After Action Report. /. 61-63; Operations maps, 21 August, 31 August, 15 September 
1944.11. Statýf Reports. G-2.2 September. LXI-LXII. 
FUSA Report of Operations Aug 44-Feb 45.1'9 30-37, Situation Map No. 4 (AMIENS-LILLE- 
CHARLEROI). Most of these prisoners had escaped the "Falaise Gap. " 
SecondArm 
*v 
Histon% 193. Map -Dispositions and Intentions of Second Army on 2 Sep 44. 
(Reproduced as figure ý5. ) 
NAC. RG 24. Volume 10636. Report by GEN. H. D. G. Crerar, CB, DSO, covering Operations of the First Canadian Army from 24 AUG-I" SEPT 1944; NAC, RG 24, Volume 10542, File 215A21.016(9). 
Montgomcry sent a message to Crerar as his armor coiled for maintenance, saying, "IT IS VERY 
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21 Army Group's spearheads had moved 150 miles from 28 August to 2 
September and, with the enemy forming no coherent front, Dempsey's forces struck 
out toward its key objectives of Antwerp and Brussels. With bad weather delaying the 
air drop at Tournai, LINNET was cancelled when the US First Army continued its 
advance, overrunning the intended target area. Montgomery had wanted the I 
Airborne Corps to move toward Ghent, thus anchoring his flank while Second Army 
continued its advance, but discussions with Bradley on 3 September produced a new 
agreement. Army Group boundaries pointing cast defined the axes of advance of both 
Montgomery's and Bradley's Army Groups. From the point of view of operations, this 
was a far-reaching decision affecting the rest of the campaign in Europe. SHAEF was 
not present at the conference deciding upon these boundaries, nor was there any 
apparent discussion from the SHAEF G-3.574 
The new boundary gave Bradley operational responsibility for the area south 
of the line Toumai-Wavre-Hasselt-Sittard-Garzweiler. Dempsey described the inter- 
army boundary in more dramatic terms: 
It will run just SOUTH of a line BRUSSELS-DUSSELDORF, which 
gives the whole of the RUHR to me. We will, if possible, by-pass the 
RUHR to the NORTH and come in behind it near HAMM. 573 
Montgomery, as he frequently did, followed up the conference with a general 
-M" directive to confirm the details of what had been discussed. He announced as his 
intention in M. 523: 
necessary that your two Armd Divs should push forward with all speed towards ST OMER and 
bcyond. NOT rpt NOT consider this time for any div to halt for maintenance. Push on quickly. " 
ý14 Afonigomeq Log, 2-3 September 1944. 
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(a) To advance eastwards and destroy all enemy forces encountered. 
(b) To occupy the RUHR, and get astride the communications leading 
from it into Germany and to the sea ports. 576 
His general concept was to have Second Army complete the capture of Brussels- 
Ghent-Antwerp, with 12 Corps echeloned back to await Crerar's clearance of the 
Bruges area. Crerar's own advance was to halt in this area "until the maintenance 
situation allows its employment further forward. " His exact plan for the Second Army 
and his understanding of what Bradley had "agreed to" laid the groundwork for his 
later decisions (see figures 36 and 37): 
Second Army 
6. On 6 September. the Army will advance eastwards with its main 
bodies from the general line BRUSSELS-ANTWERP. Before that 
date light forces may operate far afield, as desired. 
7. The western face of the RUHR between DUSSELDORF and 
DUISBERG will be threatened frontally. 
8. The main weight of the Army will be directed on the RHINE 
between WESEL and ARNHEM. 
9. One division, or if necessary a Corps, will be turned northward 
towards ROTTERDAM and AMSTERDAM. 
10. Having crossed the RHINE, the Army will deal with the RUHR 
and will be directed on the general area OSNABRUCK-HAMM- 
MUNSTER-RHEINE. 
Operations of 12 Army Group 
11. First US Army is being directed to move its left forward in 
conjunction with the advance of 21 Army Group. 
12. First US Army is directing its left two Corps (7 and 19) on: 
MAASTRICHT-LIEGE 
SITTARD-AACHEN 
COLOGNE-BONN 
ý" Dempsey Diaq, 3 September 1944. Brussels had been given to Second Army in 21 Army Group 
Amendment No. I to M 520,29-8-44. 
ý*b M. 523.3-9-44. 
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13. First US Army will assist in cutting off the RUHR by operations 
against its south-eastem face, if such action is desired by Second 
Army. 577 
Eisenhower had met with his American commanders on 2 September, but had 
not seen Montgomery for any length of time since 23 August. In the meantime, he 
remained at SHAEF's "forward" headquarters, at Granville, France, some 400 miles 
from the front. He announced his "campaign plan" on 4 September by message. This 
message stated in part: 
Enemy resistance on the entire front shows signs of collapse. 
After reviewing the enemy situation. he estimated that the only course of action open 
to the Germans for preventing collapse was to reinforce their retreating forces with 
divisions from within Germany or other fronts to block the key entries to the Ruhr and 
the Saar, this contingency Eisenhower noted as being doubtful, as the enemy would 
place a priority on defending the Ruhr approach. He stated definitively- 
Our best opportunity of defeating the enemy in the West lies in striking 
at the RUHR and at the SAAR, confident that he will concentrate the 
remainder of his available forces in the defense of these essential areas. 
Having announced his chosen course of action, he stated: 
My intention continues to be the destruction of the enemy forces and 
this will be the primary task of all elements of the Allied Expeditionary 
Force. 
His concept of operations by groups of armies was stated as: 
The mission of Northern Group of Armies and of that part of Central 
Group of Armies operating north-west of the ARDENNES is to secure 
5.! - Ibid. 
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ANTWERP, breach the sector of the Siegfried Line covering the 
RUHR and then seize the RUHR. 578 
Given the importance of the Ruhr in the Allies' estimates, it was clear to 
Montgomery that Eisenhower not only had targeted his forces for the main objective, 
but also had confirmed that Bradley would closely cooperate and that this directive 
thoroughly supported his M. 523, issued the day before. 
Assuming that the message followed the standard missions in priority, 
Bradley's missions south of the Ardennes were clear 
The missions of the Central Group of Armies, exclusive of that portion 
operating north-west of the ARDENNES, are: 
A. To capture Brest 
B. To protect the southern flank of Allied Expeditionary Force 
C. To occupy the sector of the Siegftied Line covering the SAAR and 
then to seize FRANKFURT. It is important that this operation 
should start as soon as possible, in order to forestall the enemy in 
this sector, but troops of Central Group of Armies operating against 
the RUHR north-west of the ARDENNES must first be adequately 
supported. 
D. To take any opportunity of destroying enemy forces withdrawing 
from south-west and southern FRANCE. 
The final paragraph continued the ill-defined command authority of 21 Army 
Group over First Allied Airbome Army: 
The First Allied Airborne Army will operate in support of Northern 
Group of Armies up to and including the crossing of the RHINE and 
then be prepared to operate in large scale operations in the advance into 
GERMANY. 579 
52 " Eisenhower Papers, 11'. 2115-2118 , NARA RG 33 1. Overlord 38 1, msg. 13765,4 Sept 1944. This 
message was drafted by the G-3, Maj. -Gen. Bull, on 3 September and was reviewed in conference with 
Spaatz and two of his air commanders, and with Bull. Eisenhower strengthened the words concerning 
FAAA from the draft. -will operate in accordance with existing instructions. " 
5,1114 Ibid. 
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Eisenhower's directive was not meant to bow to Montgomery's plan nor even 
to grant priority for it. More important was the accompanying staff paper that went to 
Eisenhower unseen by the Commander of 21 Army Group, though its contents were 
obviously inspired by the 2 September Americans-only command meeting chaired by 
Eisenhower. The accompanying paper, called [the] "Advance to Breach the Seigfiried 
[sic] Line Appreciation, " revisited the issue of forces to favor an advance by Third 
Anny. The tactical situation, it stated, posed 
an opportunity to breach the Seigfried [sic) Line by rapid aggressive 
movement by the Third Army on the SAAR and thence on 
FRANKFURT. Estimates indicate that the minimum forces for this 
operation should be about seven divisions. From the logistical point of 
view, however. Central Group of Armies only can say whether this 
would be possible without prejudicing operations north of the 
ARDENNES. As US ground forces are now distributed, the operation 
appears practicable only if a corps of three divisions is withdrawn from 
the First Army effort and made available to the Third Army, thus 
leaving First Army with two corps of three divisions each. 380 
The 14 th" 15th , and 16 
th paragraphs of the memo contradicted the logic of the 
SHAEF's G-2 Enemy Order of Battle Map, published on 2 September, that showed 
unengaged enemy divisions holding the Channel Coast as far as the hook of Holland. 
These paraggaphs stated: 
In view of the relative weakness of the enemy northwest of the 
ARDENNES. it is considered practicable to reduce the strength of the 
Allied forces making the main effort without prejudicing its success. In 
fact. it is considered desirable to do so to maintain the speed of 
advance. If one US corps is withdrawn from these forces, the Northern 
Group of Armies will have its own fourteen divisions plus the support 
of the First Army (UNITED STATES) with six divisions. The First 
590 NARA. RG 331. Overlord 381. SHAEF/17100/18/Ops(A), "Advance to Breach the SEIGFRI ED 
[sic] LINE Appreciation. 1. SHAEF Weekly Intelligence Summary No. 24; Patton Diary, 30 August 
1944: Patton. ffarAs / Knew It, 120. Patton states that he had made this argument to Bradley and Bull 
on this day. but that SHAEF did not concur with it. He referred to this as -the most momentous error of 
the war. - Four days later. it appears that Bull is making Patton's case for him to Eisenhower. 
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Allied Airborne Army of approximately four divisions will also 
support the Northern Group of Armies. There will therefore be twenty- 
four divisiorls for the accomplishment of the main object. 
This reduction in strength of the First Army would release a Corps of 
three divisions for operations elsewhere on the firont of Central Group 
of Armies. Whether this extra Corps could be used in an offensive role 
depends upon the logistic situation which is a matter for Central Group 
of Armies. It is not considered that operations should be conducted 
towards the SAAR at the expense, logistically, of the main operations. 
Should it prove possible to operate against the SAAR without 
prejudices to the main operations against the RUHR there are many 
advantages to be gained by anticipating the enemy in the occupation of 
the SAAR sector of the SEIGFRIED [sic] LINE and striking at 
FRANKFORT [sic] without ffirther delay. 
The staffs recommendation was precisely what Eisenhower wanted to hear, 
and to believe: 
General Bradley has full authority to transfer units from First to Third 
Armies. Therefore, no instruction to him in this respect is necessary. 
Should. however. the Supreme Commander be called upon to make a 
decision on this question, it is recommended that: 
a. First Anny be reduced to two Corps and given first call on US 
logistical resources; 
b. Third Army, reinforced as required, be pennitted to advance on the 
SAAR as soon as this can be undertaken without prejudice to 
operations northwest of the ARDENNES; 
C. A Corps be held in Army Group reserve in the PARIS-TROYES- 
[area] for use as necessary. 581 
Thus, Eisenhower was given his "staff's recommendation, " which was in fact, 
based on personal friendships and politics rather than on military considerations. 
Having already decided that the Saar would have equal verbal weight in all 
discussions of objectives with the Ruhr, despite the obvious falsehood of the matter as 
identified by the JIS appreciation, Bull's appreciation of the forces available, their 
5" SEIGFRIED [sic] LINE Apprcciation, 2. 
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capabilities, and the stated ability not "to prejudice operations north of the 
ARDENNES"' by stripping away forces was sophistry, not a careful appreciation. The 
false positive enemy picture implied was in contradiction to Eisenhower"s own G-2's 
estimate. Bull's paper was in fact, low-grade staff work. Bull had "situated the 
appreciation. " 
At the heart of the problem was SHAEF's own "appreciation. "" Using 
statements such as, "The enemy has no prospect of a rectification of this dismal state 
of affairs, " while dramatic, was incredibly wrong. 582 The much vaunted ULTRA 
failed to identify German moves within Germany not only to strengthen the West 
Wall. but to create panzer brigades from burnt-out Eastern Front divisions or to 
rapidly reequip and reorganize divisions from the streams of stragglers unstoppable by 
the "air supremacy" that had meant so much. Moreover, SHAEF seemed ignorant of 
the tactical problems at hand. 
The ports all had to be reduced by force, requiring thousands of tons of bombs 
and artillery as well as troops. Once captured, each would require up to two months to 
be cleared of mines, debris and sunken ships, and engineers had to rebuild facilities as 
well as rail and road links from each port to the outside. Never was the victory disease 
more prevalent than among Eisenhower, the SHAEF staff, and America's self- 
proclaimed thruster. Patton. Patton's fantasy of going to Frankfurt with seven 
divisions was a recipe for nondecision at the operational level, even if it could be 
accomplished. Moreover. it ignored every factor of terrain, enemy strength, logistics, 
and weather, besides hamstringing airpower. Besides failing to guarantee any 
582, SHAEF Wcckly Summary No. 24,4. 
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operational decision, SHAEF's planners had failed to consult their own logisticians, 
who contributed nothing to the directive. Once the directive was sent, the logisticians 
convened finally to assess what could be done. The 4 September directive rivaled 
Eisenhower"s TORCH plan for failing to concentrate on getting to the primary 
objective. 583 
Also of import as the days of fall turned to rain, was the great weight given to 
First Allied Airborne Army. It was not, in fact, the same as adding four divisions to 21 
Army Group. As July and August had alreadly shown, it was difficult to bring an 
airborne operation to fruition. Nor were the airmen and airborne commanders intent 
on letting their forces be used for campaigning once dropped. Seize, hold, and leave 
quickly were their watchwords. Intent on a safe drop and a rapid link, Brereton and the 
Americans intended to keep US divisions out of 21 Army Group's order of battle for 
any but a yery short time. Melding this mindset to an opemtionally significant 
objective was a challenge not yet accomplished. 
Most ludicrous was the implication that the forces available north of the 
Ardennes were a coordinated force heading for the Ruhr. They were not under one 
commander following one plan. First Army's left neither supported nor acted in 
concert with Dempsey and Brereton's divisions were not under Montgomery's 
command until dropped, and then for a limited period. Nor were the "14" divisions of 
21 Army Group available to press to the Ruhr. In Crerar's Army, I Corps was spread 
from Le Havre to Abbeville and Crerar was debating with Montgomery the problem 
5" Pogue. The Supreme Command, 258.259. The Chief of Staff of IX Engineer Command, which built 
airfields for 9" Air Force. estimated that support possibilities for Patton's divisions would be heavily 
restricted. and estimated that perhaps no more than three divisions could be supplied. 
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of laying siege to Boulougne, Calais, Dunkirk. and Ostende. besides reaching to the 
Scheldt, an air-line distance of 90 miles. Dempsey had yet to recover his 8 Corps from 
Normandy, and his remaining corps driving toward Breda and Eindhoven were halted 
at the Dutch frontier awaiting airborne support. In reality, only five divisions and two 
armored brigades were available for a drive either eastward or northward once 
Antwerp was cleared. Any force driving eastward would have to rely heavily on First 
Army to carry the Licge-Aachen-Cologne corridor. the true highway to the Reich. And 
Bradley refused to synchronize his lcft with these efforts. From this -attack, " Bull 
thought removing divisions would speed the process of penetrating the Siegfried 
Line? How? 
Eisenhower's directive was transmitted at 1755, no doubt crossing 
Montgomery*s M-160, which was transmitted at 2055. Given the state of SHAEF's 
communications and its isolation, Eisenhower should have understood that Monty 
would have communicated something after the 2 September meeting, but probably not 
so soon. Montgomery's Liaison Officer at 12 th Army Group informed him that 
Bradley would split his supplies evenly between Hodges and Patton. This bode poorly 
for a concerted thrust on the Ruhr by Dempsey and Hodges, as Montgomery recorded 
in his log: 
First Arrny, on my right, is being scaled down in consequence; and its 
right hand Corps is being directed round to the south of the Ardennes; 
only two corps 7 and 19, are coming on with me on my right.... 
I feel very strongly that a big decision is required. 584 
""Montgomety Log, 4 September 1944. The day before. he noted his belief in a strong thrust 
somewhere. " Appreciating the terrain, he stated. "The country leading into Germany via METZ and 
FRANKFURT is very hilly and wooded, and is good for defence. It is easy 'going' round north of the 
RUHR. - 
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M-160 was a devastating appreciation that contradicted the yet-to-be-seen 
Eisenhower directive. In nine short paragraphs, Montgomery critiqued the situation as 
he saw it, stressing the logistical problems that would only increase and revisiting the 
objective and the object of the OVERLORD campaign: 
1.1 consider we have now reached a stage where one really powerful 
and full-blooded thrust toward Berlin is likely to get there and thus 
end the German war. 
2. We have not enough maintenance resources for two full-blooded 
thrusts. 
3. The selected thrust must have all the maintenance resources it 
needs without any qualification and any other operations must do 
the best it can with what is left over. 
4. There are only two possible thrusts, one via the Ruhr and the other 
via Metz and the Saar. 
5. In my opinion the thrust likely to give the best and quickest results 
is the northern one via the Ruhr. 
6. Time is vital and the decision regarding the selected thrust must be 
made at once and Paragraph 3 above will then apply. 
7. If we attempt a compromise solution and split our maintenance 
resources so that neither thrust is full-blooded we will prolong the 
war. 
8.1 consider the problem viewed above as very simple and clear-cut. 
9. The matter is of such vital importance that I feel sure you will agree 
that a decision on the above lines is required at once. If you are 
coming this way perhaps you would look in and discuss it. If so, 
delighted to see you [for] lunch tomorrow. Do not feel I can leave 585 this battle just at present. 
No meeting of the minds was possible, for both commanders viewed the 
situation from prejudiced vistas. 12 th Army Group's battle had encouraged 
Eisenhower to start the Double Thrust theorized by the Broad Front concept. Patton's 
ý" EL. Correspondence File, M 160,4 September 1944. Monty also hand-wrotc a letter to Eisenhower 
on the same date thanking him for his congratulations on promotion to Field Marshal. Judging from the 
tonc of his message. letter, and log entries, he considered that there was no chasm in their relationship 
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Third Army had been halted on 30 August due to lack of fuel. Bradley restored Third 
Army's equal issue of fuel with First Army on 5 September, and Patton decided, if 
necessary, he would continue his attack by pretending to reconnoiter and then 
reinforcing his advance as an attack. Patton moved out toward the Moselle, the 
Siegffied Line, and in his mindý "the Rhine. " The same day, Bradley transferred the 
79th Division from the XIX Corps near Mons to Patton's XV Corps on his right flank, 
a move that Eisenhower had approved on 2 September. 586 
Fuel. however. remained the main issue. Bradley's equalization of supply for 
both First and Third Army belied any claim by Eisenhower that the northern thrust 
had "priority.,, 587 While Monty counted on a full-blown attack by First Amy toward 
Aachen. Bradley disregarded this concern for attacking directly into the industrial 
heart of Germany in order to reestablish his heartfelt plan, the five-corps assault south 
of the Ardennes that he had proposed in the NORMANDY TO THE RIIINE plan. 
Patton*s forces moved forward as his supplies increased, and he ordered his two 
advancing corps, the XII and XX, to seize Nancy and Metz, respectively. Patton added 
and that he was expressing his professional opinion, not challenging Eisenhower's right to command. 
Montgomery had seen Ike for -10 minutes" on the 26, their last substantial discussion was on the 23d. 
"" Pation Diary. September 3-5,1944: MHI, Pogue Papers. Bradley interview with Pogue. Bradley 
states he pcrmittcd Patton to stop when he felt it was necessary. 
'I. CMH. Royce L. Thompson. Historical Division, Services of Supply. MS, "ETO Field Commands 
Gasolinc Status August-September 1944, " Study No. 21,1948,16,36. Patton's Third Army on I 
Scptcmbcr'*rcquired" 450.000 gallons of gasoline, 10,000 gallons of diesel, plus lubricants; 110,600 
gallons %%, crc dclivcrcd. Packaged gasoline (in cans) was computed at a rate of 276 gallons per long ton. 
Bulk gasoline was computed at 368 gallons per ton. As a very rough estimate, an American field army 
in September 1944 requircd about 1.100 tons of fuel daily. Patton's Army, temporarily under a 2,000- 
ton-pcr-dav supply limit (2 September), requested 1,500 tons daily in fuel, 500 in ration s/supp I ies. See 
COS Thh-hrm. r biaýy. 28 August-2 September 1944. 
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a flourish to his plan; he ordered XH Corps to be prepared to rush forward to seize 
Mannheim and establish a bridgehead on the east bank of the Rhine. 588 
Hodges' First Army was the key to any American participation in a 
concentrated northern offensive or any direct attack on the Ruhr. It had begun its 
swing north on Dempsey's flank with nine divisions, three of them armored. Bradley 
in his 2 September conference had made clear that the right (southernmost) corps, the 
Vth, was to have priority of supply. Fronted between Soissons and Compiegne, V 
Corps wheeled due eastward with two infantry and one armored division with its new 
boundaries stretching from the Grand Dutchy of Luxembourg to the southern Belgian 
border. On 4 September it pushed toward the Meuse and beyond. 589 By 6 September, 
V Corps had captured Sedan and, as gasoline shortages halted its armor, enemy 
resistance stiffened about 8 September. By 10 September, the corps had entered 
Luxembourg City and prepared to cross the Sauer River and then move on to 
Coblenz. 590 
Hodges had told his corps commanders, "It is my desire that the advance of 
First Anny shall not be stopped for lack of supplies. " Supply economies, however, 
had fallen short of this goal, though the Army was arrayed from right to left almost on 
the German border. Hodges' G-2 reported four infantry and seven panzer divisions to 
the Army's front, in a strength approximating two infantry and two panzer divisions. 
Liege. directly on the gateway to Germany, had fallen on the 8 1h , and by II September 
588 Tliit-(1.4i-tti. %-. 4. lier, 4ction Repdrt. 1. September 4 (D+90); ibid., Annex 2, Operational Directive, 5 
Scp 44. XI. 
5'9 VCorps Histoq. 228-234. contains operations maps, orders, and overlays as well as a narrative for 
the advance. 
5" Ibid.. 235-242. 
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divisional patrols had entered Germany in the V and VII Corps sectors. Bradley's 
reduction of the 5: 2 tonnage allocations between First and Third Armies to a 1: 1 ratio 
had been hardest felt in XIX Corps, which had barely reached the Dutch border near 
Maastricht when the Army halted on 12 September. 591 
The result of Hodges' priorities was a refused left flank leaving a gap between 
21 Army Group and First Army. On Bradley's bidding, Hodges had pushed toward his 
right. ostensibly to gain crossings on the Meuse, but leaving the XIX Corps' troops in 
the more open sector into Germany grounded for lack of fuel. While First Army's 
other corps were at the Siegfried Line, XIX Corps was leapfrogging its units and was 
still 20 miles from the border. More important, with the Siegfried Line at its weakest 
and the enemy retreating in disarray, Bradley had withdrawn the 79th Division from 
the extreme left flank of his army group to be moved to Patton's right-hand flank, 
several hundred miles away. Perhaps more critically, at the same time he had moved 
the 5th Armored Division from its assembly area near the 791h, to accompany V Corps 
on its advance towards the hills and woods of the Ei fel. 592 
From the point of view of sitting on the best terrain corridor into Germany and 
beyond, and 12 th Army Group's assigned mission of supporting the 21 Army Group, 
XIX Corps should have been First Army's main effort and an obvious candidate for 
59'FUS. 4 Report of Operations Aug 44-Feb 45,3846; Situation Map No. 5, LIEGE-AACHEN- 
DUREN. 
"2 CMH Files. 8-3.1 AW, MS. Historical Division, European Theater of Operations, Breaching the 
Siegfried Line, 1, Chapters. 1. Ill. VII. Vill, XII. (This is the theater "first draft" of the official history. 
It is not to be confused with XIX Corps pamphlet of same name listed in bibliography. ) Bradley's 
action is in concert with the -infantry view" that every corps needed an armored division. Bradley 
makes no mention of this in his memoirs, and his own operations files are strangely empty concerning 
this period: the intelligence files for this period are missing. The official historian sheds little light on 
the decision, though the theater historian's preliminary history has excellent material and maps 
concerning XIX Corps problems. Additional material is found in the Combat Interviews Section of the 
Theater Historian's Files. RG 407. 
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the addition of another armored division. Instead, XIX Corps was grounded and 
stripped of a division which, at the height of the "fuel crisis, " was transported laterally 
across the length of the Army Group's own lines of communication to be committed 
in a secondary operation. A four-division thrust by XIX Corps, then, was ruled out, 
Corlett being denied the ability to make a key thrust conceptually similar to that of 
another XIX Corps Commander in another army, Heinz Guderian, had made in 1940. 
From the point of view of ground alone, Corlett was the key to the Schlieffen-in- 
reverse plan that drove Montgomery's intentions. Bradley hobbled him at the time the 
Germans were weakest. 
Bradley, as a self-professed master student of terrain, must have known this. 593 
The joint decision of Montgomery and Bradley to extend the Army Group boundary 
beyond Brussels and into Germany had given Bradley the best terrain approach. From 
a geographical perspective, the two avenues identified for SHAEF's Broad Front or 
double thrust were within the confines of 12 th Army Group's boundaries. The northern 
terrain approach begged a heavy concentration of armor which, in the hands of a 
"German" or like-thinking general (or following Montgomery's operational policy set 
forth in M. 520), would have rushed the enemy's defenses as they were still unmanned 
and perhaps linked with airborne forces to cross the waterways. This had happened in 
reverse in 1940 in the same sector during the seizure of Eben Emael. 594 In 1944, with 
the Rhine and the Ruhr ahead on an eastward axis, its logic was undeniable. 
5" The author willingly attests to Bradley's ability to read a tactical map. During several on-the-ground 
studies of the Tunisian battles of Bradley's corps outside of Bizerte, especially the four-division assault 
from Choigui Pass northward. the author was impressed with the precision and care of Bradley's 
terrain estimate and attack plan. Bradley, like Montgomery, was a master of the set-picce attack at 
corps level. 
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Moreover. such an advance would have been an American operation. with Second 
Army relegated to protecting its north flank and operational coordination logically 
being performed by a strong "ground forces commander, " Eisenhower. This would 
have been the obvious result had LINNET 11 been agreed upon. but it was shunned by 
Bradley. 
Having insisted on an advance to the east into the Saar, Bradley sabotaged his 
own and hence Montgomery's advance on a northern route by hamstringing Hodges 
with fuel reductions and stripping away troops. Patton's thrust might have been 
staggered as the "one-two punch" that Eisenhower had originally seen as the armies 
had turned north. The 2 September meeting had released both Patton and V Corps to 
resurrect 12'h Army Group's southern attack as its own "main effort. " 
Hansen's diary records over time the evolution of Bradley's thinking that 
crippled the northern thrust. Bradley's mental state concerning Montgomery's 
influence had reached paranoic proportions and this manifested itself in Bradley's 
mind as battlefields geographically separated into American and British sectors. 
Geography and the smaller size of the 21 Army Group, however, precluded this, 
though Bradley still advocated it. His aide recorded Bradley's reaction to the 
newspaper coverage of Montgomery's "command" of ground forces: 
I get along with Monty fine enough. But, we've got to make it clear to 
the American public that we are no longer under any control of 
Monty's. 
ý44 Alexander McKee. TheRacefor the Rhine Bridges: 1940,1944,1945 (New York: Stein and Day, 
197 1). Part 1. examines the 1940 operations in this area. 
328 
To Bradley, that meant having his own separate geographic area, and not 
participating in joint or complementary operations. Having encouraged his own press 
camp to report -his successes, " Bradley, still under 21 Army Group's "operational 
direction, " had savaged his aide for passing on a message from Montgomery inquiring 
of the military situation in Paris, saying, "What the devil business is that of his? " 
Similar outbursts followed British attempts to coordinate boundaries during the move 
toward Brussels. Bradley had no doubt harbored anti-British grudges since Tunisia, 
but Patton's never-ending rants fueled the discord in his mind. That the egocentric 
Montgomery seemed blissfully unaware of Bradley's hatred complicated matters, 
particularly when Bradley simply "listened" rather than expressing disagreement. 595 
Bradley's solution was to fight his "own" sector, the Saar. He followed another 
Missourian. John J. Pershing, in believing the advance to victory lay only through 
Lorraine. Eisenhower had agreed with Montgomery that the key approach north of the 
Ardennes needed more troops by placing First Army alongside 21 Army Group. When 
Bradley acceded to Montgomery's change in boundaries, Hodges found himself 
fronting on the Liege-Aachen-Cologne approach, the primary avenue named by the 
SHAEF planners. Hansen recorded how Bradley wanted to fight: 
Gen's [Bradley's] original plan called for supply schedule that would 
assign supply to Third Army, hold First [Army] in place until Third got 
on the Rhine. Now it is planned to shoot both annies, on to the Rhine in 
force and for that reason it has been necessary to hold them up for 
Hansen Dian-, 25 August 1944; Patton Dian,, passim, MHI, Bradley Commentaries, passim. 
Patton. as previously mentioned, had long advocated that Eisenhower was "over-persuaded" by Monty 
and that the British had sought to diminish all American influence or credit for victory. Bradley 
consistantly held that the British would meet no resistance in the north and that no American troops 
should be committed on the northern avenue. On I September, Hansen records Bradley as saying: I 
told Ike when he was here that Monty didn't need anything to help him in his effort that [sic] what he 
had was plenty and that he wouldn't find any opposition going up there-that we should turn east, 
through [throw) everything we got into Germany and by Krist [sic) we can. " 
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supply. When both are up to the Rhine. the force of the effort will go to 
the First Army which will then gain a bridgehead and together with the 
British Army plan to cut off an[d] isolate the Ruhr from the rest of 
Germany, the British fqom] the north and we from the south. If 
possible, we shall extend a bridgehead on the far side of the Rhine as a 
base for future operations in the Third Army sector. 
Thus, it was clear in 12'h Army Group Headquarters that Eisenhower foresaw a 
double envelopment of the Ruhrý with Bradley acting in concert with 21 Army Group 
after Bradley's Army Group fronted on the Rhine. This meant that the much talked- 
about seizure of the Saar was not considered an immediate prelude to moving Patton 
deeper into Germany, at least as long as logistics was considered a brake on large- 
scale maneuver. 
Noting the British success at Antwerp, Bradley intended to take over "la [sic] 
havre" for US use if the British could supply themselves through Antwerp. Bradley 
saw this not only as a major solution to his problems, but as an out that would allow 
him to screen and not capture Brest immediately, an objective that still defied 
American efforts. 5" 
On 4 September, 21 Army Group's own situation offered operational 
possibilities outstripping those of Patton's surge to the Meuse. Dempsey's army had 
moved more than 250 miles in the six days since 28 August. (See figure 35. ) Brussels 
was captured on 3 September and Antwerp on 4 September. Crerar's men were 
outside Le Havre and in Dieppe and St. Valery, and were moving toward Boulogne. 
Troops, however, were scattered and their next moves dictated by the necessity to 
51* Hansen Diaq. Sept. 5". 
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maintain momentum rather than secure rear areas or leapfrog administrative areas 
forward. 597 
The I Vh Armoured Division entered Antwerp, and Guards Armoured captured 
Louvain. Montgomery recorded: 
The situation now is that we hold a ring from the sea at ANTWERP, 
south-westwards through LILLE-BETHUNE-ST. POL-and along the 
CANCHE river to the sea at LE TOUQUET. 
To the north of this line are many Germans, possibly 100,000 and they 
cannot escape. 598 
Believing this to be the situation, he had transmitted his M. 160 questioning a 
Double Thrust advance and reiterating his appreciation that a concentrated all-out 
attack be made north of the Ardennes. Tracing the "trap" in which he had just placed 
the German 15 h Army with Dempsey, he began conceiving a replacement for the 
cancelled LINNET I and an alternative to the plan developed by Brereton to drop 
forces in the Liege-Maastricht area ahead of 12 h Army Group. Bradley had wanted no 
part of the scheme. and Monty saw the trap in relinquishing the "reserve" granted by 
Eisenhower. He recorded his logic-logic that would remain steadfast for the most 
critical fortnight of the campaign: 
We shall have to sit back in the BRUSSELS-ANTWERP, pretending 
we do not mean to go towards the RUHR; if we advance openly 
towards the RHINE the Germans will blow the bridges-which would 
be awkward as north of the RUHR it is a very big river, in fact almost a 
sea. 
Going further, he decided on a course of action: 
ý97 CARL, N-13336. D. T. I. (War Office), Advance of 30 Corps Across River Seine to Brussels and 
Antwcrp. 24 August to 4 September 1944, NAC, RG 24, Volume 10636, Report by Gen. H. D. G. 
Crerar covering Operations of First Canadian Army from 24" AUG- I SEP 1944; NARA, RG 407, M L- 
227. Box 24145. Operation ASTONIA. Capture of Le Havre. 10-12 September 1944. 
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We shall want a big airborne drop to capture the bridges over the 
RHINE and the MEUSE. 599 
The staff college instructor, blinded by -Maintenance of the Objective. " sought 
a way to solve all his problems by using the marching force to gain a bridgehead 
across the "very big river" while maintaining his momentum toward the Ruhr. The 
airborne operation, called COMET, would grab a bridgehead while two corps of the 
Second Army moved north of the Siegftied Line and around to the rear of the 
objective. The unsolved problems, however, grew larger as reports filtered to his 
tactical headquarters. 
Antwerp, the objective most desired by SCAEF, had been taken with docks 
and facilities intact, but it remained to be made usable. Antwerp was located at the 
end of the roughly 50-mile-long Scheldt Estuary, and the Germans held the banks in 
force but as yet, had not thoroughly mined the long approach to the harbor. Ramsay 
had signaled the day before, warning of the problem; Dempsey, Horrocks, and 
Roberts, the division commander, had not been advised of what was obvious on any 
map. And Horrocks, accurately stating he was no Napoleon when it came to the higher 
practice of war, had failed to mount an attack to cross the river before the German 
defenses could congeal. With Dempsey's concurrence, Horrocks pressed eastward. 600 
491moqszomety Log, 4 September. 
500 ]bid. 
0,00 Love and Major, Ramsav Diarv, 13 1, WO 285/10, Dempsey Diary, 4,5 Sep 44; Lt. Gen. Sir B. G. 
Horrocks with Eversley Bel field a nd Maj. -Gen. H. Essame, Corps Commander (New York: Charles 
Scribner's Sons, 1977) 80,8 1; Maj-Gen. G. P. B. Roberts, From the Desert to the Baltic (London: 
William Kimbcr. 1987). 207-2 10; L. F. Ellis et al., Victorv in the West, Vol. 11: The Defeat of German. v 
(London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office. 1968), 5,6; Major Ned Thornburn, First Into Antwerp (The 
Castle. Shrewsbury: 4" Bn K. S. L. I. Museum Trust, 1987). 
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Thus Antwerp was not available even for the month-long "clearing" process 
estimated for the estuary. Still considering his own logistics to be based on the 
Channel Ports which Crerar was inexorably clearing, Montgomery did not see 
Antwerp as an immediate objective worthy of stopping the momentum east, which 
would not only be stopped but would also require a forced crossing of significant size 
and preparation if the enemy fortified the Rhine. Nor did Montgomery see the 
problem as Eisenhower did. In Monty's mind, Bradley was responsible for capturing 
his own base and port area, and he was seen via Eisenhower's directives as moving 
rapidly to fully develop the ports in his own rear. 601 
The Fifteenth Army continued streaming northward from Boulogne into the 
"Breskens pocket" formed west of 30 Corps, and was able to cross the estuary into 
north Holland and behind the Rhine. Unless the estuary could be sealed Erom the north 
side. it would provide an escape route for the 100,000 troops Montgomery had 
thought he had bagged. The problem was that 21 Army Group was too small to handle 
the frontage it faced. Dempsey's 30 Corps was stretched from Antwerp to Louvain, 
about 30 miles. 12 Corps, Dempsey's refused left flank, had not advanced past the 
Scheidt south of Ghent. 8 Corps remained grounded south of the Seine. Crerar was 
equally stretched. I Corps was clearing the Le Havre peninsula and reached north on 
the coast to the Somme. Simonds' 2 Canadian Corps moved north of the Seine, 
clearing the flying bomb sites inland, and on the coast was moving on Boulogne. Ten 
'O"'Libcration Campaign, " 52-64. This traces with reproductions of messages and studies the 
convoluted assessments of Antwerp in relation to the advance. The key belief at 21 Army Group was 
that the clearance of the Channel ports then being undertaken would support 21 Army Group and 
would be available in less time, and that operational opportunity could be sought with time to spare to 
open the port. Antwerp was a key issue to Bradley, who had not developed his own port; 21 Ann. y 
Group Achninistrative Histoq, 34-36. 
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divisions covered an area of roughly 300 miles' frontage, with their main logistics 
base about 400 miles to the rear of the farthest elements. Germans "held" in their 
coastal fortresses or moving north of the estuary were estimated by Montgomery to 
number about 100,000 men. The German Fifteenth Army, though composed of 
splintered formations and stragglers. outnumbered Dempsey's spearheads. 
602 
At 21 Army Group, the truer picture that soon emerged was that the situation 
was totally fluid at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels. At no time was a clear 
statement of priorities from the top down more needed, yet more absent. In classic 
terms, the pursuit teetered on its culminating point, and only a focused shift in effort 
could maintain momentum in some-but not all-areas. Eisenhower's directive was 
obsolete upon issuance, and only Eisenhower could direct actions to achieve an 
operational decision somewhere. The three ground commanders in chief were helpless 
to achieve their individual goals with the forces and sustenance at hand. Eisenhower 
had thought he had 6'decided. " but it was obvious to Montgomery that the machine 
would soon fail to work. Ike and Bradley, riding higher on "Victory fever, " ignored the 
signs. 
Moreover, CHASTITY was permitted to die a silent death and Bradley, 
releasing Patton from his failure, assigned the Ninth Army Headquarters to clear 
Brittany. It had been a month since Patton's spearheads had reached the CHASTITY 
area. The key rail, road, and beaches had neither been secured nor developed. With 
Antwerp in the bag, Eisenhower decided that Montgomery would be responsible for 
002 Second&mv Historv, 192-197. NARA, RG 407, ML-2250. Historical Section, Canadian Military 
Hcadquarters, kistorical Report No. 146, "Operations of First Canadian Army in North-West Europe, 
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providing Bradley not only with Le Havre as a port, but with Antwerp for Bradley's 
sustenance-despite the fact that the new American LOCs (lines of communication) 
would cut across Monty's LOCs at a 90 degree angle. 603 
While Dempsey shifted corps to prepare to cross the Meuse and Rhine Rivers, 
aiming at the Ruhr as targeted in early September, Montgomery and Eisenhower 
debated the strategy for the assault on the West Wall. Monty found it offensive that, as 
a field commander who operated out of a handfid of trailers with a small staff, he 
would have to fly 400 miles to the rear to visit Eisenhower's 5,000-man headquarters 
while scores of generals, air marshals, and admirals, and more than a thousand field- 
grade officers existed to run Ike's battle. Eisenhower, whose nose had consistently 
been out of joint since Normandy, wandered SHAEF's halls publicly damning Monty 
to his personal staff and visited his American commanders, but had refrained from 
seeing 21 Anny Group's commander. Avoiding personal discussion, Eisenhower 
characteristically sent letters and messages, perhaps fearing that many of the written 
statements, if presented in person, were easily open to refutation. 604 
31 JUL-I OCT 44. " 3743. It should be noted that by 20 September, 2 Canadian Corps would "hold" 
about half of 21 Army Group's total frontage. 
60ý Ruppenthal. Logistical Support ofthe Armies, 11,104-109. 
"4 It should be an item of comment, but has escaped the criticism of American historians, that 
Eisenhower's aides and staff kept (and many published) diaries quoting Eisenhower's public attacks on 
his subordinates. Monty in particular. No such diary appeared from Monty's camp, nor is there any 
evidence that Monty criticized Ike or any commander in front of his junior or personal staff. While 
Monty kept up a frank correspondence with his superior. Brooke, Eisenhower criticized Monty in 
spades in private meetings with Marshall. It is also interesting that Americans consistently consider 
Montgomery's insistence on closed-door, private meetings only between commanders to have been 
snobbery on Monty's part. Private and thus frank discussions between commanders is a common 
practice among senior off iccrs. Ike, the staff man, liked to be surrounded by his own staff to prevent 
confrontations or to divert questions that he himself could not answer. Eisenhower also told S. L. A. 
Marshall in a 1946 interview that he always traveled forward to visit commanders and did not prefer 
conferences calling his commanders rearward. In Montgomery's case, Ike had to be coaxed to visit, 
and Ike's preference for huge staff conferences in the rear is well documented. At its largest, SHAEF 
would total more than 16.000 personnel. 
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Considering what had transpired since his meeting %%ith his American 
commanders, Eisenhower's consideration of Montgomery's M. 160 had to be more 
carefully thought out. The reply, in fact, was drafted in toto by the staff and approved 
by Eisenhower. Eiscnho%ver's -victory disease" was pronounced in this message, an 
appreciation which, by the time of the second part's arrival, would already be 
contested by Eisenhower's own G-2. Granville's communications were not expert and 
put Eisenhower farther out of touch with the battlefield. 
605 The reply, sent on 5 
September. arrived at Montgomery's headquarters on the Vh and the 9h, with the 
second part arriving first. This did not help matters, as the second part softened 
Eisenhower's reply to the concentrated thrust. By the 91h. the entire message would 
have read as follows: 
1. While agreeing with your conception of a powerful and full 
blooded thrust toward Berlin, I do not repeat not agree that it 
should be initiated at this moment to the exclusion of all other 
maneuvers. 
2. The bulk of the German Army that was in the west has been 
destroyed. We must immediately exploit our success by promptly 
breaching the Siegfried Line, crossing the Rhine on a wide front 
and seizing the Saar and the Ruhr. This I intend to do with all 
possible speed. This will give us a stranglehold on two of 
Germany's main industrial areas and largely destroy her capacity to 
wage war. whatever course events may take. It will assist in cutting 
off forces now retreating from south west France. Moreover, it will 
give us freedom of action to strike in any direction and will force 
the enemy to disperse, over a wide area, such forces as he may be 
able to assemble for the defense of the west. 
3. While we are advancing we will be opening the ports of Havre and 
Antwerp, which are essential to sustain a powerful thrust deep into 
Germany. No re-allocation of our present resources would be 
adequate to sustain a thrust to Berlin. 
'05 Author intcrvicw with Col. Edward Martin, formerly senior American communications element 
commandcr. SHAEF. 1944-1945. 
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4. Accordingly my intention is initially to occupy the Saar and the 
Ruhr, and by the time we have done this, Havre and Antwerp 
should be available to maintain one or both of the thrusts you 
mention. If [In] this connection I have always given and still give 
priority to the Ruhrý and the northern route of advance, as indicated 
in my directive of yesterday which crossed your telegram. [M 1601. 
Locomotives and rolling stock are today being allocated on the 
basis of this priority to maintain the momentum of advance of your 
forces, and those of Bradley northwest of the Ardennes. Please let 
me know at once your further maintenance requirements for the 
advance to and occupation of the Ruhr. 606 
Montgomery had, in fact, not received Eisenhower's 4 September directive 
until the 6 th , and immediately signaled Eisenhower concerning 
it: 
You can relyon 21 ARMY GROUP to o all out 100 percent to further 
your intention to destroy enemy forceS. 6,97 
Montgomery was convinced, as his 8 Corps still lacked transport to move and 
his two armies operated with two open flanks, that if the Ruhr was to be struck before 
the enemy withdrew into the Siegfried Line, it would require a concentrated assault, 
an assault his own two-corps 2 Army was not strong enough to deliver immediately. 
He also knew. from his liaison to Bradley, that Bradley's forces were both dispersed 
and shy of supply. rendering their "run to the Rhine" certain to fail. In the meantime, 
Montgomery shifted corps, hoped to seal the bleeding trap north of the Scheidt, and to 
rush the Allied Airborne Army into a coup-de-main of the Meuse and Rhine bridges. 
As enemy resistance stiffened, and the final (first) part of Eisenhower's signal 
arrived. Montgomery immediately replied, calling the question on priority: 
Have now received the whole of your Directive No. FWD-13889 dated 
5 Sept. 
M* EL. Correspondence File. Cable 5 September; Eisenhower Papers. IV, 2120. 
00" EL. Correspondence File. M-169.6 Sept. 1944. 
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Have studied your directive No. FWD-13765 [4 September] carefully 
and cannot see it stated that the northern route of advance to the RUHR 
is to have priority over the eastern advance to the SAAR. Actually, 
XIX US Corps is unable to advance properly for lack of petrol. Could 
you send a responsible Staff Officer to see me so that I can explain 
things to him. 668 
Bradley had never published another directive modifying his offensive listed in 
his own Letter of Instruction No. Six, dated 25 August. His Letter of Instructions No. 
Five had merely shifted responsibility for Brittany to the Ninth Army. Moreover, it 
had now become apparent that, besides grounding XIX Corps, Bradley had shifted an 
infantry division from the primary avenue of advance to Patton's southern flank. It 
was intuitively obvious, even in Granville, that an assault on the east face of the Ruhr 
would need a complementary attack through the Liege-Maastricht-Aachen avenue. 
Despite his presence at the 2 September meeting authorizing the move, it is probable 
that Eisenhower did not know that First Army's assault on the West Wall was leaving 
behind a corps. This fact, plus the planning for COMET, the crisis of supply, and 
Montgomery's insistence that a priority following the text-book definition of the Main 
Effort be made, forced Eisenhower to act. He went forward. Crippled with a bad knee, 
he flew to Brussels in his C47 Dakota to meet Monty. 609 
EL. Correspondence File, M-181.9 September 1944. 
FUSA Report of Operations Aug 44-Feb 45. Map No. 5. LIEGE-AACHEN-DUREN; EL, Smith 
Collection of World War 11 Documents. SHAEF War Room Summaries, September 1-10 1944; 
Afontgomety Log. 9 September 1944. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
Going To MARKET 
COMET was intended to solve multiple strategic and operational conundra. It 
addressed the greatest strategic objective, the rapid destruction of the enemy's 
capability to resist by offering a quick bounce across the Rhine; it provided for the 
envelopment of the remaining enemy clinging to the coast; and it promised the 
establishment of strong forces within striking distance of the Ruhr without having to 
penetrate and reduce any portion of the Siegfried Line. Moreover, it was the boldest 
use of airborne forces by the Allies yet seen in the European theater. But it was not a 
unique solution, nor was it even uniquely British, though it would be aI Airborne 
Corps show. It was a multiple-bridge coup de main combined with a rapid ground 
advance of a heavily armored corps. The Germans had shown the way in 1940, and it 
had become part of Montgomery's repetoire. 
Montgomery had attached airborne forces to practice bridge coup-dc-main 
operations while he commanded 5 Corps in England in 1941. No doubt inspired by 
the Eben Emael and Holland operations of May 1940, Montgomery had been the first 
senior British officer to include airborne forces in exercises in World War II. In the 
invasion of Sicily in 1943, he planned three brigade-sized bridge coup-de-main 
operations to speed Eighth Army's passage on the main route running up the eastern 
coast: for I Airlanding Brigade at the Ponte Grande Bridge near Syracuse, for the 2 
Parachute Brigade to capture the road bridge south of Augusta, and for I Parachute 
Brigade to capture the Ponti di Primesole Bridge over the Simeto River south of 
Catania, which would link with a sea-landed Commando force. While the 2 Parachute 
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Brigade mission was canceled, the other two were launched and achieved mixed 
results. Bad navigation, gliders separating from their tows, and the shooting down of 
friendly aircraft by the Allied navies plagued the missions. Both bridges were captured 
and temporarily held, but in both cases the airborne were forced to relinquish their 
captures due to the failure of the ground linkup force to speedily reach their objectives 
as they fought up the narrow Sicilian road. While the Ponte Grande bridge was 
temporarily lost and then almost immediately recaptured as the ground forces arrived. 
the second objective was also retaken intact by 13 Corps as the removal of charges by 
the airborne troops firom the Primesole Bridge likewise saved it from destruction. The 
lessons of the operation were not lost. Ironically, one of the battalions at the Primesole 
Bridge was commanded by Lt. Col. John Frost, and the linking corps was commanded C 
by Lt. Gen. M. C. Dempsey. 610 
American airborne commander Matthew B. Ridgway's hard feelings against 
the British began in Sicily. Additionally, the lack of training of the aircrew involved 
and the differences in forces also created perceptions that were later hard to dispel, 
and in some cases, never were. 611 
A coup de main of the Orne River bridges had also been a primary feature of 
the 6 th British Airborne Division's Normandy operation. 612 The idea of capitalizing on 
"'o Field Marshal Sir B. L. Montgomery, El Alamein to the River Sangro (Germany: British Army of 
the Rhine. 1946), 96-101: Hamilton. Monty: The Makingofa General. 309-310; Otway, Airborne 
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'NEPTUNE' by 38 and 46 Groups, RAF, 11, passim, Lt. Gen. Sir R. N. Gale. With the SLxth Airborne 
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the airborne to negate water hazards while maintaining the momentum into Germany 
appears to have been solely Montgomery's, not that of his plans staff or the staff of I 
Airborne Corps. At the moment Antwerp was being captured, Montgomery had 
completed conceptualizing an airborne operation to replace LINNET. 
Initiation of the operation followed the methodology that had been standard 
with Montgomery since Normandy and by First Allied Airborne Army since August. 
On 3 September, Monty and Dempsey discussed an airborne operation to support 30 
Corps' mission of securing a bridgehead on the Rhine between WESEL and 
NIJMEGEN. The next day Dempsey met Browning, De Guingand, and Miles Graham 
at 2 Army's headquarters to discuss the capture of "NUMEGEN and ARNHEM. " The 
following day, this orders group met Montgomery. Browning, De Guingand, and 
Graham discussed the concept, after which Browning reported to Dempsey to finalize 
details. Dempsey, under whose Army I Airborne Corps would operate once dropped, 
and who would assign a corps for the ground phase and linkup, took control of the 
details of the ground plan. Browning then returned to First Allied Airborne Army to 
develop the outline plan into a coordinated operation. 613 The airborne troops for 
COMET would come from I Airborne Corps, and the airlift would be supplied by 
RAF 38 and 46 Groups under Air Marshal Hollinghurst. Because COMET was a 
"British operation, " Brereton, Parks, and the American-dominated staff at Sunninghill 
referred to as Warrcn,. 4irborne Operations. European Theater] (Maxwell A. F. B., Ala.: Air University, 
1956), 78-80. 
613 NAC. RG 24, Volume 20402, File 969. (D24), "Operations-2"d British Army Sep/Dec 44, " 21 Army 
Group TOPSEC Most Immediate Cipher Message No. D/19,3 SEP 44; Dempsey Diary, 3-5 SEP 44; 
. Wontgoineq Log. 4 September. The date for COMET's main attack (ground phase) was now 7 September. permitting a full day attack to the Eindhoven area prior to a dusk coup de main, which had 
originally been scheduled for 6 September. As with every planned airborne operation since 
NEPTU&E. the dates would continue to slip. 
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Park did not involve themselves in modifying detail or in "approving" the concept. 
Instead, they worked to support the Field Marshal's plan. XVIH Corps, would remain 
free to support Bradley. (See figure 38. ) 
Montgomery had approved Dempsey's outline plan on 5 September and 
recorded it in his log: 
(a) 30 Corps, with Gds. Armd. Div. and II Armd Div. leading, start 
off at 0700 hrs. on 7 Sept. from LOUVAIN and ANTWERP areas. 
The movement is northeast, directed on EINDHOVEN and 
BREDA. 
(b) The I British Airborne Div. plus the Polish Para. Bde., will be 
landed on the evening of 7 Sept. (before dark) in the general area 
ARNHEM-NUMEGEN-GRAVE to seize the bridges over the 
RHINE and MEUSE. 
(c) If the weather is bad and the airborne forces cannot operate, then 30 
Corps will not go beyond the line EINDHOVEN-BREDA. The 
corps will advance beyond this line when the air forces drop. 
(d) Gds. Armd. Div. will be directed on GRAVE-NUMEGEN- 
ARNHEM. 
(e) II Arrnd. Div. will be directed on BREDA-TILBURG- 
HERTOGENBOSCH, and on to the RHINE crossing to the north. 
(f). 12 Corps to take over ANTWERP and left flank protection. 614 
Montgomery was relying on surprise to make the coup de main, but his ground 
plan still relied upon some forces turning toward Breda and thence toward Rotterdam, 
as specified in his M. 523. The main force would go east between Wesel and Arnhem, 
with the Americans on the right. COMET supported this plan; it did not signal a 
longer drive northwards on the right flank except to get over the Rhine and behind the 
614. Ifoqgonieq Log. 5 Scptember. 
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Siegfried Line on the enemy's right flank. 12 Corps would keep the enemy from 
escaping from the Antwerp area. 615 
COMET proceeded, basing the force on I Airborne Division, commanded by 
Major-General R. E. "Roy" Urquhart. FAAA had been notified of the new operation 
on the evening of 3 September, shortly after LINNET 11's cancellation. 21 Army 
Group had that day explored planning for an airborne operation for seizing Rotterdam, 
but this had been set aside for COMET. While one half of LINNET's airlift was 
released for air transport, the remainder was dedicated to the air drop for the new 
operation. On 4 September, FAAA issued a directive to Browning formally initiating 
planning for COMET. 
616 
Directive "Operation on the River RHINE, " dated 4 September, said: 
[Y]ou will immediately prepare detailed plans for an airborne operation 
along the River RHINE between ARNHEM and WESEL. 
Following the American practice, it designated a "mission7l: 
Land in such areas as will permit of your seizing intact and controlling 
all bridges and ferries over the River RHINE and its branch from 
ARNHEM to WESEL, both inclusive. 617 
The air planning for COMET encountered a snag not seen since the Normandy 
drop-the consideration of enemy air defenses as a primary factor. The day before, US 
P47 fighter-bombers flying at 1,200 feet along the planned LINNET air mutes had 
615 M. 523: Dempsey Dia)y, 5 SEP 44. 
t. 16 Parks Diaty, 3.4 September 1944. It should be remembered that Brereton and Browning still had 
not -mended fencer over Browning's 3 September protest over LINNET 1 I's planned execution. See 
Chapter Four. The formality of FAAA's directive to plan COMET established that FAAA had accepted 
the plan in principle. Brcreton, as ever. retained his power to -veto" any plan. 
ol, NARA. RG 33 1. V AAA. -Operation Comet, " Operation on the River RHINE, First Allied 
Airborne Army. 4 September 1944. 
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been heavily damaged by ground fire believed to be from enemy motor columns 
retreating toward Germany. This led Air Vice Marshal Hollinghurst at the air planning 
conference to estimate that C-47 losses for COMET would be 40 percent. The 
Airborne Army's Chief of Staff and Operations both stated that such losses were 
unacceptable, 
unless the Commander-in-Chief [of 21 Army Group] demanded the 
mission as absolutely necessary to the success of his movement north 
of the Ruhr. 618 
While the ongoing planning modified the concept eliminating a possible drop 
at Wesel and substituting Arnhem, the Allied Airborne Army also awaited the 
removal of 46 Group's aircraft to the Mediterranean for a mission to Greece. 
Simultaneously, FAAA moved ahead on their own initiative with a plan to propose to 
SHAEF to drop the US XVIII Corps (Airborne) behind the Siegfried Line near 
Cologne. They also worked on Brereton's pet project, moving the US airborne corps 
onto the continent in the Paris area. What was telling about this diversity of interests 
while under notification for planning an "Op" was that debate erupted between 
CATOR and FAAA as to whether the RAF groups were actuallY assigned and not 
merely tasked by the Allied Airborne Army. CATOR believed that they were assigned 
to FAAA. The Allied Airborne Army stated that they had heard such, but had never 
seen an authorizing document. Thus, not being sure of its own assigned organizations, 
Brereton's headquarters referred the problem 
613 Parks Diary. 4 September 1944, Conference Notes of Meeting in Chief of Staff's Office, 4 
Scptcmbcr 1944. The conference notes indicate the G-3 stated that. "the Ruhr operation was not very 
feasible due to intcnsc flak. and the distance was at the limit of operations-too far for [double-tows] 
gliders to bc brought in. - Bad weather prevented an immediate aerial photographic run of the area. 
This was done on 6 September. 
344 
to AEAF, SHAEF, and the groups concerned to see if authority is 
firm. ' 19 
The ground chain of command had no such problem focusing. Functioning 
more as a corps commander in Second Army than the spare wheel in an operation that 
consistently downplayed the importance of the ground battle--the raison d'etre of the 
airbome-Lt. Gen. Browning worked with Urquhart and the Polish commander, 
Major-General Stanislaw Sosabowski. Browning had four brigade-sized elements for 
the initial drop and had planned to bring in 52d Lowland Division in an airlanding 
operation to reinforce the northern airhead on D+2. 
Intelligence given to the Airborne Corps from First Allied Airborne Army was 
general and contained little that was useful for operational planning. Mirroring the 
SHAEF intelligence estimates and spreading victory fever, it almost seemed to be 
published "for the encouragement of others. " On 4 September, FAAA noted: 
Enemy still appears incapable of halting Allied advances now nearing German frontiers. Appreciate enemy must make supreme effort to slow 
down the pace of withdrawal in order to gain time for reftirbishing of West Wall defenses. Latter badly neglected and depleted of large 
proportion fire power but still considerable obstacle. Probable that 
enemy will attempt to withdraw proportion of infantry and armour into 
reserve, while covering with expendable infantry, but at present no 
evidence that enemy can disengage. 620 
619 ParAs Dian-, 5 September 1944, Notes of meeting in Chief of Stafrs Office, 5 September 1944, 
, ifarshall Papers. It', 572. The commitment of US aircraft for this Churchill-inspired mission to Greece 
had personally been opposed by Gen. Marshall. Brercton had wanted to substitute US aircraft for the 
committcd British aircraft so as not to shift aircraft already preparing for an operation. It is an 
interesting commentary that the use of 100 transport aircraft had reached the Combined Chiefs of Staff 
levcl for decision and had drawn firm guidance personally to Eisenhower how to act in the matter. 
*210 NARA. RG 33 1. Entry 253. Box 3. FAAA, General File, 319.1, First Allied Airborne Army, G-2 
Summary No. 1.4 September 1944,2. FAAA's intelligence section was apparently the last section to 
be filled. Air intelligence was obtained through Wing and Group Channels from IX Troop Transport 
Command or the RAF Groups/Air Ministry Channels. Ground intelligence provided to the divisions 
was from parent headquarters as assigned, and there are no records indicating a competent, functioning 
G-2 operation at this time that could assist the divisions in planning other than their drop zones. 
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I Airbome Corps estimated that the German forces in 21 ArmY Group's sector 
were withdrawing to the Siegfried Line behind the general line Aachen-Ruhr. They 
believed that "low-quality" coastal divisions were withdrawing to the area north and 
northeast of Arnhem. Though intelligence for the area along the River Rhine and 
north of the river estimated the flak to be "very considerable, " I Airborne Corps 
believed that 30 Corps' advance would negate the flak south of the river as and as far 
east as Tilburg. 
I Airborne Corps noted that 30 Corps would "adjust" its advance from its 
staging areas, "so that the surprise of the Airborne landings will not be prejudiced. " 
Browning announced as his intention that I Airborne Corps 
will seize and hold the bridges at the following places: 
(i) Over the MAAS at GRAVE 
(ii) Over the RHINE at NIJMEGEN 
(iii) Over the NEDER RUN at ARNHEM [sic] 
so as to pass through the GUARDS Armoured Division. 
Browning's plan incorporated concepts previously planned for 
TRANSFIGURE and LINNET. The basic concept remained a surprise airborne drop 
with a rapid linkup by advancing ground forces. 30 Corps would assume command of 
I Airborne Corps upon linkup, with both corps under 2 Army. As the northerranost 
bridgehead was the key to the operation, I Airborne Division would concentrate at 
Arnhem as soon as possible after the bridges were secure, while the Polish Parachute 
Brigade held the Nijmegen area. Both TRANSFIGURE and LINNET were concerned 
with seizing and controlling areas during a fluid tactical situation; COMET required a 
different approach to battle. According to the published plan, beginning at 0600 on 8 
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September, three coup-de-main parties each in six Horsa gliders would independently 
seize one of the designated bridges, holding the structure until relieved. Two-thirds Of 
the I Airborne Division would arrive by parachute at 0800 in the first lift, carrying out 
parachute drops for 90 minutes. The second lift, including the remainder of the 
division, I Polish Brigade, and the corps headquarters, would arrive either in the 
evening or early the following morning. The 52 Division would arrive by air landing 
621 on an airfield improvised by 30 Corps on D+2 (10 September). 
The planned landing and drop zones reflected the compromise required 
between seizing the objective and finding suitable terrain for large-scale glider and 
parachute landings. Flak was an overriding concern, determining not just the routing 
of aircraft but also landing- and drop-zone selection. Recognizing the need to capture 
the bridges by surprise to prevent their destruction or reinforcement, the coup-de-main 
teams were subjected to the highest risks. Two hundred eighty-one aircraft for 
parachute troops and 368 glider tugs would comprise the first lift, and 114 parachute, 
323 gliders, and 144 supply aircraft would make up the second lift. The third and 
fourth lifts would bring in the balance of the Polish Brigade, aviation engineers, the 
main component of the corps headquarters, additional signals, and the 52 (L) Division. 
Urquhart's I Airborne, with I Polish Parachute Brigade under command, would need 
360 tons of supplies per day, and 52 (L) Division would be supplied commensurate 
with its own landing, eventually to require an additional 220 tons daily. Parachute 
aircraft would be flown by the US IX Troop Carrier Command's 52 nd Wing, and 
62' MHI, Papers Collected brMajor General FL Parks. "Operation Comet, " Hq/Atps/2559/G. 6 Sep 
44, HQ Airborne Troops Olý Instruction No. 1. Browning's order noted, "There will be no advance [of 
Sccond Army] from the RHINE bridgeheads before a port between HAVRE and ANTWERP is 
operating. - 
347 
glider tows would be flown by the RAF 38 and 46 Groups. During the actual mission, 
all known flak positions along the corridor would be attacked by 8 th Air Force and 
aircraft from the Air Defence of Great Britain. 622 
Two parachute "drop zones" (DZs) and four glider landing zones (LZs) were 
planned. The target area of Arnhem and Nijmegen was split by the Rhine (Neder 
Rijn), Waal, and Maas rivers that flow gradually from about 30 feet above sea level in 
the east to below sea level in the west. The land itself is polder, lowland reclaimed 
from the sea by dikes or dams. Southeast of Nijmegen the polder rises to 275 feet, and 
northeast of Arnhem it reaches 360 feet. Scattered patches of woodland are north and 
northwest of Arnhem and south, southeast, and southwest of Nijmegen. 623 
North of the Rhine, LZ "S" and DZ "X" were assigned for the Arnhem Bridge. 
Located approximately five miles west-northwest of the city of Arnhem, they were 
located amidst heavy woods that would mask their view from the city. (See figure 39. ) 
LZ "S" lay between the Arnsterdarn-Arhern Highway and was bisected by the 
Amsterdam-Arnhem railway. DZ "X" adjoined the LZ to the south and was between 
the highway and the Neder River north of the town of Heelsum. The terrain was 
generally flat. 
624 
DZ "Y" was a triangular drop zone pointing eastward, located five miles south 
of Nijmegen in the "Y" formed by the Maas-Waal Canal and the Maas River. (See Q 
'22 NARA. RG 33 1. IAAA, Operation Comet, Supply Dropping COMET, 9 Sept 44, IX TCC, 1,2; 
HQ AirTps/TSIý1559/G. 7 Sep 44, Total Aircraft required for Coup-de-Main, I" and 2"d Lifts; Field 
Orders for 52d Wing and 38' Group, passim. The landing areas for 52d (Lowland) were either to be 
improvised airstrips built by the American 878' Aviation Engineer Battalion or Dcclen Airfield 
(northeast of Arnhem). if captured. 
6"-% NA PA. RG 33 1.1 AAA. Operation Comet. Hq. 52"d T. C. Wing, 6 September 1944, F. O. No. 6, 
Annex 1. Intelligence, 1. 
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figure 40. ) Located in a northeast-southwest line approximately eight miles south- 
southeast of Nijmegen in a wooded tract were LZ's "TY', "T' and "L. " "Z" was just 
east of Grosbeek; "U" was south of Grosbeek and east of Mook, and "1: ' lay between 
the highway and the Maas River. 625 
Urquhart's plan was for I Parachute Brigade to reinforce and hold the Arnhem 
bridgehead after the bridge was seized by coup de main. They would land on DZ "X" 
4 Parachute Brigade, landing on DZ "Y, " would relieve the coup-de-main force at the 
Grave Bridge and cover the MAAS river bridgehead. I Airlanding Brigade, landing 
on LZ "Z, " would relieve the coup-de-main party at the Nijmegen Bridge and hold the 
Waal bridgehead. The Polish Brigade would land on DZ "P" in the second lift to 
relieve 4 Parachute Brigade at Grave. When relieved by 30 Corps, I Airborne 
Division would concentrate between Arnhem and Elst, with I Polish Airborne in the 
vicinity of Nijmegen. The Independent Parachute Company would mark- drop and 
landing zones prior to the main drops, and the Divisional Recce Squadron would 
reinforce the coup-de-main parties at the Arnhem and Nijmegen bridges. 626 
The actual coup-de-main plan was the hardest to fulfill. Browning sent 
Dempsey an immediate message concerning the coup-de-main parties, saying: 
In view of complete lack of LZs and DZs near bridges after study of 
maps and photos on my return here consider it essential to land coup de 
main glider parties on each bridge night 7/8 Sep. Then bring in first 
main lift airborne force early daylight 8 Sep otherwise surprise 
1124 Ibid. 
62.11 Ibid.. John Baynes, Urqhuart ofArnhem: The Life ofMajor General R. E. Urquhart, CB, DSO (New 
York: Brasscy's, 1993), 78.79. Of some note is the absence of comparison of the drop zones accepted 
by Urquhart for COMET and later those used in MARKET. both in his own book and in his 
biographer's life. 
o2t. PRO. WO 171-393.1 Airborne Division Operation Instruction No. 8, Confirmatory Notes On 
Division Commanders Verbal Orders. 
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impossible. Must warn you that strong protest against latter has been 
lodged here by Air C in C. 627 
Argument over the tactics of bridge seizure, the role of surprise, daylight or 
night assaults, and the air plan would resurface within several days, and the basic 
concept for COMET would change still again. Dempsey had meanwhile refined with 
Browning the plan to include the seizure of a bridge over the Meuse near Neebosch to 
permit flexibility within the target area. Dempsey at this time still recognized that 12 
Corps would contain the Fifteenth Army, but that during COMET, "maintaining a 
strong left flank" and "speed is essential" were predominant considerations. 628 
Horrocks' 30 Corps Operation Instruction No. 23 Operation "COMET"' 
outlined the crucial ground linkup to I Airborne Corps: 
30 Corps will advance to and secure a bridgehead over the RHINE in 
the area WEST of incl NUMEGEN and dominate the area to the 
NORTH. 
Horrocks' plan stated that using two armored divisions, an infantry division, and an 
armored brigade, 
30 Corps will advance with Guards Armd Div right, II Armd Div left. 
50(N) Div move forward by bounds on II Armd Div Route. 629 
Horrocks' corps would have some 800 tanks and, with all arms and services included, 
approximately 100,000 men. For this force, he designated two axes of advance, "Club" 
027 PRO. WO 205/192 (15375 1) Topsec Cipher Message D/57 of 7 SEP 44. The original plans called 
for a coup de main at 0430 hours followed by the parachute dropping of main force at 0800. Later 
plans for 10 September moved glider assault to 0600. The fact that Leigh Mallory was approving and 
disapproving plans for transports indicates that AEAF was still considered part of the airborne approval 
process as part of the mid-August agreements. Leigh Mallory's own influence, however, was rapidly 
waning. 
e2s NAC. RG 24, Volume 20420, File 969. (D24), Second Anny, Minutes of Chief of Staff's 
Con fcrcnce. 5 September 1944; Dempseýv Diaty, 5 Sep 44. 
629 PRO. WO 171-341,30 Corps Operation Instruction No. 23 Operation "COMET, " 6 Sep 44. 
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and "Diamond. " Club Route, the Corps' right avenue and the track for Guards Annourcd, 
would later bear an ominous tale: It followed the main road from Mech-Ghcel. 
Arendonk-Eindhoven-St. Oderode-Nijmegen-Amhem-Apeldom. The I Ith Armoured's 
"Diamond" Route began after a trip from Antwerp to pick up the road from Tilburg- 
Hertogenbosch-Zaltbommel-Tiel-Renkum-Ede. Within two days of the order's 
issuance and with the stiffening of resistance, Horrocks Shifted 50th Division to 
"Diamond" with the I Vh Armoured to trail Guards Armoured up the Corps "centre- 
line. " Horrocks apparently saw resistance as stiffer closer to Antwerp than on his 
outside flank- toward Germany, an assessment that later would prove true. 630 
Though Horrocks' mission was essential, the airborne plan was the key to 
success. While 30 Corps' double thrust to the north would assure wrapping up the 
Fifteenth Army and establishing a base north of the Rhine, Holland's multiple 
waterways could easily be used to form defense lines to break the momentum of any 
advance. With off-road vehicular movement hampered by the water-laced poldcriand, 
the necessity for rapid movement to prevent defense lines from stabilizing was crucial. 
Only a simultaneous surprise strike by airborne forces could accomplish this. Most 
critical was the simultaneous seizure of bridges and key areas, not simply to prevent 
their destruction but to freeze all movement of enemy reserves within the battle area. 
By constricting the enemy's arteries deep within their own rear, the ability to mount 
counterattacks, to form blocking positions, and switch lines, or to reinforce defended 
localities would be eliminated or degraded while aiding the momentum of the Allied 
6 to Ibid. The standard configuration for an armored division was 246 cruiser tanks and 44 lights. The 
independent armored brigade possessed 190 cruiser tanks and 33 lights. '-Club Route" was the ccntre- 
line name used by 30 Corps throughout the Northwest Europe campaign. 
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advance. Often lost on analysts, this form of ground interdiction could be 
accomplished only by the seizure of the bridges and roads specified in the plan as well 
as dominating the sectors assigned to the airborne divisions. 
Most ominous for the Allies was the transfer to the north of the First Parachute 
Army under General Kurt Student, the founder of the German Fallschirmjaeger 
(paratroops). German commanders had been drilled since before the Normandy 
invasion that immediate and violent response to any parachute incursion was critical 
to prevent an air-delivered enemy from forming up, seizing their objectives, and/or 
establishing defensive blocks. No man was more imbued with this philosophy and 
could transfer it to his subordinates in more rapid orders than Student. First Parachute 
Army would take control of the remnants of the retreating forces to the immediate 
west of the intended target area. Though ULTRA decrypts identified both Student and 
his command as early as 6 September, these identifications did not appear in 2 Army's 
Intelligence Summary until 16 September, and not before MARKET in the 
intelligence of 21 Army Group, who published no summaries from 12 to 18 
September. Unit identifications on the Albert Canal did appear on 8 and 9 September 
in Second Army intelligence. 631 
The plans for COMET, expected to be executed with only 72 hours' 
preparation, were simple in concept and based on the expectation that 30 Corps would 
force a penetration, and that the coup-de-main parties would be reinforced by the main 
force of paratroops, who in turn, would be quickly reached by the armor. Daring in 
6" Hinsicy. British lntellýzence, 3. Part 2,382: Second Army Intelligence Summary No. 104,16 
September 1944,1. SHAEF did not show I Parachute Army in its 9 September Weekly Summary No. 
25. but showed it in the following week's published Order of Battle Map. 
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concept, COMET relied heavily upon the belief that the enemy forces in depth were 
retreating, not under command of formations, and in organizational and moral 
disarray. Second Army's Intelligence Summary No. 91 for 3 September asked and 
answered a key question: 
The whereabouts of enemy armour is still somewhat of a mystery, and 
it has not put in an appearance on Second Army front today. It is 
probably moving back to GERMANY on our right flank-. 
There is no sign of any German stand in a big way but we must 
presume all possible will be done to defend the frontiers of the 
REICH. 632 
Reports of thousands of prisoners taken daily indicated that the enemy was 
indeed fragmented, its formations splintered, and the strength of the enemy within the 
Siegfried Line inconclusive, though no reserve formations within Germany were 
identified. On one day, Second Army's PW cages processed prisoners from 40 
separate German formations. 633 With the American victory at the "Mons Pocket" and 
Crerar's advance beginning to ring Calais and Boulogne, Second Army noted five 
divisions tmpped in the remainder of Belgium and offered little hope for Fifteenth 
Army to escape "by land. " 634 
Weather delayed COMET but Horrocks believed that 30 Corps should have 
attacked immediately, since they had fuel for a 100-mile advance. In retrospect, at 
least one airborne commander would regret that an advance as far as Zon had not been 
632 Second Army Intelligence Summary No. 91, Up to 2400hrs. 3 September 1944,1,2. This was, in 
fact. precisely correct. 
03) Second Army Intelligence Summary No. 93,5 September 1944,1. 
C.. %4 Second Army Intelligence Summary Nos. 94,95,6-7 September 1944. 
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attempted immediately, thus shortening the run to the Rhine planned for Guards 
635 
Armoured . 
The issue of seizing the bridges before they could be blown, however, 
remained paramount. The Germans had proven to be among the world's best military 
engineers. Their leaving a series of key bridges intact along the line of advance, 
simply, was something that no one believed would ever be possible. Moreover, the 
Germans had already initiated engineering reinforcement of the terrain defenses. 
Extensive defensive inundations were made along the coast from Calais to the mouth 
of the Scheldt and along the major rivers running through northwest Belgium past 
Ghent and as far as Antwerp. The effect was not only to form barriers to offensive 
operations to capture the coastal ports, but also to separate Dempsey's forces by 
inundations within his sector. 636 
The decision for COMET made late on 3 September was for a temporary halt 
of the Second Army, with the promise of a quick advance planned to begin on 6 
September. This was delayed in stages to the 7 Ih ,8 
Ih and then the I Oth . As with 
LINNET, the airborne was the sticking point. Moreover, COMET had shifted the line 
of advance northwards on two mutually supporting routes, off-balancing the due- 
eastward offensive by Second Army that was previously meant to be tightly tied with 
First US Army's assault. Hodges' assault, however, had been stopped in XIX Corps 
sector by lack of fuel. A gap was developing to the south and east, while intelligence 
6" Brian Horrocks, Escape to Action (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1960), 205; Maj. Gen. Stanislaw 
Sosabowski. Free4t, I Served (Nashville: Battery Press, 1982), 194. 
WO Second Army Intelligence Summary No. 89,1 September 1944, Summary No. 91,3 September 
1944. Both contain extensive maps and studies of water obstacles in Belgium and Southern Holland. 
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now warned that the Fifteenth Army's trapped troops were moving north of the Neder 
Rijn into northwest Holland. 
ULTRA had warned on 5 September that Fifteenth Army had been given 
orders to maintain coastal fortresses at Boulogne, Calais, Dunkirk, Walcheren Island 
and Flushing Harbor, the Antwerp bridgehead, and along the entire Albert Canal line 
to Maastricht. While these orders had been transmitted on 3 Scptcmber-the day 
before Antwerp's capture-decrypts clarifying these orders were not transmitted to 21 
Army Group until late on S September and on 6 September, the day originally meant 
for COMET's debut. On 7 September, decrypts provided Montgomery information 
that Walcheren was to be fortified and that Fifteenth Army would conduct a fighting 
withdrawal to defend the line Zeebruge-Bruges-Ghent as well as to begin crossing 
troops at usable ferries. Mines and attempts to block the estuary were to begin on 8 
September. On the same day, intelligence warned that 25,000 troops had already 
1,37 crossed northward . (See figure 4 1. ) 
Intelligence also warned that COMET's progress would be more heavily 
contested. Second Army's Intelligence noted that: 
there are more enemy troops between the ALBERT Canal and the 
lower RHINE than there were three days ago. In this connection it is 
worth pointing out that enemy rail communications in Western 
GERMANY have not yet been pulverised to the same extent as they 
were in Northern France.... 
Ferries across the Scheldt are doing a roaring trade, and all of 15th 
Army that can get away is making North across the river. The enemy's 
intention is reasonably plain: enough must be left to keep us out of the 
ports ... and to hold a perimeter south of the SCHELDT, but apart from 
these forces. all the remainder of 15 th Army that are to fight again must 
0? Hinsicy. British Intelligence, 3. Pam 2,378-379. 
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somehow cross the river. Targets galore are likely to be presented to 
our Air Forces in the process. 638 
COMET, originally meant to be executed on 6 September, was changed for 
late on the 7 th or early the next morning on the 8th. Weather was the culprit causing 
the delay, along with additional preparation needed by the airborne. The "36-hour" 
preparation rule handily adopted by Brereton was always unreasonable. Intelligence, 
mapping, briefings, and rehearsals for ground troops took time, as well as the normal 
troop-leading steps needed to prepare division- and corps-sized operations. This 
included the shifting, staging, and movement of "sea tails" and "ground tails, " the 
huge truck and baggage train needed to support immobile airborne divisions when 
linked to ground forces. Brerqton had downplayed this, and his own staff, dominated 
by the concept that an airborne operation is merely an air operation to which ground 
troops are attached, and whose needs are subordinated to the air, unwittingly courted 
disaster. These delays now meant that Montgomery could not react to the Fifteenth 
Army's moves without negating his investment in time lost in halting while awaiting 
COMET's preparation, in the belief that it would be repaid in large operational gains. 
As LINNET 11 demonstrated, Brereton was a sloppy planner who 
overestimated his headquarters' ability to adequately prepare plans. 639 He rushed 
6)8 Second Army Intelligence Summary No. 96,8 September 1944. 
639 Author interview with Lt. Gen. E. R. Quesada, 24 October 1984, at the Staff College. Quesada 
stressed that Brcreton showed little or no attention to detail and left strong subordinates alone as long 
as he (Brcreton) looked good. It is also known that Arnold considered Brercton "a loose cannon. " Most 
anti-Brereton material (which is substantial) is anecdotal. He left a remarkably clean paper trail and his 
correspondence with or private files in Arnold's papers are sparse enough to encourage the belief that 
the file had been sanitized. Bradley disliked and had little respect for Brereton, particularly after 
COBRA. It has also been said that Brercton and Coningham had poor relations. Brcreton had a 
checkered past with the British, had actually supported Monty at Alamein, but had been "shamed" into 
leaving the India theater due to his personal conduct. Brercton's competence and his role in the loss of 
the American Air Force in the Philippines have been defended by Dr. Roger G. Miller of the Air Force 
History Office. who is preparing a biography. 
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additional studies while his staff should have focused on COMET, particularly issues 
of counterflak, intelligence, and the actual mechanics of seizure of objectives. lie 
offered a huge menu of half-baked selections designed to fit the appetite of the 
moment. 
As COMET ground forward, additional planning on other operations 
continued. Montgomery's headquarters inquired as to the feasibility of an airborne 
operation to clear Walcheren Island and solve the Antwerp problem, a study 
immediately shelved by First Allied Airborne Army as unworkable for airborne 
troops. Called INFATUATE, the plan later became a First Canadian Army mission. 640 
The additional plans were the product of Ridgway's desire (with Brereton's 
blessing) to use the XVIII Corps (Airborne) under a US flag against objectives in 
Bradley's sector. NAPLES Land 11 were planned in First Army's area beyond the 
Siegfried Line east of Aachen and to establish a bridgehead on the Rhine near 
Cologne; MILAN I and MILAN H were in the Third Army sector and included a 
Siegfried Line breach near Trier and a Rhine crossing near Coblenz. Also in Patton's 
area were CHOKER I and CHOKER 11, featuring a Siegfried Line breach near 
Saarbrucken and a Rhine crossing between Mainz and Mannheim. 641 The plans for the 
First Army area were all hatched ir) outline form during the month of September. 
Simultaneous to this planning, of some import, is the SHAEF/First Allied Airborne 
Army connection concerning TALISMAN, regarding an airborne strike on Berlin's 
6"0 Brereton Diaries. 340-34 1. 
"'Ibid.; CMH. MS, -History of the First Allied Airborne Army, 2 August 1944-20 May 1945" 
[hcrcaftcr referred to as -FAAA History"], 61-66. Details of these operations are found in the specific 
file folders in RG 33 1. IAAA. 381 Plans. Additional material is found alphabetically in CMH, MS 
Chronology of Notes. The MILAN/CHOKER series were proposed in October and November. 
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airfields and the naval base at Kiel in the event of a German surrender. Airborne 
planning was initiated for this contingency in September based on the release of 
SHAEF's updated contingency plan in the event of a collapse of Germany. Thus, 
Brereton's headquarters, in fear it might not be prepared for a future operation, rarely 
focused on the job at hand. 642 
While TRANSFIGURE, LINNET I and 11, and the early plans showed that 
Brereton was quick to approve concepts and offer his own ideas, he did not appear to 
connect these operations to ground operations at the time. He personally grasped little 
of campaign planning and was buffeted by the whims and kibitzs of Tedder, who 
increasingly saw the airborne forces as his personal preserve; by Bull at SHAEF, who 
felt Eisenhower's eagerness to deploy the force; by Ridgway, who interpreted Bradley 
for him and who continuously attempted "to sell" airborne plans at 12'h Army Group; 
and most importantly by Arnold, who wondered why his "airborne army, " a desired 
piece in his future independent air force, was not winning the war through air- 
delivered troops, a new form of airpower. 
Eisenhower and his staff, meanwhile, had offered no guidance. Brereton also 
continually pressed to move First Allied Airborne's headquarters and its troops on to 
the continent near Paris. This reflected not only Brereton's view that he would be a 
player on the scene, but the fact that FAAA, by default, could not operate from British 
W Ibid. This plan was later called ECLIPSE. 
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bases in much of 12 th Army Group's sector. Leaving the airborne in England meant 
being condemned to Montgomery's sole control for operations. 643 
Hitherto, Browning had been the principal airborne planner. His views had 
dominated most of the pre-NEPTUNE ideas at 21 Army Group, and he was relied 
upon heavily by both Montgomery and, by default, Brereton, whenever operations 
were planned in Montgomery's sector. BENEFICIARY, TRANSFIGURE, LINNET 1, 
and LINNET 11 were all I Airborne Corps assignments. 6" Detailed planning for these 
operations had been finalized by Browning's staff with the respective air transport 
commanders, most notably Air Vice Marshal Hollinghurst. Now, Major General Paul 
L. Williams (IX Troop Carrier Command), recently returned from commanding the 
ANVIL airborne operations, had been inserted within the advisory chain for 
COMET. 645 
The ground battle in Second Army's area continued to affect the COMET 
operation. The unrelenting pursuit of 30 Corps had inflicted more than 40,000 
casualties on the enemy for a loss of less than 1,400 men and 42 tanks. Dempsey had 
to contend with the simultaneous requirements to rest, refuel, and refit, with the more 
643 Brereton Diaries, August-September, passim; Parks Diayy, August-Septcmber, passim. These 
diaries arc the best sources of influences on Brcrcton. with the Parks Diary serving as the superior 
source and one which records Tedder's and Ridgway's influences. Paris had been an early theme with 
Brercton, who did not comprehend that the logistical effort needed to move and supply the FAAA on 
the continent would cripple the advancing annies. 
'" Lt. Gen. Gavin told the author in a 1983 interview that Ridgway believed Browning was trying -to 
get control- of the American airborne forces by establishing I Airborne Corps. Ridgway "sold" this 
idea to Eisenhower when trying to create his own airborne corps command, in which he succeeded. 
This was XVI II Corps (Airborne). Ridgway, like Bradley, was paranoid over the British influencing or 
gaining control of US troops. This was a popular theme with Bradley, and it hampered any attempts to 
coordinate or control combined operations. 
N., Many of the parachute aircraft for COMET were from Williams' command. Hollinghurst. however. 
was tccbnically the troop carrier commander. though as with all air operations, every air general 
seemed to have the right to veto every detail. 
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urgent time press of regrouping for COMET as well as capturing the needed start-lines 
for the 30 Corps divisions. Meanwhile, advancing infantry divisions still needed "to 
mop up" bypassed enemy formations, gather prisoners, secure flanks and rear areas, 
and stage forward supplies for the dash to the Rhine. German airfields were 
rehabilitated as 2 TAF began to leapfrog its wings forward. 646 
As if to posit Ludendorff s dicta that strategy follows tactics (or here, more 
accurately, "operations"), Guards Armoured Division became a key influence in 
determining the fate of the campaign. Major-General Allan Adair's immediate 
objectives-a bridgehead on the Albert Canal and then on the Meuse-Escaut Canal- 
and his distant divisional objective-the town and bridges of Eindhoven-were 
essential to meeting COMET's time schedule. Enemy resistance to his armored 
advance on two separate axes demonstrated that the pursuit was over, and II 
Armoured Division's failure to gain a canal crossing north of Antwerp before its 
regrouping indicated that the hardening of the enemy sector was not merely due to 
local defenses. Bridgeheads on the Albert were not developed until 8 September and 
on the key De Groot bridge on the Escaut, on the loth. 
647 
(See figure 42. ) 
Elements of four German divisions were identified within the 30 Corps sector 
on 7 September, including fragments of the I SS Panzer Division and a handful of 
parachute battle groups. (See figure 41. ) These units functioned not simply as a block 
to Allied advance, but were in effect the "straggler line" designed to recover the 
fragments of escaping fonnations still percolating through the Allied lines. This 
6"0 Second Armr Hisron?, 195-197. 
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hardened crust, the subsequent slow regrouping of Second Army, and the failure to 
seize a bridgehead on the Escaut Canal short of the Dutch frontier, called the question 
on COMET's viability as a lightning strike to seize a Rhine bridgehead. 30 Corps' 
start line was farther from the river bridge objectives than intended, and two 
additional water barriers remained in between. Most importantly, it appeared that the 
shattered enemy had congealed, but the question remained, how thick was the enemy 
crust and did anything substantial lay beyond it? 648 
Three significant areas evolved during the week between COMET's 
conception and the seizure of the De Groot bridge. Logistics, an evolving intelligence 
picture, and a rapidly changing ground situation forced new "appreciations" at every 
level from theater to the smallest fighting unit. 
The 4 September taking of Antwerp, to include its port facilities, seemed to 
change the logistics picture as well as to cover Bradley's failure to scize the necessary 
ports to develop CHASTITY and the Quiberon Bay project. Brest, now a matter of 
prestige rather than a necessity, had been shunted onto an unknown, Simpson, to 
capture. Moreover. it left open to interpretation a key tenet of Eisenhower's argument 
for the ANVIL landings in Southern France: that the Marseilles group of ports was 
essential to the OVERLORD campaign. Having achieved Marshall's goal, to stymie 
and stop the Italian campaign, Eisenhower hedged on pressing for shipping through 
"7 SecondAnnr Histom 198-199, Appendix "K": Captain the Earl of Rosse and Colonel E. R. Hill, 
The Ston, ofthe Guards Annoured Division (London: Geoffrey Blm 1956). 99-122. Maj. -Gcn. G. L. 
Verney. The Guards Armoured Division (London: Hutchinson, 1955). 89-98. 
"" I bid.. 199-202. Note that Horrocks' -COMET- plan would have taken these on the move had it been 
launched on 7 September. 
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the Mediterranean as Roosevelt and Marshall combined to press for a more rapid 
prosecution of the allegedly secondary campaign in the Pacific. 649 
From the perspectives of the 21 and 12 Ih Army Groups, Antwerp meant 
different things. Montgomery's administrative plan, based on the 21 August 
Administrative Appreciation, was based upon maintenance from the Seine ports, with 
the delay of opening a more forward base until Rotterdam and Hamburg were 
captured. 650 
Logistics became a wedge that not only drove apart operations but began to 
split loyalties concerning command. Having received the second half of Eisenhower's 
directive on 6 September, Montgomery recorded: 
So everything is to be split-forces, air, maintenance, transport, rolling 
stock, etc., etc. 
I can see no good results obtaining from this decision; I fear it is 
exactly what the Germans would like; I fear an early end to the German 
war is not now likely. 
The great and outstanding lessonfirorn this war is the importance of 
concentration of effort; we now chuck that overboard. 
Montgomery, clear in his mind as to why this had happened, named Eisenhower as the 
problem: 
'" Eisenhower Papers, IV, 2105,2106,2107; Ruppenthal, Logistical Support of the Armies, 11,108. 
Eisenhower during this period wavered concerning the Mediterranean. On 30 August he told Marshall 
it might be necessary to support DRAGOON through the Bay of Biscay; the next day he said that the 
Italian campaign -assumed added importance, " not due to its operations but as a possible foil to 
"fanatics" who might wage guerrilla warfare in the interior of Germany after it collapsed. On 13 
September he finally asked Wilson, Dcvers, and the Mediterranean commanders to investigate creating 
supply capabilities to support Third Army. 
0-10 -Liberation Campaign, " 4346, Campaign Admin. Development, "21 Army Group Administrative 
Appreciation: Location of the Advance Base and Maintenance beyond the River Seine. " The M. G. A., 
however. described the British targets as Antwerp and Rotterdam at a meeting at SHAEF on 26 
August. 
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He issues instructions without first discussing the repercussions with 
his subordinate generals. 651 
In reality, Monty meant "without discussing it with the 21 Army Group 
commander, " for Montgomery knew that Ike had held a conference with Bradley and 
his army commanders prior to issuing his directive splitting the forces. 
In this light, the surprise capture of Antwerp, particularly as Crerar's two corps 
having seized only one port were stretched from Le Havre to Boulogne-offcred 
perplexing challenges both logistically and to the accomplishment of Montgomery's 
long-range intentions regarding a northern envelopment of the Ruhr. From a tactical 
and operational perspective, Crerar's Canadians were the logistical foundation for 
Montgomery's campaign until well into the Ruhr. Dempsey recorded his meeting with 
Montgomery's administrative chief on 7 September, as COMET awaited launching: 
In the existing conditions operations are strictly limited by the 
administrative situation, and until we can get the Channel ports 
(preferably BOULOGNE and DUNKIRK) which will land some 5000 
tons a day, until DIEPPE is working, which will land 4000 tons a day, 
and until we get a regular air lift of 1000 tons a day, Second Army 
cannot be developed beyond ARNHEM. When these ports have been 
opened we can go as far as MUNSTER. 652 
Antwerp's own role, even in Dempsey's mind, was hazy. Opening its northern 
approaches was a priority, but was clearly a secondary mission given to his flank 
651 Alontgomety Log. 6 September 1944. Montgomery was quick to note that Eisenhower's directive to 
Montgomery had received a low priority at Eisenhower's headquarters, marked -important" as 
opposed to "top priority- which all command messages to senior commanders were. Had Monty 
wished to say that this was deliberate. and that this had never happened to any other senior commander 
at any other time during the war, he would have been on good grounds concerning the second half of 
that statement, and might'charitably be said to have probable cause concerning the first. Deliberate or 
accidental, this was a serious error on SHAEF's part and should have resulted in the firing of the signal 
officer responsible. Worse, the upshot was to convince Montgomery that SHAEF was farther out of 
touch with the front than he had feared. 
0-52 Dempsey Diaty. 7 SEP 44. 
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corps. An hour after his recorded meeting with his administrative chief, he saw Lt. 
Gen. N. E. Ritchie of 12 Corps and ordered: 
One division in ANTWERP ready to move NORTH and go for 
WALCHEREN Peninsula; 
One division SOUTH of ANTWERP ready to move towards BREDA 
to protect the LEFT flank of 30 Corps; and 
One division holding the ring from ANTWERP to GHENT. 653 
Having met with Montgomery prior to the other two meetings, and with 
Montgomery in daily meetings with his administrative chief, this was the picture in 
Dempsey's mind as reflected by the 21 Army Group's commanders intentions, which 
still centred on going east to the Ruhr. At the same time, Montgomery noted in his 
diary that the two forward corps of Second Army would still- be able to operate "on by 
bounds to BERLIN. " 
More important, Montgomery believed, correctly, that: 
12 Army Group pays no attention to any orders it may have received 
about the priority of the northern thrust; its total available maintenance 
is split equally between two Armies; this actually gives priority to the 
Third US Army as it has less Divisions employed. 
Bradley's actions were seen by the 21 Army Group commander as a reflection 
of Eisenhower's lack of grip on his own forces, feeding Monty's persistent belief that 
Ike was "unf it" to lead the land armies. Monty stated: 
Eisenhower has no idea what is going on. 654 
0" Ibid. 
t-. 14 Afonkizomen, Log, 7 September 1944. Montgomery increasingly saw SHAEF's staff as culprits 
combining to iecp Eisenhower isolated from the reality of the battle situation. See further log entries 
for 7 September and beyond. 
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Montgomery thus saw the immediate logistical famine as a command issue 
based upon failing to establish a priority, more for transportation assets that were in 
short supply, than for port facilities, which were in the process of being captured and 
cleared. He continued to see the final opening of Antwerp not simply as a channel 
control and dernining operation, but also as a subsequent task for First Canadian Army 
on the seaward flank. Ritchie could help by limited operations north of Antwerp. 
INFATUATE, turned down by Brereton as an Airborne Army mission, sent a further 
signal that strategically, SHAEF saw no immediacy in Antwerp as a target. 
Indeed, considering that First Allied Airborne Army was the theater's only 
reserve, and Antwerp was the primary goal of the theater's immediate ground 
campaign, a clear directive to complete the opening of Antwerp should have been 
issued. Tedder-whose contempt for Montgomery not only included walking 
SHAEF's halls louding enumerating Montgomery's "mistakes, " but also attempting to 
define ground tasks for 21 Army Group through Eisenhower-expressed his strong 
beliefs to Brereton that the Rotterdam port should be the key airborne target. 653 
While the flak concentrations on the coast might well have precluded such an 
operation. a close discussion of it with Eisenhower might have clarified the key 
variant in views among SHAEF, 21 Army Group, and 12th Army Group. That variant 
was time. The driving force separating these headquarters was the perception of 
opportunity that the victory disease had inspired, but which each of the respective 
W Tedder attempted to convince Eisenhower that as Deputy Supreme Commander, he was deputy for 
all operations. not simply air. Moreover, considering he felt that airpowcr and ground power were 
equals. he saw no problem with designating ground objectives to support his air campaign. These werc 
mostly airfields. but later an odd symbiosis that supports this belief would develop between him and 
Montgomery over an air plan designated HURRICANE. that would be advanced by Tedder in October 
1944. 
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commanders viewed through the prism not only of his own command but of his own 
problems. As such, how fleeting an opportunity they perceived varied not simply by 
intelligence on enemy forces deployed, but weather projections, logistical forecasts, 
artillery ammunitions states (which grew critical at this period), replacements (which 
grew to crisis proportions not just between the British and Canadians, but soon to be 
among the American divisions also), and a host of military considerations of every 
kind. 
The time variant had also modified the logistical plan and the perception of 
what it had always been. Montgomery should have been advised in detail of the 
American logistical view, particularly since it was Lt. Gen. J. C. H. Lee, Eisenhower's 
American services of supply commander, and not SHAEF's G4, Lt. Gen. Humphrey 
Gale, who really forced the Antwerp issue. As with everything from Eisenhower to 
Montgomery, it came in writing rather than in discussion, as Ike was not fond of 
speaking with his British subordinate. 
The "time" viewpoint no doubt was enhanced by Antwerp's capture, but its 
capture, as was known by all at the time, meant nothing if it couldn't be used. 
Antwerp's use, however, was Lee's solution to his own dilemma. Three weeks before, 
the weekly meeting of chief administrative officers at SHAEF had agreed that: 
the development of BREST for intake of US divisions and their 
equipment was of highest priority as soon BREST is captured. 
CHASTFIY, however, was seen as tentative, and General Gale asked the 
planners for 
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a forecast what the overall tonnage capacity and requirements would be 
on the 15'h September and the need for this scheme 1,56 
Despite this lack of urgency in deciding or forcing an operational solution, 
ports remained the concern of logistical planners. Noting the British targets of 
"Antwerp and Rotterdam, " Monty's administrative deputy offered up Lc Havre and 
Rouen to the Americans, though Lee stated he believed study would support the 
priority for Brest. 657 Moreover, as the advance continued, the road distance from 
current ports forced rapid rail restoration as a key to diminishing trucks needed for 
long hauls. Lee transferred both locomotives and rolling stock to help 21 Army 
Group, but the Americans continued to review "CHASTITY's practicality" weekly 
despite its obvious benefits in saving long hauls of troops and equipment by road or 
rail. 658 
The continuing problem was not simple. Commanders could make a logistical 
investment for the future, focusing on opening ports such as Antwerp, Brest, or 
Quiberon Bay, or continue to press advances, hoping to reach immediate objectives 
before administration broke down. When and how logistics would break down was 
problematical. Stopgap measures such as the Red Ball and Red Lion truck runs, the 
reduction in port offloadin g to free trucks for long hauls, and the continuing 
rehabilitation of the French rail system added to tonnages delivered beyond any 
original forecasts. This, plus the economics taken in operating measures and the 
6"6 NARA. RG33 I. SGS. entry 1, Box 55. File 33718 Volume I I, Chief Administrative Officer 
Conferences. Meeting of Chief Administrative Officers Minutes of Weekly 22d Meeting, 19 August 
1944.1.2. 
Weekly Meeting of Chief Administrative Officcrs Minutes of 23' Meeting, 26 August 1944,3. 
Weekly Meeting of Chief Administrative Officers Minutes of 241 Meeting, 2d September 1944. 
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intemittent use of air transport, gave a false positive outlook on continuing 
opemtions. 
Montgomery had simplified the answer by pressing for one advance, at least 
until the logistical situation had been improved. Bradley had pressed for his own 
advance, virtually ignoring his own solution by finishing the capture of the southern 
Brittany ports. By themselves, these would have solved 12 th Army Group's problems 
in mid- to late September had they been fully approached in mid-August. Moreover, 
Bradley's eastern advance eliminated the "self-healing" logistical problem of a 
northern advance. Aiming Patton to Metz instead of Aachen meant that the necessary 
force to take Antwerp, the V-2 sites, and the Channel ports held by the remnants of 
the Fifteenth Army, plus an advance on the Ruhr, could not be maintained. Bradley's 
choice forced an "advance or ports" alternative on Montgomery that would not have 
obtained if there were three full armies operating north of the Ardennes. With such a 
force, the Allies could have had an advance and seized adequate ports simultaneously. 
Eisenhower's 4 September directive had reversed reality. Recognizing that the 
German Army in the west was not capable of an immediate cohesive defense, he 
ordered a general advance and the seizure of two substantial areas of Germany without 
recognizing the logistical improbability of supporting sufficient forces to do so. By 
doing so, he had transferred the onus to succeed on his subordinates as he withdrew to 
his waterside headquarters far from the front. 
Failing to be forced by logistics to choose, Eisenhower faced the nuances of a 
changing intelligence picture. Dempsey and Horrocks had already felt the change at 
the front. SHAEF and the senior headquarters, however, had to respond by changing 
368 
their plans. Strong's intelligence section summarizing the week ending on 9 
September noted the Allied attempts at encirclement had now reached the stage where 
the actual "battle for the REICH is beginning. " SHAEF assessed the 48 "nominal" 
divisions located in the west as equating to four panzer divisions and 20 infantry 
divisions. On Eisenhower's right, a wide gap still existed through which the German 
Nineteenth Army was escaping, though this equated to no more than three divisions. 
The German First Army, fronting on Patton's forces, received two "low grade" 
infantry divisions as reinforcements, and three panzer or panzcr grenadier divisions 
remained in the line, with two more being rebuilt behind the front. SHAEF noted that 
Fifth Panzer Army had "disappeared" and that the armor both north and south of the 
Ardennes 
seems to have been withdrawn from the line and much of it has been 
reported either in layback positions or on its way out altogether, 
presumably for refit, not to say rebirth. In the NORTH, panzer 
elements have been going out via LIEGE, and splitting into two parties, 
going WEST and NORTH; in the SOUTH, two panzcr groups are 
crystallizing [sic] in rear of METZ and NANCY. On the whole, the 
group SOUTH of the ARDENNES seems the more active and possibly 
the larger. 659 
On Eisenhower's lefL or northern, flank opposing Montgomery, Strong noted: 
Fifteenth Army is now isolated and its ten divisions cut off on the 
FLANDERS Coast, though some may escape by ferry or by the sea. 
The approaches to HOLLAND ahead of the British advance are 
meantime only blocked by the natural water obstacles and by the 
meagre resources of C-in-C NETHERLANDS, amounting to one 
division and some oddments. "60 
*- SHAEF Weekly Intelligence Summary No. 25 for the Week Ending 9 September 1944,1.5, 
"0 Ibid.. S. 
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importantly, no panzer divisions or equivalents were noted in the 21 Army Group 
area. 
SHAEF's analysts, furthermore, predicted that even with transfering divisions 
from other fronts, no more than a dozen divisions could be scraped up in the next two 
months. 
They estimated that 200,000 men had escaped the furnace of the Normandy 
campaign, predicted that "many" of the 70,000 troops in Belgium would make good 
their escape, and that with perhaps 30,000 replacements from within Germany, the 
strength available to man the West Wall would be about 300,000 men, or roughly 15 
divisions. They noted further that: 
It is most unlikely that more than the true equivalent of four 
panzer/panzer grenadier divisions, with 600 tanks, will ever be found. 
By September's end, with intratheater transfers, perhaps 20 division equivalents 
would exist in the west. 
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With the capture of Romania and its oil fields, and the continuing attacks 
against synthetic oil production by the USSTAF, Germany faced a dim future, but its 
military capability to defend was not eliminated. Moreover, as the SHAEF analysis 
continued, it provided, without comment, a detailed study of the German Siegfried 
Line. The Allies having reached the West Wall, this study should have influenced 
operations, as the original CIS Staff Study concerning terrain had failed to do. 
In terms used by a German military writer, the study described the line's 
defenses as "tactics dug into the ground. " Meant to be a continuous 
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antitank-/antipersonnel obstacle covering the prewar German border, the defense zone 
extended in depth to furnish "a dense zone of cross-fire to seal off any penctmtion of 
the forward position. " The German line reversed the Ma&ot design, which 
comprised massive forts in shallow depth. The Siegfried Line consisted of numerous 
small positions in extensive depth. Admitting that the line was designed as a skeleton 
of a defense upon which additional field works, artillery in depth, and reserves would 
be used, the basic defense concept still required the counterattack style of German 
defense used since the Great War to maintain its integrity. While the current state of 
the line was speculated upon, the unalterable characteristic of the line was 
unchangeable: 
In general, the fortifications are strongest between STRASBOURG and 
TRIER. Specially stong areas are OFFENBERG (opposite 
STRASBOURG), KARLSRUHE, the BIENWALD gap, 
PIRMASENS, ZWEIBRUCKEN, SAARBRUCKEN, TRIER and 
AACHEN. At all of these there arc, in addition to the main line, 
reserve positions which are also fortified in depth. Moreover, between 
KARLSRUHE and TRIER, there is a stop line, lightly fortified and 
NOT of great depth, running 15 to 40 miles behind the fronticr. 662 
Without stating the obvious, Strong's latest estimate had begun to put an end 
to SHAEF's "victory disease. " His previous estimate had termed the 
German Army in the West [as] no longer a cohesive force but a number 
of fugitive battle groups. 
Eisenhower had responded by opening his 4 September directive with the words, 
Enemy resistance on the entire front shows signs of collapse. 
663 
661 Ibid. 
662 SHAEF Summary No. 25, "The Siegfried Line, " 1,24. 
t-03 SHAEF Weekly Intelligence Summary No. 24.4; Eisenhourr Papers, IV. 2115. 
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The specter of an enemy manning a fortified line with 15-20 divisions and rebuilding 
a panzer force to a strength of 600 tanks was not indicative of a crumbled force. 
Moreover, the location of the enemy's strength and the potential strength in depth and 
number of positions of the Siegfried defenses had to be taken into account. The 
greatest depth of the Siegfried Line lay between 12 th Army Group's boundaries, with 
the southern flank most heavily defended. Additionally, the current panzer divisions 
operating were known to be forming in front of Third Army's axis of advance. 
Bradley's views of this increased resistance are unrecorded, though his aide 
claimed that Bradley questioned SHAEF's estimate and the 
picture [Bradley] got on our ability to maintain armies of our own for a 
push through the Siegfried Line on our routes of advance. 
664 
He also told Patton that 
we must take Brest in order to maintain the illusion of the fact that the 
US Army cannot be beaten. 665 
Bradley and Patton blamed their supply problems on COMZ and Lee, who 
made no friends by moving his headquarters into Paris at the height of the gasoline 
shortage. Despite numerous conferences at SHAEF and with COMZ, both Bradley 
and Patton remained strangely silent on the uncaptured ports and uncleared areas that 
were meant to be supply bases for 12 th Army Group. 
"'4 Hansen Diaq, Sept. 10'. The relevant G-2 estimates and files for this period are missing from the 
official 12dArmy Group records. The enemy picture in divisions can be replicated by referring to the 
12" Army Group daily situation maps, copies of which are kept in NARA, RG 319, and also at CMH. 
05 Patton Diary, September 9,1944. Note that the Ninth Army, which had assumed the clearance of 
Brest and the drinany Peninsula as its mission, was assigned three infantry divisions and one armored 
division, all formerly Third Army Divisions. VIII Corps was likewise transferred from the Third to the 
Ninth Army. 
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Third Army's G-2 noted the resistance met along the Moselle River from the 
crossings on 5 September, and three days later cited that among the German 
capabilities assessed were: the ability to both defend and delay Mt of the Moselle 
while bringing forward reserves; local armored counterattacks against spearheads; and 
the potential to defend and delay the Third Army in its zone of advance while 
counterattacking from the south-and that a delay, trading space for time to cover the 
manning of the Siegffied Line, was possible. No longer did Third Army report "no 
cohesive front lines" for its enemy. 166 
On 8 September, Bradley pressed Hodges to advance his armor more quickly 
in the V Corps sector, claiming that German panzer attacks against Patton were due to 
V Corps' lack of progress. First Army's advances, however, registered between five 
and 10 miles daily along the entire front despite gasoline shortages. 667 Bradley's 
preoccupation with Hodges' right flank was a portent of future operations. 
First Army, however, prepared for entering Germany on a broad front. 
Originally meeting scattered resistance along its front as it turned eastward, the First, 0 
like the Third Army, met new resistance after it moved through Liege on 8 September. 
V Corps cleared the entire Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, while VII Corps moved on 
Aachen from the southern approach. XIX Corps moved toward the Maastricht 
appendix, with its left flank refused at Hasselt. Hodges intended that Collins, his 
6'* ThirdArmY. 4fier Action Report. 11, G-2, LXIV, Daily Intelligence Summary, 8 September 1944. No 
German divisional identifications arc noted in the reports for the beginning of September. SHAEF's 
Summary No. 25 indicated that the major enemy formations fronting on Third Army were 3 Para. 26 
SS. 27 SS. Panzer Lehr. 48 Inf. 15 Panzer Grenadier. and an additional infantry division moving into 
sector. Third An-ny's published operations map for 15 September indicates elements of three Panzer 
Grenadier divisions, four infantry divisions. and two parachute divisions. Third Amy then had six 
infantry divisions and three armored divisions. 
*67 Hansen Diaty, 8 September 1944. 
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favorite commander, be the Army main effort. With Gerow's V Corps being prodded 
by Bradley, a cohesive attack by Second Army and First Army's left-hand corps was 
impossible, thus ignoring the ideal attack terrain north of Aachen. 668 By 10 
September, considering the crisis in his supply, Hodges halted the V Corps advance 
669 due to ammunition shortages and cautioned his corps to halt if they met resistance. 
Dempsey's Second Army held up COMET. Montgomery had opted for 
grounding one-third of Dempsey's Army's strength, taking their transport to keep his 
columns going. These had now stopped. As the airborne operation was delayed, the 
ground attack evolved from its original continuous sweep from "Louvain and 
Antwerp" to Horrocks' current COMET plan that called for an immediate seizure of 
the Corps start line, Eindhoven-Tilburg-Breda. Firm resistance and continued shifting 
of troops had prevented this effort. The distance from the De Groot bridge on the 
Escaut Canal to Eindhoven had not been spanned. Dempsey had continued to put off 
launching COMET, and on 8 September, he indicated to Horrocks that COMET could 
be launched no earlier than the night of 9/10 September. Dempsey put the delay to 
continuing bad weather, but the next day Montgomery made clear a more serious 
issue: 
The stiff resistance on the line of the Albert Canal has prevented quick 
progress by Second Amly. The airborne drop is therefore put back, we 
cannot drop the airborne troops on the RHINE and MEUSE bridges 
until the leading Corps of Second Army has got to EINDHOVEN. It 
4*8 FUSA Report of Operations Aug44-Feb 45,1,38-44, Situation Map No. 5 LIEGE-AACHEN- 
DUREN. SHAEF War Room Report, 10 September 1944. During this period, when Hodges and Patton 
received equal tonnages, First Army used approximately 571,000 gallons of fuel daily. Hodges had 
five infantry and three armored divisions. 
"" Hogan, A Command Post at War, 147. 
374 
looks as if the whole airborne drop will now have to be on a far bigger 
scale. 670 
Montgomery issued new orders to Crerar and Dempsey, but did not cancel or amend 
COMET. These orders were: 
Canadian Army 
(a) To take over GHENT from Second Army. 
(b) To capture Havre 
(c) In the Pas de Calais to capture BOULOGNE, DUNKIRK, and 
CALAIS in that order. 
(d) Then to clear the area of the mainland enclosed in the line 
BRUGES-GHENT-NICHOLAS. 
(e) Then to capture the islands at the mouth of the SCHELDT, i. e., 
WALCHEREN and others, so as to open up the port of 
ANTWERP. 
Second Army 
(f) To operate northwards across the MEUSE and the RHINE, through 
EINDHOVEN and ARNHEM, and secure the area ZWOLLE- 
ARNHEM-UTRECHT. Later it will move eastwards to the 
MUNSTER-HAMM area. 671 
Thus, Montgomery assigned Crerar's priorities: to clear his flanks and rear and 
capture the Channel ports, then to clear the area north of the Rhine to open Antwerp. 
This permitted Dempsey's advance across the Rhine. But at the same time, 
Montgomery received a signal from the VCIGS regarding current intelligence on the 
V-2 rockets attacking England. Given the new enemy threat, and his own military 
670 Demps4ývDiaýv. 8 SEP 44; Alontgomery Log. 9 September 1944; A1anbroo4ePqpcrs, M/184.9 Sep. 
Montgomery also signaled Alanbrooke emphasizing that the airborne drop could not start prior to 
Second Army reaching Eindhoven. 
o7l Afontgomen, Log, 9 September 1944. Montgomery had impressed on C, ciat his role in maintaining 
the advance. ýAC. RG 24, Volume 11001, War Diary G. O. C. -in-C First Canadian Army, I Sep 44-30 
Sep 44. -Memo to Comd Corps, 9 September 1944, " notes: -it follows that a speedy and victorious 
conclusion to the war now depends, fundamentally, upon the capture by First Cdn Army of Channel 
ports which have now become so essential, if administrative problem is to be solved i. e. LE HAVRE, 
BOULOGNE, DUNKIRK. CALAIS. and generally in that order of importance. " 
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objectives, it was expected that Montgomery would relate these problems and their 
solution to a command decision requiring concentration of effort: 
I am more and more convinced every day that unless Eisenhower will 
concentrate on one thrust, and put everything into it, then we shall 
make no progress and the war will be prolonged. 672 
While the apparent stalemate on the Eindhoven road may have prompted the 
review of attack plans, the accrual of intelligence did not bode well for the current 
COMET plan. Dempsey's intelligence on 8 September stated that the presence of 
parachute and other troop reinforcements definitely indicated that the number of 
enemy troops between the Albert Canal and the Rhine was growing. The following 
day's analysis. noted that the areas southwest of Antwerp still remained to be cleared, 
that numerous troops behind stiff rearguards were waiting to cross the Scheldt, and 
that the rearguards on the critical Albert Canal were receiving fresh reinforcement. 
While German armor was expected, no divisional armor had been identified. 673 
Dempsey's own assessment concerning COMET grew dark: 
It is clear that the enemy is bringing up all the reinforcements he can 
lay hands on for the defence of the ALBERT Canal, and that he 
appreciates the importance of the area ARNHEM-NIJMEGEN. It looks 
as though he is going to do all he can do to hold it. This being the case, 
any question of a rapid advance to the North-East seems unlikely. 
Owing to our maintenance situation, we will not be in a position to 
fight a real battle for perhaps ten days or a fortnight. Are we right to 
direct Second Army to ARNHEM, or would it be better to hold a LEFT 
flank along the ALBERT Canal, and strike due EAST towards 
COLOGNE in conjunction with First Army9 674 
072 Ibid. 
"" Second Army Intelligence Summary No. 96, Up to 2400 hrs. 8 September 44,1; Summary No. 97, 
Up to 2400 hrs. 9 September 44,1. 
V4 Dcmpseýv Diaq, 9 SEP 44. 
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Dempsey had yet to clear the enemy from south of the Escaut, but the question 
he posed required not simply a recasting of Montgomery's operational design, but a 
major decision concerning the execution of Eisenhower's Broad Front strategy. On 
balance, what Dempsey proposed could be a simple reordering of priorities, but one 
that would favor the escape of the Fifteenth Army and the establishment of a heavy 
German presence in Holland north of the Rhine. To move on the Ruhr would have 
guaranteed a longer campaign to free Antwerp as well as installing a long, open front, 
albeit across the Rhine along Second Army's entire rear. Neither Crcrar nor Dempsey, 
even with the move of 8 Corps from Normandy, would have the divisions to counter 
such a threat. 
Montgomery certainly felt the pull both rearward to clear the coast and 
Antwerp and, after Nye's message on the V-2 threat, toward Rotterdam. Given the 
size of his forces, shifting priority to these objectives would stop any eastward 
advance by Second Army and commit 21 Army Group to a prolonged offensive in 
north Holland, the results of which would favor the airmen for airfields but would 
probably eliminate 21 Army Group from any advance on the Ruhr. Additionally, it 
would require the commitment of the American divisions not yet deployed to fill the 
vacuum north of the Maastricht-Aachen approach unless Third Army shifted 
northwards and Patch's Seventh Army, reinforced by new divisions, took over the 
Saar approach. Sixth Army Group would then be given an expanded role and, 
theoretically, its supplies could come from the Marseilles port group. This was a 
major reordering of the front, in line with the emerging appreciations of enemy 
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resistance but not catering to the idea of a 1944 defeat of the Germans that was then 
rampant in Washington and London. 675 
Eisenhower, who had yet to assume command of the DRAGOON forces, had 
planned for no such eventualities. If Eisenhower played to form and entrusted only 
"his boys" with great responsibilities as in the past, and considering his estranged 
676 feelings towards Devers, he would never give Devers a significant role. 
From Montgomery's perspective, COMET became more necessary, not simply 
to bounce the Rhine, but to seal North'Holland and permit Crerar to systematically 
move northward. This would not only clear the ports, but also deal with the Antwerp 
and now the V-2 threat while Second Army maintained its advance to threaten the 
Ruhr. In order to do so, he needed Eisenhower's commitment to sustain his advance, 
and that of Hodges alongside. 
On 6 September, Montgomery had signaled Eisenhower emphasizing that 
Eisenhower could 
rely on 21 Army Group to go all out 100 percent to further your 
intention to destroy enemy forces. 677 
0.75 CMH. MS. 2-3.7 AE. P-9, Royce Thompson. Proposed CCS Directive to Eisenhower to End ETO 
War in 1944. As late as October, Marshall debated sending Eisenhower a directive to end the war by 
the end of 1944. This was believed to have been initiated by Eisenhower's 13 September summary sent 
to the CCS, and was discussed informally by the CCS in September and pursued throughout the month 
of October. See also Ehrman, Grand Strate&n,. V, 377-404, passim. 
676 Eisenhower Papers, IV, 2466-2469. This, of course, dealt primarily with Americans, over whose 
career fates he held total control. His continuing irritation with Montgomery stemmed not only from 
the fact he (Eisenhower) was appointed by the British government, but from the fact he had not 
-chosen- Monty, who therefore was not beholden to Ike for his job. Ike, like his benefactor Marshall, 
trusted only those he knew and considered in his camp. So, also, did Montgomery. Ike's feelings 
toward Dcvcrs are reflected in his continued attempts to belittle his contribution to Marshall. 
07 EL, Correspondence File, M-169,6 Sept. 1944. 
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Despite his distaste for the conunand arrangements, Montgomery had demonstrated 
no indication that he would attempt to have them changed. fie did, however, 
recognize that the decision point for maintaining an adequate double thrust concerning 
priorities had passed. Bradley, having equalized supply to both the First and Third 
Armies, was holding his own on neither avenue of approach. Intelligence had 
indicated that Patton would soon be opposed by the rcrnnants of Germany's panzcrs, 
and that the refurbishment of enemy forces was outstripping the Allied ability to 
maintain an advance. COMET's limited force and the new situation to the northwest 
at Antwerp would require a new plan. Montgomery wanted Eisenhower's support in 
initiating one. 
The split directive, missent by SHAEF, prompted this. Monty signaled, noting 
the receipt of the missing parts: 
Have studied your directive No. FWD-13889 carefully and cannot see 
it stated that the northern route of advance to the RUHR is to have 
priority over the eastern advance to the SAAR. Actually, XIX US 
Corps is unable to advance properly for lack of petrol. Could you send 
a responsible Staff Officer to see me so that I can explain things to 
hiM. 678 
Eisenhower chose to come himself. He had last seen Montgomery on 26 
August and then only for a few minutes. Considering that he had committed the 
theater reserve for Montgomery's use, that the longest flank- for any Army Group was 
still the uncleared Channel Coast, and that the key to his logistical problems was 
seeming more and more pointed to Antwerp, his only course of action as -ground 
forces commandee' was to go forward to see for himself, hear his commander's plans, 
O. "S EL. Correspondence File. M-181.9 Septcrnbcr 1944. 
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and outline his campaign plan. Monty had asked for this meeting on 4 September, and 
though Eisenhower had met with Bradley at least three times and even with his 
American army commanders during this period, Eisenhower ignored the northern 
flank. He would not go forward to speak with Dempsey or Crerar on their situations 
until later in the campaign, and his meetings with Montgomery would be forced by the 
situation, not by his own desire to actively command ground operations. 
The IOh of September, 1944, was a day of decision that changed the 
Northwest European Campaign. That morning, while conferring with Browning and 
Dempsey, Montgomery ordered an increase in COMET's force, deciding to employ 
the entire airborne force of First Allied Airborne Army-, he noted that "enemy 
resistance there is getting stronger. " 679 If an assault to the east and the use of the 
airborne at Wesel vice Arnhem were discussed, this was not recorded. 680 Dempsey, 
who had already questioned the enemy's strength north of the Neder Rijn in his own 
diary, noted: 
In view of increasing German strength on Second Army front in the 
ARNHEM-NIJMEGEN area the employment of one airborne division 
in this area will not be sufficient. I got from C-in-C his agreement to 
the use of three airborne divisions. 
Dempsey returned to his headquarters with Browning and, according to his notes, 
fixed with him the outline of the operation. He can be ready to carry 
this out on 16 September at the earliest. 
674 
, tfont. gomery Log, 10 September. 
"0 Richard Lamb, Alontgomerv in Europe. 1943-1945: Success or Failure? (New York: Franklin Watts, 
1984), 214. Richardson, Flasiiback-, 186. Lamb says that Dempsey had called to recommend an 
airborne drop at Wesel vice Arnhem, but that the V. 2 message from the War Office that morning (it 
was actually the day before) decided the issue. No record of any such discussion was made by either 
man, nor did Dempsey record his disapproval of the new plan. Wesel had been ruled out early in 
COMET's planning due to heavy flak, a fact that Dempsey was aware of, he would not have 
reinstituted an airborne plan even if the Wesel advance was agreed to. 
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Later that afternoon, Horrocks received new instructions. Dempsey records: 
[1] gave him the plan for the operation to be carried out by Airborne 
Corps and 30 Corps-with the co-operation of 8 Corps on the RIGHT 
and 12 Corps on the LEFT. 
The complementary ground attack, planned as a thrcc-corps offensive, was named 
GARDEN. O'Connor's 8 Corps was to be brought forward and Ritchie's efforts 
shifted eastward, requiring an investment both in time and supplies but permitting a 
heavy assault to stearnroll the enemy's strengthened defense. Following his meeting 
with Horrocks, Dempsey met with Broadhurst. 691 
While there is no doubt that Montgomery and Dempsey were in accord 
concerning the details of the new operation, Dempsey took over its planning and 
coordination. As with EPSOM, CHAMVOOD, GOODWOOD, BLUECOAT, and 
other operations, Dempsey commanded the tactical forces, with oversight, not 
interference. from Montgomery. 682 
Eisenhower arrived at Brussels airfield and, due to his injured knee, the 
conference with Montgomery was held within the aircraft. Montgomery recorded the 
meeting for Alanbrooke via Nye: 
AM DentpseýyDiaq. 10 SEP 44. Dempsey records the range status of Broadhurst's squadrons. 
Considcring that Broadhurst would state that he was not informed of the operation, it is inconceiveable 
that the man who was coordinating air support for COMET would not be kept abreast of the change; 
PRO. WO 205 /192,21 A Gp/001432/Ops/A, II September 1944. Outline Plan for Revised Operation 
-COMET. " Note that this memo at 21 AG by Belchem states that operation is -to lay a stair carpa" 
02 Hart. Afontgoniet), and "Collossal Cracks. "passim. Many have accused Montgomery of 
overcontrol. and assumed that Dempsey was a cipher. The archival record for this operation does not 
support that view. For the only serious discussion of Dempsey, Crcrar, and Montgomery's relations 
with them. sce Han. The Persian Gulf war demonstrated that even with modem communication it is 
difficult for the senior headquarters to control operations on the battlefield and that the headquarters 
fighting the battle should be the lowest level headquarters where communications and a complete array 
of assets. to include air. logistics, special intelligence, and reserves, can be employed. In World War 11, 
this was an Army-level headquarters. 
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I said it was essential he should know my views and the action to be 
taken was then for him to decide. I gave him my opinion on the need to 
concentrate on one selected thrust vide my M160 of 4 Sep. He did 
NOT repeat NOT agree. I said that in para 4 of Part 4 of his 13889 of 5 
Sep he stated he had always given and still did give priority to the 
RUHR and the northern route of advance. He then said that he did not 
mean priority as absolute priority and could not scale down the SAAR 
thrust in any way. He said he had not meant what was in the telegram 
as regards priority for the RUHR thrust. 
But we have got no further. I foresee considerable delay before I can 
build up enough strength to develop operations northwards towards 
ARNHEM and UTRECHT as I have not the transport to get forward 
any maintenance and bridging. A great deal of bridging will be 
683 required . 
Tedder, who attended the meeting, sent the following description of the 
meeting to Portal: 
Today (10 September) I accompanied Eisenhower in Brussels to meet 
Montgomery. In our discussion there the advance to Berlin was not 
discussed as a serious issue, nor do I think it was so intended. The real 
issue is the degree of priority given to the American corps operating on 
Montgomery's right flank and the extent to which Montgomery 
control(s] his operations. A useful discussion then followed. 
Montgomery, however, made great play over the word "priority" and 
insisted that his interpretation of the word implies absolute priority if 
necessary to the exclusion of all other operations. Argument on such a 
basis obviously futile and Eisenhower made it clear that he could not 
accept such an interpretation. It is impossible to fight both hands at 
present, and date for the left hook has not come yet and could not come 
until north army group maintenance was based secretly [securely? ] on 
Channel ports. 
I feel the discussion cleared the air, though Montgomery will of course 
be dissatisfied in not getting blank cheque. It will help to insure Ruhr 
thrust does get proper priority which we all feel it should have. 684 
0.83 M. 186quotcd in Nigel Hamilton. Moniy: The Field Marsha 1944-1976 (London: Hamish Hamilton, 
1986). 53. 
C. 14 NARA. RG 319, AMSSO to OCTAGON CAS FROM D/SAC, 111531 September 1944, Extracts 
from D/SAC Diary, Pogue Secret Files, 27 March 1947. Italicized words added in diary not in 
message. See also shortened variant in Tedder, With Prejudice, 57 1; LHC, Papers ofSir Humphrey 
Gale [hereafter referred to as Gale Diaq], 10 September 1944. Gale, who according to most accounts 
was excluded from the meeting, says he was called into the conference after it had gone on for a while 
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Sir Humphrey Gale noted Montgomery's refusal to clear Antwerp 
immediately, but did not equate it with the need to maintain momentum at least to the 
Rhine. Gale never recorded the subtleties in the operational plans, nor did he see 
Montgomery as doing anything but "going to play for his own hand, " inspired only 
because of his replacement as ground commander. He did, however, agree, that the 
685 support of Hodges' northern corps needed to be addressed . 
Eisenhower records that he had stressed the need to close to the Rhine on all 
fronts, and that Antwerp's opening was Montgomery's priority, though he noted that 
taking Arnhem would 
merely be an incident and extension of our eastward rush to the line we 
needed for temporary security [the Rhine]. "6 
Montgomery did not need permission to launch an expanded COMET. First 
Allied Airborne Army remained per the 4 September directive under his planning 
authority, though no doubt existed that SHAEF could withdraw that authority. it is, 
however. doubtful that Eisenhower gripped the relevance of what was at stake, as he 
and was attacked with -recriminations by Montgomery and Graham" concerning details of transport. 
He accused Montgomery in his diary of discussion. stating, -My own view is that MONTGOMERY 
never intended to go to BERLIN ... and that he wanted proof that Eisenhower had prevented 
him from 
ending the war in a few days. " 
0.95 Gale Diaiý*. 10 September 1944. Montgomery. of courseý was not refusing to clear Antwerp; he had 
assigned the mission to First Canadian Army. in whose sector the port had been assigned. Gale's 
comments were typical of the SHAEF staff. He knew little of what was transpiring on the battlefield 
and was upset when it disrupted his methodical supply plans based on the phase line forecasts. His 
argument should have been with his own boss, Eisenhower, who controlled all ground forces. 
00% Eisenhower. Cnisade in Europe, 307; Eisenhower Papers. W. 2135, fn 5; Cornelius Ryan. A Bridge 
Too Far (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1974), 76 In, Major-General PLE. Urquhart with Wilfred 
Grcatorex. Arnhem (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1958), 4; Hamilton, Alonrw The Field 
, %farshal. 64. In old age Eisenhower told his biographer that he not only agreed to MAliKET 
GARDEN. he insisted on it. He also granted a vitriolic interview tojournalist Cornelius Ryan. whose 
description of the 10 September meeting is often quoted. Ryan had several key facts wrong concerning 
that day. to include the presence of Browning -in the wings- and repeating the fabricated and famous 
bridge too far- comment. 
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remained uncomprehending that the enemy defense had congealed everywhere and 
that his pursuit was over. 
Montgomery believed that the closure to the Rhine on all fronts was not only 
logistically impossible but increasingly doubtful, as the "destroyed" armies that 
Eisenhower had described in his early September directive were obviously rapidly 
regaining strength. The argument really was over concentration, at least temporarily, 
on a line of operations. 
Eisenhower had recorded a confidential memorandum on 5 September stating 
the following: 
Two weeks ago when General Montgomery insisted upon a whole 
American Army moving to the northeast on his right flank I told him 
that he did not need that much strength to destroy the Germans still on 
his front. With his usual caution he felt it imperative that we make 
certain of no halt in operations toward Antwerp and Brussels.... 
I now deem it important, while supporting the advance on eastward 
through Belgium, to get Patton moving once again so that we may be 
fully prepared to carry out the original conception for the final stages of 
this campaign. 687 
Neither man had withdrawn from his August conceptions, but Eisenhower had, in 
fact, been proven wrong, as even a casual look at the enemy order of battle maps 
published by his own headquarters would indicate. 688 The bulk of the enemy force 
remaining in the West was in the northern sector. Montgomery did need forces to gain 
both Brussels and Antwerp, and in fact needed more forces to maintain an eastward 
07 Eisenhower Papers, IV, "Secret Office Memorandum, " September 5,1944,2121-2122. 
683 SHAEF Weekly Intelligence Summaries, Nos. 22,23,24,19 August to 2 September, 1944; Enemy 
order of battle maps. 
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movement or to clear Antwerp. He could not do both. Moreover, the concentration of 
logistics to gain a line on the Rhine was not there. 
Eisenhower knew this and so warned Marshall on 4 September, saying: 
The closer we get to the Siegfhed Line the more we will be stretched 
administratively and eventually a period of relative inaction will be 
imposed upon us. The potential danger is that while we are temporarily 
stalled the enemy will be able to pick up bits and pieces of forces 
everywhere and reorganize them swiftly for defending the Siegfhed 
Line or the FJiine. 689 
if Eisenhower held to this line during the 10 September meeting, he was in fact 
contradicting his own belief that his forces were about to take both the Ruhr and the 
Saar. At Antwerp, he noted the "line needed for temporary security" was the Neder 
Rijn, hence Arnhem was mandatory as an operation. But what of Bradley's operations, 
and their relation to those in the north? 690 
As Montgomery prepared his improved COMET, Bradley issued a new 
directive, Letter of Instruction Number Eight. Bradley's orders followed Eisenhower's 
policy: 
Twelfth Army Group advances to the East to secure bridgeheads over 
the RHINE from MANNHEIM to KOLN both inclusive. 
His directives to his armies were: 
First Amly. 
(1) Continue to advance to the East to secure crossings over the 
RHINE River in the vicinity of KOBLENZ, BONN and KOLN. 
(2) Make contact with 21 Army Group and protect the left (north) 
flank. 
t'S9 Eisenhower Papers. IV, 2118-2119. 
b9o 
Eisenhower, Chisade in Europe, 307. 
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Third Army. 
(1) Continue the advance to the East in zone and secure crossings of 
the RHINE River in the vicinity of MANNHEIM and MAINZ. If 
sufficient forces become available to Third Army, it will also seize 
a bridgehead in the vicinity of KARLSRUHE. 
(2) Protect the south flank East of ORLEANS inclusive. 
Ninth Army. 
(1) Reduce the BRITTANY Peninsula and protect the south flank 
along the LOIRE River from its mouth to ORLEANS inclusive. 
Bradley offered no concept of operations that would have required establishing 
a priority. Instead, the tasks applied bore equal weight except for the note on 
administration: 
Armies will have equal priorities of su? ply except that the capture of 
the BREST area will have first priority. 6 
More importantly, he relegated XIX Corps to a passive role, acting neither in support 
of nor in concert with Second Army. This shift in priority assured that no concentrated 
thrust by the British and Americans could be made. 
While these orders were issued, Dempsey and Browning began planning to 
launch a strengthened attack. Browning's arrival at First Allied Airborne Headquarters 
prompted a hasty assembly of the key generals within the command. The staff rapidly 
produced an outline directive for PLAN SIXTEEN. Within several hours, a new name 
emerged: MARKET. 
"' 12'4 Arm 
,v 
Group Report of Operations, V, G-3 Section, "Letter of Instruction Number Eight, 10 
September 1944. " 
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CHAPTER NINE 
MARKET GARDEN 
The First Allied Airborne staff dubbed the replacement for COMET "Plan 
692 Sixteen" until an official code word could be assigned . Despite American 
sensitivities over the use of the American divisions, there was never any question of 
Montgomery's authority concerning committing FAAA to a larger operation. The 
Chief of Staff, Parks, visiting SHAEF forward on 9 September, had been told that 
XVIII Corps (Airbome) was available for an operation against Walcheren Island and 
the Scheldt, and that all of FAAA was available to Montgomery "until the Rhine is 
crossed. " As with most SHAEF decisions, there was a contrary clause, seemingly 
designed by the SHAEF G-3, to put themselves back in the decision loop. The 
commitment of the entire Airbome Army was to be referred to SHAEF not for 
operational reasons, but because SHAEF had committed half of their transports to 
transport duties. Given the directive committing them to Montgomery, this was 
assumed to be a mechanical requirement. Brereton's G-3, however, had informed 21 
Army Group that US forces were not available for a Walcheren operation, and cited 
Williams' disapproval of the plan. The G-3 assumed that XVIII Corps would support 
the Americans, and though Parks knew better, no record exists of FAAA disabusing 
21 Army Group of this belief prior to the decision to abandon COMET. 693 
"92 Brereton Diaries. 339,340; FAAA had only nine operations on the books at the time. British V 
Airborne Division, however, had planned fifteen. The original draft order is marked "Operation 
Sixteen. " "SIXTEEN" was proposed by I Airborne Corps. 
693 Parks Diatý-, 9 September 1944.3,6; Brereton Diaries, 340,34 1; "FAAA History, " 68; Otway, 
Airborne Forces, 214. Much of FAAA's effort at headquarters level at this time was taken up in 
fighting transport requirements. CATOR, the subset created to manage airlift and run by FAAA, had 
been relegated to a "plane provider" by SHAEF's G4 "Priority Board, " who decided on transport 
missions. Brercton attempted to have Tedder fix this, but MARKET intervened. "FAAA History" 
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Sunday, 10 September, proved fateful. At 1430 Browning telephoned FAAA 
with the warning order, recorded by Parks: 
[Eisenhower and Montgomery] desired the LINNET force employed in 
the COMET area except that it should extend ftirther south ... 
[Browning] had told them that the 15'h or 16 Ih was the earliest date 
possible that this could be done ... 
Eisenhower promised to make all air transport available for the 
operation. 694 
Brereton called the plans conference for 1800 at his headquarters at 
Sunninghill Park, Ascot. Present were: Brereton, Browning, Williams, Hollinghurst, 
Parks, Stearley, Cutler, J. M. Gavin (CG, 82d Airborne), A. C. McAuliffe (Divarty CG, 
101" Airborne), and a host of staff officers from I Airborne Corps and XVIII Corps. 
The GOC I British Airborne Division, R. E. Urquhart, was not present, nor was I 
Airborne Division represented. 695 
Browning read aloud the outline plan, and this was followed by statements by 
the various commanders or principal staff officers. The outline listed as Browning's 
intention: 
Airbome Corps will capture and hold crossings over the canals and 
rivers on Second Army's main axis of advance. 
The key paragraphs of the plan are reproduced below: 
records that the Walcheren Operation was to be part of INFATUATE, with the intention of seizing the 
eastern causeway of Zuid Beveland using a parachute brigade. It was to be launched in conjunction 
with a seaborne crossing of the West Schelde and a landward thrust along the isthmus of the Beveland 
Canal. It never matured beyond planning stages and, due to the tactical situation of the First Canadian 
Army, was planned to occur in late October. Brereton says that he had disapproved the use of airborne 
forces in INFATUATE on II September, though this did not appear to have been formally conveyed 
to 21 Army Group. Otway notes that disapproval was sent to 21 AG on 21 September. 
04 Parks, Diary. 10 September 1944. 
C-45 Ibid.. Minutes of Meeting called by Commanding General, First Allied Airborne Army, held at 1800 
hours, 10 September 1944,1. 
388 
METHOD 
4. ]British Airborne Division 
Will land and capture the ARNHEM bridges with sufficient bridgehead 
to pass formations of Second Army through. 
101 USAirborneDivision 
Will seize and hold the bridges at NIJMEGEN and GRAVE with the 
same object in view. The capture and retention of the high ground 
between NIJMEGEN and GROESBEEK is imperative in order to 
accomplish the Division's task. 
82 US Airborne Division 
Will seize the following on the Second Army's main axis to ensure the 
speedy pass through of that Army to the GRAVE, NIJMEGEN and 
ARNHEM crossings. 
a. Canal crossing 3596 [DE GROOT, Junction de' la Meuse a 
L'Escaut, timber decking on steel trestles*] 
b. WALKENSWARD 
c. EINDHOVEN 
d. Bridge in square 4425 [Wilhelmina Canal, ZON, a 2-span steel 
girder swing bridge*] 
e. ST OEDENRODE 
f. VEGHEL 
g UDEN 
52 (L) Division 
Will be flown in NORTH of ARNHEM as soon as airfields are 
available. 
LIFTS 
696 
5. In principle as for LINNET . 
The key statements or decisions made during the conference included: 
* that the operation would not take place before the 15 th or 16 th (Browning); 
CMJ NARA. RG 33 1. SHAEF, Entry 256, "Operation Market", Book 3, First Allied Airborne 
Headquarters. Airborne Army Operation Reports, 1944, Operation (Sixteen) "MARKET, " Outline 
Plan. 10 Sep 44. Specific information on bridge coordinates/targets [*] found in Bridge Details, 
appended to Engineer & Topo. 0.1.2. G-2 (Int) Div. SHAEF, Market Book 3 file. 
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e that FAAA would conform to 21 Army Group's "intentions and desires" and 
that timing would be the greatest factor to establish (Brereton); 
* that the range to the target area would not pennit a double glider tow, and that 
single tows for gliders would be used (Williams); 
e that the 10 1" would take the southern air route and the 82d the one north of it, 
requiring a reversal of missions as originally assigned in the outline plan. The 
82d would be briefed by I Airborne on their plans [COMET] (Williams; 
approved by Brereton); 
e that the operation would be named MARKET; 
* that a drop commencing at daylight would preclude adequate counterflak 
preparation and that an evening drop would give a full day for preparation; this 
negated a two-lift operation in one day (Stearley); 
* that the 101"" missions would be decided and briefed the next day 
(Browning); 
e that the date for MARKET would be decided on the evening of II 
September. 697 
Flak soon came to the fore as the most significant problem in the target area 
and was discussed during the morning of the II September at the routes-and-timings 
briefing with Gen. Williams. The divisions soon found that their missions were at 
647 ParAs Diaq, Conference Notes, 10 September, 14. 
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odds with the air transport commander's views. 698 Flak, not the necessity of a surprise 
air landing to seize bridges, would determine what the air transport commander would 
permit. 
In the I" Airborne Divisi6 area, the same drop zones designated for COMET 
were approved, minus the LZ designated for the coup-de-main glider operation to 
which Leigh Mallory had previously objected. Additional drop zones and landing 
zones were added to accommodate the three-day delivery of the division in the 
vicinity of the original COMET areas, with the exception of the Polish "K" drop zone. 
Assuming that the division would be formed in the objective area and that its presence 
would eliminate flak, this drop zone was added south of the town of Arnhem. 
In the 82d Airborne Division area, Gavin planned with Colonel John 
Oberdorfer, the A-3 of IX Troop Carrier Command, a series of drop zones that 
straddled the high ground specified as vital in the outline plan. The LZ designated for 
the coup de main in COMET north of the NIJMEGEN Bridge was ignored. 
In the 101" Airborne Division area, the commander, Maj. Gen. Maxwell 
Taylor, protested his assigned missions, and turned down drop zones indicated by 
Browning that he believed would scatter his division, even though they were designed 
to establish the crucial first "stair carpet" designed to achieve a quick linkup and 
passage for the 30 Corps force. Brereton supported Taylor in this argument. Taylor 
also was supported by a virtual soviet of US Army generals, including Ridgway and 
69S The appointment of Williams as air transport commander is not recorded and apparently happened 
prior to the 10 September conference. It can be speculated that he was appointed due to the use of two 
American divisions to be transported and because he commanded the far larger troop carrier force. 
Browning was retained as mission commander due to his planning of COMET and because his corps 
would fit within the British 2 Army structure more easily than Ridgway's XVIII. 
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Cutler, all decrying the plan and stating that it negated US doctrine by not employing 
the 10 1 "' Airborne as a division. 699 
The disagreement in fact, smacked of more than just a division commander's 
nonacceptance of the plan. Rather, it harked back to American disatisfaction during 
the LINNET planning. Brereton informed Parks, probably accepting Taylor's views 
that: 
The proposal regarding dropping 101 Division along an axis of 30 
miles in length is considered to lessen the chances of accomplishment 
of the present mission. Such dispersion destroys tactical integrity and 
renders it incapable of fighting as a Division and presents 
insurmountable problems of re-supply. Each of the small groups is 
susceptible of being destroyed in detail and of [not] accomplishing its 
mission. 
Brereton said that as an airman he opposed such a concept due to problems of 
finding numerous drop zones, and supplying and defending against flak on scattered 
drop zones. His own views (or those of Williams) had dominated drop-zone and route 
selection. He said: 
I propose to group the three Divisions in following areas: ARNHEM, 
NIJMEGEN, UDEN, so that each may be capable of assembly (into] 
sectors of divisional action in least practicable time and that two 
divisions will be mutually supporting. The Divisions at NIJMEGEN 
and UDEN will be capable of strong coordinated offensive action to 
the Southeast. 
Brereton's concerns, however, were not simply tactical. He and Ridgway were 
still intent on -selling" airborne for an American operation at MARKET's expense. 
Parks noted: 
('99 MH1. Papers of Clay Blair (author of Ridgway's Paratroopers), Letter BG Stuart Cutler to Clay 
Blair. 20 February 1984.5. Cutler is incorrect as to the time of day that Brercton was informed of 
MARKET. Taylor does not mention incident in his diary. 
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Ridgway has talked to Bradley and Hodges. There is a strong desire to 
support the bridges across the RHINE in about ten days. If the 
American Division[s] go in MARKET I will have left only the 17 th 
[US] and 6 th [British] Airborne, both in very inferior state of training. I 
recommend, if possible, that one Division be kept out of Market. 700 
Parks brought up the topic at SHAEF, gaining Smith's and Bull's concurrence 
on the 101" dispersed drop, but neither intended overruling the Army Group 
commander's plans, feeling that Montgomery should have the final say. Smith refused 
the idea of removing a division from MARKET, stating that the entire Airborne Army 
was available to Montgomery until he crossed the Rhine. Smith, however, agreed to 
701 ensure that Montgomery returned the airborne divisions after MARKET . 
Brereton wrote Dempsey concerning his objections and ordered Taylor and 
Parks to see Dempsey on 12 September, an action unknown to Browning. American 
objections to MARKET were not the only reevaluations of the operation underway. 
While the airmen and ground commanders met to plan the air operation, Montgomery 
met with Graham, his logistician, and was given stunning news. GARDEN could not 
go forward until 23 September unless SHAEF increased 21 Army Group's supplies. 
Monty immediately signaled Eisenhower: 
I have investigated my maintenance situation very carefully since our 
meeting yesterday. Your decision that the northern thrust towards the 
RUHR is NOT to have priority over other operations will have certain 
repercussions.... The large scale operations by Second Army and the 
'00 Parky Diaq, II September 1944: Record of Telephone Conversation, General Brereton-General 
Parks, 1630 hrs, II September, 1944. Parks was at SHAEF when phoned by Brereton and immediately 
registered his commander's views. 
"' Ibid., Smith and Bull had no brief to "approve" drop zones, as tactics was not SHAEF's 
responsibility. Parks was no doubt lining up support in case the British demanded that their plan be 
accepted in toto. This also flies in the face of the alleged American principle of "never telling a 
subordinate commander" how to execute a mission, a myth commonly repeated by historians. Smith, 
who generally acted on the logic of arguments rather than on their national basis, was correct to say 
that Montgomery should have the final say. As will be seen, Monty had delegated the "say" to 
Dempsey. who was the officer in tactical command. 
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Airborne Army northwards towards the Meuse and Rhine cannot now 
take place before 23 September at the earliest and possibly 26 
September. This delay will give the enemy time to organize better 
defensive arrangements and we must expect heavier resistance and 
slower progress.... Above facts show you that if enemy resistance 
continues to stiffen as at present then NO great results can be expected 
until we have built up stocks of ammunition and other requirements. 702 
The courses of action open to Eisenhower were clear- he could cancel 
MARKET and perhaps redirect the operations for the entire front, opt for a later and 
obviously less promising operation if the worsening fall weather permitted it, or back 
Montgomery with enough logistical support to push the operation forward but no 
more. Neither man would have expected a shift to a northern concentrated thrust. 
Eisenhower intended to send Smith to see Montgomery to organize support for 
GARDEN and apparently did not answer the signal. 703 
This decision was not made in isolation. That day Eke held a bedside 
conference with Bradley, Smith, Bull. and Strong to decide if Patton's army should be 
curtailed to support Crerar's in supply. No decision was made. 704 The 12 th of 
September, therefore, would become a critical day, at every level from theater to 
division, as key decisions were made not just in relation to MARKET GARDEN, but 
in shaping Bradley's operations as well. 
1702 EL. Correspondence File, M-192, Sept. 11,1944. Dempsey spent the 11' reviewing his 
administration. and visited his corps commanders to inform them operations would not begin prior to 
23 September unless he received additional supplies; Demps4ýy Diary, II SEP 44; 21 ArmY Group 
Administrative History, 37-39,47. 
'0' No response is filed in Eisenhower's correspondence. nor does Montgomery mention receiving a 
signal in his mcmoirs. 
704 Eisenhower Papers, IV. fn. 1.2130. No memorandum for this meeting exists either in the crucial 
Post Overlord 381 file or in Bradley's Operations Plans and Memoranda. Eisenhower was bedridden 
with his knee injury. 
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On 12 September Eisenhower received approval from the CCS of his SCAEF 
78 signal (9 September) outlining his broad front strategy. The Chiefs, in their reply, 
drew attention: 
(a) To the advantages of the Northern line of approach into 
GERMANY, as opposed to the Southern. They note with 
satisfaction that you appear to be of the same mind. 
(b) To the necessity for opening of the Northwest ports, and 
particularly ANTWERP and ROTTERDAM before the bad 
weather sets in. 705 
Eisenhower received a second message in the form of a letter from Bradley on 
13 September, downplaying Montgomery's comments on the slow movement of XIX 
Corps, a fact he attributed to the requirement to build bridges near Liege and to some 
petrol shortages. He noted that: 
First Army states that they now have on hand sufficient ammunition for 
five days' fighting and enough petrol to carry them to the Rhine. With 
the supplies coming forward even at their present rate, he [Hodges] 
should be capable of a considerable effort for a week or ten days 
without any reliance upon air supply. 
Third Army states that they have enough ammunition on hand or in 
immediate sight for about four days fighting and enough petrol to carry 
them to the Rhine. 706 
Bradley noted his intent to shift Patton's boundary northward and to 
concentrate the three armies-First Third, and Ninth-after Seventh Anny was able to 
move northward from 6 th Army Group. More important, Bradley described that 
RG 331 Post Overlord 38 1,1, SHAEF Incoming Message, Reference OCTAGON 16,12 September 
1944: EP IV. 2124-2128. Eisenhower had told the chiefs, "The first operation [of his campaign plan) is 
one to break the Siegfiied Line and seize crossings over the Rhine. In doing this, the main effort will 
be on the left. Then we will prepare logistically and otherwise for a deep thrust into Germany. " Thus, 
Montgomery was correct in assuming that operations north of the Ardennes would receive priority and 
that the Saar operation would be a secondary effort whose support should not have hampered either 
Dempsey or Hodges. Bradley's actions, supported by Eisenhower, belied this. 
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Hodges had received more supplies than Patton, averaging 3,300 tons versus 2,500, 
and that the projected increase in supplies of 2,000 tons daily for the Army Group 
would be divided to favor First Army. Patton's advance towards the Moselle, he 
noted, would be stopped if he had not achieved a bridgehead by 14 September. 
707 
From Eisenhower's perspective, his Double Thrust was continuing to work, 
and Montgomery's plan could go forward without hindering the American advance. 
These two operations, in Eisenhower's mind, continued to be independent and not 
complementary, and XIX Corps, as Bradley had stated, was to continue its flank guard 
mission for First Army "due to the gap" between Army Groups. Bradley, in fact, had 
no intention of stopping Patton's advance to favor Hodges, and had conspired with the 
Third Army commander to keep it going, knowing that Eisenhower would never halt 
his friend's success. The issue of fuel and supply priority was also falsified. Bradley 
had kept the logistics priorities even and during the period 10 to 16 September, the 
difference in fuel deliveries favored First Army by only 32,440 gallons, or roughly 
4,600 gallons per day, during a period where nearly a million gallons of fuel were 
issued to the two armies. 708 
100 Ibid., Lctter Bradley to Eisenhower, 12 September 1944,1. Receipt time of this letter is stamped 13 
Scptember at SHAEF. Bradley's claim that XIX Corps was supported was untrue, nor did his 
description of affairs fit First US Army's situation or the orders of its commander. 
"07 Ibid.. 2.3. 
'08 MH1. Pogue Papers, Pogue interview with Bradley, 1, Patton Diary, September 12,1944, Patton, 
WarAs I Knew It. 130, CMH MS. Study No. 21, Thompson, "ETO Field Commands Gasoline Status, 
August-Septcmbcr 1944. " 
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The 12 th of September appeared to signal an improvement in the operational 
situation at 21 Army Group. Le Havre fell, netting 10,000 prisoners. The operation 
had been a major Joint Operation launched by First Canadian Army and the RAF. 709 
Smith had aisured Montgomery's execution of his plan, as was Eisenhower's 
wish. On 12 September at Monty's headquarters, Smith had promised 1,000 tons of 
supplies delivered daily to the Brussels railhead. Monty, taking this as a major change 
concerning strategy, noted: 
Bedel[l] Smith was sent to see me and promised everything that I had 
been asking for weeks; the northern thrust against the RUHR is at last 
to be given priority. 710 
Unmentioned, either in his diary or to Brooke via an "M" signal, were Smith's 
concerns about German strength in the Arnhem area. Smith pointed out the increasing 
strength of the enemy, and asked if the spearhead could be made stronger with added 
airborne troops landed aroun4 Arnhem. 711 He did not argue for MARKET's 
cancellation or express disapproval of the general concept of the plan at the time. 
"" Report by Gen. H. D. G. Crerar, 8 November, 1944 covering Operations of First Army from 2-30 
September 1944,1-4, RAF Narrative, IV, 132-136, Stacey, Victory Campaign, 111,329-336; Canadian 
Army Historical Report No. 146,40-44. 
Montgomen, Log, 12 September; EL, Correspondence, M-197,122000 Sept. Montgomery thanked 
Eisenhower fýr assistance and designated 17 September as D-Day for MARKET. 
MHI, Pogue Papers, Interview S. L. A. Marshall with Walter B. Smith, 10-19. Smith noted: "I went 
up personally to talk to MONTGOMERY about it [Market]. Our G-2 indicated that there were parts of 
3 armored divisions in and around where the First Airborne was to drop. Montgomery ridiculed the 
idea and laughed me out of the tent. But GENERAL STRONG was right about it. We thought the drop 
was too weakly weighted but MONTGOMERY laughed at the idea. " In a 1947 interview with Forrest 
Pogue, Smith repeated the three-armored-di vision strength, but said 21 Army Group Intelligence 
people denied this. Maj. -Gen. Kenneth Strong, Intelligence at the Top: Tile Recollections ofan 
Intelligence Officer (London: Cassell, 1968), 149, notes that Eisenhower told Strong to accompany 
Smith to see Montgomery, but that Smith raised the objections concerning enemy strength alone in 
conversation with Monty. Strong does not mention date and no corrobarative evidence has been found 
by author in Montgomery's papers, Smith's papers, the War Diary of 21 Army Group, or the Chief of 
Staff's records of meetings at SHAEF that a separate trip, beyond the 12 September visit, was ever 
made. Ryan, A Bric4ge Too Far, 158, Lamb, Montgomery in Europe, 226, and others have painted this 
trip as almost a "stay of execution" request made on 15 September in light of ULTRA evidence. Lamb 
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Intelligence on 12 September, however, was not as clear as was later claimed. 
Williams, the 21 Army Group G-2, published Intelligence Summary No. 159 that day, 
the first since 28 August. Arnhem had been an "intelligence target" since 6 
September, when Williams first briefed the known enemy situation there for COMET. 
Williams didn't like the plan, but found no reason to call for its disapproval. On 12 
September, Williams noted that the best defense for the Rhine, as being practiced by 
the enemy, was the denial of sea ports by the enemy, noting that Walcheren Island had 
now been added to the list of "fortresses. " He noted that the secondary line of defense 
consisted of the water lines forward of the Rhine and "the somewhat mossy West 
Wall. " He reported that the German press had touted that the Allies did not intend to 
seek a decision in the Ruhr, 
but on the Southern flank along the Longwy-Toul line by tearing open 
the West Wall on the upper Rhine and in the Saar and Palatinate. 
Williams noted that German reinforcements, in the form of new division 
identifications, two panzer grenadier divisions from Italy, and possibly the 21 Panzer 
division, were located in this sector. Model, the new C-in-C West, had issued an order 
of the day stating: 
At this time the Fuhrer needs to bring new troops and new weapons 
into operation. Soldiers, we must gain time for the Fuhrer. 712 
The advance of 30 Corps had cut off escaping infantry moving toward the coast; the 
panzer divsions already withdrawn from the line had no reported fate. Williams 
is incorrect in a number of facts concerning intelligence and dates; Ryan was unaware of ULTRA and 
perhaps relied upon Eisenhower's memory or fabricated the date. As Ryan was unware of ULTRA, 
and Eisenhower, Montgomery, Brereton, and Strong were unaware of the photos seen by Brian 
Urquhart. it is probable that the 15 September meeting never happened. 
712 21 Army Group Intelligence Summary No. 159,12 Sep 44,1. 
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assessed the seven divisions identified blocking the Antwerp approach as equivalent 
to three divisions. The remnants of 1,2, and 12 SS Panzer Divisions were identified in 
retreat in front of First Army, and 116 th Parizer southeast of Liege. Williams' map 
indicated that the greatest parizer strength in identified "divisions" was between 
Aachen and Trier. South of Eindhoven, "Para and GAF elts (elements] were noted, 
with 6 Para [regt] on the flank. " 713 Second Army's Intelligence Summary for the same 
day reflected the same dispositions but offered no information concerning panzer 
division refits or locations. 714 
First Allied Airborne Army's G-2 noted no additional dispositions; but 
repeated information concerning newly formed panzer brigades being rebuilt from 
division shells (with 33 panther tanks and II assault guns in a panzer battalion plus a 
panzer grenadier battalion). This was believed to be the extent to which divisions 
might be rebuilt. This information was passed on to I and XVIII Airborne Corps. 715 
Thus, as far as estimates were concerned, MARKET GARDEN, with its 
enhanced ground and airborne components, appeared to be a viable operation, its 
added strength offsetting the reorganizing enemy. ULTRA had tracked the 
reorganization plans of C-in-C West for panzers with decrypts on 5 and 6 September, 
locatina 2d and 116th Panzer in Holland and noting that 9 SS and 10 SS Panzer would 
refit in Holland in the Venlo-Amhem-s'Hertogenbosch area. Its parent organization, H 
SS Panzer Corps, was said to oversee the refit from Eindhoven. By the time of 
Ibid.. 2-3. overlay, "Enemy Dispositions, 12 Sep. - 
'14 Second Army Intelligence Summary No. 100, up to 2400 hrs. 12 Sep 44, part 11 Order of Battle. 
7" NARA. RG 33 1, First Airborne Army G-2 Summary No. 8,11 Sep 44,2; Summary No. 9,12 Sep 
44. The same information concerning panzer brigades is included in Second Army Summary, No. 100, 
12 September 1944. 
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Smith's visit, 2d and II 6th Panzer were located on the American's front and neither 9 
SS or 10 SS Panzer had been located. Concerning their importance to MARKET 
GARDEN, the estimate made by Williams was crucial: 
9 SS and 10 SS were last identified in the great retreat on First US 
Army front. There cannot be much left of them. What there is is out of 
the line and may have found its way into Holland. 716 
At the division level, assigning drop zones went ahead, but the Taylor-Parks 
visit to Dempsey not only prompted another personal rift, but substantially changed 
the original concept for MARKET. Upon reading Brereton's letter demanding 
changes, Dempsey said, "Yes, absolutely. " The new drop zones would land the 101" 
Airborne Division minus a combat team between Eindhoven and Breugel, with the 
task of seizing bridges at both localities. A combat team landing at Veghel would link 
the 101s' to the 82d Airbome. Dempsey noted that though he had patrols within five 
miles of Eindhoven, he intended no further advance that would alert the enemy and 
prompt the demolition of the first bridge. 
717 Later that day, Dempsey coordinated the 
move of O'Connor's 8 Corps to the right of 30 Corps. That evening, the decision to 
launch MARKET on 17 September was made by Montgomery and Dempsey at 21 
Army Group. FAAA, that moming, had ruled out any discussion of a night drop due 
to a "no-moon" period. 
718 
"16 21 Army Group Intelligence Summary No. 159,12 September 1944,3. This was the last summary 
published by Williams prior to MARKET GARDEN. 
-,. Parks Diaiy, 12 September 1944. The actual letter cannot be found in the Parks Diary of FAAA 
records. but can be found at CARL, as part of Document RS-17582. Hqs FAAA, II September 1944, 
-Short Estimate of the Airborne Operation 'Market'. " The Parks Diary essentially excerpts parts of the 
letter in the diary text. 
718 Dempsey Diaq, 12 SEP 44; NDU Diary ofMajor General Maxwell TaYlor, Septembcr 12,13, 
1944. Parks Diaty: Minutes of Staff Conference at FAAA. 0900 hrs, 12 Sept. 44. Dempsey does not 
mcntion the dccision to change the 101' mission or the visit of Taylor and Parks. Taylor defined the 
ncw mission in his diary as, "holding of three points only canal crossings from E[indhoven]. " A 
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The 13 th of September was used to fmalize the plan for MARKET GARDEN 
and to hannonize thinking at theater level with that of the Army Groups. 
The Second Army staff conference, held at 1500 hours published the final 
plan. (See figure 43. ) The confmnatory notes stated: 
OBJECT OF THE SECOND ARMY 
To place Second Army including airborne forces astride the Rivers 
MEUSE, WAAL and NEDER RHINE on the general axis GRAVE 
[coordinates deleted]-NIJMEGEN-ARNHEM and to dominate the 
country between the RHINE and the ZUYDER ZEE thus cutting off 
719 communications between GERMANY and HOLLAND . 
Dempsey designated Zero Hour at 1300 hours on 17 September. Prior to the 
launch, 12 Corps would continue clearing the area up to the Meuse Canal and 
establish a bridgehead over it. 8 Corps would move onto 30 Corps' right, assuming 
control of II Armoured Division in place. For the GARDEN phase, Dempsey ordered 
that: 
British Airborne Corps: 
I Airborne Division including Polish Parachute Brigade capture 
bridges over NEDER RHINE at ARNHEM and to dominate the 
surrounding country. 
82 US Airborne Division is to capture bridges over MEUSE and 
WAAL in area GRAVE and NIJMEGEN and dominate intervening 
area. 
The plan for the employment of 101 US Airborne Division will be 
made direct between Commander 101 Airborne Division and 
Commander 30 Corps. Commander 101 US Airborne Division arrives 
BRUSSELS I 100 hrs. 14 Sep. 
"combat team" in US parlance was a regiment plus artillery and combat service support elements. A 
US regiment had three battalions. Taylor apparently had to be ordered by Brercton to brief Browning 
on changes. Browning was justifiably indignant that he had neither been informed nor allowed to 
discuss the plan with Dempsey. 
719 NAC, RG 24, Volume 20420, File 969. (D24) Ops 2 nd British Army-Sep/Dec 44, Notes on Chief of 
Staff's Conference at Second Army at 1500 hrs. 13 SEP 44, dtd 14 Sep 44. 
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30 Corps 
10 1 US Airborne Division is to capture and dominate all crossings over 
obstacles on the main axis of 30 Corps i. e. road HECHEL- 
EINDHOVEN-VEGHEL-UDEN-GRAVE. 
30 Corps will pass rapidly through the corridor established by British 
Airborne Corps and 101 US Airborne Division [under command, 30 
Corps] and will establish itself on the high ground in the area between 
ARNHEM and the ZUYDER ZEE. 
[8 Corps] will progressively relieve 30 Corps of responsibility for its 
RIGHT flank and will capture initially WEERT and SOERENDONK. 
8 Corps will later advance as far NORTH as the MEUSE and possibly 
beyond. 
[ 12 Corps] will progressively relieve 30 Corps of responsibility for its 
LEFT flank and will capture initially RETHY, ARENDONCK and 
TURNHOUT and later advance as far NORTH as the MEUSE and 
possibly beyond. 720 
Lacking adequate aircraft and glider tows, the crucial airborne operation would 
be spread over three days, with the first drop taking place on D-Day, the second the 
morning of D+l, and the third the morning of D+2. VAiile 83 Group, RAF, would 
provide close air support, US close air support parties would be also be present in the 
airborne formations and at Second Army. 30 Corps would carry enough bridging to 
span the three major water obstacles but would move it forward only on order as 
needed. Bridges captured would be supplemented by new-built bridges; bridges blown 
would be built if the bridgeheads were held by airborne troops, and bridgeheads 
assaulted if the bridges were demolished and not held by the airborne. 721 
The same day, Browning issued his final Operation Instruction No. 1, 
confirming command arrangements and missions already given, but noting that 101" 
Airborne would 
120 Ibid., 2,3. 
721 Ibid., 3,4. Additional details have been omitted. The entire order was six pages long. 
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seize bridges and defiles on 30 Corps' main axis of advance to ensure 
the speedy pass-through of that corps to the GRAVE-NIJMEGEN and 
ARNHEM crossings. Definite locations will be notified shortly- 
722 
The 101" would be subordinate to Airborne Corps for the flight and drop, and to 30 
Corps for ground operations until returned to I Airborne Corps by Second Army. 
The unity of the original commander's intent, the bridge coups de main that 
would help lay "an airborne carpet, " had been broken-a fact unknown to 
Montgomery at this time as oversight for all operational planning had passed to 
Dempsey. On the operational level, Monty felt he was being both supported and 
enthusiastically helped by both Eisenhower and Bradley. Bradley visited Monty on 13 
September-a satisfactory meeting, according to Monty, who recorded in his log, "He 
is a most awfully nice chap. " As in most dealings with Bradley, Monty did not notice 
that the Trojan Horse tactics of appearing to be fiiendly and then working against him 
were at play, a fact that he did not realize until much later. 723 
Ike's own message to Monty that day also bespoke encouragement and 
confidence. He promised 500 tons by road, and 500 tons by air except during 
MARKET, to the 21 Army Group until I October, and that he would assist in freeing 
up airborne forces for opening the Scheldt or providing some other support. 724 The 
same day, Eisenhower sent a finther directive to his commanders, amplifying his 9 
7" CARL, Document RS-1 1583, HQS AIRTRPS/TS, Operation Market Operation Instruction No. 1. 
723 Montgomery Log, 13 September; Hansen Diary, 13 September; Bradley, A Soldier's Storv, 416-418. 
Hansen records Ridgway's aide as describing his dislike of Browning, and that XVI II Corpý 
commander wanted to jump on the Rhine bridges in Bradley's sector. No contemporary record of 
Bradley's action towards cancelling MARKET are extant, though he claims in his 1951 ghosted 
memoirs that he called Eisenhower claiming that Monty had left him holding the bag on their 
"previously planned joint offensive. " Considering that Bradley had stripped XIX Corps of a division 
and that XIX Corps was short of fuel, this is a preposterous claim. 
724 Eisenhower Papers, IV, 2133-2135. 
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September directive. He listed as possible options "a single knife-like or narrow 
thrust" or 
to drive forward through the enemy's western frontiers to suitable 
positions on which we can regroup while preparing the maintenance 
facilities that will sustain the great bulk of our forces on the drive into 
Germany. 
Any operations, he felt, required the development of ports to support the 
advance, with the Northern Group clearing the Channel ports and Antwerp, the 
Central Group, Brest, and the Southern Group, Marseilles. While assuring the 
understanding that Antwerp was a requirement for a northern thrust to the Ruhr, he 
delineated both a maneuver scheme and specific tasks to outline his campaign: 
The general plan ... is to push our forces forward to the Rhine, 
securing bridgeheads over the river, seize the Ruhr and concentrate our 
forces in preparation for a final non-stop drive into Germany. While 
this is going on we must secure bases.... 
The maneuver plan is to push hard over the Rhine on our northern 
flank with Northern Group of Armies, First US Army and the First 
Allied Airborne Army, with the Third US Army, except for a limited 
advance explained below, confined to holding and threatening action 
until initial objectives on the left are attained. 
Northern Group of Armies, swinging generally northward from its 
present position, will advance promptly to seize a bridgehead over the 
Rhine and prepare to seize the Ruhr. 
The Central Group of Armies must push its right only far enough, for 
the moment, so as to hold adequate bridgeheads beyond the Moselle 
and thus create a constant threat to the German forces and prevent the 
enemy from reinforcing further north by taking troops away from the 
Metz area. As quickly as this is accomplished all possible resources of 
the Central Group of Armies must be thrown to the support of the drive 
of the First US Army to seize Bridgeheads near Cologne and Bonn, in 
preparation for assisting in the capture of the Ruhr. 
After Northern Group of Armies and First US Army have seized 
bridgeheads over the Rhine the Third US Army will advance through 
the Saar and establish bridgeheads across the Rhine. If, at an earlier 
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date, maintenance of the Third US Army becomes possible, this 
advance will be initiated at that time. 
After attainment of the Moselle bridgeheads above directed, operations 
on our left will, until the Rhine bridgeheads are won, take priority in all 
forms of logistical support except for (a) adequate security measures 
and continuous reconnaissance by forces on the right; (b) necessary 
resources for the securing and developing ports. 725 
Montgomery immediately acknowleged. Eisenhower's directive, thanking him 
for his assistance, and noting that 500 tons' road lift would be needed until 7 October 
when r3il across the Seine would be in operation, and that he had coordinated his 
operations with Bradley. Most important, he stated: 
Am arranging to develop as early as possible operations designed to 
enable the port of Antwerp to be used. Now that Havre is captured am 
moving Headquarters First [Canadian] Army and 49th Division up to 
Antwerp at once. Am grounding and immobilizing 51't Division at 
Havre and using the whole of its transport to enable this move to take 
place. 726 
From the Supreme Commander's Perspective, 21 Army Group was moving to 
seize his primary objectives, and was accelerating attempts to clear the coast and 
move on to clearing the Scheldt to open Antwerp. Two huge movements were in 
train--one to clear the coastal ports and begin the clearance of Antwerp's approaches, 
and one to gain a bridgehead over the Rhine. From the perspective of any planner or 
commander, the message clearly implied that the British airborne drop and the First 
Army drive constituted the Allied Main Effort, and were a concerted part of the same 
maneuver "to push hard over the Rhine on our northern flank. " 727 
... Eisenhower Papers, IV, 2136-2138. This message has been reproduced only in its key parts, and 
enumeration has been removed from the paragraphs. It was transmitted to the CCS and British Chiefs 
of Staff as M sg SCAF 8 1. 
726 EL, Correspondence, M. 205,14 1000 Sept. 
727 Eisenhower Papers, IV, 2137. 
405 
Bradley did not react enthusiastically to the directive despite his 
foreknowledge of its contents. His aide, Hansen, recorded his commander's ire with 
the Eisenhower plan to weight the left flank, saying: 
Brad is opposed to this, sensing the possibility of a breakthrough in 
the V Corps sector where sharp penetrations have already been made 
or in the area of the 3 rd Army which then may pinch the Ruhr from 
the south and plunge through to the Rhine. Ike, however, has his 
heart set with Monty on main effort to the north. Where penetration 
has now been made by 4 th Division and 28 1h Division into the 
Siegfried Line there is every indication that Line is not sufficiently 
manned. [Refers here to Luxembourg] G-2 has estimated that the 
German cannot muster strength in the line until first week of October. 
Essential therefore we break through now. Brad's plan is to favor the 
First Army with supply for main effort in their sector which Ike 
prefers but he does not wish to weaken the Third Army which 
reported today that it crossed in strength.... Patton swears, "There is 
nothing in front of us; we can go clear through to the Rhine. " 728 
Montgomery's own operational design was completed and discussed with his 
army commanders on 14 September, after which he issued the written directive, 
M. 525, that constituted his design for "the MARKET GARDEN Campaign. " (See 
figure 44. ) In his general summary, he assigned clearing the mouth of the Scheldt as 
the First Priority for the Canadian First Army. He emphasized: 
Our real objective, therefore, is the RUHR. But on the way to it we 
want the ports of ANTWERP and ROTTERDAM, since the capture of 
the RUHR is merely the first step on the northem route of advance into 
Germany. 
Intention. 
728 Hansen Diary, September 14'. He records the next day that Bradley "represents the American 
view, " and that Bradley's reply to being carried along with Montgomery's operation is I will not have 
the tail wag the dog. " Bradley's view of his supply problems continued to be -COMZ is not doing its 
job. " Patton's claims of a clear advance into Germany were false. His own intelligence then portrayed 
the effective combat strength in front of his three corps as equating to eight divisions, with 67,500 men 
in defense with 90 tanks and assault guns. The G-2 further estimated an available reserve equating to 
six divisions with 53,500 combatants and 80 tanks. See ThirdArmy AfterAction Report, //, Staff 
Reports, LXV, 13 September Intelligence Estimate: Estimate of Enemy Strength in Third US Army 
Zone. 
406 
To destroy all enemy west of the general line ZWOLLE-DEVENTER- 
CLEVE-VENLO-MAASTRICHT, with a view to advancing eastwards 
and occupying the RUHR. 
First Canadian Army 
8. Complete the capture first of BOULOGNE, and then of CALAIS. 
9. DUNKIRK will be left to be dealt with later; for the present it will 
be merely masked. 
10. The whole energies of the Army will be directed towards 
operations designed to enable full use to be made of the port of 
ANTWERP. 
Airborne troops are available to cooperate. 
14. Subsequently [to clearance of North Holland and ROTTERDAM], 
Canadian Army will be brought up on the left (or northern) flank of 
Second Army, and will be directed on BREMEN and HAMBURG. 
Second British Army 
15. The first task of the Army is to operate northwards and secure the 
crossings over the RHINE and MEUSE in the general area 
ARNHEM-NIJMEGEN-GRAVE. An airborne corps of three 
divisions is placed under command Second Army for these 
operations. 
16. The Army will then establish itself in strength on the general line 
ZWOLLE-DEVENTER-ARNHEM, facing east, with deep 
bridgeheads to the east side of the IJSSEL river. 
From this position it will be prepared to advance eastwards to the 
general area RHEINE-OSNABRUCK-HAMM-MUNSTER. 
In this movement its weight will be on its right and directed towards 
HAMM, from which place a strong thrust will be made southwards 
along the eastern face of the RUHR. 
17. The thrust northwards to secure the river crossings ... will be rapid 
and violent, and without regard to what is happening on the flanks. 
Subsequently the Army will take measures to widen the area of the 
initial thrust, and to create a secure line of supply. 
12 Anny Group 
19. First US Army is to move eastwards as follows: 
(a) 5 Corps is directed on BONN. 
(b) 7 Corps is directed on COLOGNE. 
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(c) 19 Corps carrying out flank protection on the northern flank of 
the Army, -along the inter-Army Group boundary. 
20. The Army is to capture BONN and COLOGNE, and to establish a 
deep bridgehead, some 10 miles in depth, on the east side of the 
RHINE. 
21. The Army is then to advance eastwards round the south face of the 
RUHR. This operation will be timed so as to be coordinated 
carefully with the move of Second British Army round the north 
face of the RUHR. 
There will be very close touch between General Bradley and myself 
during these operations. 729 
Receipt of Eisenhower's message concerning supplies that morning, plus his 
own M. 525, solidified Montgomery's campaign concept though he had not yet 
received the 13 September campaign directive from Eisenhower. Dempsey, who had 
decided not to press on to Eindhoven to prevent a stirred homet's nest, continued 
regroupment and detailed coordination with his corps commanders. To the south, 
Hodges, whose G4 had informed him the army had eaten down its supply reserves, 
had stopped V Corps' advance due to artillery ammunition shortages. Hodges, 
however, permitted "Lightning Joe" Collins in VII Corps to conduct a 
"reconnaissance in force, " a mission which was extended to V Corps while XIX 
Corps remained static. VII Corps penetrated the West Wall in the Stolberg corridor 
south of Aachen, but soon found itself stopped by German reserves. The V Corps, 
which had penetrated the Ardennes, soon halted, but by 13 September, the nature of 
battle had changed. First Army was now facing a stronger enemy and the pursuit was 
over. On 17 September, Hodges shut down operations on First Army's front in order 
729 M. 525,14-9-44,1-3; Eisenhower Papers, IV, 2134. This is an abbreviated form of the directive 
maintaining original paragraph enumeration but exccrpting some detail. It is important to note that 
Montgomery's statement concerning close touch with Bradley is neither a wish nor an unauthofizcd 
statement. Eisenhower promised such in his 13 September message. 
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to build up supplies. Bradley's logistics shift to Patton had permitted the Germans to 
bar the door in the Maastricht-Aachen-Stolberg corridors. The main gateway into 
Germany was closed. 
730 
As troops moved to airfield staging areas and gliders were loaded, the final 
details of the airborne division plans were briefed. Upon these divisions. the '*airborne 
carpet, " the true fate of MARKET GARDEN rested. 
Taylor's published plan for the 101" Airborne solidified his modified role for 
his division. It accounted for a three-day lift using 432 parachute aircraft and 70 glider 
tows (Waco, CG4A gliders) on D-Day, 450 gliders on D+I, and 382 gliders on D+2- 
(See figure 45. ) It listed as its concept of operations: 
101" Airborne Division will land by parachute and glider in daylight 
on D, D+I, and D+2 Days, in the Zon-Vechel area with the mission of 
seizing and holding the principal stream and canal crossings at 
EINDHOVEN, ZON, and VECHEL in order to assist the advance of 
the British 2 nd Army northward along the EINDHOVEN-GRAVE 
highway. 731 
On D-Day, three parachute infantry regiments would land: the 501" on DZ 
"A"; the 502nd on DZ "C"; and the 506th on DZ "B". The northern force landing on 
DZ "A" would secure the canal and stream crossings in the Vechel area. These 
included two rail bridges to the west and northwest of the town as well as small 
bridges spanning the Aa River and Willems Vaart Canal. This force and its captured 
objectives would provide the key link between the two American divisions. The 
northernmost of two concentrated drop zones, DZ "C" was used to constitute the 
130FUSA Report of Operations Aug 44-Feb 45.1,38-46, Map No. 5. LIEGE-AACHEN-DUREN; 
Hogan, A Command Post at War, 147-149; Collins, LightningJoe, Chapter X111, passim. 
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division reserve, and block the Zon-St. Oederode Road, as well as to seize the small 
bridge south of the town on the Dommel River. From there, a detachment would also 
be sent to the southwest to capture the bridge at Best spanning the Wilhelmina Canal, 
an alternate route for 30 Corps' advance. But the DZ "B" force was key. It would 
capture not only the Zon bridge on the Wilhelmina, but would have to march south to 
Eindhoven to capture the city and take the Dommel River bridges south of the 
town. 732 
None of the 101" objective bridges was large, but each would require a 
replacement span or bailey bridge if the original was blown by the enemy. The key 
link for the 101" on Club Route was the Zon Bridge. The bridge, with trees and a 
built-up area between the target and the drop zone, was not planned as a coup-de-main 
target. A flat field, suitable either for paratroops or several gliders, lay directly to the 
east of the north end of the bridge but was not used. 
Taylor's plan concentrated his division for the drop, but it placed no unit near 
its primary objective for a coup de main. The Zon bridge, the first of the southern 
bridges, was about I to 1.2 miles straight-line distance from the edge of Drop Zone B 
and was separated from it by a patch of the Zonche woods and the small clump of 
houses at Otiesburg. The series of small bridges at the southern end of Eindhoven Jay 
731 NARA, RG 407, Decimal 3101-3.9, Field Order #1 with Annexes, MARKET-101" Airborne 
Division, 14 September 1944. 
732 Ibid. 
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about eight miles from the Zon bridge. Valkenswaard was six miles south of 
Eindhoven and seven miles north of the 30 Corps start line for Club Route. 
733 
The original outline plan for MARKET agreed to by Montgomery, Dempsey. 
and Browning had placed the 101"" southern objective and southern drop zones near 
Valkenswaard, both to shorten the linkage distance to 30 Corps, and to provide a close 
envelopment of the enemy's rear area, approximately where one would expect to find 
the en(. my artillery gun line and close combat reserves. GARDEN, unlike COMET, 
was not designed to start at Eindhoven. Taylor's protest assured a full 20-mile cushion 
of enemy terrain between Horrocks' lead tanks and the 101't Airborne first lift, not the 
seven miles desired by Montgomery and Dempsey. More importantly, Taylor's plan 
lengthened the distance that Guards Armoured Division would be expected to fight to 
a minimum of 13 miles. 734 
The intelligence estimate for the 101", based heavily on photographs, 
accurately pinpointed antiaircraft threats, obstacles, and visible minor defenses, 
including weapons pits, slit trenches, and a number of probable machine gun 
locations. Its accompanying map trace displayed the division's only enemy order of 
battle information, but no tactical analysis was offered. It showed that in front of 8 
Corps, three "divisions'ý--3 Para with 1,000 men, 354 th Infantry with 8,000 men, and 
the 272d Infantry in depth with 1,000 men. Around the nose of the 30 Corps salient 
pointed at Eindhoven were the 2d SS Panzer Grenadier "division" with 3,000 men and 
733 All terrain descriptions are based on 1944 maps and photos. The original road has been overbuilt, 
Valkenswaard is now essentially a suburb of Eindhoven, the southern bridges are within the town, and 
Otiesburg is now a small village. 
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30 tanks, the 9 SS Panzer Grenadier "Division" with 1,500 men and 10 tanks, and the 
10 SS Panzer Grenadier "Division" with 1,000 men and five tanks. Between the 
Wilhelmina. Canal and the Maas, it displayed the 509 Security "Battalion" as 
64 
735 
unlocated . 
Gavin's 82d Airborne Field Order, published on 13 September, listed its 
concept of operations (see figure 46): 
82d US A/B Div, (less dets), will land by Prcht and Gli commencing D 
Day S of NIJMEGEN; seize and hold the hwy bridges across the 
MAAS River at GRAVES [sic] and the WAAL River at NIJMEGEN; 
seize, organize, and hold the high ground between NIJMEGEN and 
GROESBEEK; deny the roads in the Div area to the enemy; and 736 dominate the area shown [overlay omitted of div. sector) . 
Gavin divided the division into "Force A" and "Force B" for two separate lifts, 
with "A" landing on D-Day. Within Force A were the 505 th Parachute Infantry, to land 
on DZ "N"; 504 th Parachute Infantry, to land on DZ "0"; the 508 th Parachute Infantry, 
to land on DZ "T"' with a field artillery battalion and pathfinders to convert "T" into 
LZ "r' for the Force B landings. For the second day, "N" and "T-' would be used for 
glider Us to bring in the 325 th Glider Infantry Regiment and two glider field artillery 
battalions. 
As had Urquhart and Sosaboski before him, Gavin stipulated that one of the 
four bridges on the Maas-Waal must be seized. All four would be attacked in the 
734 Under the original concept, Guards Armoured also would have been within the range fan of Amy 
artillery groups; the Taylor variant required a shift of guns forward for support, an impossibility on a 
single road designed for a link and pursuit on the "stair carpet" envisaged by Montgomery. 
73'NARA, Field Order #1, op. cit., annex 10, Enemy Order of Battle (overlay). 
736 NARA, RG 407, Entry 427, Box 12420,82d A/B Div FO# II -Opn MARKET, 1. 
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hopes of seizing one intact. 
737 (See figure 47. ) Gavin's plan, while ensuring that the 
vital ground designated-the Groesbeek Ridge-was held, and that a secure link- with 
the 101" was made, was a defensive plan that did nothing about the problem of 
Nijmegen or more important, to assure a coup de main of Nijmegen's vital road 
bridge. Gavin's drop-zone geometry theoretically created a 25-mile perimeter for the 
division, to be held by fewer than 7,300 men landing in the first lift. The planned drop 
zone nearest the Grave Bridge was almost two miles away, the nearest to the 
Nijmegen Bridge was between five and six. Gavin had wanted to send a battalion to 
the bridge, but Browning told him not to, stressing that securing the Grave Bridge and 
the Groesbeek Ridge had priority, ind that losing either of them would cause the 
failure of GARDEN and the probable destruction of his division. The night before the 
operation, Gavin gave the regimental commander of the 508'h Parachute Infantry oral 
orders to send a battalion to seize the bridge upon landing-an order the regimental 
commander understood was to be accomplished only after he had captured his primary 
objectives to the east of Groesbeek Ridge. No force, then, would press for the 
Nijmegen bridge in the early hours of the operation. 738 
The intelligence estimate of the 82d benefited from the British study of the 
area during COMET. The division G-2, Maj. Walter Winton, provided a prescient 
appreciation: 
737 Gavin, Airborne Warfare, 97; Sosabowski, Freely I Served, 140-143. 
'" NARA, RG 319, Correspondence, CMH Filcs, The Siegfried Line Campaign, MHI, Papers of 
Lieutenant GeneraIJames U. Gavin, Letter Gavin to Theater Historian, 25 July 1945; Letter to Chief 
of Military History from Lt. Gen. Browning, February 1955; Letter to Chief of Military History, Brig. 
Gen. R. E. Lindquist, 9 September 1955; author interview, 1999, with Lt. Gen. John Norton, who was 
the Division G-3 during MARKET. Gavin ordered a battalion sent to the bridge on the night of 17 
September upon finding out the 508' had made no move to the bridge. Norton remembers that 
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it is reported that one of the broken Panzer divisions has been sent 
back to the area north of ARNHEIM [sic] to rest and refit, this might 
produce some 50 tanks. We may therefore reckon that the forces from 
ROTTERDAM to the German frontier might comprise a regt from 719 
Div, a regt from 347 Div, remnants of 70 Div, a few mobile bns, some 
scraped up static troops and one Panzer division, much the worse for 
wear. 
Noting that perhaps 4,000 SS training troops were believed to be in Nijmegen 
along with the units identified, he assessed: 
an estimate of a divisional strength in this area may not be far wide of 739 
the mark . 
Urquhart's I Airborne Division, s plan was confirmed by Browning's last written 
instructions to I Airborne on 13 September designating three priority tasks in order. the 
capture of the Arnhem bridge or a bridge; the establishment of a bridgehead sufficient 
to permit the deployment of 30 Corps north of the Neder Rijn, and the destruction of 
the flak in the division sector to permit the safe passage of subsequent lifts. No 
junction point with the 82d to the south was established in order "to preserve ... [the 
division's) southern bombline, " thus permitting fire-ranging air attacks between Nijmegen 
and Arnhem. No prediction or timescale for a linkup was predicted, only that: 
The time at which you are to expect junction with 30 Corps leading 
troops will be notified to you from Corps Headquarters as soon as it is 
definitely known. 740 
On 12 September Urquhart issued his plan dividing the force into three lifts, 
the first comprising I Parachute Brigade, I Airlanding Brigade, the Division's tactical 
Browning told him to await news of 30 Corps' position while securing his perimeter and waiting for 
the rest of his own division to arrive. 
739 NARA, 82d A/B F. O. 11, op. cit., Annex I C, Order of Battle Summary, II September 1944,1. 
740 PRO, WO 171-393,1 Airborne Division Report, Annexure'B': Operation "MARKET" Instruction 
No. 1, Hq. Airborne Troops (Main), 13 September 1944. 
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headquarters and the division recce squadron. A light field artillery battalion (less a 
battery) and engineers and assorted support would also go in. The second lift landing 
the next day would bring in 4 Parachute Brigade and the balance of the Airlanding 
brigade, light battalion, and resupply. The third lift would bring I Polish Parachute 
Brigade Group. 741 (See figure 48. ) 
I Parachute Brigade would land on DZ "X. " Its primary mission was to seize 
and hold in priority the main road bridge at Arnhem and a pontoon bridge located at 
the turn in the river, about one Hometer west of the road bridge. The rail bridge, 
about four miles southeast of the drop zones south of Osterbeek, was ignored, 
probably as it was outside the division's planned perimeter. After the seizure of the 
main road bridge, I Parachute Brigade would seize and hold DZ "K" southeast of the 
bridge for the arrival of the Polish brigade. I Airlanding Brigade would land on LZ 
"S" to secure LZs "S" and "E' and DZ "X. " Its primary responsibility would be to 
hold the division zone for the second lift, protecting DZs "Y" and "X" and LZs "S" 
and "Z. " It would also protect the landing of Polish gliders on LZ "1: ' during the third 
lift. The division recce squadron, less a troop in reserve, would seize the Arnhem 
bridge in a coup de main under control of I Parachute Brigade. 21 Independent 
Parachute Company would mark all LZs and DZs. The glider pilots would form two 
battalions, one in division reserve and one under control of I Airlanding Brigade. 742 
Following the issuance of Browning's written directive on 13 September, Urquhart 
issued additional instructions forbidding the destruction or preparation for destruction 
741 Ibid. Annexure'C: Oper? tion 'MARKET' I Airborne Div OpInstr. No. 9, Confirmatory Notes on 
GOC's Verbal Orders, 12 Sept. 44, sheet 1. 
742 Ibid., sheets 3-4. 
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of bridges and directing that all ferries and barges in the division area be brought to 
, 743 the north bank "so as to safeguard them for future use. 
I Airborne's situation, and hence its plan, was the most precarious of the three 
airborne divisions. While the 101" lay at the tip of a projected 20-mile advance, and 
the 82d at the tip of a 43-mile advance by 30 Corps, I Airborne had to count on 
Adair's armor moving 64 miles to reach the Arnhem bridge, and about 60 to link with 
the Polish brigade south of the town. While COMET had provided for the seizure of 
the Grave and Nijmegen bridges, MAPXET's plan left Nijmegen for a later assault, 
and no "carpet" existed for the armor to roll up on the "island" between Nijmegen and 
Arnhem. Among the worst of the division's many plights was its forced dispersion. As 
its full strength could not arrive in less than three days, it would be three days at the 
earliest before it could consolidate itself Its D-Day landing strength was three 
parachute and three airlanding battalions, with the latter remaining to protect the 
"airhead" for subsequent reinforcement and supply. The division's move to the 
objective, therefore, was a three-battalion attack separated on individual routes, to be 
followed by the movement and seizure of the northern half of Arnhem by 4 Parachute 
Brigade and the western section of Arnhem by I Airlanding Brigade, a total of six 
battalions and the balance of the division. 
When Maj. Gen. Richard Gale, the GOC of 6 Airborne in Normandy, 
examined the plan on Browning's invitation, he was appalled, saying that the entire 
division should be dropped near the bridge or, at minimum, move to the bridge 
following a coup de main. He claimed he would resign if he had to carry out the 1 
143 WO 171-393, Annexure W; I Airborne Div. Op. Instr No. 10, Additional Notes on Operation 
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Airborne plan. '44 Still, Browning could offer no solace to Urquhart, nor was the 
conversation with Gale ever mentioned to him, for the airmen controlled the drop. 
Hollinghurst had ruled out closer drop zones, and Williams had denied 
Hollinghurst's request for 38 and 46 Groups to fly double lifts on D-Day for the I 
Airborne, the second lift coming in at dark or later. More important, perhaps, was the 
assessment made that the ground south of Arnhem was unfit for mass glider landings 
due to ditches and the existence of few roads. The Horsa glider needed wheels to 
permit its heavy loads to be extracted by removing the tail assembly, a factor that 
ruled out "no wheels" landings on broken terrain. While it was a matter of later debate 
as to whether flak was the primary discriminator in landing so far from the objective, 
certainly the specter of dividing the division by the river-with parachutists landing 
on the island and gliders landing as planned-might have played heavily in 
consideration of gaining an airhead for the second lift. Given the slow buildup over 
three days necessitated by the lack of airlift, no one would risk splitting the division 
fiirther. The British airhead would have to be north of the river. 745 
The signals capability of the division also promised a potential for disaster, a 
situation already well known fi-om the planning for COMET. With drop zones ranging 
from five to eight miles from the objective, and the dispersal of the division's 
battalions, the short-range capability of the division's standard radio sets prohibited a 
MARKET, 13 Sep 44. 
7, " Red Berets '44 (London: The Illustrated London News, 1994), 72-73; Martin Middlebrook, Arnhem 
1944: The Airborne Battle, 17-26 September (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994), 17,18. 
74*s Otway, Airborne Forces, 263,292,293. 
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controlled battle employing any form of reserve to exploit oppommity. to maneuver. 
or to prevent disaster. 
746 
I Airborne's intelligence had studied the sector since their warning order of 3 
September. During COMET, division intelligence had appreciated that there were 
6-seven mobile battalions" of 20 Mobile Brigade in the Zwolle-Zuthen area northeast 
of Arnhem. The intelligence officer also noted that the Germans had assessed the 
value of bypassing the West Wall defenses and assumed that portions of four 
divisions out of contact might be used to cover the river crossings: 
The GRAVE-NIJMEGEN-ARNHEM route therefore may be guarded 
by the best part of a low category division, possibly a mobile Bn and of 
course by Flak troops. 747 
This assessment was strengthened on the morning of 10 September with the 
commment that 
the fighting capacity of the new Battle Groups formed from the 
748 
remnants of battered divisions seems unimpaired . 
On the eve of MARKET, the written assessment for I Parachute Brigade summarized 
the division's dilemma concerning enemy information: 
[A] reported concentration of 10,000 troops SW of ZWOLLE on I Sep 
may represent a battle scarred panzer division or two reforming, or 
alternately the result of the emptying of ARNHEM and EDE barracks 
to make room for fighting troops; though a likely role for the training 
units would appear to be digging the WAAL line. 
To sum up: there is no direct, recent evidence on which to base an 
estimate of troops in the immediate divisional area. The capacity of the 
746 Lewis Golden, Echoesfrom Arnhem (London: William Kimber, 1984), VI I I, passim. 
747 PRO, WO 171-393,1 Airborne Division Planning Intelligence Summary No. 1,6 September 1944, 
1-2. 
PRO, WO 171-393,1 Airborne Division Planning Intelligence Summary, 10 September 1944,2. 
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normal barracks at ARNHEM, VELP and EDE is nearly 10,000 and 
billeting possibilities are considerable; moreover ARNHEM itself, if 
the enemy's main defensive line is on the WAAL, will be a vital centre 
on his L of C, and will inevitably contain a number of troops which are 
out of the line: it will be strongly defended as soon as the line is 
manned, but at present may be emptier while the available troops are 
digging trenches or conducting their fighting withdrawal from the 
749 ALBERT canal . 
Thus, from the perspective of the three airborne division commanders near 
week's end, each had discomforting plans, yet each hoped that the enemy would not 
recover sufficiently to prevent his success. Each saw a hazy collage of German forces, 
less frightening than those arrayed against NEPTUNE. Whatever personal terrors they 
had, they led their divisions in pla nning and rehearsals as if success were not just 
reachable but inevitable. 
The ground force plan, GARDEN, left less flexibility in execution than the 
airborne plan. While dispersion and an attack from the sky might temporarily open 
doors to unforeseen opportunities for the airborne, Dempsey's plan called for a narrow 
sector attack by three divisions, the center division advancing on a single road. There 
was little doubt that the single road, Club Route, was key to GARDEN's success and 
the survival of I Airborne Corps, with 30 Corps' survival dependent not only on 
shattering the enemy defense throughout its depth, but on Horrocks' flanks being 
covered in a short amount of time by 8 and 12 Corps. 
30 Corps Operations Instructions No. 24 replaced the original COMET ground 
plan. At its beginning, it outlined an intelligence picture estimating that: 
749 PRO, WO 171-393,1 Airborne Division Report, Annexure D: I Para. Bde. Intelligence Summary 
No. I dated 13 Sep 44,2. 
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The total German force, including both remnants of formations now 
quitting FRANCE and FLANDERS and reinforcements coming from 
GERMANY and satellites, is quite inadequate to offer prolonged 
resistance along any line. 
While noting a division-sized force was probably being reconstituted, it noted 
also that its antiaircraft gunners would be poorly trained for antitank work, though 
it 
was estimated that: 
Enough is available for every major nodal and water crossing to be 
allotted a troop of six 88 mm. 
Armoured reserves of more than squadron size are most unlikely to 
appear on the corps front. 750 
Horrocks; stated his intention: 
30 Corps will advance when ordered at maximum speed and secure the 
area incl NUNSPELT ... to excl ARNHEM. 
Armored support in regimental strength would be attached to both the 101"' 
and 82d upon arrival in their sectors. A second, subsidiary axis was provided part of 
the way, making the main axis DIAMOND. The subsidiary, HEART, which ran from 
Valkenswaard-Leende-Geldorp-Nunen-Gemert-Volkel, was to be used only by 
fighting troops. The intention was to switch traffic temporarily if part of the main 
route became unusable. The lead element of 30 Corps, Guards Armoured Division, 
was ordered to proceed at maximum speed to Arnhem, to bypass Appeldorn, and to 
dominate the area "NUNSPELT to excl APELDORN. " If the major bridges (or 
bridge) were lost, 43 Division would assault and bridge the gap. 43 Division would 
advance on order at maximum speed, eventually consolidating from Apeldom due 
'" PRO, WO 171-341,30 Corps Operation Instruction No. 24 Operation "GARDEN, " 15 Sep 44,1; 
Horrocks, Corps Commander, 98-99. This contains Horrocks' personal orders given to his 
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south to link with I Airborne north of Arnhem. The 50th Northumberland Division 
would follow and seize a river crossing over the Ijssel at Doermond. An extensive 
bridge train was available on order. 751 
GARDEN differed significantly both in scale and intent ftom COMET, but in 
each case the 30 Corps final objective was a bridgehead over the Rhine, with 
GARDEN adding an advance to the Zuider Zee. COMET planned a51 -mile advance 
beginning at Eindhoven, GARDEN a 99-mile thrust beginning south of the Belgian- 
Netherlands border. In the first plan, Dempsey had planned for a single division 
besides Guards Armoured and I Airborne to reach beyond the Neder Rijn, with the 
air-portable 52 Lowland Division (to be flown into Deelen airfield) adding perhaps 15 
miles to the ground requiring capture. In the new plan, both the 43 and 50 Divisions 
were added to Guards Armoured to form the force north of the I Airborne with the 52 
air-landing at Deelen. Under COMET, Horrocks had two mutually supporting 
armored divisions in the advance; now he had one, with the flank corps each having 
an armored division. Most significantly, HorTocks expected "to roll up the airborne 
carpet, " with fully 40 of the first 64 miles dominated by airborne troops who would 
"pass" the rapidly moving armor forward. As such, and considering the narrowness of 
his sector, his Corps was march ordered for a pursuit, not a sustained attack. (See 
figure 43. ) In COMET, he had expected to advance the first 30 miles without airborne 
support, but against neglible resistance and a retreating handful of stragglers or 
battered units. 
commanders on 16 September at Bourg Leopold. In these orders, Horrocks stressed the need to reach I 
Airborne in 48 hours if possible. 
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Only the enemy and weather seemed the unknown factors. and weather could 
be predicted and waited upon. Two ULTRA-capable headquarters, Brereton's First 
Allied Airborne Army and Dempsey's Second Army in operational control of 
MARKET GARDEN, published daily intelligence summaries. Of particular note for 
intelligence was the location and size of panzer divisions. On 13 September, Second 
Army noted that 2d and 9th Panzer had been located in the US sector, and that 1,9, 
10, and 12 SS Panzer divisions had 
been seen in small packets but there is no reason to suppose that any of 
these formations is operating or indeed is in condition to operate as a 
division at this time. 752 
In summarizing enemy strengths and capabilities along the western front, First 
Allied Airbome's G-2 made the following assessment on IS September. 
In [the] north, enemy can not be expected to stop [the] Allied drive 
over Rhine unless reinforcements are made immediately available. Still 
no evidence that anything except remnants 15 Army is arriving in 
753 Holland . 
The following day, the FA. AA G-2 added the following under "miscellaneoue': 
Evidence enemy has increased strength in line Antwerp-Hasselt. It is 
attributable partly to arrival of parachute troops and partly to 
reappearance of elements of 15 Army. 754 
The published estimates, however, did not reflect every parcel of intelligence 
received, nor did they portray the controversy that raged at various command levels. 
On IS September, Williams at 21 Army Group spoke with the Lt. Col. Tony Tasker at 
'5' Ibid., 2-13. Despite the designation of elements of Club Route as Heart or Diamond, the main road 
has been forever remembered as "Club Route, " and its subsidiary generally lost to historians. 
752 RG 24, Second Army Intelligence Summary No. 101, up to 2400hrs. 13 Sep 44,1. 
713 NARA, RG 33 1, First Allied Airborne Army G-2 Summary No. 12,151715 Scp'44,3. 
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First Allied Airborne Army concerning the imminent publication of SHAEF's weekly 
summary, noting that elements of two SS panzer divisions were refitting in the 
Arnhem area. No firm agreement with SHAEF's assessment was reached, with the 
Airborne G-2 disbelieving the presence of 10 SS, and Williams accepting that the 
headquarters or trace elements might be there but the actual force was 
755 
unsubstantial . 
ULTRA had produced a series of clues pointing to the Arnhem area. On 6 
September the key indicator was decrypted regarding the refit of 58 th Panzer Corps 
moving to Koblenz, but also ordering H SS Panzer Corps to Army Group B, 
transfering it to Eindhoven to direct the rest and refit of 2d, 116th, 9th Panzer 
Divisions, and Heavy Assault Gun Abteilung 217. These divisions as well as 10 SS 
Panzer were to move to the area Venlo-Arnhern for refit. 756 On 9 September, 9th 
Panzer was moved to the Aachen-Liege sector to go into German Seventh Army 
reserve. 757 On 11 September, 10th SS Panzer was located east of Maastricht, 
according to a division report dated 5 September. 758 The following day, decrypts 
indicated that the 2d and II 6th Panzer Divisions had migrated to the German Seventh 
Army's front. 759 On 13 September, a decrypt cited orders for Luflotte 3 requesting 
reconnaissance flights over the Beeringen Bridgehead to ascertain whether the British 
force staging there would move north, or eastward toward Roermond. Simultaneously, 
"4 Ibid., G-2 Summary No. 13,16 Sep 44,3. 
711 MHI, Pogue Papers, Interview with Brig. E. T. Williams. 
756 Author's possession: Msg XL 9245,060103Z/9/44; see Hinsley, British Intelligence, 3, Part. 2, 
383, fri. 96. This series of message copies from CARL; originals can be found in PRO, DEFE files. 
757 Author's possession: Msg. 090734Z/9/44. 
758 Author's possession, Msgs: 112347Z/9/44 and 121808Z/9/44. 
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it was asked if it could ascertain whether US forces would move north against 
Maastricht or east against Aachen. 760 
On 15 September, a message was decrypted stating that a German nightly 
appreciation on 9 September identified 30 Corps between Antwerp and Hasselt and 
that a possible additional corps (army) of up to 14 divisions with 800 to 900 tanks was 
moving forward. The German estimate was that the British intended a thrust on both 
sides of Eindhoven into Arnhem, so a photo recce was requested. This appreciation 
also accounted for a possible attempt to encircle German forces in the western 
Netherlands from the areas of Nijmegen and Wesel. 761 Several days later, a further 
decrypt clarified that the Germans were concerned about identifying whether the 
major thrust expected would go to Arnhem or Aachen. 762 The same day, another 
decrypt revealed that Army Group B Headquarters had moved to Oosterbeek, four 
kilometers west of Arnhem. 763 
At I Airborne Corps, the General Staff Officer 2 (intelligence), Maj. Brian 
Urquhart, requested photo imagery coverage on 12 September that was returned on the 
15'h, with a series of low-oblique photos showing 
German tanks and armored vehicles within easy range of the I 
Airborne Division's main dropping zone. 
'" Hinsley, British Intelligence. 3, part. 2,383. 
'60 Author's possession, Msg: 13024 1 Z/9/44. 
761 Author's possession: Msg: 15 1612Z/9/44. 
762 Author's possession, Msg; HP 9 131313Z/9/44. 
763 Author's possession, Msg: HP 220,15 Sep 44; see also Hinsley, British Intelligence, 3, Part. 2,385, fn. 108. 
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Already distraught over what he felt was an ill-conceived operation, Urquhart 
was relieved and placed on medical leave after an impassioned discussion with 
Browning, who did not act on what he felt was inconclusive. 
764 
Beginning 14 September, two telegrams were dispatched to what the resistance 
referred to as "British Central, " the intelligence clearing and decoding organization 
that operated under M16. The first telegram was received and decrypted on 15 
September, the second a day later. The text of the first said: 
Evaluation B. with following text: SS Hohenstaufl[sic] along Yssel. 
Units from this division noticed from ARNHEM to ZUPTHEN and 
along road ZUPTHEN-APELDORN. H. Q. perhaps at EE[F]DE. Field 
Fortifications are being built along YSSEL. 
The second telegram, decrypted. on the 16 th , stated: 
Eval. B. text: Ref Telegram of 151h September at Arnhem. Meldekopf 
[Kampfgruppen] Hohenstaufl., This is the assembly place of members 
of the SS Division previously reported. Also at Arnhem Meldekopf 
[Kampfgruppen] Harzer presumably forming part of a unit situated 
south of Arnhem. 
The second message was garbled in decryption and was corrected verbally by phone 
with Dutch representatives in London. 765 No record has been found to indicate that 
either message was forwarded to 21 Army Group. 
764 Brian Urquhart, A Life in Peace and War (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1987), 72,73. 
Urquhart says he was surprised by a comment on the 9' and 10' SS Panzcr as refitting in the Arnhem 
area, a fact he says was confirmed by the Dutch Resistance. This could only have been the 12 
September Intelligence Summary, which did not locate them in the Arnhem area, RAF Narrative. IV, 
147, reports that limited air reconnaissance was flown due to weather and states that "tactical air 
reconnaissances were carried out over the proposed airborne landing zones but they appeared to have 
yielded little, if any, useful information about movements of the enemy. " Urquhart's "Dutch source, " 
moreover, has not been verified by documents. Moreover, it is uncertain and improbable that I 
Airborne Corps had a Dutch liaison officer during the planning phase who might have passed on the 
information. No such written intelligence from the Dutch appears in 21 Army Group or 2 Army 
records. 
764 PRO, CAB 106-1133, Correspondence, Netherlands Military Attache to the Cabinet Office, 30" 
March 1953. 
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SHAEF published Weekly Intelligence Summary No. 26 for the week ending 
16 September, the day before MARKET GARDEN's scheduled start. Hidden on page 
7, the following appreciation was offered: 
First Parachute Army has energetically taken over the ANTWERP- 
HASSELT Sector from C-in-C NETHERLANDS. but has contributed 
little more than the glamour of its name, that little being remnants of 
the two or three parachute divisions. 
Seventh Army was late in getting reinforcements but it has now 
received 9 Panzer Division, to some extent refitted, from the SOUTH. 
and also one panzer brigade, with probably more infantry to come as 
the threat to the Fatherland develops in this area. Moreover 2 SS 
Panzer Division, and perhaps I SS Panzer also, have come off 
comparatively well in the way of tank replacements, though 12 SS 
Panzer remains very shadowy. 9 SS Panzer Division, and with it 
presumably 10, has been reported as withdrawing altogether to the 
Arnhem area ofHOLLAND: there they willprobably both collect some 
new lanksfrom the depot reported in the area of CLEVES. 766 
The accompanying order-of-battle map marked 11 SS Panzer Corps as 
"unlocated, " but centered it near Eindhoven. The larger-scale map graphics of the 
entire front located the corps at the Dutch-German border between Munster and 
Osnabruck. The assessment for the nominal strength of the 14 Panzer/Panzer 
Grenadier Divisions in the west was a probable equivalent of five divisions. The 31 
infantry divisions located on the front were equated to 2 1. The four divisions of First 
Parachute Army facing Second Anny were rated as equaling three infantry 
767 divisions. Citing enemy losses on all fronts in the west as amounting to about 
900,000 men, the G-2 stated flatly that: 
766 SHAEF Weekly Intelligence Summary No. 26 for the week ending 16 September 1944,7. Italics arc 
author's. 
767 Ibid., 6. 
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No force can, then, be built up in the West sufficient for a counter- 
offensive or even a successful defensive. 768 
Browning's own instructions, issued on 13 September, were not unrealistic in 
their assessment of enemy armor in the entire MARKET area and should be seen as 
the best large-picture estimate available to the divisions that would fight: 
The enemy is fighting determinedly along the general line of ALBERT 
and ESCAUT canals from inclusive ANTWERP to inclusive 
MAASTRICHT. His line is held by the remnants of some good 
divisions, and by new arrivals from HOLLAND. They are fighting well 
but have few reserves. The total armoured strength is probably not 
more than 50-100 tanks, mostly Mark IV. There is every sign of the 
enemy strengthening the defences of the river and canal lines through 
ARNHEM and NUMEGEN, especially with flak, but the troops 
manning them are not numerous and many are of low category. The 
169 flak is sited for dual purpose role-both AA and ground . 
On the 16 September, Dempsey sent Browning his final instructions, 
confirming their understanding of the plan and adding, "My very best wishes to you 
and all your splendid chaps. " 30 Corps would begin its advance "seventy minutes after 
10 1 starts to drop. , 
770 
At 1630 hours on 16 September, the staff weather officer issued his four-day 
forecast for southern England, the North Sea, and the battle area. Based on adequate 
771 
conditions predicted, Brereton gave the green light for MARKET . 
768 Ibid., 8. This is a far cry from the panicked assessment claimed by Cornelius Ryan and others that 
prompted Strong and Smith to fly to see Montgomery. Ryan, A Bridge Too Far, 157-159; Strong, 
Intelligence at the Top, 149. 
769 CARL, R-1 1583, HQ/AIRTPS/TS, 13 Sep 44, Operations Instruction No. 1,1. 
"o PRO, WO 285-15, Headquarters, Second Army, 16 Sep 44, Ltr. Dempsey to Browning. 
771 PRO, WO 205/623, Headquarters, First Allied Airborne Army, Office of Staff Weather Officer, 16 
Sep 44; PRO 205-693, Operation Market Garden, Weather, 1-3. While the weather appeared marginal, 
it was considered "good for the time of year, " with some clouds and morning fog. 
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MARKET's air program began the night of 16/17 September as 282 bombers 
from RAF Bomber Command hit flak positions along the northern route along with 
selected airfields. During the morning of 17 September, 100 RAF bombers struck 
coastal batteries and shipping near Walcheren, and 852 bombers from Eighth Air 
Force attacked 112 flak positions along both routes to be used by the troop carriers 
and glider tows. A total of 1,546 aircraft and 478 gliders comprised the air train that 
began dropping parachute troops at approximately 1300 hours. Pathfinders had 
marked selected drop and landing zones shortly before. 
772 In 80 minutes' time, a total 
of 16,500 troops arrived by parachute and a further 13,781 landed by glider in the first 
lift. Subsequently, 3,690 more parachuted into the battle area and a further 905 flew in 
by airplane, making a total of 34,876 troops delivered by air. 
773 
The air landings achieved complete tactical surprise. Transports and men 
suffered few losses en route to the battle area. As Browning had stated, the operation 
would have to succeed, "bottom to top, " making the early seizure of the 101" 
Airborne Division's objectives essential to 30 Corps' rapid movement. (See figure 
49. ) Assault teams from the 506 th Parachute Infantry on DZ "B" left without waiting 
for unit assembly to move toward the Zon bridge and two smaller bridges, an 
estimated 2.5 miles away. Scattered enemy resistance was met. Arriving to within 100 
yards of the bridge almost three hours after the drop, the assault team watched the 
Germans destroy the bridge by demolition. Some troops swam the canal, and the 
712 Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate, The Army Air Forces in World War 11, Vol. 111, Europe: 
ARGUMENT to VE-Day, Januaq 1944 to May 1945 (Washington: Office of Air Force History, 1988), 
603-604; RAF Narrative, IV, 145-150. 
773 CARL, N-5787-1, Hqs. First Allied Airborne Army: Allied Airborne Operations In Holland 
September-October 1944,2. 
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entire 506 th Regiment held a 2,000-yard-deep bridgehead south of the canal by 
midnight. 
The 502d Parachute Infantry on DZ "C" took two hours to assemble before 
marching on St. Oderode and seized the bridge over the Dommel after a skirmish. One 
company sent to the Best bridge was driven off by counterattack after initially 
capturing the bridge. 
Landing on DZ "A" and on an unplanned area to the north, the 50 1" Parachute 
Infantry seized the two highway bridges and two rail bridges spanning the Aa River 
and the Willems Vaart Canal. While some resistance was met, all objectives and the 
town of Vechel were captured. 774 
The 82d Airborne Division began its drop at 1305 and completed dropping its 
regiments by 1328. (See figure 50. ) The 505th Parachute Infantry made a compact drop 
landing on DZ "N. " It was tasked to seize the town of Groesbeek and the key ridge 
dominating the division area, as well as to block the approaches to the south and east 
of the division. The 508 th Parachute Infantry, tasked to send a battalion to the 
Nijmegen bridge and to protect the western flank of the division, failed in their bridge 
mission. The 504 th Parachute Infantry, landing on DZ "0, " fanned out to seize bridges 
over the Maas Waal Canal at Heuman (bridge 7) and Blankenberg (bridge 8. ) One 
company was dropped east of the river and seized the key Grave bridge. The bridges 
774 10 1" Airborne Market Annex No. 4; Tactical Operations of the Division, 1. 
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at Hattert (bridge 9) and Honinghute (bridge 10) were also the objectives of assault 
detachments. Only bridge 7 over the canal was captured intact. 
775 
I Airborne Division's assault, led by I Airlanding Brigade, began with the 
release of 153 Horsa gliders to arrive on LZ "S" beginning at 1300 hours. (See figure 
5 1. ) These were followed by 154 Horsa and 13 Hamilcar gliders landing on LZ "Z. " I 
Parachute Brigade began dropping on DZ "X' at 1355 hours. Consolidating their 
landings, the bulk of the divisional recce squadron and the three parachute battalions 
began moving on separate routes to the Arnhem bridge, their plan being to have 2 
Parachute Battalion capture the bridge while the 3 Parachutý Battalion assisted from a 
northerly axis. 2 Para was also to capture the rail bridge and pontoon bridge, if 
possible, along the way. I Parachute Battalion was to hold the high ground just north 
of Arnhem. 776 Landing next to an SS training battalion, two of the battalions and part 
of the recce squadron were embroiled in a series of ambushes, with only one 
parachute battalion, a troop of antitank guns, engineers, signals, and the brigade 
headquarters detachment eventually reaching the north end of the Arnhem road 
bridge. The Germans destroyed the pontoon bridge and the rail bridge. 777 
The H SS Panzer Corps, noted to be refitting in the Arnhem area, had the 
remnants of two formations, 9 SS "Hohenstaufen" and 10 SS "Frundsberg. " (See 
figure 52. ) Both were no more than brigade group strength, about 3,000-3,500 men 
but with about an equal number of men available in combat service support elements. 
7" NARA, RG 407, Entry 427, Box 12344, Opn Market-82d Abn Div Narrative, 1944,1-3. It should 
be noted that the "coup de main" drop zone for the Grave bridge was not approved during the planning 
phase by IX Troop Carrier Command. It was -coordinated" between the transport pilots and the 
regimental commander just prior to the actual drop. 
"6 1 Airborne Division Report, Annexure 'N', "Story of the I Parachute Brigade. " 1. 
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Hohenstaufen was then bereft of tanks and, Frundsberg's strength eventually rose to 
about 50 tanks. Both received orders quickly for immediate action, with 9 SS to 
remain and defend Arnhem, and 10 SS to move southwards, occupy the Nijmegen 
road and rail bridges, and defend the town. With no coup-de-main force holding and 
blocking the bridges, this action negated the surprise achieved by the initial parachute 
drops and ensured Nijmegen's reinforcement from the north while splitting the Allies 
by occupying the "island" between Nijmegen and Arnhem. 778 
Initially, both the 101" and 82d met scattered resistance and, at least 
temporarily, had numerical superiority in each of their sectors. Critical to their 
survival would be the rapid penetration of the "crusf' separating them from 30 Corps 
and the transit of Guards Armoured Division. In each sector, a major water obstacle 
blocked movement. The Zon bridge was gone, and the alternative bridge over the 
canal at Best was in enemy hands. The Nijmegen bridges were in enemy hands. The 
Arnhem bridge was blocked from the south. Dempsey had believed that reaching 
Arnhem would be an operation ranging from two to five days, but everything had been 
predicated on complete "carpets" south of Nijmegen to Eindhoven and the 
777 Ibid.; Frost, A Drop Too Many, Chapter 15. 
778 Wilhelm Ticke, In the Firestorm ofthe Last Years ofthe War: /1. SS-Panzel-k-orps with the 9. and 
10. SS-Divisions "Hohenstaufen " and "Frundsberg" (Winnipeg: J. J. Fedorowicz Publishing, 1999), 
222-233; Robert J. Kershaw, "It Never Snows in September ": The German View ofMARKET- 
GARDEN and the Battle ofArnhem, September 1944 (Surrey: Ian Allen, 1994), 321-322,326-327; J. 
Dugdale, Panzer Divisions, PanzerGrenadier Divisions, Panzer Brigades ofthe Arm ,v and 
lVaflen SS in 
the West, Autumn 1944-February 1945. ARDENNES and NORDWIND. Their Detailed and Precise 
Strengths and Organisations, Volume I [Part /J September 1944 Refitting and Re-equipment (London: 
Galago Publishing, 2000), 77-93; Marcel Zwarts, German Armored Units at Arnhem. September 1944 
(Hong Kong: Concord Publications Co., 2001), passim. Assessing German strength is difficult because 
of the constant reinforcement given to the major formations during the battle. Kershaw attempts to 
provide a daily order of battle with strengths approximated. Zwarts offers several -snapshots" but does 
explain the differences in combat and support strengths. The issue of numbers reinforces General 
Hackett's comments concerning building combat capabilities. (See fn 787. ) 
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simultaneous taking of the major bridges . 
779 The airmen and the American division 
commanders had negated this plan; the replacement concept of "moving to the 
objectives" from a tight airhead was too slow for the task. 
Horrocks announced his attack time upon notification of I Airborne Corps' 
takeoff. Zero hour was designated at 1435 following preparatory fires begining at 
1400.30 Corps "rolled up" behind a 350-gun moving barrage centering on Club 
Route, with 5 (Guards) Armoured Brigade leading the division. Guards Armoured 
planned its advance in two phases. Phase one would be the initial advance and capture 
of Valkenswaard. Two battalions supplied by the 50 (N) division would cover the 
flanks of the advance. The division expected to concentrate south of Eindhoven until 
ordered to "bound" forward through the 101" Airborne. Phase Il would constitute the 
advance toward the final objective with two brigades "up" beginning at first light on 
780 D+I . With nightfall at 1847 and total 
darkness at 2005, the division intended to halt 
for the first night. 
Once past the last fall of artillery shot, Guards Armoured rapidly met 
resistance, losing nine tanks quickly in ambush. While rocket-firing Typhoon aircraft 
flying in a "cab rank" of continuous flights to support the armor, did much to advance 
the column, Valkenswaard, where Adair had planned to harbor his lead units until 
daylight, was not reached until dark. The following day Guards Armoured pressed 
779 Urquhart, Arnhem, 4; FAAA, Airborne Operations in Holland. 1, Major General Sir A] Ian Adair. A 
Guards'General. The Memoirs ofMajor General SirAllan Adair (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1986), 
162-164. The FAAA Report notes that Dempsey expected to reach the Zuider Zee in 2-5 days, and to 
link with I Airborne Division between D+I and D+3. 
'80 CARL, R-13333,21 Army Group Operation "MARKET GARDEN" 17-26 Sept 1944 [hereafter 
referred to as 21 Army Group MARKET GARDEN]; Appendix L to part 11, Extracts from Guards 
Armoured Div 0.0. No. 12,15 Sep 44,93-95; Section 8: 30 Corps Operations 17 September. 37-39; 
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toward Eindhoven, where it linked with the airborne at 1700 hours. One brigade had 
unsuccessfully attempted to bypass Eindhoven, and the airborne, failing to gain a 
bridge at Zon, had attacked again at Best, where the bridge was finally destroyed by 
the Germans. A new bridge was rapidly built at Zon during the night, and tanks rolled 
forward on it at first light, 0615, on 19 September. 781 
Guards Armoured had been opposed by "the Regiment von Hoffman. " The 
101" had correctly identified one kampfgruppe from the 10 SS Panzer that had been 
attached to the First Parachute Army and provided its only real armor support with 15 
Mk IV selfpropelled panzeýaeger antitank guns, a motorized battery of field guns, and 
a collection of "regiments. " Along the road, the Germans established a series of 
"blocks" in depth; Valkenswaard had been the second. Two others awaited on 18 
September, one in Aalst and another at Eindhoven, both delaying Guards Armoured 
from reaching the 101st. The necessity to build a bridge at Zon negated the "second 
bound" plan, which had been meant to take them through to the Nijmegen bridge and 
beyond. 782 
The second day's thrust by 30 Corps was threatened by moves not yet seen. 
The road running northwest from Eindhoven to Utrecht, west of Arnhem, marked the 
sectors of three "divisions, " really brigade-size kampfgruppen, running from south to 
north, the 85th, 245 th , and 59th. Student deployed the 5 9th against the 101"" western 
PRO WO 171/605, War Diary 5' Armoured Brigade, Guards Armoured Division, Sep 17'. Brigadier 
Gwatkin credits "Typhoons" with -wonderful assistance. " 
781 SecondArm 
*v 
History, 220-22 1. 
782 Kershaw, It Never Snows, situation map facing 192; chapters, 2,3, and 7. 
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and northwestern flanks, holding Best and threatening the division's drop zones. The 
85, h and 245th lay in Ritchie's path. 
GARDEN's flank corps were meant to draw off enemy reserves from attacking 
Club Route. (See figure 53. ) O'Connor's 8 Corps launched a night crossing of the 
Escaut canal east of 30 Corps' boundary to pass 3 Division, whose task was to extend 
to the northeast, reaching a depth of approximately 10 miles. 0' Connor intended, at 
that point, to launch II Armoured Division to the area east of Eindhoven bordered by 
Deurne-Helmond. Besides broadening the base of Dempsey's attack, 8 Corps would 
move on order to the Maas, covering 30 Corps. Commencing at midnight on 18 
September, 3 Division (which had motor-marched 300 miles from France on 17 
September) launched its attack less than 18 hours after arriving in sector. At the same 
time, 50 (N) Division was transferred to 8 Corps, to continue developing security in 
depth for Horrocks' attack, but now under O'Connor's supervision. II Armoured 
passed through the bridgehead by noon on 19 September, with recce moving toward 
the objective area. 783 
Lt. Gen. N. E. Ritchie's 12 Corps was to widen the attack approximately 15 
miles to the west, launching a night crossing of the Escaut Canal by 53 (W) Division 
at Lommel. during the night of 17 September to protect 30 Corps' flank and to prevent 
the enemy from attempting a breakout eastward toward Germany. (See figure 54. ) The 
15 (H) Division was to expand the Gheel bridgehead, and Ritchie was to pass 7 
Armoured Division on order to seize the area bordered by Boxtel, Hertogenbosch, and 
'83 Second Anny Histo)31,244-246. 
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Tilburg. 12 Corps met considerable opposition, and by the end of 19 September. no 
784 
progress was made toward contacting the 101" southwest flank . 
Montgomery knew by nightfall on 17 September that his plan for seizing the 
bridges had only partially succeeded, but considering the expected growing 
opposition, he felt that "we had made a very good beginning" Dempsey believed that 
the airborne operation was developing satisfactorily, as had Guards Armoured's 
attack He met with the three corps commanders on the morning of 18 September to 
arrange for O'Connor's takeover of 30 Corps' rear areas. Dempsey's intelligence 
called the current operation "a parallel-in-reverse" of the 1940 aerial invasion of 
Holland, hinting that signals intelligence had received a plethora of information from 
the no-longer-security-conscious enemy reporting the airborne drops. Intelligence 
further noted elements of the 9 SS and 10 SS Panzer Divisions as "new in the canal 
area, " and noted: 
There are reported to be two battle groups, each of roughly a battalion 
strength, under the command of another battle group carrying the title 
10 SS Div FRUNDSBERG. They are unlikely to have any heavy tanks 
with them, certainly no appreciable number. '85 
Dempsey's G-2 further assessed that the bulk of the replacements of quality 
had gone to meet Patton's thrust, and secondarily to the Aachen sector during the 
previous fortnight. Noting that parrying the Holland thrust by Second Army would 
require risk in other sectors, he stated: 
[I]t is considered unlikely that any large scale reinforcements can be 
made available, and the battle now joined will be fought out by the 
7" Ibid., 240-242. 
78 .5 Second Army Intelligence Summary No. 105, up to 2400 hrs. 17 Sep 44,1. 
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troops on the ground, with the uncertain addition of some troops south 786 
of the River Scheldt. They will not amount to much . 
That "uncertain addition, " the unknown factor, had been the crux of the 
intelligence problem in predicting German capabilities. A new pattern of German 
replacement, reinforcement, rehabilitation, and almost "spontaneous regeneration" of 
combat power would emerge to tip the scales significantly. Intelligence had for weeks 
located headquarters and enumerated rapidly growing numbers of stragglers pouring 
into Germany. That these could be made into combat-effective formations in a matter 
of weeks or sometimes days, challenged the entire belief system of the Allied 
generals. These "new" units now began to appear throughout Holland and indeed the 
entire Western Front. 787 
While Dempsey noted, consistently, "dull, rain" in his daily diary, the weather 
had more ominous meaning for MARKET. Brereton had delayed the morning 
operation on D+I due to predicted fog, rescheduling air operations to arrive over 
Holland in mid-aftemoon. This lift, comprising 1,360 troop carriers and 1,203 gliders, 
brought in the glider support units for the 101", the glider regiment of the 82d, the 4 
Parachute Brigade, and the remainder of the Airlanding Brigade for I Airborne. 
116 Ibid., 2. 
'8' In his interview with the author at Fort Leavenworth, Sir John Hackett described the remarkable 
efficiency of the German soldier. He noted that given a large body of German stragglers inserted below 
a headquarters element, these troops could begin to function like a trained unit in a short amount of 
time. While obviously not equal to picked, highly trained troops, they fought extremely well and 
aggressively. One comment that was telling was, "You have never fought in a [real) war, until you 
have fought Germans. " It was the disbelief of professionals in both the American and British Army, 
that units could literally be -reborn" so rapidly after battle that made their estimates of German 
strength and capabilities so erroneous. The fact that some German units had members drawn from the 
shells of as many several dozen formations also perplexed G-2s who tracked prisoners from these new 
kampfgruppen by their paybooks. The reality they refused to accept was that many times the Allies 
were meeting not -stragglers" but new rehabilitated units. 
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Supplies were also dropped. 788 While the delay proved indecisive to either the 10 1" or 
the 82d, it severely hampered the now encircled I Airborne Division and slowed its 
move toward Arnhem while the enemy simultaneously massed against it. 
Additionally, Brereton's decision stopped 83 Group from flying close support, the 
decision having been made to keep only one air mission, resupply or tactical, aloft at 
one time. While the transports waited for the fog to lift, the tactical air forces on the 
continent found themselves grounded by orders. 789 
Moreover, communications between the air missions proved disastrous. Air 
requests from the MARKET area were sent via London to 2 TAF in Brussels and then 
on to 83 Group; there apparently was no direct link. The impending breakup of AEAF, 
the move forward of the Air C-in-C, Leigh Mallory, to Granville to be near 
Eisenhower, the lack of interest of the Deputy Supreme Commander, Tedder, in the 
largest airborne operation in history, and the remarkably poor communications that 
plagued Second Army's air links, seemed to divorce the "air weapon" of the Tactical 
Air Forces from the ground battle. First Allied Airborne Army gave the air delivery 
788 FAAA, Allied Airborne Operations in Holland, 8; Warren, Airborne Operations. European Theater, 
117-118; 
789 RAF Narrative, IV, 15 1; PRO WO 171/208, Second Army "G" Ops-Opns Log, Second Army Air 
Support Notes No. 85,85,87, Sept 17-19; PRO CAB 101/316, Air Operations Allied Expeditionary 
Air Forces, 17'-30 September 1944/including Close Air Support to 30 Corps; Second Army notes of 
sorties for the first three days are: 230 in support of 2 Army and 86 as armed rcccc; on 18 September, 
173 of 263 flown were over MARKET area; 73 sorties were flown but results were nil due to weather. 
Only two armed rccce missions were flown north of Arnhem. The air support for MARKET GARDEN 
was poorly coordinated by the numerous airmen involved. Brereton's insistence on being the "air space 
manager" [in modem terms] often left the GARDEN forces and indeed the MARKET forces without 
close air support. Brereton insisted that no tactical missions could be flown while air transports were in 
the sky-essentially eliminating many of the benefits of air superiority over the battlefield. Apparently, 
changes in air rescheduling were sent to 2 TAF without time to react, even when decisions were made 
the evening before by Brereton. 83 Group flew 550 sorties on D-Day [see Chapter II for discussion]. 
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role top priority-, they saw little immediacy in the problems of the GARDEN force in 
competition with their own transport schedule. 
790 
Indeed, the airborne's ground battle began changing rapidly, and air support 
would have been welcome. The 101" cleared Eindhoven of a battalion of Germans by 
noon on D+I, reaching the group of bridges south of the town. A link- with Guards 
Armoured was made before dark, and a bailey bridge built during the night to replace 
the blown structure. Passing the division forward, Guards Armoured reached Grave. 
30 miles away, by 0820. (See figure 55. ) Damage to bridge 10 (Hotinghue) caused 
Club Route to be directed via the Heuman Bridge, bridge 7, then via Groesbeek to 
Nijmegen. The Nijmegen bridge had not been captured, and Browning, Adair, and 
Gavin met at noon to coordinate a combined attack to clear Nijmegen and seize the 
bridge over the Waal. While the corridor from Zon to Grave remained clear, enemy 
activity on both the 101" northwest flank and the 82d east flank portended the grave 
operational problem now facing MARKET GARDEN. 
The presence of Model at Army Group B, Student at First Parachute Army, 
and Bittrich at II SS Panzer Corps provided a clear, concerted view and plan for how 
to squeeze, cut off, and eradicate both the airborne and ground elements piecemeal. 
These actions, though put in train early in the operation (in late afternoon on the 17, h) 
were clear by 19 September. While probably benefitting from the capture of a 
complete MARKET plan from a downed US glider during the first lift-presented to 
790 CAB 101/332, Notes for Air Chief Marshal Sir Ralph Cochrane from Air Chief Marshal Sir Harry 
Broadhurst on the Tactical Air Force Operations in Normandy, 3,4, Coningham, Operations ofSecond 
TacticalAir Force, 28; Leigh Mallory, Despatch, 77-79; Charles Carrington, Soldier at Bomber Command (London: Leo Cooper, 1987), 177-18 1. 
438 
Student within hours of the landing-the German response was more than likely the 
doctrinal response of three like-thinking, seasoned, combat commanders. 
791 
As Guards Armoured linked with Gavin's men on the road between Grave and 
Heuman, regiments from the 59th Division pressed the 101" at Best, at the Zonche 
forest, and along the Zuid Willems Canal between Schindel and Veghel. East of 
Grosbeek, elements of the 406 th Division coming from the Reichswald Forest pressed 
the Groesbeek Ridge and drop-zone areas, as well as attacking from the southeast at 
Mook. Meanwhile, reinforcements from 10 SS "Frundsberg" rafted across the river to 
bypass Lt. Col. John Frost's block at Arnhem, and then proceeded south across the 
Nijmegen Bridge to reinforce the town. 792 
While GARDEN had the benefit of two corps beginning their attacks to 
provide the threat to the enemy's south flank-and neither the 101'" nor the 82d were 
in danger of being overrun as British armored regiments soon were to be attached to 
each to bolster their threatened flanks-I Airborne was effectively boxed and the 
element at the Arnhem bridge isolated from any relief by the division. Building on the 
effective temporary block laid by SS Battalion Kraft near Wolfheze, 9 SS 
791 NARA, RG 319, "R-Manuscripts, " MS R-5, Lucian Hechlcr, Invasionfrom the Shy, Research 
Section, Office of the Chief of Military History, 1953,2742; MacDonald, Siegfried Line Campaign, 
141-143. The "W' Series were research studies of the campaign using German documents to 
supplement the research and narratives of the US Official Historians. 
792 Kershaw, It Never Snows, Situation map: Situation within the Airborne Corridor 18-19 September 
1944, VIII, IX, X, passim; Warren, Airborne Operations. European Theater, 130; 21 Armv Group 
MARKETGARDEN, 44-47; FAAA, AlliedAirborne Operations in Holland, 9-11. Gavin indicated to 
the author that he had worried about armor in the Reichswald forest and had sent patrols looking for it. 
His G-3, Major (later Lt. Gen. ) John Norton, told the author during an interview that Browning, who 
spent most of his time at the 82d command post, was likewise concerned about the division's east 
(right) flank, and had cautioned Gavin not to press the attack in Nijmegen on the 18th at the expense of 
losing the high ground. This, of course, was reversed when Guards Armoured arrived. Both men were 
reacting to unconfirmed "reports" of a tank depot in the vicinity of Cleve. Browning had told Gavin on 
the evening of the 18' that Nijmegen bridge should be taken by dark on the 19' or latest early on the 
20'. This was based on Guards Armoured arriving on the 19'. 
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Hohenstaufen had effectively built a "sperrlinie" (literally, obstacle line). which had 
held I Parachute Brigade at Arnhem's town limits. (See figure 56. ) Meanwhile, 
another ersatz division of kampfgruppen, Division von Tettau, formed west of I 
Airborne's drop zones. At the time of the second lift on 18 September, they had begun 
to move eastward across Drop Zone "Y, " while additional kampfgruppen to the south 
compressed the I Airborne area both from the river and off the original drop zones. 
While 4 Parachute Brigade's drop had been taken under fire, many of the Dutch SS 
were routed by Hackett's troops, and the Von Tettau attack was halted until 19 
September. 793 
This did not alleviate I Airborne's peril. While the division commander was 
temporarily isolated during I Parachute Brigade's unsuccessful attempt to enter 
Arnhem, the arrival of Hackett's brigade did not signal a needed fresh estimate of the 
airborne's mission. Believing the full three brigades could still move to the river, the 
division's acting commander moved Hackett's brigade toward its original objectives 
north of Arnhem, while the Airlanding Brigade attempted to hold back Von Tettau 
while somehow reinforcing I Parachute Brigade's move to the bridge. Failing 
immediately, this resulted in the compression of I Airborne Division into a "kessel" 
(cauldron or pocket) centering on Osterbeek, with I Airborne's new headquarters sited 
a few minutes' walk from where Model had been ousted on 17 September when the 
parachute drops began. Returning to his division, Urquhart found two disastrous 
occurrences had happened. First, the high ground of Westerbouwing had not been held 
as "vital ground" due to the intended move of the division eastward, and second, the 
'" Kershaw, /I Never Snows, Situation maps, Formation of Kampfgruppe von Tettau, and Arrival of 
440 
ferry at Heavedorp, below Westerbouwing, had drifted away. Both the division and 2 
Para were now isolated, both from each other and from any help coming from south of 
the Neder Rijn. 794 
Weather continued to plague MARKET, as did routing shifts. Brereton had 
compressed his air missions into a single stream, following the northern route on D+1 
due to enemy action, and now shifted all missions to the southern route on D+2 for 
simile. r reasons. While this caused planning confusion, it also lengthened the arrival 
times-times that were also later in the day. Both lifts arrived too late to be committed 
to battle on arrival day. Weather, however, cancelled many air missions, with only 
half for the 101" being flown, most of the 82d's being canceled, and some gliders of 
the Polish Brigade arriving north of the river with heavy losses on arrival in the 
ongoing battle. Two of the cancellations were noteworthy: The 82d was to receive a 
second glider battalion on 19 September, and the Polish Airborne Brigade was 
planned to land on Drop Zone "K7 south of Arnhem bridge. Given the critical 
shortage of infantry at Nijmegen and the disastrous isolation of 2 Para at Arnhem, the 
now teetering tactical situation north of the Neder Rijn was not to receive even the 
problematic "help" of these two landings. 795 
Second Lift at Ginkel Heath. 
7" Interview with Sir John Hackett, 1983. Hackett noted that Urquhart's absence was critical in that the 
importance of Westerbouwing -would never" have escaped Urquhart. In retrospect, Hackett felt the 
failure to retain this ground doomed the division, though it was not apparent to him or the other 
brigadicrs at the time. The original plan did make provision to secure ferries and barges. The daily 
situation overlays reproduced from the I Airborne Report in Urquhart's book show the compression of 
the division into a perimeter from its attack stance. See Urquhart, Arnhem, 44,78,94,102,118. 
... Warren, Airborne Operations, European Theater, 127-133. Warren notes that the original drop 
planned for the Polish brigade would have arrived at 1000 hours, several hours before German armor 
began reducing Frost's positions north of the bridge. However, dropping the Poles on the original Drop 
Zone "K" might have led to the slaughter of the paras, as the southern end of the bridge was held by 
elements of 10 SS. 
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Dempsey and Montgomery met on 19 Septenber to discuss the operational 
situation, but Montgomery was ft*g to manage multiple problems-, dealing with 
Crerar by phone in an attempt to speed up the ongoing attack on Boulogne and to 
develop a thrust to open Antwerp, and communicating with Eisenhower, who now 
suddenly wrote asking for Monty's views on future operations 
Tý6 Still, throughout 
their meeting, neither Monty nor Dempsey predicted disaster. The Nijmegen bridge. 
not taken by 19 September, was the key to both I Airborne's survival and the viability 
of the original plan. Dempsey's flank corps were slowly developing momentum. 
Williams, at 21 Army Group, repeated his theme that preventing Allied use of 
Antwerp was the Germans' most effective defense for the homeland, but 
Montgomery's G-2 offered little on the developing tactical situation. He did note: 
Hohenstaufen division is located along the Yssel, with units from 
Arnhem to Zupthen, and along the road Zutphen-Apeldorn and Hq. 
Possibly at Eede. 9SS Division has been missing for some time. A 
mixed battle group Frundsberg of 9 and 10 SS was identified yesterday 
South of Eindhoven: so there may be some truth in this report; but the 
division cannot be in a very formidable state. 797 
Dempsey's intelligence section did not add gloom, stating in their 18 September 
report: 
There is no reason to suppose that he [the enemy] has anything worse 
in store for us than we have met so far, and nothing of divisional size is 
likely to appear just yet. 798 
"'* Montgomery Log, 19 September. Eisenhower's comments will be covered in Chapter 10. 
717 21 Army Group Intelligence Review No. 160,18 Sep 44,2. This array was generally accurate prior 
to 17 September; since the airborne drop 9 SS had formed to fight I Airborne; Hinsley, British 
Intelligence, 3, Part 2, does not discuss this intelligence as it underscores that the first actual usable 
dispositions produced by ULTRA were after the operation began, and in fact, were not accurate on the 
day delivered. Had they been delivered in this detail two days before, no one could have ignored them. 
'98 Second Army Intelligence Summary No. 106, up to 2400 hrs. 18 Sep 44,2. Noteworthy is the 
assessment in Order of Battle locations of the 9 SS and 10 SS listed as battalion strength, 11. 
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The followin, 
.. 
day's appreciation began almost as a cheer: 
Right, left and centre the enemy has had the worst of the day, and on 799 
all sectors of [the] Second Army front there are successes to record . 
While casually mentioning that the Arnhem bridge could "not be held, " the 
assessment of the corridor leading from the original bridgehead to Nijmegen was 
remarkably sanguine, noting that though the enemy no doubt would try to break the 
link, the effort to mount a large counterattack had been spent instead to keep the 
airborne groups separated. Citing the presence of the boundaries between the First 
Parachute Army and C-in-C Netherlands, the G-2 wrongly assessed that it would be 
difficult to coordinate battle armngements. 800 
As this summary was being distributed, the situation belied its content. From 
the German perspective, three Schwerpunkt existed: one north of the Neder Rijn at the 
Osterbeek Perimeter, one at Nijmegen, where the defense of the Nijmegen bridge and 
the blocking of the road north was critical; and one south of the Waal, which might be 
seen as the entire length of 30 Corps' corridor northward. Major efforts were mounted 
against the Allies in all three sectors. 
On 19 and 20 September, the 107 th Panzer Brigade at Zon and elements of Il 
Falschirmjaeger Corps, based at Cleve, launched attacks. Coming out of the east with 
a tank raid, the enemy was driven off at dark on the I 9th at Zon. This early raid was 
developed into a larger attack at the same spot at dawn on 20 September, when the 
107th reappeared to attack and temporarily control by fire the area around the Zon 
bailey bridge. The 107 th was driven off by tanks from Guards Armoured Division; this 
Second Army Intelligence Summary No. 107, up to 2400 hrs. 19 Sep 44,1. 
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posed the only southern threat to the corridor on the 20th. H Falschirmjaeger Corps 
planned a three-pronged attack at dawn, but the attack started in late morning. While 
the two northem attacks see-sawed, the southem thrust; which took Mook 
temporarily, reached within two kilometers of the Heuman bridge before being driven 
off in the afternoon by airborne infantry and Guards Armoured tanks. 801 Guards 
Armoured Division, by this time, had been segmented to bolster "Club Route- in the 
airborne sectors, now about to be renamed "Hell's Highway" by the paratroops. The 
15/19 Hussars were attached to the 101", the first of a series of detachments that 
would stretch Adair's division over two-thirds the length of Club Route while 
diminishing its own strength to push forward. The Coldstream Group would soon be 
linked with the 82d to defend its eastern flank from armored incursion and to form an 
armored reserve in the center of Club Route. 802 
The hasty attack proposed against the railroad and road bridges by Gavin for 
19 September failed, as three columns of paratroops and tanks moved on both bridges 
and toward the post office allegedly holding the demolition controls for the main 
bridge. Neither bridge column succeeded, though the paratroops reached the post 
office and found nothing there. Another attack was planned for 20 September. 
The combined attack by the Guards Armoured Division and the 82d Airborne 
on the Nijmegen bridge was a two-part assault involving a tank-infantry attack on the 
bridge from the south and a river assault crossing designed both to flank the enemy 
8'0 Ibid., 2. 
801 Kershaw, It Never Snows, Situation map, The Situation on Hell's Highway, 20-26 September, 145- 
147; 190-192. 
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and seize the northern approaches to the bridge. (See figure 57. ) Two kampfgruppen 
held the twin bridges: a rail bridge in the west, backed on the north shore by additional 
troops in the fort near Lent, and the road bridge outposted by defenses at the outlying 
traffic circles. Both bridges were set for demolition. The attack plan agreed upon by 
Adair, Browning, Gavin, and Horrocks was a stronger version of the plan used on 19 
September. One column would attack the rail bridge, essentially to cover the rear of 
the second column attempting to clear Hunner Park and the Valkof, west of the road 
bridge, while a third column worked from the east toward the traffic circle and 
approaches to the road bridge. Each column was a mix of Guards tanks and American 
paratroopers. Simultaneously, part of a battalion would cross the river under the fire 
support of tanks, to seize the north shore and flank the north end of the bridge from 
the west. Each group would be exposed, the men in the river crossing the worst, the 
entire attack relied upon pressure built on the defense from every quarter and 
incredible bravery on the part of every man taking part. 803 
While the bridge attack was being prepared, I Airborne received a radio 
message at 0140 hours from I Airborne Corps (Rear) requesting the designation of a 
new drop zone for the Polish brigade. New coordinates were flashed to the rear 
designating a drop zone near the town of Driel, across from the Heavedorp ferry and 
802 FAAA, Allied Airborne Operations, 9; Verney, The Guards Armoured Division, 112. In addition to 
the 15/19 Hussars, the 44 Royal Tank Regiment, two squadrons of the Royals, and two batteries of 
artillery were attached to the 101" by Second Army. 
803 Adair, A Guards'General, 165-167; Lt. Gen. James M. Gavin, On to Berlin: Battles ofan Airborne 
Commander, 1943-1946 (New York: Viking Press, 1978) 169-175,178-181; 21 Army Group 
MARKET GARDEN, Section 8, Operations of 30 Corps, 48-5 1; A Short History of 30 Corps, 33-35, 
Map 19; Captain Nigel Nicholson and Patrick Forbes, History ofthe Grenadier Guards in the War of 
1939-1945 [hereafter referred to as Nicholson and Forbes, Ae Grenadier Guards], I (n. p., n. d. ), 129- 
140; 82d Division Narrative, Opn Market; section "Crossing the Waal River, " 1-20. This section, based 
on field interviews, indicates that the battalion picked for crossing, 3d Battalion, 504" Parachute 
Infantry, had no previous knowledge, plan, or preparation for the river crossing. 
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closer to the perimeter. I Airborne Corps had known from a message on 19 September 
that the south end of the bridge was held by the Germans, thus threatening the Polish 
drop. Sosabowski hastily planned and briefed his commanders, though weather would 
intervene to prevent the planned drop that morning. The fight in Nijmegen, however, 
intensified. 804 
While fighting increased on the 82d's east flank, the attack toward the bridge 
began at first light with house-to-house fighting, as direct assaults proved suicidal. By 
mid-afternoon, Hunner Park and the Valkof were cleared, and the Americans began 
their river crossing under withering fire, eventually establishing a shallow perimeter 
on the dike overlooking the river. The first tank assault by the Grenadier Guards was 
driven off, but a second, beginning about 1800 hours, was made when the Americans 
were seen moving toward the bridge from the west. This assault crossed the bridge 
under fire and linked with the American paratroopers. A shallow bridgehead, about a 
mile deep, was established as darkness fell, and clearing the bridge area of snipers and 
demolitions proceeded. 805 At dark, the situation at the Arnhem bridge was critical. 
Dempsey's major concerns went beyond relieving I Airborne Division. The 
landing of the airborne had given him command of the three airborne divisions, but 
his entire responsibility lay with impelling success within all four corps involved. 
Montgomery, who had no fiinher reserves to commit, was forced to accept the role of 
bystander; it was, after all, an army-level battle. From this perspective, the operation 
'04 First Airborne Report, Annexure "M, " War Diary, Sheet 5, entry, 20 Sep 0140; it is unclear when I 
Airborne Corps received the original message; Golden, Echoesfrom Arnhem, 164,165, George F. 
Cholewcynski, Poles Apart: The Polish Airborne at the Battle ofArnhem (New York: Sarpedon, 
1993), 118-119; Sosabowski, Freely I Served, 156-158. 
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teetered. O'Connor's 8 Corps was just coming into action, with 3 Division widening 
its bridgehead on the Escaut, II Armoured moving on Heeze, and 50 Division 
clearing pockets of resistance behind Club Route. Ritchie's 12 Corps met firm 
resistance. 53 Division had crossed but two brigades in its sector, and the Highlanders 
of 15 Division were blocked by a strong enemy defense. The crisis for GARDEN, 
however, was along Club Route. Dempsey's only solution for the southern end of 
Club Route was to transfer the 101" Division to Ritchie's control, now making the 
south end of the route an affair to be guarded by both Ritchie on the west and 
O'Connor on the east. Dempsey went forward on 21 September, meeting with 
Browning, Horrocks, and later Ritchie. 806 
HorTocks received little help from the slow movement on his flanks, and each 
of the two "airborne carpets" was pressed from the flanks. The 101", already drawing 
forces from Horrocks' "linking force, " Guards Armoured, was pressed from both 
flanks, by both a brigade of armor and a division kampfgruppen. Likewise, the 82d, 
now straddling the Waal with two bridges in hand, were also pressed from the eastern 
flank by a division kampfgruppen. Ahead of Horrocks, lay a building force on the 
"island, " the patch of land between the Nijmegen Bridge and the troops clinging to the 
end of the Arnhem bridge, II miles away. While virtually penned in by these forces 
along nearly 50 miles of road, each sector was in crisis, with the southern-most 
already penetrated and the road cut at St. Oderode. This momentary cut would soon 
turn into a running battle along the road from Veghel to Uden. From an operational 
905 Nicholson and Forbes, The Grenadier Guards, 134-140; 82d Narrative, "Crossing the Waal, " 
passim. 
806 Dempsey Diaty, 20 September. 
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perspective, while the relief of I Airborne and a bridgehead on the Neder Rijn were 
critical, tactical loss in the 82d area, or more important, on Hell's Highway in the 
101" area, could cause the destruction of the entire corps. In good weather, airpower 
might have been decisive. Between 20 September and the end of the battle, weather, 
and Brereton's restrictions, hampered the only "hammer" that Dempsey might have 
used. 807 
At Brereton's headquarters, Brereton and his staff viewed the operation in 
terms of air transport missions. Brereton had overflown the drop on D-Day in a B- 17 
with Matthew Ridgway, and a wireless link was established with I Airborne 
Headquarters by 1700. Ridgway was told the next day that upon the fly-in of 52 
Division, XVIH Corps would assume command of the two US airborne divisions and 
Browning would take command of I Airborne, 52 (L), and the Polish Brigade. Parks. 
who initiated this idea, immediately received approval from Brereton. While Brereton 
made weather and route changes, he also informed Ridgway that he would prepare his 
corps for another drop after I October, "regardless of whether we have received 
replacements of men and material. " While Brereton and Ridgway visited 2 Army on 
the continent on 20 and 21 September, the only additional aid offered to I Airborne 
Corps by the headquarters was to fly in two battalions of the 52 Division in gliders 
intended for the airborne engineers. 808 
80'SecondArmy Histoiy, 229-233, NARA. RG 407, ML-93 1, Positions and Activities of 8 and 12 
Corps during Market Garden; 21 Army Group MARKET GARDEN. 48-52; Horrocks, Corps 
Commander, 117,118. 
" Parks Diary, 17-21 September. Of some interest should be the fact that Browning did not know his 
headquarters would be downgraded and an additional corps headquarters flown in with the 52 
(Lowland) Division. Browning turned down the offer of the two battalions of the 52 (Lowland) 
Division, though it had never been made clear to him how much of the division would be sent. 
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Brereton's information at Sunninghill Park revolved around the air situation. 
His own G-2 did not identify elements of the 9 SS and 10 SS Panzers as engaged until 
their 19 September report, and the same day reported: 
I PARA ARMY front pierced by Allied thrust into EINDHOVEN. 
Light opposition offered against Allied airborne landing. 809 
While Brereton had boasted to Eisenhower, while still commander of Ninth Air Force, 
that he could control the air support that would make an airhead unassailable, he did 
not use his own authority or, more important, fly to see Coningham, who still smarted 
from not having the final say over air support. Leigh Mallory and the moribund 
Headquarters, AEAF remained even farther in the shadows. As 30 Corps waited for 
dawn on 21 September, the question no doubt in every mind from the Waal to the 
perimeter north of the Neder Rijn was would help come from the air? 
Gavin's men were incensed that Guards Armoured had not gone forward 
during the night. Yet those on the dikes north of the Waal knew nothing of what 
transpired south of them. Nijmegen had yet to be cleared, and the corps commander 
had ordered forward 43 (Wessex) Division to clear the island. The carpet had run out. 
Horrocks saw a battle ahead though he still pushed the point element of Guards 
Armoured forward on 21 September to maintain pressure. The night had granted cover 
for the Germans to move up additional forces to block the road. By dawn, there were 
fewer than 150 men fit to fight at the Arnhem bridge; by 0900 these remnants had 
been overrun. Tactical reconnaissance reported that 20 enemy tanks came south and 
Considering there was little secure terrain in this point of the battle, it is questionable where they could 
have been landed. 
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began deploying south of Elst, about one third of the distance between the Nijmegen 
and Arnhem bridges. At midday, the 82d withdrew south of the Waal as 130 Brigade 
took over the bridgehead and two of its battalions cleared west Nijmegen. Finally. 
about 1230, as the Irish Guards pressed ahead, the lead troop was annihilated in 
ambush. Overhead, the "cab rank" of Typhoons, which had broken them out of a trap 
in identical circumstances only five days before, circled aimlessly as wireless 
communication broke down. Artillery support likewise failed. While the Irish Guards 
were held, a flanking attempt by the Welsh Guards also failed. and then the light was 
gone. They had gained but two of the II miles; the actual "advance" of the Guards 
had lasted 20 minutes. 810 (See figure 58. ) 
The Polish Brigade dropped near Driel at 1714 hours. Suffering casualties due 
to the closeness of the enemy, darkness and the lack of the operating ferry. 
Sosaboski's men were unable to cross the river. Their mission had been to 
immediately reinforce the I Airborne, which was known to be heavily pressed. Wireless 
link with 30 Corps had permitted the 64 Medium Regiment to fire close support 
missions throughout the day. 811 
Horrocks' plan had been to fan out to the west of the main road if it was 
blocked, first with the Guards Armoured, which had failed, and then with 43 Division 
as it assumed the assault while the Guards groups held the flank against the panzer 
8'9 NARA, RG 33 1, FAAA, G-2 Summary Number 16.191630 Sept. 1. On 19 September, FAAA's G- 
2 reported the presence of 9 SS on 14 September, apparently from 2 Army Report or ULTRA of 18 
September. 
8'0 21 Arnty Group MARKET GARDEN, 53-55; Major D. J. L. Fitzgerald, Histoly ofthe Irish Guards in 
the Second World War (Aldershot: Gale and Polden, 1949), 508-511; L. F. Ellis, Welsh Guardv at War 
(Aldershot: Gale and Poldcn, 1946), 227,228; Gooderson, Air Power at the Battlefront, 9 1. 
"' 21 Arnýy Group MARKET GARDEN, ibid., 55-58. 
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block south of Elst. (See figure 59. ) While 214 Brigade lost time due to mishaps and 
mistaken tracks taken, the Household Cavalry was able to link with the Poles at Driel, 
followed by two battalions of the Wessex in column. While some DUKWs were 
brought forward, they were found unsuitable due to the dikes, and few rafts were 
available. About 50 Polish paratroopers crossed the river into the airborne perimeter 
during the night. The 129 Brigade had pressed up the road directly toward Elst to 
break 9Ae block holding the Guards, but made little headway. (See figure 60. ) 812 
The 43 Division commander, Maj. Gen. G. I. Thomas, ordered an attack to 
clear the Elst area on 23 September as it was apparent that a race was on between the 
Germans to build up an inpenetrable line, and the 43d Division to break a hold on the 
road to Arnhem while preparing a crossing to relieve the beleagured I Airborne 
Division. 30 Corps had meanwhile placed 32 Guards Brigade in the Veghel-Uden area 
to maintain a mobile reserve against attacks, while 5 Guards remained with 129 
Brigade facing the German blocking positions south of Elst. The 214 Brigade 
launched a fading-light attack at day's end and gained the outskirts of the village of 
Elst in heavy fighting that lasted until 2200. Some 250 Polish paratroopers were 
ferried into the airborne perimeter north of the river, much of the time under shell and 
mortar fire. Many of the assault boats were dedicated to ferrying ammunition that had 
not been able to be supplied by air to the I Airborne position. Food and ammunition 
within the airborne perimeter had reached crisis proportions. While Montgomery 
began to doubt the ability to hold the perimeter, Dempsey remained unconvinced that 
disaster was at hand. Both Horrocks and Thomas considered that the failure to mount 
912 21ArntvGroup MARKET GARDEN, ibid., 58-61; FAAA, Ibid., 14,15; Maj. Gcn. H. Essame, The 
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a large crossing the night of the 23d had spelled an end to hope for holding a 
bridgehead. 813 
83 Group made an appearance over the airborne perimeter on 23 September 
for the first time, with 22 sorties flown the next day and 81 sorties on the 25'h. 
Broadhurst complained that he could hear I Airborne calling for help on their 
Phantom link, but the Brereton restrictions concerning air support kept his Typhoons 
sitting on runways waiting for permission to help. While aircraft could attack 
identifiable targets in open areas, close support was impossible. Urquhart's positions 
were in heavy woods, and no direct radio links existed between the division and 
aircraft flying overhead. 814 
Dempsey's plan was to ferry another battalion over during the night of 24 
September and, depending upon the rest of 30 Corps' situation, decide then either to 
withdraw the division under the cover of darkness on the night of 25/26 September, or 
mount a large assault crossing to relieve them. (See figures 61 and 62. ) On the 20, a 
meeting with Horrocks, Browning, Thomas, and Sosabowski was held to plan another 
crossing. Thomas, who would control the crossing, had decided to pass the 4 th Dorsets 
and a Polish Battalion against the ferry site, and simultaneously pass the remaining 
Poles directly into the perimeter. Sosabowski argued against the plan, emphatically 
calling for a larger crossing downstream to ferry the majority of Thomas's division 
43"' Wessex Division at War 1944-1945 (London: William Clowes and Sons, 1952), 123-128. 
"' 21 Armýy Group MARKET GARDEN, ibid., 62-64; FAAA, ibid.. 15,16; Montgomery Log, 23 
September; Dempsey Diary, 23 September; Essame, 43"' Wessex Division. 128-132. 
114 RAF Narrative, IV, 152-154; Gooderson, Air Power at the Battlefront, 97,98. 
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and the remainder of his brigade to the west. His plan was disapproved. The resulting 
crossing in the early hours of 25 September proved disastrous. 815 
The late arrival of assault boats had delayed the crossing, and while about 350 
of the Dorsets crossed, as well as several tons of stores that were passed into the 
airborne perimeter, the late start and a lack of boats kept the Poles from crossing into 
the perimeter. The Dorsets, landing at the base of what was obviously vital ground, 
met immediate resistance and were soon fragmented by the ten-ain, darkness and the 
enemy. Most of the troops were lost. The failure of the Dorset crossing convinced 
Thomas that a withdrawal of Urquhart's division-not another reinforcing crossing- 
was the sole option remaining. 816 
It was the crisis in 30 Corps, however, -that sparked the withdrawal order. 
Dempsey was clear when he said that 30 Corps' operations would determine how 
much effort was put into crossing the Neder Rijn; I Airborne, at least from the 23d, 
had been a victim awaiting the decision. The period of 24 hours on the 24'h, during 
which the road was cut in the 101" Division area, had signaled the futility of 
attempting to press northward, as the flank situation had not been alleviated. (See 
figure 63. ) Both Montgomery and Dempsey agreed that I Airborne had to be 
withdrawn. (See figure 64. ) With the sending of the predetermined code word 
"Berlin, " Urquhart was told to prepare his division to withdraw. That withdrawal 
came during the night of 25/26 September. Urquhart wrote, "At the back of my mind 
was Gallipoli, " and his withdrawal plan on keeping the appearance of defending-the 
8" Sosabowski, Freely I Served, 182-184,198; Middlebrook, Arnhem 1944,414417; Essame, 43d 
Wessex Division, 133-136; Choleswczynski, Poles Apart, 220-224; A Short History of30 Corps, 36-38. 
316 Middlebrook, Arnhem 1944,418422; Essame, 43d Wessex Division, ibid. 
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result of his remembrance of studying the problem for a promotion exam. 43 Division 
provided a program of both artillery and machine gun fire, with the remainder of the 
4 th Dorsets assisting. Assault boats ferried some 2,163 men from I Airborne, 160 from 
the Polish Brigade, and 75 from the Dorsets. Approximately 180 men comprised a 
detachment left in contact, sacrificing themselves to hold the perimeter while the 
those able to leave withdrew. 817 
While MARKET had failed to gain its final objective, GARDEN had to fight 
to retain its 63-mile gain. Neither Dempsey or Montgomery was defeated. and both 
adjusted to the situation at hand. Other operations in Normandy, and before in Italy, 
Sicily, and Africa, had come up short of planned objectives. The reality of battle 
always was that campaigns were composed of many half-failures and half-successes. 
Despite his reputation for caution, Montgomery knew battle was always a gamble and 
that preparation and concentration were attempts to weight the odds in favor of 
victory, but they could never guarantee it. 
The day Urquhart's sergeants major held formations to account for those 
present and those left behind, Montgomery and Dempsey met to plan the next stage of 
their drive to the Ruhr. Both expected that Hodges would come forward with a drive 
to the south of Dusseldorf. While Dempsey finished clearing Horrocks' flanks4 Crcrar 
would also press eastward with some forces to clear the terrain toward Hertogenbosch 
while using his remaining forces to move toward Antwerp. Nijmegen and the "island" 
s'721 Arnýv Group MARKETGARDEN, 69,70; Montgomery Log, 25 September; Dempsey Diary. 25 
September; Urquhart, Arnhem, 167. 
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remained to be defended. Both could be developed as later springboards to the 
Ruhr. 
818 
On 27 September, Montgomery issued M. 527. As if to explain the 
disappointment of MARKET GARDEN, he began: 
The enemy has re-acted violently since we launched the operations 
outlined in M 525 dated 14 September. He has had to give serious 
consideration to the threats to turn the Siegfiied Line, to nullify the 
defensive value of the Rhine, and to outflank the RUHR. 
Continuing, he repeated his plan: 
Intention 
(a) To open up the port of ANTWERP 
(b) In conjunction with First US Army on the right, to destroy all 
enemy forces that are preventing us from capturing the RUHR. 8 19 
Getting to the Ruhr, the object of his arguments and actions since the 17 
August meeting with Bradley, still remained foremost in Montgomery's mind. Getting 
there rapidly, he believed, would be the only operational decision needed on the 
battlefield to end the Northwest Europe campaign rapidly. 
8'8 Montgomery Log, 26 September; Dempsey Diar y, 26,27 September. 
$19 M 527,27-9-44. 
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BLANK IN ORIGINAL 
CHAPTER TEN 
Denouement 
On 15 September, prior to the launching of MARKET GARDEN, Eisenhower 
raised the question of the future phases in his Broad Front campaign. That day, 
Devers' Sixth Army Group was activated, giving Eisenhower operational control of 
all Allied armies in Northwest Europe. It was also the day of the "flap" over the 
presen(. (- of "German Panzer Divsions" in Holland. Ike obviously was nonplussed by 
the prospect, as he %xTote Monty: 
We shall soon, I hope, have achieved the objectives set forth in my last 
directive (FWD 13765) and shall then be in possession of the RUHR, 
the SAAR and the FRANKFURT area. I have been considering our 
next move. 
Noting that these objectives would have drained Germany's reserves, and that 
the direct attack on the remaining important objectives left within Germany would 
yield great opportunities, Eisenhower offered his own assessment: 
Clearly, BERLIN is the main prize, and the prize in defense of which 
the enemy is likely to concentrate the bulk of his forces. There is no 
doubt, whatsoever, in my mind, that we should concentrate all our 
energies and resources on a rapid thrust to BERLIN. 
In outlining the objectives, he noted, it was too early to designate thrust lines, 
but the Allied forces must be prepared to do the following: 
a. To direct forces of both Army Groups on Berlin astride the axes 
Ruhr-Hanover-Berlin or Frankfurt-Leipzig-Berlin, or both. 
b. Should the Russians beat us to Berlin, the Northern Group of 
Armies would seize the Hanover area and the Hamburg group of 
ports. The Central Group of Armies would seize part, or the whole, 
of Leipzig-Dresden, depending upon the progress of the Russian 
advance. 
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c. In any event, the Southern Group of Armies would seize Augsburg- 
Munich. The area Numberg-Regensburg would be seized by 
Central or Southern Group of Armies, depending on the situation at 
the time. 
Simply stated, it is my desire to move on Berlin by the most direct and 
expeditious route, with combined U. S. -British forces supported by 
other available forces moving through key centers and occupying 
strategic areas on the flanks, all in one coordinated, concerted 
operation. 820 
Three days before, Bradley had written emphasizing his views, and 
Eisenhower mollified him, saying if he [Bradley] could 
keep Hodges fully supplied up to the moment of his attaining his first 
principal objectives, then there is no reason why Patton should not 
keep acting offensively if the conditions for offensive action are 
right. 821 
Montgomery's reaction to Eisenhower's letter was to reiterate his case for a 
single concentrated thrust. Stating that Eisenhower's objectives were attainable with 
the forces in hand, eliminating the necessity of moving on Central Germany with the 
central army group. Montgomery's key argument, as he summarized it, was: 
5.1 consider the best objective the Ruhr, and thence on to Berlin by 
the northern route. On that route are the ports, and on that route we 
can use our seapower to the best advantage. On other routes we 
would merely contain as many forces as we could. 
6. If you agree with para. 5, then I would consider that 21 Army 
Group, plus First Army of nine divisions, would be adequate. Such 
a force must have everything it needed in the maintenance line; 
other Armies would do the best they could with what was left over. 
7. If you consider that para. 5 is not right, and that the proper axis of 
advance is by Frankfurt and central Germany, then I would suggest 
that 12 Army Group of three Armies would be used and would 
have all the maintenance. 21 Army Group would do the best it 
could with what was left over; or possibly the Second British Army 
"0 EL, Correspondence, GCT 370-3 I/Plans, 15 September, 1944; Eisenhower Papers, IV, 2148-2149. 
He sent Bradley an identical letter. 
921 Eisenhower Papers, IV, 2146-2147. 
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would be wanted in a secondary role on the left flank- of the 
movement. * 
He stressed further, in a later paragraph: 
8.1 consider that our plan, and objectives, should be decided NOW, 
and everything arranged accordingly. I would not myself agree that 
we can wait until nearer the time, as suggested in your letter. 822 
Eisenhower had meanwhile been informed by his staff that in examining the relative 
priority of capturing Rotterdam or Antwerp as a port, they had determined that 
Antwerp should be given priority since it had been captured intact, and that the 
clearance of its channel would yield the quickest and surest dividend. 823 
MARKET's initiation on 17 September did nothing but intensify feelings 
concerning both viewpoints, given that Eisenhower had in fact committed SHAEF's 
strategic reserve, the Airborne Army, in an attempt to jump the Rhine. But, contrarily, 
Eisenhowert refused to shift forces to maintain operations as a single movement on 
the decisive axis to complement this reserve, despite the effect of hampering both 
advances by assigning a potentially larger force a thrust on a secondary avenue. Nor 
did Eisenhower see command as an issue. As long as priority was given to a northern 
advance, he felt Montgomery and Bradley could continue to coordinate their 
operations under his command. 
Given the daily worsening weather, the increase in the strength of resistance, 
and the strain on logistics that would not be alleviated until Crerar was able to shake 
free of the Channel ports and put his full strength into the Scheldt, Montgomery felt 
922 Montgomery, Memoirs, 250-251. This letter appears to be missing from the Eisenhower 
Correspondence File at the Eisenhower Library. It is listed as M. 526 in the Montgomery Log. 
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thal -a Nvait and see to decide attitude" was tantamount to bringing on a front-wide 
halt in operations without obtaining an operational decision on the battlefield. This 
was the essence of the difference between Eisenhower's and Montgomery's 
opci-ational philosophies, neither a reemergence of "ego over strategy" as held by 
SHAEF's detractors of the Field Marshal, nor a direct attack on Eisenhower's right to I 
he "Allied Ground Forces Commander. " 
Montoomery, meanwhile, attempted to push Crerar into moving on Antwerp C, 
with his left-hand corps while using his right-hand corps, I (British) Corps to stretch to Cý 
support Dempsey's left, which was in tactical crisis. He also continued to press 
Brereton for an airborne operation designated for Walcheren Island to open the 
Scheldt. ' ,' Despite Eisenhower's backing for an airborne operation to open the 
Scheidt, Brereton and Williams refused, citing the unsuitability of Walcheren as a 
target, though the airmen made no attempt to investigate alternative schemes to 
reinforce Crerar's Scheldt operation. Brereton, in fact, still wanted to use the Airborne 
I 
Army within 12"' Anny Group's sector, regardless of the lack of strategic effect such 
an operation might have. This feeling grew stronger after the beginning of 
MARKET. 
ý25 
Post Ot-criord, Vol. 1. G-3. PS-SHAEF (44) 43, "Relative Priority of Operations for the Capture of 
Rotterdam and Antwerp, " 16 September 1944. 
" -1.1 , 
Wontgonicri, Log, 20 Septemberý EL Correspondence File, M-2 18,20 September 44. This message 
ýisks, foi ciarification on Walcheren Operation. 
', Post Ovcrlord, Vol 1, Msg, FWD- 15386, Eisenhower to WAS. USSTAF for Spaatz, 21 Sep 44; 
, MSG. FWD- 15385. Eisenhower to Montgomery, 21 Sep 44ý G-3 GCT 370-91 Plans, Sept 44, nA 
Rapid Capture of the Antwerp Area study. 1-4. See also Brcreton Diaries, 349: Parl, -ý Diarý-, 18,19 
September. Note that the SYIAEF planners had likewise ruled Rotterdam a poor airborne objective, 
though it had at one time been favored by Tedder and Brereton. See, Post Overlord, ibid., SHAEF 
GUI 370-9 1,18 September 1944, Capture of Rotterdam, 1-4. Eisenhower's solution was to order 
maxinium air assistance for operations against Walcheren, an order made meaningless by Tedder's 
dcccntralization ofair in support of Montgomery. 
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While weather had kept Montgomery from flying, to the battlefield earlier, lic 
moved his tactical headquarters to Bourg Leopold on 21 September to be closc to 
Second Amy. His receipt of Eisenhower's rcpiN, to his M-526 raised the issue ol 
command ofthe Northem Thrust in Montgonicry's mind. Fccling that both 12'11 
(froup*s insistence on shorting Hodges on supplies, and Eisenhower's belief that his 
and Montgomery's operational views were in accord. Montgomery now believed that 
only his control of' ground operations north of' the Ardennes could set the Allied 
straten, toward what he desperately belleved to be the nght course of' action. 
Eisenho, xer had written: 
Generally speaking I find myself so completely in agreement with your 
letter of 18 September (M-526) that I cannot believe there is any grcat 
difference in our concepts. 
Never at any time have I implied that I was consider-ing an advance into 
Germany with all armies moving abreast. 
Fie continued. negating the first parag-Taphs of his letter: 
There is one point. however. on which -we do not agree, it' I interpret 
your idea correctly. As I read your letter you imply that all the divisions 
Nve have. except those of the 2 1" Anny Group and approxinialek, ninc 
of the 12 th Army Group, can stop in place where thc 
'v 
are and that we 
can strip all these additional divisions from their transpon and 
everý,, thing else to support one single knife-like dnve toward Berlin. 
This may not be exactly \vhat you meant but it is certamb, not possible. 
What I do belleve is that we must marshal our stren, -, th up along the 
Western borders ot'Germany. to the Rhine if possible. insure adequate 
maintenance by getting Antwerp working at full blast at the earliest 
possible moment and they [sic] carry out the dnve you suggest. All of 
Bradley's Group, except his left army, which makes his main effort. 
will move forward sufficiently so as always to be in supporting 
position of the main drive and to prevent concentration of German 
forces against it front and flanks. 
In fUrtherance of his points. Eisenhower added: 
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I merely want to make sure that when you start leading your Army 
Group in its thrust onto Berlin and Bradley starts driving with his left 
to support you, our other forces are in position to assure the success of 
that drive. Otherwise the main thrust itself would have to drop off so 
much of its strength to protect its rear and its flanks that very soon the 
drive would peter out. 
As you know I have been giving preference to my left all the way 
through this campaign including attaching First Allied Airborne Army 
to you and adopting every possible expedient to assure your 
maintenance. All other forces have been fighting with a halter around 
their necks.... 
When we get on the Rhine the next concern of Bradley's will be to put 
a strong fully equipped Army on his left to accompany you to Berlin. 
826 
Humphrey Gale's personal delivery of this letter and his briefing on Bradley's 
logistical situation changed Montgomery's views concerning the "help" he was to be 
getting from Hodges or Bradley. He immediately asked that Eisenhower shift the 
inter-Army Group boundary farther north to permit him to send 8 Corps against 
Emmerich-Cleve, noting that failure to do so would cause Second Army's operation to 
'4gradually peter out. " Just as Bradley and his generals railed at Lee for failing to 
supply them, Montgomery told Eisenhower that Gale had brought on the mess, 
without specifically stating that Bradley had shifted supply priorities to Patton. 
827 
Monty's failure to fly to Versailles on 22 September, so as not to leave the critical 
MARKET-GARDEN battlefield, was viewed at SHAEF as a slap to Eisenhower, 
though Eisenhower apparently never accepted that as true. 828 
826 EL, Correspondence File, Letter, Eisenhower to Montgomery, September 20,1944; Eisenhower 
Papers, IV, 2164-2165. 
82' EL, Correspondence File, Messages, M. 22 1, M. 222,21 September 1944. 
823 MHI, Pogue Papers, Interview Eisenhower with S. L. A. Marshall, ibid. 
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Hoping to salvage what he now realized was a teetering operational situation, a 
situation made more critical by the slowness of Second Army to reach Arnhem. 
Monty sent a last message: 
Thank you very much for your letter of 20 September sent via Gale. I 
can not agree that our concepts are the same and I am sure you would 
wish me to be quite frank and open in the matter. I have always said 
stop the right and go on with the left but the right has been allowed to 
go on so far that it has out-stripped its maintenance and we have lost 
ilexibility. In your letter you still want to go on further with your right 
and state in your Para. 6 that all of Bradley's Army Group will move 
forward sufficiently etc. I would say that the right flank of 12 Army 
Group should be given a very direct order to halt and if this order is not 
obeyed we shall get into greater difficulties. The net result of the matter 
in my opinion is that if you want to get the Ruhr you will have to put 
every single thing into the left hook and stop everything else. It is my 
opinion that if this is not done then you will not get the Ruhr. 
Your very great fiiend MONTY 829 
The 22d of September proved to be a critical day, both for MARKET 
GARDEN, and for the direction of the ongoing campaign. The fresh appearance of 
German armor on 30 Corps' front and the time lost in shifting assault forces on Club 
Route doomed not just Frost's battalion at the bridge, but GARDEN itself, though that 
appreciation had not been admitted either at Second Army or at 30 Corps. Brereton 
had signaled that the fight for the corridor demonstrated that the enemy had not 
decided to relinquish Southern Holland, would attempt to confine I Airborne, and 
would continue to evacuate Fifteenth Army from harm's way. 830 
At Versailles, Eisenhower faced his generals, minus Montgomery, to assess 
the campaign. Twenty-three generals, air marshals, and admirals were in attendance. 
829 EL, Correspondence File, Msg. M 123,21 September 1944. 
830 poSt Overlord, 1, msg. VX-25396, Personal for Marshall, from Brereton signed Eisenhower, 22 September 1944. 
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The list of decisions provided with the minutes of the conference clearly outline 
Eisenhower's intentions: 
a. That all concerned differentiate clearly between the logistical 
requirements for attaining objectives covered by present directives, 
including seizing the RUHR and breaching the SIEGFRIED LINE, 
and the requirements for the final drive on BERLIN. 
b. That the fact will be generally accepted that the possession of an 
additional major deep-water port on our north flank was an 
indespensable prerequisite for the final drive deep into 
GERMANY. 
C. The envelopment of the RUHR from the north by 21" Army Group, 
supported by 0 Army, is the main effort of the present phase of 
operations. 
d. The boundary between 21" and 12 1h Army Groups ... [was to be 
changed to reflect 21 Army Group's request to concentrate]. 
e. The 12'h Army Group to take over as quickly as possible the sector 
now held by 8 th British Corps. 
f (1) 12 th Army Group to continue its thrust, so far as its current 
resources permitý towards COLOGNE and BONN. 12 th Army 
Group will also be prepared to seize any favorable opportunity of 
crossing the RHINE and attacking the RUHR from the south when 
the maintenance situation permits. 
(2) The remainder of 12 th Army Group to take no more aggressive 
action than is permitted by the maintenance situation after the full 
requirements of the main effort have been met. 
h. 20 Army Group to open the port of ANTWERP as a matter of 
urgency and to develop operations culminating in a strong attack on 
the RUHR from the north. 831 
Bradley would shift two divisions in ten days' time to assume 8 Corps' sector, 
and XV Corps would be shifted with its two divisions to Sixth Army Group to ease 
the maintenance situation. 832 Eisenhower sent a message confirming his intention to 
83'Post Overlord. 1, Memorandum for Chief of Staff, Supreme Commanders, Conference, 24 
September, Minutes of Meeting Held in the War Room of SHAEF Forward at 1430 hrs., 22' September 1944. 
$32 Ibid., 3. 
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support the immediate capture of the Ruhr, and that he would give any necessary help 
to assure the immediate capture of Antwerp. 833 
Both De Guingand, who had attended the conference, and the Director of 
Military Operations, Lt. Gen. Simpson, who had visited SHAEF at that time, felt that 
the Versailles Conference had cemented a coherent campaign plan favoring a northern 
priority for operations. Importantly, Simpson noted that Bedell Smith knew Bradley 
and Patton had violated both the spirit and the letter of Eisenhower's directives. 
Simpson told Alanbrooke that getting the Americans to obey Ike's orders would be 
key, a problem Smith told Simpson he would make clear and which would be 
alleviated in the future. 834 
An immediate message was sent to Bradley, with a copy to Montgomery 
directing Hodges to support Montgomery's efforts. In a handwritten note on 24 
September to Monty, Eisenhower stated his views from the conference at Versailles: 
Me have obtained complete understandings that should hold all the 
way from here to the completion of our present bid for the capture of 
the Ruhr. 835 
While the positive will offered by Eisenhower seemed to foretell an 
accommodation, which, if it didn't follow Montgomery's prescription for a continous 
manuever to drive to the Ruhr and beyond, would lead to more closely harmonized 
operations among the three Army Groups. But the past had proven to be prologue; 
there was ill will too strong to overcome in the American camp. MARKET GARDEN 
833 EL, Correspondence File, Msg, FWD 15407,22 Sept 44; Eisenhower Papers. IV, 2175,2176. 
134 LHC, Alanbrooke Papers, Memorandum for CIGS from VCIGS, 23 September 1944. 
". EL, Correspondence File, Letter, Eisenhower to Montgomery, 24 September, 1944; typed copy in Post Overlord, 1; Eisenhower Papers, IV, 2185,2186. 
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continued an unhealable chasm that had widened between the Americans and British 
since Normandy. In Montgomery's mind, the decision to support a drive to the Ruhr 
had come one month too late, but in Bradley's mind, the decision never should have 
come at all. Bradley had, after all, been working to physically separate the Army 
Groups and to elimate any complementary benefit that closely harmonized or 
concentrated operations would have on 2d Army. Bradley's ego, not the specter of 
dead men resulting from failed opemtions that were inadequately supported, was the 
overriding factor in keeping the Army Groups from opening the key gateway into 
Germany in the fall of 1944. So it had been in August, and so it would continue 
throughout 1944. 
Bradley's sabotage was clearly visible to everyone, it seems, except 
Eisenhower. In early September, Bradley had transferred 79'h Division, leaving XIX 
Corps short of an infantry division throughout September, despite the larger open 
coastal flank to be cleared by the British and the northeastward orientation of Second 
Army that should have brought support from its southern neighbor. Given that 
Montgomery lacked a corps in early September, and with ULTRA warning both that 
the Fifteenth Army was escaping and that panzer divisions were initially located near 
Maastricht and were perhaps set for rehabilitation in Holland, the choice of 
diminishing the left flank corps and depriving it of both transportation and fuel 
appeared to be careless if not deliberate. Moreover, the encirclement at the Mons 
pocket in September opened a gap across what was the greatest single maneuver 
avenue into the Reich, the area north of Aachen. XIX Corps' armored division, the 2d, 
was starved of fuel, and another armored division, the 5'h, was shifted southward to 
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enter Gennany through the the constricted Ardennes-Eifel region as V Corps was 
angled south to support Third Army at the end of the first week of September. The 
corps entered Germany only to withdraw for lack of flank support. 
As COMET was prepared and Hodges assigned corps objectives across the 
Rhine, the priority given to the two southern corps was designed to maintain the 
original design under Bradley's NORMANDY TO THE RHINE plan of August. 
When Brereton had recast LINNET into LINNET H, the airborne landing in the 
Maastricht-Aachen area (the mouth of the maneuver corridor to the Ruhr) Bradley 
turned it down, passing the airborne baton back to Monty while clamoring for 
Montgomery's planes to be taken away for fuel runs. LDWET 11, and a concentrated 
drive by XIX Corps, might have opened the Aachen corridor during the critical first 
week of September, when little enemy opposition would have been met save 
antiaircraft fire. At the same instant, much time and precious fuel was lost in shifting 
forces on an axis south of Aachen during the height of the fuel crisis for no 
operational gain. 
Hodges' reconnaissance in force of 12 September had failed and despite his 
and Patton's oaths that enough fuel and ammunition existed for a run to the Rhine, the 
advance soon halted for a logistical pause. Moreover, the long-suffering Corlett had 
not been advised of the change of boundary agreed to by the Army Groups prior to 
GARDEN, and he soon found British columns heading north, leaving his northern 
neighborhood empty of allies. Had Bradley even informed Hodges? 
Hodges' thrust south of Aachen in the Stolberg Corridor fizzled from lack of 
strength, as did a wide deployment to clear the Hurtgen and to capture the Roer Dams. 
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Both attacks were uncoordinated and Hodges, fearing German-occupied Aachen to his 
rear, dropped off infantry to clear it rather than to envelop the city and keep the Roer 
plain approach fluid. The Germans built up defenses. Yet, First Army's G-2 had 
extolled the opportunities waiting, and on 15 September, had stated: 
The strategic opportunity offered at the moment to the First U. S. Army 
is enormous. A breakthrough in the sector of the V and VH Corps of 
the West Wall offers the possibility of a swift advance to the RHINE. 
This would force the enemy to evacuate the RHINE-LAND because he 
would then occupy a compromised line with an obstacle at his back. 
The cutting of strategic roads and bridges and the prevention of 
withdrawal across the RHINE could effect the destruction of the 
remaining western field forces. 836 
Bradley's split of resources between his armies forfeited the concentration 
needed to maintain momentum. The battles for the Stolberg corridor, Hurtgen, and the 
Roer Dams would stalemate into one of the bloodiest campaigns in U. S. Army 
history, all preventable had the Americans concentrated in their northern corridor 
when the enemy was still weak. Patton's own thrusts, head-on into concentrating 
German defenses, added tens of thousands of casualties to the West Wall campaign 
that stretched on for three months. 837 
While Montgomery had repeatedly pined over this opening and Bradley's lack 
of interest in developing a side-by-side offensive, Corlett had pressed Hodges, even as 
MARKET GARDEN was faltering. On 21 September, he had written: 
816 NARA, RG 407,101-2.15 to 101-3.0, Box 1956, First Army Intelligence Estimate No. 28,15 
September 1944. 
837 Hugh Cole, The Lorraine Campaign (Washington: Chief of Military History, 1950,1981), passim; 
Anthony Kemp, The Unknown Battle: Metz, 1944 (New York: Stein and Day, 1980), passim; John 
Nelson Rickard, Patton at Bay: The Lorraine Campaign, September to December 1944 (Westport, 
Conn.: Praeger, 1999), passim; Edward G. Miller, A Dark and Bloody Ground. The Huertgen Forest 
and the Roer River Dams, 1944-1945 (College Station: Texas A&M Press, 1995), passim. 
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[T]he whole XIX Corps zone up to the Rhine is almost an ideal battle- 
field and a natural gateway in Germany proper, across the Rhine.... 
It is believed that if the 301h Infantry Division and the 2 nd Armored 
Division were relieved of the responsibility of guarding the flank, of 
First U. S. Army west of the Siegfried Line, they could with adequate 
artillery and air support go through all of this opposition to the Rhine 
in the vicinity of COLOGNE. 838 
On 26 September, Corlett, assessing his new mission of protecting the right 
flank of Second Army with the addition of 7'h Annored and 29'h Divisions, added: 
The terrain east of the MAAS River, with the exception of the 
SIEGFRIED LINE, is especially favorable for both armored and 
infantry action. A splendid road net exists. The ground is low and 
rolling from our fi-ont line positions to the RHINE in the vicinity of 
either COLOGNE or DUSSELDORF. The distance to the Rhine is 
about 60 kilometers. 
It is believed that the SIEGFRIED LINE can be breached on the front 
of the XIX Corps without undue losses. Such a breach would complete 
the encirclement of AACHEN and it is estimated would enable a force 
of sufficient size to advance quickly to the RHINE to secure a 
bridgehead across the RHINE, providing the left flank of the advance 
were properly secured by sufficient troops. Every day of delay will 
increase the difficulties of this task. 839 
The same day, Montgomery assessing his front and that of the Americans to his south, 
sent his intentions to Alanbrooke and published M. 527. He stated his intentions 
clearly- 
(a) To open up the port of ANTWERP. 
(b) In conjunction with First US Army on the right, to destroy all 
enemy forces that are preventing us from capturing the RUHR. 840 
$38 NARA, RG 407, Box 24117, "Combat Interviews, " XIX Corps, Invasion Through the Siegfried 
Line, Junc-Novembcr 1944, Headquarters, XIX Corps, Memorandum for Commanding General, First 
US Army, 21 September 1944,1. 
"9 Ibid. "Combat Interviews, " Headquarters, XIX Corps, Memorandum to Lieutentant General 
Courtney Hodges, 26 September 1944,1. 
to M-527,27-9-44. 
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Assessing the enemy buildup north of the Neder Rijn and in the area east and 
southeast of Nijmegen, Montgomery noted the benefits accrued from MARKET 
GARDEN: 
[W]e are favourably situated in that we hold main road crossings over 
the MEUSE and the RHINE on the EINDHOVEN-NIJMEGEN axis, 
and thus have the ability to operate south-eastwards between these two 
rivers. Such a thrust, in conjunction with a strong advance eastwards 
on KOLN and DUSSELDORF by First US Army on our right, would 
be difficult for the enemy to hold. 
(See figure 65. ) The Nijmegen bridgehead, he noted ftirther, posed a "threat" to the 
enemy of a further assault northward and a possible river crossing. The upcoming 
"killing match" at the door of Germany, demanded more closely harmonized 
opemtions: 
[I]t is clear that the armies which are to capture the RUHR should not 
now operate on divergent axes. 
They must operate on convergent thrust lines, and thus become such a 
powerful force that the enemy will not be able to stand against the 
combined might of the two armies. 
The objective, and the prize, is the RUHR; its capture will mean the 
beginning of the end for Germany. 
His armies would continue to clear up the coast, with Crerar's Canadian Army 
masking Dunkirk, completing operations against Calais and Boulogne, and "at once" 
developing operations to open Antwerp. A strong thrust to clear Dempsey's left was 
also ordered. Dempsey's maintenance of the corridor and a strong posture facing north 
had to continue, but his new tasks, depending upon logistics, would be 
to operate strongly with all available strength from the general area 
NIJMEGEN-GENNEP against the N. W. comer of the RUHR. 
The right flank of the movement will be directed on KREFELD. 
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On the left flank, the RHINE will be crossed as and where opportunity 
offers, and in particular every crideavour will be made to get a 
bridgehead at WESEL. 841 
Having met with Bradley and Hodges and "coordinated" their plans, he noted 
that the 7 th (US) Armored Division would clear the area south of the Peel Marshes and 
act as a link between the Second and First Armies. More importantly, he noted as his 
understanding of the agreed-upon plan that: 
The [First] Army is to develop as early as possible a strong offensive 
movement eastwards up to the RHINE. 
The main weight of the movement will be directed on COLOGNE. The 
left flank of the movement will be directed on DUSSELDORF. 
Bridgeheads over the RHINE will be secured as opportunity offers. 
He noted under "Subsequent Operations" that: 
The converging movement of the Second British Army and First US 
Army against the N. W. and S. W. comers of the RUHR area 
respectively will be developed in each case as early as is possible. 
Close touch and liaison will be necessary between the two armies. 842 
Eisenhower's letters of 23 September to Bradley, copied to Montgomery, had 
made it clear that Bradley 
should direct Hodges to exert his main effort to meet the Field 
Marshal's developing requirements. To save time, particularly in such 
emergencies as immediately needed adjustments of inter-army group 
boundaries or in suddenly arising tactical situations, the Field Marshal 
should communicate directly with Hodges. ... Each Army Group Commander will ... report to me any development that, in his judgement, prejudices the accomplishment of tasks assigned to his 
Amy Group. 843 
"'Ibid., 2. 
842 Ibid., 3. 
943 Eisenhower Papers, IV, 283. 
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Ike's letter of 24 September, clarifying his agreement "on the present bid for 
the capture of the Ruhr, " strengthened Montgomery's deeply wished and 
fervently 
held belief that Second Army would assault the Ruhr and that the Americans would 
cooperate by assaulting it from the south with First Army. Without stating it as such, 
22 September conference had granted Monty a strong position in bringing on that 
decisive battle, and Hodges was told to "exert his main efforts to meet" 21 Army 
Group's requirements. 844 Also, importantly, Eisenhower had responded to Monty's 
M. 527 with a note approving of the changes brought about by the Arnhem setback, 
noting kindly that: 
These slight changes are to be expected in all battles, and I must say I 
am delighted to have you so close to that critical spot ... and I hope to 
be able to run up to see you very quickly. 845 
Since early September, Montgomery had been fighting two military campaigns 
and one very political one. He had, of necessity, been using half his force to clear the 
Channel Coast, not simply to reduce enemy garrisons left in his rear but to open ports 
needed for the sustenance of his army. Le Havre, the first of the major ports, was to be 
given to the Americans to replace port facilities they themselves had failed to capture 
in Brittany. It had taken two divisions, thousands of bomber sorties, and a significant 
$44 Eisenhower Papers, IV, 2183,2185. 
945 EL, Correspondence File, Letter to Montgomery, 27 September 1944. The same day, Montgomery 
submitted to Eisenhower his recommendation to the King for a shower of awards, to include a Knight 
Commander of the Bath for Bradley, five Companions of the Bath, 10 awards for US staff officers who 
had served alongside 21 Army Group in Normandy, and valor awards for the MARKET operation to 
include Distinguished Service Orders, Military Crosses, Distinguished Conduct Medals and Military 
Medals. Monty asked for Eisenhower's recommendations for these awards. See Correspondence File. 
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portion of the specialized armor from the 79" Armoured Division to reduce Le Havre. 
The remaining ports contained the rest of Crerar's six divisions. 846 
As MARKET GARDEN began, 2 Canadian Corps' "front" ranged from west 
of Antwerp, west about 70 miles to Zeebrugge on the coast, southwestward for about 
an equal distance to Cape Griz, and then about 30 miles southward past Boulogne. 
While Simonds' two infantry divisions invested Boulogne and the area west of 
Antwerp, the remainder of the front was screened by armoured divisions, and Dunkirk- 
by a Special Service Brigade. 847 
The escape of the Fifteenth Army and the decision not to move northward 
immediately into Holland had resulted from an eagerness to continue the pursuit 
eastward with Second Army while retaining Crerar's Canadians for a separate set of 
battles on the left. The decision to launch COMET, the operation at issue here, was 
decided upon, even as Antwerp's docks were being taken by Roberts's armor. In some 
measure, these decisions were also the result of a lack of timely operational 
intelligence plus the fact that no intelligence officer or agency had yet to assess not 
only that the German ability to rehabilitate what was believed to be a destroyed army 
exceeded any commonly held beliefs in the matter, but that virtually all the enemy loss 
estimates that had fed the "victory disease" had been inflated. 
ULTRA had trumpeted the beginnings of the Fifteenth Army move northward 
on 6 September. It announced the Fuhrer's policy of defending "fortresses" designed 
'46 NARA, ML-2250, Historical Section, Canadian Military Headquarters, Report No. 146, Operations 
of the Canadian Army in Northwest Europe, 31 July 1944-1 October 1944, passim. 
"7 Ibid., Situation Map, 2 Canadian Corps, 19 Sep 44; pages 34-58, passim. The shortage of infantry divisions in both Crerar's and Dempsey's armies was a major operational deficiency during this phase 
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to prevent the expedient use of Channel Coast ports by the Allies. Both were key 
decision points for the Germans, and as such should have received prominent review 
in the Allied camp. Eisenhower, however, as the custodian of the entire front, 
registered no comment over these events nor did Montgomery, whose own operational 
design had been cast, see any reason to reevaluate his plans for either 21 Army Group 
or the employment of First Allied Airborne Army. 
From Montgomery's perspective, the clearing of his rear, or the shift of forces 
due northward, would have stopped all eastward movement, a factor which also would 
have caused major reevaluation of First US Army's objectives in relation to Eisenhower's 
4 September directive. If the Ruhr and the Saar were still objectives, Montgomery 
could do no less than he was to maintain his plans, as well as his bold, creative 
decision to launch COMET both to outflank the Ruhr and to trap Fifteenth Army and 
maintain the separation of the two northern German armies in Army Group B. 
Considering the strength of enemy forces available and the great frontage that 
in Montgomery's case was semicircular (ranging fi-orn south of Boulogne, to Antwerp, 
east to the Albert Canal, and then southward to Maastricht) he could have unilaterally 
stopped one of his three operations-at the coast, at Antwerp, or in maintaining a 
thrust to gain a bridgehead on the Rhine before logistics and weather closed the 
possibility. As all these missions were within his directive from Eisenhower, he could 
demand more resources or a shift in strategy from Eisenhower. While minimal 
logistical help was provided for the enlarged COMET-now MARKET-operation, 
the most effective help available, a concerted thrust by First Army to relieve pressure, 
of the campaign. While the armor could rapidly peg out territorial claims, it was useless to clear the 
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draw reserves, and widen Model's operational dilemna was not forthcoming. This was 
never offered due to the continuing attempt by Bradley to develop an already faltering. 
and always operationally questionable, drive on the Saar. 
Eisenhower did promise force relief, frequently stating in messages, letters, 
and at conference that "Bradley's left is striking hard to support you, " both to 
complement Montgomery's operations and to weaken the enemy on his front. 848 This 
fantasy was either deliberate lie meant for tidying Eisenhower's "record" of Allied 
solidarity, or a reflection of Eisenhower's personal weakness and SHAEF's 
operational irrelevance in shaping the ground campaign. Unfortunately, it played to 
Montgomery's theme, raised as recently as 21 September, that he needed to coordinate 
operations north of the Ardennes, a military consideration; the unfolding events did 
show that Montgomery was correct concerning the orchestration of coordinated 
operations. 849 Eisenhower at no time attempted the planning, timing, coordination or 
execution of such complementary operations, leaving the "coordination" of such 
matters to Montgomery, who obtained what he thought was agreement from 
Bradley-whose Trojan Horse tactic was to agree, then ignore and, if need be, lie 
about such operations, stymieing them and overturning Eisenhower's "decisions. " 
This was the situation that obtained after 27 September, when MARKET 
GARDEN's final objective had been abandoned. Not only could Montgomery not stop 
operations to consolidate around Nijmegen, Second Army fought off heavy attacks all 
along the corridor. In early October, the enemy panzer concentrations against 
ports or to operate north of the Scheidt. 
"' EL, Correspondence File, 16 September 1944, ibid. 
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Dempsey near Nijmegen would eventually reach elements of four divisions. 
850 
Montgomery's attempt to coordinate attacks from XIX Corps south of 8 Corps' wide- 
open flank toward Venlo also obtained minimal assistance from Bradley, who 
simultaneously hampered his own encirclement of Aachen in the process by 
continuing to favor Patton both with fuel and with the southeastward push of V Corps 
into the Eifel. region. 
Montgomery's failure to stop operations toward the Ruhr stemmed from his 
belief that he should not let the enemy dig in on the Siegfried Line, especially since he 
was going to have to operate between the Maas and Rhine rivers. Foolishly believing 
that Bradley would see the Venlo area as an encirclement opportunity, he continued to 
attempt to simultaneously open ports while maintaining some move on the Ruhr. He 
would wait for the Canadians to finish their concentration following their port 
operations on the coast. 
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Bradley's own directive at this time permitted clearing the Maas area; it did 
not order any move on Dusseldorf or any coordinated operations. 852 The opposite, in 
fact, was true. Bradley's intent, if First Anny reached the Rhine, was that First Army 
849 LHC, Alanbrooke Papers, Memorandum for Lt-Gen Bedel[sic] Smith, 21-9-44. 
'" Montgomery Log, I October. He identified these as 116 Panzer, 9 Panzer, and 10 SS Panzer, while 
noting that 9 SS Panzer remained in sector. 
Montgomery Log, 28 September. Montgomery notes the time for shifting fully to the north to be 
approximately three weeks. Crerar later returned to Canada for medical treatment for recurring dysentery during the actual operations. Montgomery had hoped that Simonds would remain in 
command. 
'52 12" Arm 
'v 
Group Report of Operations, V, G-3, Letter of Instructions, Number Nine, 25 Sep 44; Letter of Instructions, Number Ten, 28 Sep 44, pp. 93-96. 
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would turn southward to gain crossing positions for Third and Ninth Army. First and 
Third Army would cross the Rhine together. 853 
Enemy action, supply, ammunition shortages within the American armies, bad 
weather, and a suddenly rehabilitated German army ended Montgomery's hope of a 
single, seamless drive on to the Ruhr. Eisenhower's acceptance that the Ruhr was a 
priority, given on 24 September, had reverted to the need to move all the armies up 
against the Rhine. Eisenhower's statement that he had never intended all the armies to 
move forward simultaneously, a lie when stated, had become policy by the campaign's 
own results. The MARKET GARDEN campaign, now over, could not change this. 
Montgomery's refusal to accept Ike's strategy tied his belief in a concentrated thrust to 
the command issue, and would soon reappear to cloud and corrupt any analysis of the 
Broad Front design. 854 
On 7 October Montgomery sent Eisenhower his own appreciation of the 
situation in the north, stating that enemy resistance, increased enemy strength, and the 
necessity to concentrate on Antwerp had caused him to decide the following: 
I therefore consider that I cannot launch Second Army towards the 
RUHR until I have eliminated the following commitments: 
Finished the operations opening ANTWERP. 
Pushed the enemy back over the MEUSE. 
He continued: 
853 NARA, RG 407, Box 24143,12' Army Group Plans and Studies, Operations East of the Rhine, 5 
October 1944, p. 1. 
8' Montgomerv Log, 5 October. In this entry, Montgomery records his attendance at an Eisenhower 
conference where the entire campaign plan again was revisited. Montgomery, clinging to Eisenhower's 
notes regarding the 22 September Versailles conference, argued for priority in the north, which he had 
understood to be Eisenhower's decision. See messages M-260,6 October; Eisenhower to Monty, 7 
October; M-264; M-266; 7 October; M-268,9 October. 
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I have therefore ordered that the attack of Second Anny towards 
KREFELD and the RUHR be postponed. 855 
The MARKET GARDEN CAMPAIGN was over. 
The fact that Montgomery's August plan had not been accepted and could not 
be revisited even by gaining a Rhine bridgehead had not sunk in, though neither 
reason was the cause of the fall stalemate. Those reasons lay in the nature of the 
campaign and the complexity of the command relations that led to the failure of 
MARKET GARDEN. 
The campaign was not simply the result of an operational design. It reflected 
tactical realities that shaped what was operationally possible; it was distorted by the 
philosophies and doctrines of the separate services that made compromise, not a 
single solution, a requirement for every problem; and it reflected the differences in 
generalship, displayed by the senior commanders, differences distorted by their own 
personalities, their ambitions, and their portrayal in the press. 
... EL, Correspondence File, Untitled Memorandum, 7 October 1944, sgnd, B. L. Montgomery, 7-10- 44. 
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CHAPTER ELEVEN 
The MARKET GARDEN Campaign: 
An Appreciation of the Factors and Controversies 
Surrounding Allied Operations in the Late Summer 
and Early Fall of 1944 in Northwest Europe 
The 1944 campaign that culminated in the launching of Operation MARKET 
GARDEN is enlightening for its richness in diverse factors that influenced the 
conduct of operations, and for the insights it offers into the problems of conducting 
joint military operations as part of a coalition. While a detailed discussion of the 
political factors that influenced the campaign would be instructive, it is beyond the 
scope of the military nature of this study, and it is to the dominant military factors that 
we now turn. 
Central to any campaign discussion must be an understanding of the relative 
combat power issues that dominated the campaign. In Northwest Europe, the basis for 
thinking on the relative combat strengths of the opposing armies was a key element in 
planning from the beginning. COSSAC's planners set an unrealistic standard for 
success in the OVERLORD campaign, that being the belief that anything but the 
broadest, subjective comparison of "combat power" was irrelevant in planning for the 
operation. This assessment was seen in a specific number of enemy divisions that 
were "acceptable" in theater to permit the NEPTUNE landings to be considered a 
"'sound operation of war. " Later, as intelligence was produced for the NEPTUNE 
beaches, the addition of beach obstacles and larger minefields was not given heavier 
weight. Most important, ULTRA failed to confirm in a timely manner the locations of 
two divisions, one an infantry division on the coast, and the second, the 21s' Panzer 
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Division, located near Caen and literally on the D-Day objective line for Second 
Army. 856 T119 further skewed the during-battle analysis of operations concerning 
success and failure of the early landings, and has been the foundation for much of the 
misunderstanding concerning the relative "worth" of the forces involved. That 
SHAEF was apparently unaware of the subtleties of such differences demonstrated the 
lack of battle "experience" possessed by many of the staff, to include the Supreme 
Commander, for whom war never progressed beyond the theoreticals of a map 
exercise. 
The existence of the heavier German defense was never accepted by SHAEF, 
or by Montgomery's critics as a contributor to the loudly proclaimed "failure" of 
Montgomery at Caen. More important, the remarkably unsophisticated analysis of 
German defense strength that followed the landings likewise limited a clear vision of 
German capabilities. Among many possible factors, two cases in point are instructive. 
These revolved around tank strengths/capabilities, and the numerical assessment of 
antitank guns available to the defense. Both equated to a tremendous antitank 
capability. Given the armor-heavy nature of Second Army, the inability of British 
Shermans or Cromwells to compete at even odds with German tanks or guns negated 
the "divisional" comparisons used at SHAEF for a correlation of forces estimate. 
German tanks killed Allied tanks at far higher ratios, and German antitank guns also 
achieved very favorable ratios. While Montgomery's critics claimed that he and his 
commanders did not understand how to use armor, Allied armor was-in any attack, 
856 Hinsley, British Intelligence, 3, Part 2, Chapters 43-44; Appendix 10. Hinsley never admits that ULTRA had "failed. " See SHAEF Weekly Summary No. 11,3 June 1944; SHAEF Weekly Summary No. 12, Order of Battle Map Entitled, "Enemy Order of Battle in West Normandy as at 5 June 1944. " 
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deliberate or hasty-highly disadvantaged by their own vulnerabilities. That armor 
men failed to commit suicide in larger numbers by pressing attacks such as EPSOM, 
GOODWOOD, TOTALIZE, or TRACTABLE should have been seen as part of the 
tactical equation, not necessarily a failure in generalship or nerve on the part of 
Montgomery or Dempsey. The ability to neutralize enemy reserves and antitank 
screens in depth was beyond the capability of the artillery of the day, and the use of 
airpowf; r to make up these deficiencies was at that time both marginally effective and 
controversial. 857 
VAiile the close defensive battles of Normandy showed shortcomings in armor, 
the pursuit that followed the breakout on both the American and British fronts 
demonstrated that Montgomery did understand the role of armor in the pursuit. He 
concentrated his armored divisions and used them to lead slower-moving and less 
mobile infantry divisions whose organic transportation prevented their own self- 
movement. Given that when Montgomery surfaqed his concentrated northern thrust 
plan, there were 13 armored divisions, plus seven independent armored brigades with 
the British and Canadians, plus numerous independent tank and tank destroyer 
battalions in the US forces, this gave SHAEF a tank superiority far in excess of 
Hitler's 1940 blitzkrieg. 858 
857 Gooderson, Air Power at the Battlefront, Chapter 5, passim; Shelford Bidwell and Dominick 
Graham, Fire-Power. British Army Weapons and Theories of War 1904-1945 (London: George Allen 
and Unwin, 1982), Part 4, passim. 
858 EL, SHAEF G-3 War Room Summary, 23 August 1944. Independent brigade numbers from Ellis, 
Victory in the West. 1, Appendix 4. Allied tank strengths per division averaged 250, for tank brigades, 
220 tanks. The author estimates that the tank vs. tank ratio of Allied tanks versus -running" German 
tanks on I September would have been in excess of 20: 1. Ellis contains a useful comparison of 
German and Allied organizations and weapons. 
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Unlike the 1940 German campaign in the west, where the armor was used both 
to create a hole in the front and then to exploit it, these divisions could have been 
concentrated against a strategic object and easily maintained a frontage of 100 to 150 
miles. Eisenhower, like the French in 1940, chose to spread his armor, which while 
carrying his general advance, achieved no operational decision. With the front 
congealed in September, the advantage of mobility was lost, and the true calculus of 
tank vs. tank and tank vs. antitank again obtained, with the same bloody results seen 
as in Normandy. Though the use of armor is a subset of the larger-scale operational 
plan, SHAEF considered neither these factors nor, apparently, any other tactical 
factors in designing their overall campaign plan, though lip service was paid to the 
idea of using avenues that enhanced armor and air power capabilities. 
The "phase line" comparisons made at SHAEF to "prove" that Montgomery's 
operations had moved too slowly in Normandy were never adequate measures of 
battlefield success. By September, though, they underscored the impending logistical 
collapse possible due to distance from ports, and they posed false positive results 
concerning operations. Distance and phase lines as depicted in SHAEF's forecasts did 
not equate to enemy force destruction, nor did they focus the weight of Allied efforts 
to key operational and strategic objectives. More deceptively, the rapid transit of 
phase lines beyond SHAEF's original forecasts did not guarantee that further 
successes would be gained as rapidly, nor did they provide adquate measures of future 
sustainment. Rather, they provided the information that was not acted upon at 
SHAEF-the priority that needed to be established for capturing the original ports 
planned for as part of the NEPTUNE campaign. 
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The entire logistical crisis was created by two factors: a lack of operating 
ports, and the distance from ports to the front lines due to the lack of intermediate 
supply dumps, hence a transportation problem. Montgomery had recast the weight of 
the Allied attack in NEPTUNE to favor a westerly attack, not simply to gain the key 
port of Cherbourg but to launch early attacks to gain the key Brittany ports. Airborne 
plans cast early in the Normandy campaign at both SHAEF and 21 Army Group 
favored early capture of these ports. The key "CHASTrM' plan, designed to solve 
both the port and rail distance problems for deploying US divisions in Brittany 
likewise was a key consideration added by the planners. 
With the pursuit on in August and early September, and Bradley tending to go 
more his own way, Eisenhower neither insisted upon nor questioned Bradley's lack of 
success in opening the Quiberon Bay area for CHASTITY, or in capturing Brest, 
despite the priority given to these objectives, both in Montgomery's directives and, as 
he assumed command, in Eisenhower's. With the decreased ability to sustain 
divisions farther from the ports; the desire for momentum to be maintained; the large 
number of self-mobile armored divisions available; and the failure to favor armored 
and some motorized divisions while infantry was left to open the ports centered on 
one consideration alone-Eisenhower's strategy to have a "broad front, " a pre- 
OVERLORD concept of operations whose basic assumptions had been nullified by 
the operational situation in August. 
An additional factor, as dominant as logistics, that affected both the battlefield 
and the overall campaign design was "the air weapon. " While this originally 
comprised the use of the strategic and tactical air forces for the theater, it grew to 
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include the Allied Airborne Army, dominated and designed by airmen. It was intended 
by Arnold and Brereton as the ultimate symbol and "proof' that the air and ground 
were equal portions of any operational situation, portions that could and in the case of 
the Airborne Army, should, be commanded by airmen. 
The philosophy or doctrine of "equality or independence in every situation, " as 
espoused by the airmen, was used by them as a constant source of variance in any 
operation in which air forces' participated. As a result, the control of aircraft prompted 
some of the war's bitterest controversies. While the "Combined Bomber Offensive" 
known as POINTBLANK remained in the hands of the Combined Chiefs of Staff 
through their executive agent, Air Chief Marshal Portal, the ainnen resented and 
resisted any attempt to make their "strategic" weapon a theater commander's weapon. 
The control of the strategic bombers for OVERLORD not only prompted a three- 
month controversy, its acceptance was intertwined by personal ambition and air force 
politics in attempting to destroy the tactical "Air Commander-in-Chief, " Sir Trafford 
Leigh Mallory. It is nearly impossible to escape the conclusion that Leigh Mallory, as 
a former "Army Cooperation Command" commander, was not the "right kind of 
chap" for the disciples of Douhet, Trenchard, and Mitchell. 859 While the RAF had 
successfully killed the Army's requests for its own dedicated aircraft to match the 
Nazis' capability, those such as Tedder saw to it that they would ensure that their 
American Air counterparts, whom he suspected as "Brown Jobs, " understood the 
"" EL, Correspondence, Letter to Portal concerning Leigh Mallory, 22 July 1944. Eisenhower changed his mind about Leigh Mallory and was unsuccessful in keeping him in theater. Tedder and Spaatz 
engineered his departure. 
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doctrine of an Independent Air Force. 860 The "AAF, " accepting a truce in the their 
own quest for independence for the duration of the war, had been given carte blanche 
by US Army Chief of Staff Marshall, but many American airmen remembered their 
roots and were far less prone to turn down pleas for help than their azure-uniformed 
RAF counterparts. 
The basic philosophical difference advanced by the RAF and then published in 
the US Army Air Forces' manual, "Command and Employment of Air Power, " was 
that: 
LAND POWER AND AIR POWER ARE CO-EQUAL AND 
INTERDEPENDENT FORCES; NEITHER IS AN AUXILIARY OF 
THE OTHER. 861 
While no ground soldier would argue that this did not apply to the Strategic 
Air Offensive against Germany, it did not match the reality of the battlefield, nor did it 
offer a synchronized use of air-ground forces unless someone, and some plan, 
dominated the other. In the case of the US Army Air Forces, whose huge size 
permitted large tactical and strategic air forces that did not jeapordize fielding a large 
army, philosophical issues reigned less as large numbers of aircraft were assigned to 
support Bradley's forces. 
For the British Army, whose size had been slashed proportionally from its 
Great War force of 3,759,000 men that included 1.6 million infantrymen and 66 
divisions, to a 2,920,000-man force of only 24 divisions worldwide (with only eight 
860 The United States Army Air Forces, a component of the Army, wore "brown" Army uniforms. See 
Owen, Tedder, passim. 
861 War Department Field Manual FM 100-20, Command and Employment ofAir Power. 21 July 1943, 
1. This entire section is both bold-faced and capitalized in the original, a first in US manuals. 
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divisions in Second Army in September 1944), the issues went beyond the philosophy 
of force employment and doctrine. Royal Air Force strength exceeded 1,000,000 men 
in 1944 and was about 950,000 at war's end, compared to the 291,000 total of 1918. 
Combined with a navy that had also doubled in size from World War I, the manpower 
issue restricted combat options for the British and required the Army to look for 
increased firepower and flexibility from the concerted use of airplanes in a 
harmonized air-ground battle. 862 Despite the fact that the million-man RAF had been 
"bought" with personnel, monies, and technology that would have made the British 
Army a world-class force, the airmen resisted aiding the army at every turn. Tedder 
and Coningham viewed the increased ineffectiveness of their air-ground team 
compared to their American and German counterparts as indicative of British Army 
incompetence, a favorite topic of Coningham in every venue possible. 863 
Eliminating the ability of the Air C-in-C to call on bombers was a success 
claimed by Tedder and Spaatz until Eisenhower, realizing that his ground campaign 
was in dire straits, acceded to ideas proposed by his fallen airman, Leigh Mallory, to 
use bombers in close support. This enraged both Tedder and Coningham, whose own 
personal hatred of Montgomery significantly hampered operations. Coningham had 
told his American understudy, General E. R. "Pete" Quesada, that he made it a firm 
rule never to do anything he was told to do by the army. He didn't expect to see a 
plan, and then be asked how the air would support. He wanted to be present when the 
862 Perry, Commonwealth Armies, 56,74,75; Bidwell and Graham, Fire-Power, 260-275. 
863 Interview with Lt. Gen. Quesada, who told author that Coningham's statements in conferences and 
at every opportunity "to run down the British Army" went beyond vicious, and would have been cause for his immediate relief in the US forces. 
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problem was announced and be part of the basic planning for the operation. He 
strongly recommended that the Americans always do the same. 864 
There was never any doubt, particularly after the German blitz of 1940, that 
the British Army saw a definite role for airpower in the ground battle. In 
Montgomery's view, airpower should first "win the air battle" and then provide 
assistanze as agreed upon to support the ground battle, both in close support and deep 
interdiction operations. Montgomery, in fact, accepted and sought to practice a 
doctrine later accepted by the world's air forces, but which Tedder and Coningham 
had discarded after its success in the desert for a more bureaucratic approach requiring 
multiple levels of approval for target requests, air mission requests, and allocation of 
effort that slowed response time to make the intervention of airpower in an opportune 
fashion almost impossible. 
The Cab-Rank system of on-call aircraft, favored by Broadhurst and the Army, 
was unpopular with Coningham, though adopted with great enthusiasm by the 
Americans, who called it "Column Cover. " 865 The issue, as viewed by the airmen, was 
one of effective use of aircraft, mainly to prevent losses, as opposed to most effective 
use of airpower to influence the ground battle. While the calculus of machine-gunning 
trucks 100 miles behind the front might eventually yield some dimension of battlefield 
effect over time, the vagaries of battle often required immediate intervention to attack 
the enemy reserves and subsequent gun-lines out of the range of artillery, to attack 
enemy reserves as they deployed, to stop movement on the battlefield, or to attack 
864 Interview, Lt. Gen. E. R. Quesada with author, 1984. 
"'; Gooderson, Air Powerat the Battlefront; ETO Air Board, ThirdPhase Airpower, passim. 
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known defensive concentrations. Given the superiority of the German army in armor. 
antitank guns, and their large number of divisions, this added combat power was a 
necessity for an army with inferior tanks and a lack of personnel replacements. To the 
host of fighter-bombers and medium bombers dedicated for 2 Tactical Air Force, 
Leigh Mallory had added heavy bombers as an emergency stopgap. Their use, though 
of mixed results, proved crucial in the July and early August battles in Normandy, and 
was critical in speeding the capture of the Channel ports. The set-piece battles used to 
capture the ports all used extensive bomber programs laid on by Leigh Mallory and 
Harris to support Crerar, whose own assets, particularly in anununition, were of 
necessity limited by Dempsey's operations, which also needed support. 
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As Coningharn failed to achieve Montgomery's relief by claiming the "Army 
plan had failed, " he went after Montgomery's air supporters, both the 2 TAF group 
commanders. He succeeded in relieving the 84 Group Commander, Brown, while 
failing to sack the efficient and popular Broadhurst. 867 Thus, at a time when 
operations became more dynamic, Coningharn sought to go his own way, loudly 
complaining that the ground force's unit boundaries-needed to confine and control 
operations- hampered the air effort, and damning the army for their refusal to have 
ground boundaries conform to his desires for "air sectors. " 868 
One of the tenets that Montgomery had preached had been that air and ground 
headquarters had to be together. Monty had moved his headquarters rearward to match 
866 RAF Narrative, IV, passim; Leigh Mallory Despatch, 100- 109. 
16' NAC, Churchill Mann Papers, "Lecture on Air Support"; Crerar Papers, RG 24, Volume 10636, 
Letter Montgomery to Crerar, 13-9-44. This letter begins, "Dear Harry, Coningham has told the Air 
Ministry that your A. O. C. (Brown) is no good, that you do not like him, and you want him changed. " 
488 
the location behind the lines to which the RAF headquarters had fled during the First 
Alamein battles. In Europe, Monty had considered Leigh Mallory his opposite 
number, and Coningham, who did not leave England until late in the Normandy 
campaign, never moved alongside 21 Army Group. As the campaign developed, 
neither would move rearward or forward to collocate. This further separated the 
concept of a harmonized "air-ground battle, " though Monty had hoped the two group 
commanders, who after all did the targeting and allocation of squadrons, would 
cooperate. They did, earning Coningham's eternal hatred. 
Coningham posed a significantly difficult problem during MARKET 
GARDEN. Here, air coordination reached its nadir. Leigh Mallory, already alerted to 
leave for Southeast Asia as a result of the machinations of Tedder, still should have 
maintained strong control of air operations, as AEAF remained the executive agent for 
coordinating air missions to support airborne operations, though Eisenhower and 
Brereton never permitted him authority to override plans despite promises made to 
that effect in late August during the formation of the airborne army. 869 
Air coordination for MARKET was spotty. While Leigh Mallory received 
cooperation from Spaatz and Vandenburg, 2 TAF failed to send representation to a 
key planning meeting on 15 September, and only six days before, the air commanders 
had decided in conference that AEAF's control of tactical air forces was no longer 
"practicable" from either Stanmore or Granville and that the AEAF should restrict 
itself to strategic operations. On 14 September, the CCS removed control of the 
... MH I, Pogue Papers, Pogue interview with Air Marshal Coningham, 14 February 1947; Coningharn, 
Operations of 2 TAF, 71-73. 
269 See discussion in Chapter Four. 
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strategic bombers from the theater commander, and Tedder, though still considered 
Eisenhower's senior airman, had no brief for the control of boffibers, which now had 
been delegated to the direct control of Spaatz and Harris. 870 Despite Tedder's attitude, 
Harris supported Crerar's Army throughout September, launching large air programs 
to assist the capture of Le Havre, Boulogne, and Calais. 871 
While this perilous attitude of noncooperation pervaded the air commands at 
the beginning of the MARKET GARDEN campaign, the status of the Airborne Army 
further muddled operational effectiveness. The RAF had opposed the formation of 
airborne divisions due to the requirement for transport, tugs, and gliders, but the 
American air chief, Hap Arnold, embraced the idea enthusiastically, creating a huge 
air transport capability. While Eisenhower had sought to centralize the training and 
support of the airborne under a unified command, Brereton, following on Arnold's 
lead, had manipulated the command into an "Airborne Army, " another variant of the 
air weapon that Arnold sought to use to gain Air Force independence and a force that 
he had hoped to absorb into a postwar independent air force. 872 
Brereton's ignorance of the requirements of ground battle, and his reftisal to 
learn, had been amply demonstrated during the frenetic planning of August and early 
September and had resulted in a serious breach in personal and professional respect 
between himself and his Deputy Army Commander, "Boy" Browning. Perhaps it was 
Browning's desire to heal this breach that caused him to be less forthright during the 
planning for MARKET. Certainly Brereton's quick dismissal of Browning's outline 
370 RAF Narrative, IV, pp. 125,148; Pogue, The Supreme Command, 273-275. 
$71 Ibid., RAF Narrative, IV. 
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plan to favor Taylor's demands should have been cause for a deep operational analysis 
of the commander's intent rather than a quick compromise solution affected by 
placing Taylor under 30 Corps for planning. Moreover, the substitution of Williams 
for Hollinghurst, who had been the principal transport commander designate during 
the planning period, substituted a far less bold, doctrinaire commander in place of 
someone who was more willing to assist in the ground battle. The confluence of these 
events added fatal flaws to the MARKET plan. 873 
Likewise, Brereton's attitude toward the British posed a problem in a 
multiservice, multinational operation. While he spoke daily with Smith at SHAEF and 
turned somersaults to please Ike, Spaatz, and Arnold in Washington, he never once 
ventured forward prior to the operation to speak with Montgomery or Dempsey, the 
men whom he would support in most of the plans hatched by First Allied Airborne 
Headquarters. 874 He did visit Bradley on a number of occasions, and spent hours with 
Ridgway attempting to create opportunities for airborne drops that Bradley would 
accept. Parks's Headquarters Diary shows that Brereton spent more time planning for 
his move to Paris, and more time away from the headquarters during the MARKET 
mounting period, than he did considering operational considerations for what would 
be the largest airborne operation in history. With air support allegedly coordinated by 
AEAF and Leigh Mallory, with Williams and Hollinghurst picking drop zones, 
timings, and routes, and with the Army commanders attempting to fit a ground 
scheme of maneuver to match a procrustean bed of aerial delivery requirements, 
872 See Chapter Four. 
'" Davis, Spaatz and the Air War, 219. Williams had been an aggressive Air Command Commander in Tunisia. Spaatz punished his support of the Army by banishing him to transports. 
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Brereton's real influence in shaping MARKET was marginalized, and his actual 
conduct in running it was at times nonexistent. GARDEN and its relationship to 
MARKET's objectives held no interest for him; as "Airborne Army Commander" he 
never even attended the commanders' meeting chaired by Browning on 16 September 
to discuss the ground plan and final requirement for the operation. 
875 
Yet Brereton's role as "Army" commander was predicated on the fact that he, 
as an experienced tactical airman, could combine close air support and ground 
operations, a claim he himself had made strenuously to Eisenhower in July when he 
attempted to create an airborne army within his own Ninth Air Force. This was 
especially crucial considering the inherent weaknesses of the airborne; their lack of 
firepower, heavy weapons, antitank capability, and self-mobility on the ground meant 
that their status as a surprise threat to the enemy could rapidly shift to that of an 
immobile force imperiled. Until ground forces closed with and relieved the airborne, 
the tactical air forces were their only method of combat support, not simply an agency 
for resupply as seen at First Allied Airborne Army. That Brereton was not operating 
closely and personally with both Leigh Mallory and Coningham, in whose sector 
MARKET would occur, demonstrated negligence on his part. That Tedder, 
Eisenhower's "senior air officer" for the theater, was also absent from key conferences 
and did nothing to assure smooth and maximum support for MARKET GARDEN, 
particularly when weather snags and communications difficulties plagued the entire 
814 He did visit Dempsey after the operation began. 
' -5 '* Brereton's ignorance of Army operations was a matter of attitude, not training. He had graduated 
from the Army Command and General Staff School and had served there as an instructor. In World 
War 1, he commanded an observation squadron supporting the Army and had been General William 
"Billy" Mitchell's G-3 during the Meuse-Argonne offensive. 
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nine days of operations, demonstrates his true "worth" as Deputy Supreme 
Commander. 
While biographers and this author have attempted to provide some insight into 
the personalities involved, it should be remembered that senior corrunanders are 
genuinely strong personalities, and reach the top of their profession by performance. 
not personality. The chemistry of Eisenhower's conunand had been forced by the 
variabl. -s of the coalition, with multiple services nominating individuals and countries 
accepting "champions" who, in the circumstances, often seemed ill-suited to the 
problems of coalition cooperation. For Northwest Europe, however, the great 
influence was the campaign plan. Once initiated, it locked services and personalities 
into a course of action which, while seemingly uncoordinated or often diverged from, 
kept a general line of operations, however inefficient, until the situation required a 
major course change. 
Neither Eisenhower nor Montgomery selected Normandy, and though both 
men can claim authorship of parts of the NEPTUNE plan, the first "original plan" in 
either man's term of command was the post-OVERLORD campaign that began in late 
August when the lodgement area had been filled out. Two components dominated 
both men's thinking; it was their diverging priorities over these issues that sparked 
debate over the campaign plan and the subsequent conduct of the war. 
The first component was the ground, seen from both operational and strategic 
perspectives. Both men recognized the role of avenues of approach and the value of 
what Jornini had described as "strategic coup d'oeil. " While any serious student of 
Europe's military geography would have immediately seen the value of the northern 
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approach, only those thiriking in terms of past, horsed armies would have accepted the 
southern gateway through Metz as a viable alternative. That SHAEFS planners 
stretched their estimate, and downplayed the value of a campaign within Germany, 
had to have been politically inspired, not merely based on a military estimate. 
Moreover, two significant differences existed in Montgomery's and Eisenhower's 
thinking. Montgomery correctly ascribed his northern concentration as a "Schlieffen 
Plan in reverse, " a complete one-movement operation designed to carry until victory, 
whereas Eisenhower had assumed his operation would pause, possibly for a month or 
two. Montgomery's strategy was totally offensive and reliant upon concentration of 
forces, supplies, and effort, with forces that were unsupportable falling into flank 
guard or reserve status. Eisenhower's idea of stretching the enemy assumed that the 
Allies would not have the initiative, nor would they achieve a superiority of forces at 
the critical point, instead providing a defensive stance as they moved and fighting the 
enemy on near-even terms. Montgomery's plan was for a death blow; Eisenhower's 
was an attrition strategy designed to kill the German army one unit at a time. 
Montgomery believed in operational concentnation, as did the Red Army, the 
German Army, indeed every major Western military force of the time; only the 
Americans eschewed it at the operational level. Eisenhower's strategy was, at face 
value, designed to split the Allies into the "Channels" that he described in his 
appreciation on Supreme Command, but it ignored the great fact that the second 
smallest army group was on the key avenue of approach and had, with the Channel 
Coast, the largest open flank to clear. Tom by the politics of keeping Marshall, 
Stimson, and Bradley happy, Eisenhower had to react to the fact that the key 
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objectives-the Channel ports, Antwerp, and the Ruhr-were in Montgomery's 
sector. The mythology that Americans do not serve under foreigners, played up by 
Patton and Bradley, was constantly used at his back to force bad military decisions. 
976 
Instead of a good campaign somewhere, he had two bad campaigns, precisely as 
Montgomery charged in his postwar comments, a fact that transpired with the failure 
of MARKET GARDEN, the stalemate in the Aachen Corridor, and the bitter fall 
campaign in Metz and Lorraine. 
At the operational level, the most essential element after concentration that had 
characterized Montgomery's campaigns since Alarn Halfa in 1942 was careful and 
thoughtful planning. British respect for "battle procedure, 'ý--the necessary planning, 
organization, reconnaissance and staging of men, equipment, ammunition, and the 
detailed briefing and rehearsal that preceded battle-had caused Monty to be called 
"cautious" by his enemies, but had been instrumental in diminishing casualties as well 
as maximizing the possibility for success. It also had encouraged the use of "limited 
objectives" to minimize risk, a less fluid approach that unfortunately favored an 
enemy keen at rapid shifting of reserves and the seizure of local opportunities. Late 
August 1944 had shown that British forces, mainly 30 Corps, could pursue and harry 
an enemy well as their American cousins. 
MARKET GARDEN, however, was a significant departure from the form 
previously seen by Second Army. NEPTUNE had permitted four months of detailed 
8'6 During World War 1, the US If Corps was formed and never served a day under US command. It 
served under British command. Separate divisions also served with the French until a large enough 
force to constitute an American army was formed. As if to follow their unwanted heritage, If Corps 
served in the British First Army in Tunisia under Frcdcndall, and then in Alexander's 18" Army 
Group, under Patton, and then Bradley. 
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planning and rehearsal, its airborne portion had been under study from the beginning 
of the COSSAC period, though Gale's division was not formally given orders until 
February 1944. The crucial coup de main at the Orne River (Pegasus) bridge had 
benefited from months of planning, training, and rehearsal, and the actual objective 
was known to the commander more than a month before D-Day. MARKET had 
benefited from the practice and planning of a number of operations, and Second Army 
and 30 Corps had been in constant combat since June and were well practiced at 
cobbling together operations, sometimes under fire. MARKET GARDEN, therefore, 
was not the product of inexperience, though First Allied Airborne Army, I Airborne 
Corps and I Airborne Division had yet to be tested under fire in 1944. Given the time 
from COMET's alert, 1 Airborne had 13 days of preparation and the two American 
divisions, seven. 
Montgomery's orders, as always, had been verbal. Dempsey and Browning had 
spoken to the Army Group commander, and were certain of his intentions and 
conversant with the "assumptions" that underlay his plan. It was their job to assure 
that their detailed plans accomplished his intention, and if the assumptions that 
underlay the plan had changed such that mission accomplishment was jeopardized, 
that they adapt their plans for success or cancel them and request new orders. 
COMET had implied several basic assumptions reflecting the enemy situation 
as it was understood on 3 September: that the enemy would not be able to form a 
coherent front and strong defensive blocks en route to the Rhine bridges, that 30 
Corps would be able to rush the small bridges ranging from Eindhoven to Veghel, and 
that the airborne would seize the large and irreplaceable bridges at Grave, Nijmegen, 
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and Arnhem in coup-de-main operations rapidly reinforced by brigade-sized elements. 
The plan itself accommodated these assumptions. By beginning at Eindhoven, the 
quick linkup needed to reach the first bridge would be a dash of roughly 30 miles 
through "negligible resistance, " a feat that had been done recently by the Household 
Cavalry and all the fighting elements of the Guards Armoured Division. Flak. it was 
felt, would be negligible in the target areas; weather would be sufficient for close air 
support and the delivery of four lifts in two days; and within several days, the air- 
portable 52d (Lowland) division would be flown in to Deelen airfield, north of 
Amhem. 
877 
Stiffening resistance south of Eindhoven, the spectre of tens of thousands of 
escaping Germans moving north of the Scheldt, and hence available for counterattack 
north of the Neder Rijn, and the increased danger from V-missile sites to the United 
Kingdom, caused a major restructuring of COMET. The new plan substituted new 
assumptions: that increased force would push through or break the enemy "crust" 
forming, and that it would be able to provide adequate flank protection. The increased 
airborne strength would permit a virtual "passage" of the attacking force for most of 
the depth of the attack and would permit control of divisional sectors and the vital 
ground along the route; surprise parachute drops or glider assaults next to the key 
bridges would permit the surprise capture of and total control over every bridged 
water course in the division sector; and the last major bridge along the route would be 
reached in two to five days. Enemy reserves, absent the far objective area, would not 
arrive prior to the ground elements of 30 Corps. 
$77 A detailed discussion of the air and ground plan for COMET is in Chapter Eight. 
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The new plan, as approved, was supposed to reflect these assumptions. The 
new tasks, as approved by Dempsey and as outlined for MARKET, accommodated 
these. Thus, in Browning's briefing, MARKET, the airborne phase, would be 
increased by adding two additional airborne divisions, and what had been seen as a 
30-mile rush to link up would be replaced by a seven-mile-deep attack with heavy 
artillery and air support. The ground attack would be three divisions wide, with a full 
corps in column. The "linking force" among the assaulting airborne divisions would 
be passed over roads controlled by the airborne for 46 miles of the route. Most 
important, the airborne lift would take place in double lifts per day over two days, 
surprise at the bridges would be by coup de main, and weather and flak would not 
pose problems. In addition to tactical surprise, both COMET and MARKET 
GARDEN assumed not simply air superiority, but that the US First Army's thrust to 
Cologne and Bonn would have drawn enemy reserves, most particularly the armored 
reserves known to be south of Aachen. 
Most significant in both cases, it was assumed that the operation could be 
executed in a short amount of time-36-48 hours after adoption of COMET and 
within 48-120 hours of adoption of MARKET-to preclude substantial enemy 
reinforcement. Also implied was the assumption that significant enemy reserves 
would not be positioned in depth throughout the route, or near the major bridges. 
Montgomery was said to have first seen the final plan on 15 September. If this 
is true, he would have discovered two key items were missing from his "intentions" as 
described to Dempsey: that the coup-de-main missions for the large bridges had been 
abandoned in each division area; that the "stair carpets" that would provide 30 Corps a 
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quick passage over most of the route had been abandoned south of Zon, in the area 
where enemy reserves for the crust would be most likely to be located, and that the 
corridor through the island would have its bridges open for enemy movement until 
both the Nijmegen and Arnhem bridges were captured. While the three-division-wide 
attack was still scheduled, it began to look as if logistics might force it to be 
staggered, with 8 Corps being the last to put in their attack. Moreover, the increasing 
flak rings around the target areas would require a daylight preparation, putting back 
the time of the drop and hence cutting the available daylight for 30 Corps' drive, 
which would be a daylight-only attack. Moreover, with one lift per day, and not two as 
in COMET, the full airborne force would not be in their areas until D+3. From an 
operational perspective, the flank support by the First US Army grew more tenuous 
daily in the Aachen-Stolberg corridors, and few enemy reserves were being drawn off 
from Holland. 
Given the change in both the plan and its acceptable assumptions, did 
intelligence justify its execution? While much has been said about ULTRA's 
warnings, the Dutch Resistance, and aerial photography, what exactly did 
Montgomery know on the eve of battle? After the war, his intelligence officer stated 
after the war the key to this dilemma in an interview. The historian's notes are 
reproduced below: 
We knew that the 10 SS Pz was in the rest area around Arnhem. But 
we knew their state had been bad. Didn't know how much they picked 
up. They had crawled across the Seine. We didn't know they had 
recuperated. SHAEF, V Army and [he] thinks that 30 Corps knew (30 
Corps not on ULTRA, but thinks that the stuff was given to Bill 
Knowland anyway). However, the commander was not indoctrinated 
so he didn't know. Tony Tasker [FAAA] sent me a chaser saying he 
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had told A/B commander he didn't think 10 SS was there. My personal 
error was not in identification, but one of strength. 878 
In correspondence with Pogue, Williams added scattered comments on the 
draft of The Supreme Command, noting cryptically: 
We agreed 9 and 10 SS were there and Airborne Army knew (I asked 
Tony Tasker their G-2). What we didn't know was to what extent they 
had been replenished with tanks since crossing the Seine. 
He noted further in the document, 
The strength, not the presence of H SS PZ K[orps] was the nasty 
surprise. 879 
Concerning Montgomery's use of G-2 estimates, Williams said: 
G2 estimates were not things M[onty] relied on, but rather oral 
testimony and the occasional special paper one wrote for his personal 
eye. I shouldn't think he read my Intelligence Reviews, for he had them 
summed up to him either by Joe Ewart (my representative at Tac. Hq. ) 
or myself 880 
Given that it is probable that only the G-2 at Monty's tactical headquarters 
would have briefed Montgomery, would he have stressed the possible location of 
"shelle' or building divisions? Moreover, would Dutch information been passed to 
Montgomery? Monty appeared to have no love for the Dutch, or for Prince Bernhard 
(who was German), but would Williams have passed raw data from the resistance? 
"s MHI, Pogue Papers, Brig. E. T. Williams interview with Forrest C. Pogue, May 30-31,1947,7. 
Note that Williams mentions ULTRA, which Pogue was not cleared to know about. 
87' NARA, RG 319. Supreme Command, Letter Williams to Pogue, 12-viii-51 [background papers of 
official historian]. 
"0 Ibid.; Letter Williams to Pogue, 10-viii-51. Of some note is that Strong, who allegedly warned about 
Arnhem, says nothing in correspondence to Pogue but is persistent in trying to establish that he had 
warned Bradley concerning the surprise attack in Ardennes. Moreover, Pogue is not much interested in intelligence -failure" at Arnhem, but is persistent in asking many questions about Strong's "warning" 
about Ardennes. 
Soo 
The official historian of the S. O. E. (Special Operations. Executive) suggests 
that any information would have held little credibility. Earlier in the war, the Germans 
had penetrated the Dutch Resistance turning a number of agents and wiping out 
S. O. E. teams that were dropped. The operations was called "North Pole. " The official 
historian states: 
Chickens hatched during 'North Pole' came home to roost during 
'Market Garden. ' Such news about secret service affairs as filtered 
through to allied airborne forces' intelligence staff indicated that Dutch 
resistance had been penetrated by the enemy to a hopeless degree; so 
that any approach by men claiming to be Dutch resisters was liable to 
be treated with reserve, even suspicion. It was the task of the 
'Jedburgh' teams to dispel suspicion and replace it with confidence-if 
they could. 881 
Certainly, no evidence of photo intelligence was passed higher to 21 Army 
Group by Browning's headquarters, and the fact remains that deep in the rear, some 
vehicles would have been expected to be found, and those seen by Urquhart were 
most probably half-tracks of Harzer's Group, not tanks, which did not appear for 
several days into the battle. 
Besides a level of sophistication that failed to account for combat elements 
other than tanks, intelligence especially failed in two key elements of information: 
strengths and dispositions. None of these were offered. Montgomery summed his own 
beliefs: 
The 2 nd S. S. Panzer Corps was refitting in the Arnhem area, having 
limped there. But we were wrong in supposing it could not fight 
88' M. R. D. Foot, SOE in the Low Countries (London: St. Ermin's Press, 2001), 391-392. The 
"Jedburgh" teams were deployed during MARKET; there were none in Holland to report prior to the 
operation. 
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effectively; its battle state was far beyond our expectation. It was 
quickly brought into action against the V Airborne Division. 882 
Given the imponderables, was the risk justified considering the information at 
hand? Montgomery had made similar risks both with I Airborne in Sicily and with the 
entire airborne effort in Normandy. It was known that the 91 " Airlanding Division had 
moved into the Cotentin on top of 82d Airborne Division's drop zones, and he 
supported the drop slightly to the east on D-Day's eve. Moreover, with knowledge that 
21 Panzer Division was within rapid motor-march distance of 6 Airborne's drop zones 
in Normandy, he likewise authorized their drop and later planned to drop I Airborne 
during WILD OATS in a more risky scheme that was overruled by Leigh Mallory. 
More telling perhaps than his assessment of enemy strength possibilities is 
Montgomery's postmortem on the airborne plan. 
The airborne forces at Arnhem were dropped too far away from the 
vital objective-the bridge. It was some hours before they reached it. I 
take blame for this mistake. I should have ordered Second Army and I 
Airborne Corps to arrange that at least one complete Parachute Brigade 
was dropped quite close to the bridge, so that it could have been 
captured in a few minutes and its defence soundly organised with time 
to do so. I did not do so. 883 
Accepting that units were reforming in the battle area, with no strengths, 
organizational information, or dispositions perhaps justified taking a risk, but 
accepting the "no coup-de-main" plan demanded by the RAF and IX Troop Carrier 
and, in particular, Taylor's compact drop that eliminated the first "carpet" and bridge, 
increased the "risk" to the status of a "gamble. " 
882 Montgomery, kfemoirs. 266. 
883 Ibid. 
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Certainly, the "drop zone geometry! --where the airborne landed-redefined 
the essence of the plan. In every case, the primary gift of an airborne operation- 
surprise-was lost due to the failure to land near or on objectives regardless of cost. 
Refusing to pay the price up front, the airborne paid a larger price later as the odds 
were turned against them by quick-reacting defenders, by weather that crippled both 
their reinforcement and air support, and by the fact that Club Route became a battle 
zone, not a short battle and a rapid exploitation mute as conceptualized by 
Montgomery and Dempsey. 
A German analysis, captured and quickly distributed among MARKET's 
numerous internal lessons sponsored by the various headquarters, noted the following: 
The enemy's chief mistake was not to have landed the entire First 
Airborne Division at once rather than over a period of 3 days and that a 
second airborne division was not dropped in the area west of 
Arnhem. 884 
The airmen themselves showed far less daring and even less imagination. 
Brereton and Williams should have been aware that the introduction of napalm, 
already used in some quantities in theater, would have been an ideal area "clearance" 
weapon and that parties of paratroops or the original glider parties should have been 
used to seize the bridge and freeze the combat area following such an attack. The fact 
that the airmen refused to countenance this showed their lack of understanding for, 
and concern about, the ground battle. 885 While Montgomery might be damned as a 
gambler, they proved unimaginative and more deadly to the plan. Nor was there much 
884 NARA, R0331, IAAA, Gcnnan Analysis of ARNHEM, 18 December 1944. 
88'ETO Air Board, Effectiveness of Third Phase TacticalAir Operations, 138-156,314-319; NARA, 
RG 18,373.2b Support of Ground Operations, Headquarters, USSTAF, I ODcccmber 1944, Eighth Air 
Force, Special Report of Operations in Support of First Allied Airborne Army Operations. 
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initiative shown as the battle failed. One wonders why bombers were not used !o 
carpet-bomb the area immediately to the east of the Elst block. Leigh Mallory, already 
skewered by Tedder and Spaatz, might have proposed this, but both the tactical air 
forces and the strategic bombers were out of his hands. Tedder, the self-appointed Air 
Supremo, might have acted, but he was nowhere near the combat area. Concerning the 
tactical planning of air operations, Broadhurst commented: 
In the Normandy campaign, this was normally [done at] the 
Army/Tactical Group H. Q., although for small specialist operations it 
was often delegated to Corps H. Q. when a small team from the main 
H. Q. would be designated to sit in for the planning. Why Arnhem was 
treated so differently has never been exposed, but I imagine there were 
very strong political reasons for the decision. 886 
Broadhurst's fiustration went beyond poor planning coordination. He related 
to the author, 
I also received this signal [relating to presence of Panzers near Arnhem 
at beginning of operation]. I immediately got on to my superior 
[Coningham, 2 TAF] headquarters asking permission to attack the 
Panzers with my rocket-firing Typhoons as they advanced toward 
Arnhem. I was virtually told to mind my own business and keep out of 
the area as the operation was being handled from England, and if Lhey 
required assistance Lhey would ask for it! 887 
Broadhurst's comments extend further, to the realm of basic communications 
capabilities: 
I was completely flabbergasted at the time to find that an operation of 
that magnitude was laid on without any proper communications 888 between the Airborne drop and the local Amy/Air Headquarters. 
886 CAB 101/332, Harry Broadhurst Notes for Sir Ralph Cochrane, ibid., 6. 
887 Letter, Broadhurst to the author, 28 March 1991. 
$88 Letter, Broadhurst to the author, 23 June 1991. 
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Brereton, declared the operation an "outstanding success, " citing the large 
delivery figures and the low loss rates of aircraft and pilots. The ground battle, of 
course, was lost by Second Anny's failure to expeditiously link up with I Airborne, a 
fact that he never considered as part of the drop plan itself. Complaining to Arnold, he 
made the following comments: 
J would like to present a few of the conditions which must be fulfilled 
to increase the chances of success of a large airborne operation. The 
first ... "don't send a 
boy to do a man's job, " "concentrate the 
maximum force on the principal objective. " This sounds trite, but the 
ground force planners persist in presenting a multiple of objectives. An 
all-out effort with everything that can fly must take advantage of the 
initial surprise by dropping the maximum of supplies and 
reinforcements before the enemy can muster his air, flak, and ground 
defenses. All troop drops and landings from the outset must be in 
combat teams, no matter how small the combat team is. 
889 
Amold, fi=Uy, thought that Brereton's Airbome Army had missed the major 
point of their existence: 
From the limited data available here, I would offer one conclusion on 
your initial operation which may bear on future plans. It appears that 
the success of the Air Commando operations in Burma and to some 
extent, the inability of your British First Airborne Division to achieve 
its objective, indicate that the key to success of large-scale airborne 
operations lies in the seizing of airfields or landing strips in the initial 
phases of such an operation. From this distant viewpoint, and at this 
time, I feel quite strongly that future airborne operations must be 
focussed about airbases if the air transported force is to remain active 
and effective. It seems clear that an airborne force cannot rely 
completely on the advance of any Ground Force. 890 
Horrocks; and Browning have been damned for mistakes, but it is hard to fault 
either for decisions made with little information. Nor was Browning's insistence on 
$89 LC, Papers ofHenry H. Arnold, Narrative of Operation Market, Dec 1944,4,6. Interestingly, it was 
Brereton who complained about the multiple combat teams for the Browning-planned 10 1' drop that 
would have placed the units on their objectives. 
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clearing the Groesbeek area and holding it incorrect. It saved the 82d and Club Route 
during the counterattacks and, given the rumors of tanks in Cleves, was probably a 
correct action. Browning's acceptance of the cancellation of the coup-de-main 
missions in the American sector may have been due to Taylor's protests and 
Brereton's failure to support him. He was not going to specify such tactics to the 
Americans. The 82d's commander was adamant in his claim that his men could have 
taken the Nijmegen bridge if permitted. This is a claim I do not accept. His force was 
too small to take the town from the south and still accomplish all his objectives. A 
battalion-sized drop north of the bridge might have worked, but a battalion was too 
small a force to take the town and the bridge from the south. More than size, it was a 
factor of timing. The 82d having failed to take the bridge at the outset, the very troops 
and vehicles that opposed the Allied assault on the twin bridges had been permitted to 
cross and fortify the town. The failure to pass the Guards Armoured expeditiously on 
19 September, along with the failure to block both bridges from southern movement 
by the 10 SS in the first hours of the operation, doomed the I Airborne. Adair's 
statement concerning this is fair: 
My orders had said that the Nijmegen bridge would be in airborne 
hands by the time we reached it, and we would simply sweep on 891 
through . 
While the airborne criticized 30 Corps, its commander noted for the official 
historian his own views: 
I cannot see what I as a Corps Commander could have done more in 
order to speed up the advance. This criticism suggests that I sat all day 
890 NARA, RG 18,312.1-k Operations Letters, entry 294, Letter Arnold to Brereton, October 13,1944. 
891 Adair, A Guards'General, 164. 
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in my Headquarters, when in point of fact I was out with the leading 
troops all day and every day, so I don't think you are being fair when 
you say this, but I blame myself very much for the mistake in tactics-I 
should have carried out a wide outflanking movement. Even so, 43 
Division did not do so badly.... 
We might have been able to relieve the V Airborne more quickly. 
but if we had reached the final objective allotted to us, the result might 
well have been disastrous, because we should not have been able to 
keep open our narrow L. of C. 892 
13rowning's views concerning the Coup de main originally planned for 
COMET but not used in MARKET, were these: 
The chief reason why coup de main were not put in was because it was 
daylight. Coup de main by nightý if carefully planned, did not give 
away the impending but major operation, whilst in daylight coup de 
main would almost certainly done so. 893 
He also expanded on this theme: 
The airborne objectives lay more or less in a strong belt of the flak 
defences of the Ruhr and the thickest part of this flak was at Arnhem 
and Nijmegen. 
The fighter cover available was sufficient to protect the fly in of the 
forces on the lines chosen, which would avoid flak as much as 
possible; but not sufficient for subsidiary lines for coup de main in 
addition. 
Normal sized coup de main parties would not have been strong enough 
to seize and hold the major bridges. 894 
While Montgomery and Horrocks are most connected with MARKET 
GARDEN's failure in some eyes, Dempsey's own comments to the official historian 
are telling: 
892 CAB 1011332, Letter B. G. Horrocks to L. F. Ellis, 20 May 1966. 
$13 CAB 106/1133, Letter F. A. M. Browning, 12 October 1954. 
894 CAB 106/1133, Letter F. A. M. Browning, 27 September 1954. 
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The plan was mine. It was not perfect-few plans are-and in several 
ways a calculated- risk was taken. We secured a good bridge-head at 
Nijmegen, and we failed to get the final objective, which was a good 
bridge-head at Arnhem.... The cutting of the road did have quite an 
effect on the development of our operations, and was a very good move 
by the Germans. 895 
MARKET GARDEN, while one of the most dramatic battles of the war, 
reflected the problems of conducting battle within a coalition. While Dempsey had 
made a 60-mile thrust into enemy territory, the operation failed either to gain the 
bridgehead desired, or to change Eisenhower's mind concerning concentrating on one 
main avenue. While MARKET GARDEN offered no proof that the war could have 
been won in 1944, it did underscore that the time to concentrate had long since 
passed, and that Eisenhower's decision, regardless of how he wavered in September, 
had been irrevocable. The plan for a concentrated thrust on the main avenue of 
approach, when offered in August, had already reached its "now or never" stage, and 
Eisenhower having failed to accept one avenue, the Broad Front became reality. 
Eisenhower had converted an operational opportunity into a tactical solution that 
failed. The Northwest Europe campaign would be an attrition campaign and it would 
be prolonged. Montgomery and Eisenhower would never agree on this decision, nor, 
in old age, even treat the issue rationally. The failure to accept his plan, Montgomery 
felt, had permitted the Germans to reform, rebuild, and launch the Ardennes offensive, 
and to eventually prolong the war at the cost of countless thousands of lives. While 
reaching Berlin was probably not possible, taking the Ruhr most certainly was, and I 
agree with Montgomery that Eisenhower's failure to try was a costly mistake. 
CAB 101/332, Letter M. C. Dempsey to L. F. Ellis, 18 June 1962. 
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Montgomery had described the events as he saw them, in the Wellington 
Memorial Lecture given to celebrate the 2001h Anniversary of the birth of the first 
Duke of Wellington. During this lecture he said: 
There are three types of commanders in the higher grades: 
I. Those who have faith and inspiration, but who lack the capacity for 
taking pains and preparing for every forsecable contingency which 
is the foundation of all success in war. These fail. 
2. Those who possess the last named quality to a degree amounting to 
genius. Of this type I would name Wellington as the perfect 
example. 
3. Those who possessing this quality, are inspired by a faith and 
conviction which enables them, when they have done everything 
possible in the way of preparation, and when the situation favours 
boldness, to throw their bonnet over the moon. There are moments 
in war when to win all, one has to do this. 
I believe such a moment occurred in August 1944 after the battle of 
Normandy had been won, and it was missed. 896 
Montgomery, as an operational commander, may have had a more clever plan, 
faith, inspiration and, indeed, conviction, but Eisenhower, as the Supreme 
Commander, possessed the only bonnet that could have flown over the moon. 
896 Field Marshal the Viscount Montgomery of Alamein, Wellington Memorial Lecture, Journal of the 
Royal United Services Institution, Vol. CXIV, No. 656,13. 
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Figure 12 (referenced in Chapter 2) 
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Figure 22 (referenced in Chapter 3) 
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Figure 23 (referenced in Chapter 3) 
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Figure 24 (refere nced in Chapter 3) 
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Figure 25 (referenced in Chapter 3) 
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Figure 26 (referenced in Chapters 3 and 7) 
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Figure 27 (referenced in Chapter 4) 
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Figure 28 (referenced in Chapters 5 and 6) 
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Figure 29 (referenced in Chapters 5,6 and 7) 
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Figure 30 (referenced in Chapter 6) 
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Figure 32 (referenced in Chapter 7) 
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Figure 33 (referenced in Chapter 7) 
ESTIMATED DISPOSITION OF ENEMY 
FORCES AS AT 1800hrs 29 AUG 44 
is 0 is so 
75 Km APPENDIX*H' 
MILES LoCHAFTER M 
UNLOCATED 
84 CORPS 58 Pz CORPS 
47 Pz CORPS 74 CORPS 
81 CORPS 2 PARA CORPS 
3 PARA DIV 352 DIV 
N 
SEVEM ARMY 
84 85 89 
271 272 275 
277 344 346 
363 708 116Pz 
347 
AM 
a ff CORPS 
2 ff 
FIFTH Pz ARMY 9 ff 10 ff 
21 Pz 12k_e ANTWERP 
7 70 
HE NY 
114 CORPS 182 
BRUSSELS G. 
12 f0 
6 PA RA LILLE 
49 INF 
18 GAF 
348 
67 CORPS AMIEN -oil 
45 
"00 275 "ýS 8 Ll 14AVRE 49 so to 17 10 Ulm 
SEA AV' 
I So 
RHEIMS 
7 OV38 9 86 COR 48 Pz t 
711 
331 
17GA PAR S 
GI 
599 
Figure 34 (referenced in Chapter 7) 
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Figure 35 (referenced in Chapter 7) 
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Figure 36 (referenced in Chapter 7) 
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Figure 38 (referenced in Chapter 8) 
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Figure 39 (rcfCrcnccd In Chaptcr 8) 
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Figure 40 (referenced in Chapter 8) 
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Figure 41 (referenced in Chapter 8) 
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Figure 42 (referenced in Chapter 8) 
lqct 
xt 
"j 
C: 1 
ED 
s ei 
(n %# Olb Z; gib % 1 
0 
%0- 
00 -ip % 
LU 
CO ttL 31 
. ezt Co ob 0. 
LU 
Nt. 
A 
cy 
CL Mab ei 
ul ob 25 Aý 0w 
e Co Z 
Ln Z 
0 
8.202z 
-%" W CL L8A ui 0 in 1- z 
iii -.. 4-- i .. Z tu r2 (D --vý , - F- 
.. i gFi 
ihr) fy 
- 
% 
331 
617 
"C 
1 
rý 
1: ) 
F, 
IC 
Figure 44 (referenced in Chapter 9) 
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Figure 45 (referenced in Chapter 9) 
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Figure 46 (referenced in Chapter 9) 
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Figure 48 (referenced in Chapter 9) 
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Figure 49 (referenced in Chapter 9) 
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Figure 50 (referenced in Chapter 9) 
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Figure 51 (referenced in Chapter 9) 
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Figure 52 (referenced in Chapter 9) 
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Figure 53 (referenced in Chapter 9) 
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Figure 54 (referenced in Chapter 9) 
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Figure 55 (referenced in Chapter 9) 
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Figure 56 (referenced in Chapter 9) 
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Figure 59 (referenced in Chapter 9) 
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Figure 60 (referenced in Chapter 9) 
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Figure 61 (referenced in Chapter 9) 
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Figure 62 (referenced in Chapter 9) 
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Figure 63 (referenced in Chapter 9) 
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Figure 64 (referenced in Chapter 9) 
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Figure 65 (referenced in Chapter 10) 
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